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INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Left to right: 
A Naik of A Sapper of A Sapper of 
The Madras Group The Bengal Group The Bombay Group 


THE 
INDIAN ENGINEERS 
1939-47 





BY 


LIEUT.-COLONEL E. W. C. SANDES, 
D.S.0., M.C., RE. (Ret.) 


LATB PRINCIPAL, THOMASON CIVIL ENGINEERING COLLEGE, ROORKEE, INDIA, 


AND AUTHOR OF 


“IN KUT AND CAPTIVITY”, “TALES OF TURKEY”, “THE MILITARY ENGINEER 
IN INDIA”, VOLS I AND II, “THE ROYAL ENGINEERS IN EGYPT AND 
THE SUDAN”, “THE INDIAN SAPPERS AND MINERS” AND 
“FROM PYRAMID TO PAGODA (HISTORY OF THE WEST 
YORKSHIRE REGIMENT )”. 


1956 
eee 


THE INSTITUTION OF MILITARY ENGINEERS 
KIRKEE (INDIA ) 


FIRST PUBLISHED .. .. .. 1956 


V26265 


L-S-86 
evi. Bb 


All rights reserved 


a sat gee ; 
Set in 10 Pt Monotype Times Wide and printed and published for the 
Institution of Military Engineers by Major K. O. Stiffie, 
Engineers, at the College Press of the College 
of Military Engineering, Kirkee, India. 


TO 


THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


WHO DIED FOR FREEDOM 


IN 


THE SECOND WORLD WAR 


FOREWORD 


By Lieut.-General Sir Harotp WILLIAMS, K.B.E., C.B., late 
Engineer-in-Chief, India, and Colonel Commandant, Corps of 
Engineers, India. 


HIS history of the Indian Engineers covers the period from the 
i bores of the Second World War in 1939 to Independence 
Day in 1947, an era fraught with great changes everywhere. 
At the outset, the Army in India was unprepared for war. Its Divisions 
existed largely on paper and it had no plans for Corps or Armies. Its 
administrative services were elementary, its fire power was meagre 
and its transport mainly animal; and although it was one of the 
largest voluntary armies in the world, well-trained and finely dis- 
ciplined, it was ill-organized and ill-equipped for modern warfare. 
But when the war ended, it had fought with great distinction in 
Africa, Europe and Asia, using every known weapon and type of 
equipment. It had played a decisive part in the defeat of Germany, 
Italy and Japan. Its officers and men had shown themselves un- 
daunted in adversity and courageous and magnanimous in success. 
In 1939 the Indian Engineers formed but a small proportion of 
the Army in India. They comprised a handful of field units with 
their headquarters at Bangalore, Roorkee and Kirkee. They had 
no transportation or survey units and practically no L of C units. 
They had little or no bridging equipment, no mines or mine detectors 
and, with the exception of a few bulldozers and compressors, very 
little mechanical equipment. Indeed, so urgently were they in need 
of re-equipping that the Chatfield Committee which met in 1938-39 
considered the possibility of making funds available for this purpose 
by reducing them to one Group with its headquarters at Mathura. 
Finally, the Committee recommended a reduction to two Groups; 
but fortunately this was not done because, only a few years later, 
the three existing Groups had to be reinforced by the formation of 
three more Groups at Lahore and others at Jullundur, Sialkot and 
Deolali, and all these Groups were soon fully occupied in recruiting 
and training personnel for Engineer units of every type in the field. 
Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes’ book describes the work of the 
Indian Engineers during the period covered. His selection as author 


Vii 


viii FOREWORD 


was amply justified for, in addition to other military histories, he 
had already written the histories of the Military Engineers of India 
from the earliest times and of the Indian Sappers and Miners up to 
1939, and had carried out much research into the record of the 
Second World War when writing the history of The West Yorkshire 
Regiment. His task was not an easy one. Entries in War Diaries 
are not always as informative as the historian would like, and for 
security reasons officers no longer write personal diaries on active 
service. In the rush and hurry of post-war reconstruction few 
officers had time to record their experiences, and accordingly the 
material available to Lieut.-Colonel Sandes was disappointingly 
limited. Nevertheless, the number and variety of the references in the 
text show that he has left no source of information untapped. His 
book gives not only an accurate chronicle of the course of events 
but also some account of those who played a part in them and of 
the atmosphere in which they trained and fought. 

Future generations of engineers seeking to know how these large 
formations of engineer troops were raised and trained in so short a 
time, and how they confronted the tasks which they were called 
upon to perform, will find the answers interestingly and vividly 
recorded in these pages. They will learn with pride of the ready 
acceptance of responsibility and the undaunted resolution of those 
who trained and led these units, and of the fine courage, imperturb- 
able cheerfulness and unquestioning loyalty of the men. They will 
read with professional pride of the great resources in engineer 
personnel, machines and material which were organized and controlled, 
and of the wide range of technical difficulties successfully overcome. 
They will find here grounds for confidence that if they maintain 
and enhance the traditions they have inherited they need not fear 
comparison with the military engineers of any other nation. 

Throughout the Second World War, British, Indian and Pakistani 
engineers served together in the same units and formations until they 
separated on Independence Day to serve their own free and inde- 
pendent countries. The author rightly takes the partnership for 
granted, for, strange as it may seem to future generations, the 
partnership was widespread and genuine. Officers and men were 
proud of their Corps because there existed between them a bond 
of affection and the comradeship of arms. Each respected the 
traditions of the other; each held the other in esteem. Many longed 
for Independence, but the partnership which had developed over 


FOREWORD ix 


many years held firm under the strenuous and searching test of 
war and was dissolved only when political considerations made a 
breach inevitable. 

The joint endeavours of the last years of this partnership are 
here faithfully recorded, and it is fortunate that this has been done 
by so competent and experienced an historian. It is a record of 
which all who were privileged to share in the partnership may justly 
be proud; a record of boldly conceived plans, of tactical and tech- 
nical brilliance, of boundless energy in execution and patient endur- 
ance under difficulties, of military engineering on a vast scale, of 
personal courage and of ungrudging service. 


Roorkee, 
August 19th, 1956. 


PREFACE 


VERY military historian faces a serious dilemma. Should he 
osanie a detailed record in the current official style which 

many may consult but few will read? Or should he concentrate 
rather on describing great achievements or gallant deeds in battle 
which will attract and hold the attention of all? In this volume I 
have tried to strike a mean by coating the pill of facts, figures and 
dates with the sugar of adventure and occasional humorous anecdote 
and thus to produce something more than a book of reference. 
Any record of engineering exploits in the field loses half its value 
unless provided with a background showing the purpose of the 
operations. Hence I have felt bound to deal occasionally with matters 
of strategy and tactics or even to encroach upon the dangerous 
ground of policy. After all, engineering in war is no more than a 
Means to an end. That end is victory. And victory can be secured 
only through the achievements of all arms in combination. 

Nearly thirteen years have elapsed since the question of a sequel 
to The Indian Sappers and Miners was first raised in January 1944, 
The writing of the latter volume, which I had begun in February 
1938, was shelved in March 1940 in the interests of war work. 
It was resumed in March 1944 and finished in August 1947, but 
meanwhile the subject of a sequel had been revived. Early in 1945, 
the British Commandants of the three Engineer Groups in India 
considered the proposal and decided that, if a sequel was written, 
the author should be a serving officer of one of the Groups. Much 
to my disappointment I was informed accordingly that my services 
would not be required. However, no serving officer could be found 
who was prepared to attempt the task and in consequence the 
scheme remained in abeyance for more than three years. In July 
1948, after I had been invited to write the history of The West 
Yorkshire Regiment in the Second World War, I thought it might 
be well to afford the Indian Commandants of the three Groups an 
Opportunity to reconsider the decision reached by their British 
predecessors. They agreed that I should write a sequel, but unfortu- 
nately my negotiations with The West Yorkshire Regiment were so 
advanced when the reply arrived from India that I was obliged to 
suggest a postponement until the West Yorkshire history had been 


xi 


xii PREFACE 


completed. The prospects of a sequel to The Indian Sappers and 
Miners then seemed rather dim. Nevertheless, in September 1949 
the Commandants agreed that I should write the sequel after I had 
completed From Pyramid to Pagoda. That occurred in April 1951, 
and in October 1951 I wrote the first words of The Indian Engineers, 
1939-47. Six chapters dealing mostly with the Middle East, North 
Africa and Italy were finished by April 1953, and the remaining nine 
chapters on Burma, Malaya and post-War India, by September 1955. 
Thus the actual writing of the narrative occupied about four years 
although the project had been under consideration for more than 
seven years previously. 

In India the moving spirit throughout has been Lieut.-General Sir 
Harold Williams who was mainly concerned in the revival of the 
project and, as Engineer-in-Chief, in co-ordinating and supervising its 
progress. My thanks are due to Mr. H. A. Cordery, Librarian and 
Archivist of the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office, for affording 
me office accommodation while in London and allowing me to consult 
hundreds of War Diaries. The Mapping Section under Colonel 
T. M. M. Penney has also given me valuable assistance. All the maps 
have been drawn by me and faired by Captain A. C. Jenner. A 
number of them have appeared already in From Pyramid to Pagoda 
and have been reproduced by kind permission of The West Yorkshire 
Regiment. In order to avoid a bulky end pocket, each chapter has 
been given its relevant maps. The Appendices have been written by 
the Commandants of the Groups in India, and the Index has been 
compiled by Lieut.-Colonel E. E. N. Sandeman, Head Librarian 
of the R.E. Corps Library at Chatham, from which I have had many 
books on loan. I am indebted to Major-General R. P. Pakenham- 
Walsh for allowing me to consult several documents used by him 
in writing the latest volumes of The History of the Corps of Royal 
Engineers, and my thanks are due also to Brigadier C. C. Phipps, 
Secretary of the Institution of Royal Engineers, for managing the 
financial and other arrangements in England and for undertaking 
much correspondence in connection with the work. Under the 
supervision of Major K. O. Stiffle, Secretary of the Institution of 
Military Engineers, the printing and publication of this history have 
been carried out very efficiently by the small Press forming part of 
the College of Military Engineering in Kirkee. 

Finally I should like to acknowledge the help given by some officers 
of the Royal or Indian Engineers and particularly by the following 
who forwarded personal notes :— Lieut.-General Sir Lionel Bond; 


PREFACE xiii 
Major-General C. de L. Gaussen; Brigadiers L. O. Clark, R. E. 
Holloway, Partap Narain, C. R. Mangat Rai, A. McGregor Stewart 
and B. E. Whitman; Colonels Arjan Singh, D. B. Chopra, T. H. F. 
Foulkes, G. F. Hutchinson, M. M. Jeakes, R. A. Loomba and 
Shamsher Singh; Lieut.-Colonels G. A. Clayton, J. R. Connor, 
R. Dinwiddie, J. R. S. W. Elkington, A. G. Hellicar, Kuldip Singh, 
A. F. Toogood, B. P. Wadhera and J. B. Wilson; Majors W. B. J. 
Armstrong, T. D. Badhani, T. Beaumont, P. M. Bennett, N. H. 
Bower, J. F. Butlin, O. Callaghan, J. H. Clark, D. De Souza, L. S. 
Dubashi, R. C. Gabriel, B. G. Goodier, G. Horne, P. M. Leslie-Jones, 
D. W. McGrath, B. D. Neame, A. B. Rhodes and A. H. W. Sandes; 
Captains G. M. Birse, R. Kiff and T. Le M. Spring-Smyth; and the 
Rev. R. T. Urwin, formerly a Major R.E. 

As a Bengal Sapper and Miner in the First World War I com- 
manded men who were the forbears of some of the Indian Engineers 
figuring in this narrative; and between the two World Wars, until 
I left India in 1930, I was in close touch with the Bengal Sappers at 
Roorkee. It is sad therefore to have reached the end of a long story 
about those whose ancestors I knew so well. Methods and conditions 
of warfare have changed out of all recognition since the far off days 
of 1914-18; yet I hope that I have shown that the Indian Sapper 
remains the same—a brave and intelligent soldier, upholding the 
traditions which he has inherited and ready to meet any emergency 
which the future may hold in store. 


E. W. C. SANDES 
Ryelands, 
Weymouth. 
October 19th, 1956. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER I 


INDIA 1939-43 


Pre-War conditions in India—Roorkee News Letters (1939-40)—History 
of Indianization—Increased responsibilities of Sapper units—Expansion during 
Second World War—S & M Groups—Recruitment—A.I.R.O.—O.C.T.Us.— 
E.O.T.S, established—Formation of Engineer Training Centres (1940)—History 
of Transportation Services—Transportation Training Centres—Transportation 
units—Survey Group—Military Engineer Services—Mobilization in 1939— 
Many units despatched overseas (1940)—New units raised (1941-42)—-S & M 
Groups adopt suffix ‘Indian Engineers” (1942)—Subsequent changes in title— 
Regimental Centres—N.W. Frontier operations (1940-41)—Indian States 
Sappers—Bangalore (1941-43)—Roorkee News Letters (1942-43) “i “ 


CHAPTER II 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA, 
OCTOBER 1939-MAY 194] 


Indian Divs sent overseas in 1939—Gen. Wavell in Middle East—4th Div 
(Gen. Heath) in Egypt—4th Div Engrs train in Nile Delta—First Libyan 
Campaign—Gen. Wavell attacks Italians in Western Desert (June °40)— Defeats 
Marshal Graziani—Italian counter-offensive (Sept. °40)—Matruh fortified— 
Second Libyan Campaign—Gen. O’Connor attacks Marshal Graziani (Dec. 
*40)—Battle of Sidi Barrani—Italians defeated—Sollum and Tobruk occupied— 
O’Connor advances beyond Benghazi—Work of 4th Div Engrs—Experiences of 
12 Fd Coy—4th Div transferred to Sudan to reinforce Sth Div (Jan. ’41D— 
Voyage of 5th Div Engrs from India (Sept. ’40)—Sth Div on Atbara R.— 
“Gazelle Force” under Col. Messervy—i0th Bde under Brig. Slim—Engineer 
work—Gen. Platt invades Eritrea (Jan. ‘41)—2nd Lt. P. S. Bhagat, I.E., 
wins V.C. near Gondar—Exploits of 2, 4 and 12 Fd Coys—4th Div (Gen. 
Beresford-Peirse) held up at Keren (Feb. ’41)—Battle of Keren—4th and 5th 
Divs penetrate Keren Gorge (March °41)—Sappers clear obstacles—Battle of 
Ad Teclesan—Asmara and Massawa occupied—Sth Div (Gen. Mayne) takes 
Amba Alagi (May '41)—Duke of Aosta surrenders all Italian forces in Eritrea— 
Operations of African Divs under Gen. Cunningham from Kenya—Third 
Libyan Campaign—Afrika Korps under Gen. Rommel attacks with Italian 
support in Western Desert (April ’41)—Gens. O’Connor and Neame, V.C., 
captured—Tobruk isolated—Rommel halts at Egyptian frontier—4th Div 
Engrs at Sollum—Fate of 35 Fd Sqn—Sth Div arrives from Eritrea—Failures 


in Greece and Crete en ae 


CHAPTER III 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 


10th Div (Gen. Fraser) lands in Iraq (April ’41)—Germans capture Crete— 
Hitler invades Russia (June ’41)—Col. Roberts defends Habbaniya on Euphrates 
against Iraqis—Iraq Campaign ends (June °41)—Work of 10th Div ee Mor 
I.E. units reach Iraq—Campaign in Syria against Vichy French—Gen. Maitlao 
Wilson takes Damascus—French Gen. Dentz surrenders (July 41)—10th Div 
(Gen. Slim) sent to Persia—41 Fd Pk Coy in advance up Euphrates—Life in 
S. Iraq—Campaign in Persia—8th Div (Gen. Harvey) advances to Ahwaz 
(Aug. ’41)—Work of 8th Div Engrs—Shatt-al-Arab floating bridge at Ba 
Teheran entered (Sept. '41)—6th Div (Gen. Thomson) arrives in nea 2 
of Sapper units in Persia—Defensive area prepared around Mosul a an iv 
Engrs and 3rd Corps Tps Engrs—Other Sapper units build defences elsew a 
Experiences of 52 A.T. Coy—‘Paiforce” formed—Middle East situation (Sept. 
*42)—Ind. Railway units on Trans-Iranian Railway—Americans take over 


XV 


20 


Xvi CONTENTS 


charge (Dec. ’42)—5 Fd Coy in Iraq and Persia—Amusing incidents—Benga 
Sapper units in Gulf of Oman (Dec. 43)}—Most LE. units leave Iraq (1944)— 
Employment in Cyprus—Det. of 9 Fd Coy lost in Dodecanese Is. (Oct. °43)— 
Experiences in Syria (1945)—4th Div Engrs in Greece (1944-45) .. oe 


CHAPTER IV 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941-AUGUST 1942 


4th Div Engrs in Bagush (May °41)}—Western Desert Force prepares to attack 
(June '41)—Battle of Sollum—Attack fails—Gen. Wavell transferred to India 
as C.-in-C.—Succeeded in Middle East by Gen. Auchinleck—Bagush defences 
strengthened—70th (Br) Div holds Tobruk—Eighth Army formed under Gen. 
Cunningham (Nov. °41)}—Composed of 15th Corps (Gen. Godwin-Austin) 
and 30th Corps (Gen. Norrie)—German-Italian army under Gen. Rommel 
much superior in armour and A/T guns—Fourth Libyan Campaign—Cunning- 
ham attacks (Nov. °41)—Checked by German armour—Gen. Cunningham 
replaced by Gen. Ritchie—Tobruk relieved—Rommel withdraws beyond 
Benghazi (Jan. ’42)—Fifth Libyan Campaign—Rommel attacks—He recaptures 
Benghazi but halts on Gazala Line—Sappers destroy crippled enemy tanks— 
Minelaying on Gazala Line—Experiences of 4 and 12 Fd Coys—Sth Div Engrs 
fortify El Alamein Line (July °41}—20 Fd Coy sent to Iraq and Cyprus—2 and 
21 Fd Coys remain—!8 Fd Coy in action near Tobruk (Dec. °4])—Gen. 
Messervy appointed Comdr, Ist (Br) Armoured Div (Jan. °42)—Country around 
Benghazi—M.T. in bad condition—12 Fd Coy in actions beyond Benghazi— 
Sth Div Engrs in Tobruk Area—Sixth Libyan Campaign—Rommel attacks 
Gazala Line (May *42)—Capture and escape of Gen. Messervy—Tank battles 
around ‘“Knightsbridge’—Our tanks outmatched—Gen. Ritchie orders with- 
drawal beyond Egyptian frontier—Gen. Auchinleck takes personal command 
in field—Tobruk garrison surrenders (June 21st, °42)—Rommel by-passes Matruh 
but halts before Alamein Line (June 30th)—Engineer units in retreat—31 Fd Sqn 
overrun—Experiences of 2 and 4 Fd Coys and 41 Fd Pk Coy—9 and 6] Fd 
Coys at Matruh—i0 Fd Coy suffers heavily in break-out—61 Fd Coy suffers 
also—Lt.-Col. Saegert captured—lItalian treatment of prisoners—20, 21, 58 
and 66 Fd Coys at work on defences (July’ 42)—E! Alamein Line strengthened 
—5th Div on Ruweisat Ridge—Mr. Winston Churchill visits Western Desert 
(Aug. Sth}—Gen. Montgomery appointed Comdr., Eighth Army—Gen. 
Alexander succeeds Gen. Auchinleck as C.-inC., Middle East—Montgomery 
oreatess Eighth Army—Engineer units trained in minelaying and mine- 


CHAPTER V 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA, 
AUGUST 1942-MAY 1943 


Gen. Rommel attacks E] Alamein Defence Line (Aug. ’42)—Battle of Alam- 
el-Halfa—German armour thrusts towards coast—Operation fails with heavy 
loss—Rommel withdraws (Sept. 3rd)—Sth Div Engrs strengthen Ruweisat 
positions—Relieved by 4th Div Engrs—Rommel flies to Berlin to consult Hitler 
—Enemy reinforcements checked by Allied air and sea superiority—Eighth 
Army strongly reinforced—Gen. Montgomery prepares to attack with 10th, 
13th and 30th Corps—Enemy now under Gen. Von Stumme—Montgomery’s 
message to his troops—Seventh Libyan Campaign—Battle of El Alamein opens 
(Oct. 23rd, 1942}—Vast artillery bombardment—30th and 10th Corps advance 
in northern sector—Gen. Von Stumme killed—Replaced by Gen. Von Thoma— 
13th Corps in southern sector—Rommel arrives from Berlin (Oct. 27th)}—He 
counter-attacks in north—Montgomery regroups Eighth Anny—30th Corps 
resumes offensive in north (Nov. 2nd)}—Last minefields penetrated—10th 
(Armoured) Corps pours through gap—German armour defeated—-Von Thoma 
captured—Enemy routed—Pursuit begins (Nov. Sth)—I.E. units open gaps in 
minefields and destroy abandoned enemy tanks—Diary of 12 Fd Coy—Methods 
of mine clearance—Problems of pursuit—LE. units kept at El Alamein clearing 
up battlefield—9 Fd Coy lifts mines along Tobruk railway—Matruh reoccupied 
(Nov, 6th)—Heavy rain interferes with pursuit—Panzer Divs escape—Tobruk 
reoccupied (Nov. 13th}—Benghazi entered (Nov. 20th)—Rommel halts at El 


Si 


82 


CONTENTS 


Agheila—He resumes retreat into Tripolitania (Dec. 11th)—British - American 
First Army already landed in Tunisia~—l15 Railway Coy, LE., on Tobruk 
Railway—7th Armoured Div enters Tripoli (Jan. 23rd, °43}—4th Div Engrs in 
Benghazi—They follow towards Tripoli—German booby-traps—Mr. Winston 
Churchill at Tripoli (Feb. 3rd}—Rommel retreats into Tunisia—He tries to 
prevent junction of Eighth and First Armies—He fails and turns back to face 
Eighth Army—He occupies Mareth Line in Tripolitania—German armour 
attacks 5lst Div and 7th Armoured Div at Medinine (March 6th)}—Attack 
repulsed—Montgomery assaults Mareth Line (March 20th) —50th Div fails 
at Wadi Zigzaou—Left hook by 2nd N.Z. Div outflanks Mareth Line— 
Advance of 4th Div through mountains—Exploits of 4 and 12 Fd Coys at Wadi 
Zigzaou—Lt.-Col. Blundell—4 Fd Coy in Hallouf Pass—Gen. Montgomery 
attacks enemy under Gen. Messe at Wadi Akarit (April 5th)—Lt. Col. Blundell 
mortally wounded—Brig. Kisch (C.E. 30th Corps) killed—Germans withdraw— 
Wholesale surrender of Italians—Eighth and First Armies link up—Montgomery 
captures Enfidaville (April 20th)—Axis forces, now under Gen. Von Arnim, rein- 
forced from Sicily—Gen. Alexander commands all forces in Tunisia as Gen. 
Easenhower’s deputy—4th Div in new 9th Corps (Gen. Horrocks)—Allies capture 
Tunis and Bizerta (May 7th)—Von Arnim withdraws to Cape Bon (May 9th)— 
4th Div Engrs in final operations—German capitulation (May 11th)—F.M. 
Alexander on Tunisian Campaign—4th Div moves back towards Egypt—Review 
by ue an VI at Tripoli (June 19th}—4th Div Engrs reach Alexandria 

uly 8th, ° a ss ay act ie a o 305 ws “8 


CHAPTER VI 


ITALY, 1943-45 


Plans for invasion of S. Europe—Invasion of Sicily and Italy by Eighth Army 
and American Seventh Army (Gen. Patton) approved—Gen. Alexander in 
chief command-—Air-borne landing in Sicily (July 9th, °43)—Sea-borne invasion 
(July 10th)—Patton occupies Palermo (July 22nd)}—Montgomery checked at 
Catania—Patton enters Messina (Aug. 16th)—Germans escape to Italy— 
Mussolini resigns—Marshal Badoglio agrees to Italian surrender—Germans 
pour 13 divisions into Italy—F.M. Rommel in command in north—F.M. 
Kesselring in south—Eighth Army crosses Messina Straits into Italy (Sept. 
3rd)—Invasion of Italy by Eighth Army under Gen. Montgomery and American- 
British Fifth Army under American Gen. Mark Clark—Eighth Army to 
advance up east coast—Fifth Army (American 6th Corps and British !0th Corps) 
to land on west coast and capture Naples—Natural obstacles—Inadequate com- 
munications—Air-borne Div lands at Taranto and Fifth Army at Salerno (Sept. 
9th)—Eighth Army moves up Adriatic coast—British 10th Corps occupies 
Naples (Oct. Ist)—Kesselring withdraws to Volturno R.—Fifth Army attacks 
(Oct. 12th)—Kesselring retires to Garigliano R.—Alexander aims at Rome— 
Fifth Army Engrs begin to restore Naples—Work of Eighth Army Engrs— 
List of ILE. units in Italy—8th Div Engrs land at Taranto (Sept. 24th, °43)— 
Arrive near ‘Gustav’ Line, south of Biferno R.—7 Fd Coy bridges Biferno— 
Trigno R. crossing—Sangro R. reached—Eighth Army captures Sangro (Nov. 
28th)—8th Div Engrs bridge flooded Sangro R.—‘Montgomery' Bailey bridge— 
Russian Mission—Eighth Army crosses Moro R. (Dec. 10th)—‘Impossible 
Bridge” built by 69 Fd Coy—Mr. Winston Churchill visits front—Changes in 
high commands—Gen. Eisenhower transferred to U.K. as Supreme Commander 
for Allied invasion of France—Gen. Montgomery follows to command 2Ist 
Army Group—Gen. Maitland Wilson succeeds Eisenhower in Mediterranean— 
Gen. Leese appointed Eighth Army Commander—Montgomery’s farewell message 
(Dec. 31st)—4th Div Engrs arrive in Taranto (Dec. 8th)—Move north of Sangro 
R.—Fifth Army operations—American 6th Corps (3rd U.S. and 5th British 
Divs) and British 10th Corps involved—No I.E. units present—Plans for Anzio 
landing—Attack across Garigliano on ‘Gustav’ Line—Anzio landing (Jan. 22nd, 
*44)—6th Corps held up—Bitter fighting at Cassino on Rapido R.—Reinforce- 
ments from Eighth Army—4th Div at Cassino—Diary of 21 Fd Coy—Subedar 
Subramaniam, 11 Fd Pk Coy, wins George Cross (Feb. 24th)—Bridging under 
fire by 8th Div Engrs on Rapido R.—Polish troops storm Cassino Monastery 
(June '44)—‘Gustav’ and ‘Hitler’ Lines broken—Fifth Army occupies Rome 
(June 4th}—Allied landings reported in Normandy—General advance towards 
‘Gothic’ Line—Rapid bridging by 8th Diy Engrs—10th Div Engrs arrive in 


KVii 


110 


XViil CONTENTS 


Italy (Feb. *44)—Move to Ortona on east coast in April—Other 1.E. units present 
—10th Div transferred to west coast (June 22nd)—Then to Perugia region— 
German mines—Mine detection by !0 Fd Coy—Exciting adventures—Ten 
divisions ordered from Italy to France—Advance towards ‘Gothic’ Line retarded 
—Fighth Army masses on Adriatic coast—4th, 8th and 10th Divs begin Opera- 
tion “Vandal” (Aug. 3rd)—5 Fd Coy rescues Italian Countess—*‘Lovers’ Lane”’ 
—Eighth Anny assaults ‘Gothic’ Line (Aug. 26th)—Fifth Army attacks south 
of Pisa—Kesselring abandons positions—Alexander reaches R. Po plain (Sept. 
21st}—Employment of I.E. units—‘Houdini’ submersible bridge—Repair of 
mountain roads—4 Fd Coy bridges Rubicon R.—8th and 10th Div Engrs in the 
Apennines (1944-45)—Much Bailey bridging—Eighth Army enters Faenza (Dec. 
15th}—Halts on Senio R.—Fifth Army south of Bologna—Country flooded— 
Eighth Army crosses Senio (April 10th, *45)—Bridging by 2nd N.Z. Div Engrs— 
8th Div Engrs at Santerno crossing (April 12th)—2nd N.Z. Div and Eighth 
Army reach Po R. (April 23rd/24th)—Po crossed by rafting—Advanced troops 
arrive on Adige R.—German resistance now negligible—8th Div Engrs build 
F.B. bridge across Adige (April 29th)—Padua occupied—13th Corps enters 
Trieste (May 2nd)—5Sth Corps already in Venice—Complete victory attained— 
Decorations won by Sapper officers—Adventures of Lt. Shamsher Singh in 
Italy—Work of I.E. units after German capitulation—Last J.E. unit (97 F 

Coy) leaves Italy (Nov. ’45)—Gen. Alexander’s farewell message 


CHAPTER VII 


MALAYA, 1941-42 


Losses of Bombay Group in Singapore surrender—Singapore defences in 
1941—Nature of Malayan Peninsula—Situation in Far East after First World 
War—Naval base started at Singapore—Defences designed only against sea- 
bome attack—Remainder of Malaya virtually undefended—Haphazard progress 
of defences—Air forces expected to guard Singapore against land attack— 
Japan withdraws from League of Nations (April 1933)—Col. Dobson improves 
sea-ward defences of Singapore Island—Three aerodromes built on east coast 
of Malaya—Gen. Dobbie appointed G.O.C. Malaya (Nov. ’35)—Col. Perceval 
as G.S.O.I—Dobbie envisages probable land attack from north—He plans 
defensive zone north of Singapore 1.—Gen. Dobbie succeeded by Gen. L. V. 
Bond (1939)—Singapore sea-defences completed—Defence policy against Japan 
based on prompt arrival of British fleet—Period extended to 180 days—Conse- 
quent need to hold Thailand frontier with 24 divisions—Reliance placed on 
French in Indo-China—Malaya garrison only one division—{!2th Ind. Inf. 
Bde arrives with 15 Fd Coy (Aug. ’39)}—Brig. Partap Narain describes Sapper 
work—War declared on Germany (Sept. 3rd, 1939)—Vichy French admit Jap 
troops to Indo-China (Sept. °40)—Two Bdes of Iith Ind. Div (Gen. Murray- 
Lyon) arrive Singapore (Nov. *40)—8th Australian Div (Gen. Gordon Bennett) 
begins to arrive (Feb. ’41)—Two Bdes, 9th Ind. Div (Gen, Barstow) reach 
Singapore (April °41)—3rd Ind. Corps in Malaya commanded by Gen. Heath— 
Troops untrained in jungle warfare—Equipment unsuitable—Few A/A guns 
or aircraft—No tanks—Defence schemes prepared—Many I.E. units arrive 
(1940-41)}—Mostly Bombay Sappers—Brig. Simson, C.E. Malaya Command— 
Brig. K. B. S. Crawford, C.E. 3rd Corps—Lt.-Col. Lindesay, C.R.E. 9th Div 
Engrs—Lt.-Col. Steedman, C.R.E. 11th Div Engrs—Australian Engrs and 
Fortress, Engrs—Frontier Operation ‘Matador’ planned—Jitra defence line 
started in N. Kedah—9th Div Engrs on east coast beach defences—IJth Div 
Engrs on frontier defence work—War against Japan appears imminent (Nov. 
41}—Jitra Line incomplete—Jap planes sink U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbour in 
Hawaii Is. (Dec. 7th, 1941)—War declared forthwith—Japs attack Hongkong— 
Surrender of Hongkong (Dec. 25th)—Experiences of Lt.-Col. J. B. Wilson, R.E.— 
Jap forces in Indo-China and Thailand (Dec. 8th)—Landings on E. coast of 
Malaya—Operation *Matador’ cancelled—I.E. units on raids into Thailand— 
Bridge demolitions—Withdrawal of 11th Div—9th Div evacuates Kota Bahru 
(Dec. 9th)—Withdraws from Kelantan State—Diary of 1 A.W. Coy—Jap equip- 
ment and tactics—Gen. Perceval, G.O.C. Malaya, describes situation—Jitra 


Line crumbles—Demolitions by 11th Div En, i i 

‘ grs—Jitra Line abandoned (Dec. 
aa eet Prince of Wales and H.M.S. Repulse sunk by enemy niterali 
: oe Rae indrawal of 11th Div continues—Muda R. bridge destroyed 
by -T. Coy—17 Fd Coy at Perak R. bridge (Dec. 22nd)—Battle of Kampar 


CONTENTS 


begins (Dec. 28th)—Jap landings on west coast—Kampar evacuated (Jan. 3rd 
*42)—3 Fd Coy at Dipang bridge—9th Div withdrawing down east coast— 
Kuantan airfield abandoned (Jan. 4th)—22nd Bde reaches Jerantut (Jan. 7th)— 
Exploits of 22 Fd Coy—Ferry demolition—I Ith Div reaches Slim R. (Jan. 6th)— 
Suffers heavily in Slim R. battlek—Enemy advances through Kuala Lumpur 
against 8th Australian Div on Johore State border—Australians defend Muar 
R. positions (Jan. 15th-19th)—Positions abandoned after heavy losses—1I3 Fd 
Coy almost wiped out—Jap brutality to prisoners—Batu Pahat and Mersing 
abandoned (Jan. 26th)—Kluang airtield lost—Withdrawal ordered to Singapore 
Island (Jan. 26th)—Brig. Paris organizes defences—Engineer work on defences— 
Distribution of defence forces—Final Jap offensive begins (Feb. 8th)—Enemy 
cross Johore Strait into N.W. Sector—They capture vital water reservoirs (Feb. 
10th)—Composite Engineer Bn tormed—Retirement to Singapore Town (Feb, 
13th)—Positions violently attacked—-Gen. Perceval surrenders Singapore to 
Japanese (Feb. 15th, 1942)—Subsequent adventures of 2nd Lt. M. M. Pillai, 
I.E.—Escape of two ships—Disastrous effect of loss of Singapore i is 


CHAPTER VIII 
RETREAT FROM BURMA, DECEMBER 1941 - MAY 1942 


Japanese invade S. Tenasserim (Dec. 14th, 1941)—Rangoon bombed (Dec. 
23rd)—Gen. Chiang Kai-Shek sends Chinese armies into Toungoo region 
under American Gen. Stilwell—Ist Burma Div (Gen. Bruce-Scott) defends 
eastern frontier—Mergui and Tavoy evacuated (Jan. 17th, ’42)—17th Ind. Div 
(Gen. Smyth, V.C.) reinforces tst Burma Div—16th Bde at Martaban—46th 
Bde at Bilin—2nd Burma Bde at Moulmein—Japs attack Moulmein (Jan. 30th)— 
Moulmein evacuated—I7th Div on Salween R. line—Japs push up Salween— 
Martaban evacuated (Feb. 9th)—Enemy cross Salween—17th Div withdraws 
to Kyaikto and Bilin R.—Gen. Wavell approves further withdrawal to Sittang 
R. line (Feb. 19th)—Poor communications—Australia refuses to send reinforce- 
ments to Burma—1.E. units in early operations—Ist Burma Div Engrs (Lt.-Col. 
Swan)—-17th Ind. Div Engrs (Lt.-Col. Ward)—Ferrying at Moulmein by 60 Fd 
Coy—18 A.W. Coy during withdrawal—Demolitions by Malerkotla Fd Coy— 
Gen. Smyth orders demolition of Sittang R. bridge—Bridge demolished by 
Malerkotla Fd Coy (Feb. 23rd)—Troops remaining on Mokpalin bank swim 
across—Lt.-Col. Orgill describes demolition—Problem confronting Gen. Smyth— 
Gen. Cowan assumes command of 17th Div—Gen. Alexander replaces Gen. 
Hutton in chief command (March 4th)—Alexander orders counter-offensive— 
Japs penetrate to Pegu—Evacuation of Rangoon—Alexander plans withdrawal 
up Irrawaddy R. to Prome—70 Fd Coy in withdrawal—Lack of explosives 
and M.T.—Japs enter Rangoon (March 8th)—Gen. Slim appointed Comdr 
Ist Burma Corps (March 19th)—Corps redesignated later ‘4th Ind Corps’— 
Subsequent career of Gen. Slim—Allied air force destroyed near Prome (March 
21st)—Defeat of Chinese armies—Enemy occupy Toungoo (March 29th) and 
Prome (April 1st)—Mandalay suffers air raid—Burma Corps covers Yenang- 
yaung oilfields—Work of Burma Div Engrs—Diary of 60 Fd Coy during 
retreat—Experiences of 24 Fd Coy and 18 A.W. Coy—Burma Corps evacuates 
Allanmyo and Thayetmyo (April 6th)—Operations north of Yenangyaung— 
Oilfields destroyed—Gen. Alexander continues withdrawal northwards—Chinese 
again defeated in Shan States—Japs occupy Mandalay—70 Fd Coy destroys 
bridges at Kyaukse (April 29th)—24 Fd Coy blows Ava Bridge (April 30th)— 
Malerkotlas at Monywa—Story of dog ‘““Gemma”—60 and 70 Fd Coys ta 
withdrawal to Shwegyin—Gen. Cowan crosses Chindwin R. at Kalewa (May 
10th)—Troops march towards Tamu—Road choked by refugees—Diary of 24 
Fd Coy—Unit reaches Kanglatongbi beyond Imphal (May 18th)—Joined by 
other I.E. units—Work of 59 Fd Coy on Tamu Road—Burma Army under 
Gen. Alexander dissolved (May 20th, ’°42)—4th Ind Corps under Gen. Slim 
assumes control ane ue i an s ie os ek “a 


CHAPTER IX 
THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM, JUNE 1942-MARCH 1944 


Situation at Imphal in May 1942—Stalemate during ensuing monsoon—Gen. 
Wavell plans counter-offensive—Tehri-Garhwal Fd Coy on Tamu Road—114 
Works Bn repairs Imphal damage—Det. 91 Fd Coy ordered to Fort Hertz—Order 


xix 


175 


210 


XX CONTENTS 


cancelled—Det. 71 Fd Coy at Fort Hertz—Bridging on Lokchao R.—Tamu 
Road opened (Dec. ’42)}—Elephants assist in bridging—Alternative routes to 
Chindwin R.—Difficulties of Tiddim route—Brahmaputra L. of C.—Air supply— 
Airfield construction—G.R.E.F. formed—362 Fd Coy prepares airfield—4th 
Corps Engrs extend Tamu Road—Operations of Gen. Orde Wingate’s *Chindits’ 
(March °43)—Myitkyina Railway cut—Chindits withdrawn (June *43)}—Bengal 
Sappers on Tamu Road—Madras and Bombay Sappers in Tamu area—24 Fd 
Coy builds first Bailey bridge—Organization of work on Tamu Road—Brig. 
Partap Narain describes conditions and methods—Changes in higher commands 
—Gen. Wavell appointed Viceroy (June *43)—Gen. Auchinleck becomes C.-in-C., 
India—Creation of S.E.A.C. under Admiral Lord Mountbatten—Tiddim route 
given priority—Exercise ‘*‘Navvy”—Tehri-Garhwal Fd Coy builds Manipur R. 
bridge—17th Div Engrs in Exercise ‘‘Navvy’’—Description by Brig. Horsfield, 
C.E. Fourteenth Army—Experiences of 70 Fd Coy—Tiddim Road opened to 
Manipur R. (May Ist, °43)—West Yorkshires on Tiddim Road—Extension 
towards Tiddim—Manipur R. suspension bridge—Lord Mountbatten arrives 
in Delhi (Oct. 7th, ’43)—Contacts Americans in China—Visits Imphal—Eastern 
Army (Gen. Giffard) split into Eastern Command, India (Gen. Mayne) and 
Fourteenth Army, Burma (Gen. Slim)—Gen. Giffard to command 11th Army 
Group including Fourteenth Army—Fourteenth Army comprises 4th Corps 
(Gen. Scoones) and 15th Corps (Gen. Christison}—Mountbatten decides on 
land offensive into Burma during monsoon—Disposition of forces—Gen. 
Wingate’s L.R.P. Force (formerly Chindits)—1.E, ‘Special Sections’ tormed 
for L.R.P. Force but not used—Japanese dispositions in Burma—Thailand- 
Burma ‘Railway of Death’—Enemy plans for invasion of India—4th Corps 
(17th, 20th and 23rd Divs) on Manipur front—Progress of Americans and 
Chinese (Gen. Stilwell) along Ledo Road—33rd Jap Div begins offensive against 
17th Ind Div on Tiddim Road (Oct. °43)—Brig. Partap Narain on experiences of 
428 Fd Coy—Tiddim water-supply scheme—Method of demolishing enemy 
bunkers—70 Fd Coy in close fighting—Brig. Partap Narain on action near 
Kennedy Peak—Sapper gallantry—Engineer build-up in Assam and Arakan 
(Dec. ’43)—4th Corps awaits enemy offensive in Manipur—15th Corps attacks 
in Arakan (Jan. ’44)—Wingate’s L.R.P. Force lands in Upper Burma by air 
(Feb. °44)—Wingate killed in air crash (March 24th)—Gen. Lentaigne assumes 
command—Jap offensive against Imphal launched (March 8th, 44)—17th Div 
{Gen. Cowan) retires from Tiddim—Sth Div summoned by air from Arakan— 
17th Div almost cut off—20th Div withdraws up Tamu Road—33rd Jap Div 
advances up Tiddim Road—15th Jap Div up Tamu Road—31st Jap Div makes 
ne hook against Kohima in rear—Japanese so-called ‘March on Delhi’ 
gins ese a ss . ns Z 


CHAPTER X 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 


First Arakan Campaign (1942-43)—Dense jungle—Heavy rainfall—Bad 
communications—!4th Ind. Div (Gen. Lloyd) occupies Maungdaw and Buthi- 
daung (Oct. ‘42)—Engineer units available—Diary of 26 Fd Coy—14th Div adva- 
nces down Mayu Peninsula (Dec. °42)—Re-occupation of Akyab planned— 
Work of I.E. units—Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road—‘Tunnels’ Section—Razabil 
Fortress—14th Div consolidates south of road (Dec. 27th}—47th Bde attacks 
Donbaik positions and fails (Jan. 18th, °43)—123rd Bde repulsed at Rathedaung 
(Feb. 3rd)—55th Bde fails at Donbaik (Feb. 17th)—Japs under Col. Tanahashi 
begin counter-offensive—6th (British) Bde repulsed at Donbaik (March 18th)— 
26th Ind. Div (Gen, Lomax) relieves 14th Div—Gen. Wavell admits responsibility 
for failure---Withdrawal to Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road—Maungdaw eva- 
cuated (May 13th)--Withdrawal to Bawli Bazar—Experiences of 74 Fd Coy— 
26th Div Engrs take over-—-Diary of 26 Fd Coy—28 Fd Coy leaves Buthidaung 
ve Veale during monsoon—Sappers take Part in raids—26th Div 
ae ae mS Py Div (Gen. Messervy)-—26th Div moves into Kalapanzin Valley 
(Sep ; ae ‘ Ind. Div (Gen. Briggs) arrives at {ront—Gen. Christison (15th 
<s i ie ans iC eel at Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road—Sth Div on coast 
) Sea . apanzin Valley—81st West African Div further inland-—25th 
pio New fe ae Cee oo ah " oe and 77 Fd Coys 

‘ A —Second Araka ign— i 
by 15th Corps—Sth Div occupies Maungdaw (Jan. oh eae ey Ca 


240 


CONTENTS 


Razabil Fortress—7th Div advances on Buthidaung—Checked at Letwedet— 
Japs launch counter-offensive—--Tanahashi Force’ advances up Kalapanzin R.— 
15th Corps Forward Base at Sinzweya threatened—-7th Div HQ overrun at 
Laungtaung (Feb. 6th)—Admin. Box at Sinzweya prepared for defence—62 and 
303 Fd Coys and 17 Bridging Section present in Box—Admin. Box invested— 
“Ascot Car Park’’—“‘Blood Nullah’’—Life in Admin. Box—123rd Bde (5th Div) 
arrives through Ngakyedauk Pass—Siege ends (Feb. 22nd)—Work of I.E 
units with Relief Forces—7th Div recaptures Buthidaung (March 11th)—Sth 
Div takes Maungdaw and Razabil—25th Div (Gen. Davies) replaces 5th and 
7th Divs at front during monsoon—2é6th Div in reserve—Goppe Pass ropeway— 
425 Fd Coy on Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road—Sappers demolish bunkers— 
63 and 425 Fd Coys cut tracks--Third Arakan Campaign—Gen. Christison 
resumes offensive (Dec. °44)—-I5th Corps advances down Mayu Peninsula and 
valleys 10 east-—25th Div (Gen. Wood) on coast—5ist Bde (Brig. Thimayya) 
reaches Foul Point (Dec. 25th)—Rafting by 63 and 425 Fd Coys on Kalapanzin 
R.—Landings on Akyab Island (Jan. 3rd, ’45)—Japanese gone—History of Indian 
Beach Groups—Duttes of a Beach Group—78 Fd Coy (Major Beaumont) in 
41 Beach Group—Unit disembarks at Akyab (Jan. 9th)—Lt. Sandes describes 
air attack on shipping—Myebon Peninsula occupied (Jan. 21st)—Landings on 
Cheduba and Ramree Islands—Experiments by Lt. Sandes with Jap mines— 
26th Div Engrs on Ramree Island-—Improvement of airfields—Heavy fighting 
at Kangaw landing (Jan. 22nd)—Enemy routed—63 Fd Coy and det. 78 Fd Coy 
at Kangaw—25th Div lands at Ru-ywa (Feb. 16th)—Experiences of 425 Fd 
Coy—Landing at Letpan (March 16th)—Lt. Raymond, R.E., wins V.C.— 
Operation ‘‘Dracula”—26th Div (Gen. Chambers) sails from Ramree Island 
for Rangoon (April 27th)—Lands in Rangoon Estuary and re-embarks (May 
2nd)--—Occupies Rangoon (May 4th)—28, 72, 73 and 98 Fd Coys begin repairs— 
Lt. Sandes on condition of Rangoon .. Ma a i vs a ‘a 


CHAPTER XI 
THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL, MARCH-JULY 1944 


Japanese plans for invasion of Assam—Advance of 33rd, 15th and 3ist Jap 
Divs against 4th Ind Corps—23rd Div guards Imphal—Strategic advantages and 
disadvantages of Imphal—17th Div begins withdrawal up Tiddim Road—Jap 
tanks destroyed in minefield—Lt.-Col. A.J. R. Hill reported missing—23rd Div 
helps 17th Div on Tiddim Road—Experiences of 428 Fd Coy—Jap road-blocks— 
Tehri-Garhwal Fd Coy demolishes Manipur R. bridge (March 26th, °44)— 
17th Div reaches Imphal (April 3rd)—Operations from Bishenpur along Silchar 
track—Diary of 24 Fd Coy—24, 362 and 429 Fd Coys improve Silchar track 
—Isolated by enemy—Improvised bridging—Operations of 20th Div on Tamu 
Road—Japs attack Tamu (March 22nd}—20th Div withdraws to Shenam (Apml 
5th)—92 and 424 Fd Coys in withdrawal from Moreh—Extensive demolitions— 
Diary of 481 Fd Coy—402 and 429 Fd Coys in fighting at Shenam-—Experiences 
of 422 Fd Coy—Lt. Pearson on Bengal Sapper units at Shenam—Work of 23rd 
Div Engrs—Experiments by 323 Fd Pk Coy—Withdrawal from Ukhrul~ 
Operations around Kohima against 31st Jap Div—Sth and 7th Divs flown to 
Dimapur from Arakan—Emplaning mules—33rd Ind Corps concentrates at 
Dimapur (April ’44)—-4th Corps isolated at Imphal—Description of Kohima— 
Japanese strategical error—Japs attack Kohima (April 5th}—Defence of 
“Garrison” and “Summerhouse” Hills—Desperate fighting on Commissioner's 
tennis court—Garrison relieved by 6th Bde, 2nd (Br) Div (April 20th)—Monu- 
ment on “Jail” Hill—31st Jap Div retreats towards Imphal—2nd (Br) Div 
pursues—Work of Sth Div Engrs at Kohima—Kohima area finally cleared 
(May 29th)—Sapper work during pursuit—33rd and 4th Corps meet north of 
Imphal (June 22nd)—Kanglatongbi Box episode in April—-Bridging by 20, 62 
and 422 Fd Coys—Battles on the Tiddim Road—17th Div opposes 33rd Jap 
Div—Fighting at Potsangbam (May 8th)—Heavy rain—Supplies at Imphal 
almost exhausted—Imphal saved by air supply—Bitter struggle at Ningthoukhong 
on Tiddim Road (July 16th)—33rd Jap Div driven out (July 16th)—Pursued 
towards Tiddim—92 Fd Coy in operations near Bishenpur—Cutting hill tracks 
for tanks—70 Fd Coy in outflanking march—Sth Div takes over the lead in 
pursuit (July °44)}—5th Div Engrs repair Tiddim Road—Re-grouping of 
Fourteenth Army—4th Corps and 33rd Corps to unite at Kalemyo on Chindwin 
R.—Operations to continue throughout monsoon—23rd Div Engrs clear Tamu 
Road—Description of modern Imphal ue? ne a es “3 


274 


313 


Xxii CONTENTS 


CHAPTER XII 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY, 
AUGUST 1944-MARCH 1945 


i *44)— ice der Gen 
etreating on all Burma fronts (Aug. 44) Americans un : 
Saciria Moaeeineand apprcachine eS pee ace an pobaeh 
i frontier of Burma—23r : ) 
FS ee Ruin E African Div in Kabaw Valley—Sth Div advancing down 
Tiddim Road—Japs killing their wounded—Hundreds dying of starvation 
and disease—Character of “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell—4th Corps withdrawn i 
India—33rd Corps to conduct pursuit—E. Africans reach Kalemyo (Nov. 15th) 
—LE. units build Tamu-Kalewa Road—Role of Sappers in large river Crossings 
23 and 20 Fd Coys at crossing of flooded Manipur R. (Sept. ’44)—Sth Div 
occupies Tiddim (Oct. 18th)—Reaches Kalemyo (Nov. 1 3th)—19th Dy as 
at front—Div Engrs build ae ene of Se ae i catee 
j —Kalewa boat-building yard— . — 
Aentine bales Dinca, of bringing boats to site—Kalewa bridge beg ents 
and opened (Dec. 10th)—Gen. Slim at bridge site— Christmas” Bailey prides 
on L. of C.—361 Fd Coy floats jeeps down Meas 7 a ae Si 
‘ — in higher commands ov. — : 
Fale bs an "Geni, Scan Gen Leese becomes Supreme Comdr, 
Land Forces, Burma—Gen. Messervy Sareea 4th roe oy eine Leno 
—Gen. Stopford continues to command 33r: oS Sin) . ubalns Pla 
for the reconquest of Burma—Fourteenth Army (Gen, oe Cenral 
Mandalay—Gen. Slim decides to cross Irrawaddy R. a 
yeu Sait south of Mandalay after 19th Div has crossed to Oe eee 
of advance—Operations north of Mandalay—36th (Br) Div coming ae rom 
north meets 19th Div from west (Dec. 16th)—Road transport deficient—Cor uy 
road-making—Sappers repair Mogaung railway—Jeep trains improvised— n 
(Br) Div arrives Katha and crosses Irrawaddy on rafts—58 Fd Coy at aire i 
R.—Crossing attempted at Myitson (Feb. Ist, 45)—Gallantry of Lt. Rajwade, I.E. 
—Crossing succeeds (Feb. 9th)—36th (Br) Div advances towards Maymyo— 
Sapper fleet of bamboo rafts on Indawgyi Lake—19th Div enters Shwebo 
(Jan. 7th, ’45)-—2nd (Br) Div arrives—Work of 19th Div Engrs—Story of derelict 
steam-roller—33rd Corps employs water-diviners—Jap mines operated by 
suicide men—Procedure in airstrip construction—I9th Div begins crossing 
of Irrawaddy near Shwebo (Jan. 15th)—Experiences of 64 Fd Coy—Crossing 
completed by 29 and 429 Fd Coys (Feb. 16th)—19th Div advances on Mandalay 
—2nd (Br) Div crosses Irrawaddy at Nzagun (Feb. 23rd)—Captures Ava Fort 
(March 17th)}—Moves towards Meiktila—20th Div crosses Chindwin R. by 
Kalewa bridge (Jan. °45)—Concentrates at Myinmu—Experiences of 92 Fd 
Coy—Mules swim rivers—“Elephant Bill” (Col. J. H. Williams) provides ele- 
phants for bridging work—422 Fd Coy ferries stores down Chindwin R.—Lt. 
Wright mortally wounded—20th Div begins crossing Irrawaddy R. at Myinmu 
(Feb. 13th)—92 Fd Coy under fire—Gallantry of Lt. Balston—Crossing completed 
(Feb, 27th}—20th Div advances towards Kyaukse—Ferrying at Myinmu by 
481 Fd Coy—422 Fd Coy prepares exits—Kyaukse captured (March 30th)— 
Operations of 4th:Corps (7th and 17th Divs and 255th Tank Bde)—Advance 
directed towards Meiktila—Elaborate methods of deception—4th Corps 
transferred across rear of 33rd Corps—Surprise crossing of Irrawaddy planned 
at Nyaungu—7th Div to lead—Sappers improve L. of C.—Drawbacks of 
Nyaungu site—Equipment brought by air—7th Div Engrs in approach to 
Irrawaddy—Equipment collected at three beaches near Nyaungu (Feb. 13th)— 


Trouble with sandy approaches—7th and 17th Div Engrs combine—Leading 
infantry paddled across in assault boats (Feb. 


13th/14th)}—Heavy enemy fire 
—Reinforcements taken across--36 Fd Sqn ferries tanks—Diary of 62 Fd Coy 
--Gallantry of Lt. Goodall—Crossing transferred to another beach— Difficult 
approaches—Sommerfeld track awaited by air—Story by Gen, Cobb—‘'The 
Irrawaddy Regatta”—4th Corps takes Taungtha and Mahlaing (Feb. 24th/25th) 
—Assault on Meiktila begins (Feb. 28th)—Meiktila almost. cleared (March 
7th)—Stories of Gen. Slim—Japs launch counter-offensive—9th Bde (5th Div) 
flown in (March 18th)—Meiktila cleared (March 28th)—19th Div enters out- 
skirts of Mandalay (March 9th)—Capture of Mandalay Hill (March 11th}— 
Fort Dufferin bombed—Infantry assaults fail—Hole blown in wall by bombing 
—Fort Dufferin entered (March 20th)\—Work of 19th Div Engrs—Reconnais- 
sances—Scaling ladders—Union Jack hoisted over Fort Dufferin, Mandalay. 


346 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER XIII 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA, 
APRIL 1945-OCTOBER 1947 


Fourteenth Army regroups for thrust to Rangoon—Use of atom bomb 
against Japan approved by Cabinet (July 24th, °45)—Closely guarded secret— 
Gen. Slim’s plans—4th Corps to move southwards from Meiktila—33rd Corps 
to use Irrawaddy route through Prome—Advance of mechanized 4th Corps 
(Gen. Messervy)—17th Div leaves Meiktila (March 30th)—Sth Div follows— 
17th Div captures Pyawbwe (April 10th)—Sth Div takes Yindaw—Sth Div now 
assumes lead—Yamethin occupied—Shwemyo falls (April 16th)—Fighting at 
Shwemyo Bluff—Armour reaches Pyinmana (April 19th)—Lewe — Airfield 
seized—Pyinmana captured (April 21st)—Armour sweeps into Toungoo (April 
22nd)—Toungoo cleared (April 24th)—Airfield repair started—Armour occupies 
Pyu (April 25th)—1!7th Div resumes lead—I.E. units make airstrips—Japanese 
begin to evacuate Rangoon—17th Div makes for Pegu—Tanks race along main 
road—‘Burma National Army” mops up Jap stragglers—4th Corps now on 
reduced rations—Jap resistance at Moyingyi Reservoir—Armour reaches Pegu 
(April 28th)—Bde of 17th Div occupies part of town (April 30th)—Remainder 
of Div continues towards Rangoon—News that 26th Div from Ramree Island 
is already in Rangoon (May 3rd)—Work of 4th Corps Engrs and Forward 
Airfield Engrs during advance—Rapid bridging and airstrip construction— 
362 Fd Coy at Pyinmana bridge—Experiences of 36 Fd Sqn with 255th Tank 
Bde—Use of Scissors Bridge tanks—Bomb dropped down well—Pyu Chaung 
-crossing—Bailey bridging—Jap suicide men with *Lunge’ mines—36 Fd Sqn 
in attack at Pyinbongyi (April 27th)—Lt. Cooper killed in gallant exploit— 
Casualties from road mines and booby traps—60, 70 and Tehri-Garhwal Fd Coys 
in Pegu—Repair of timber bridge over Pegu R.—Monsoon breaks—Floating 
bridge destroyed by floods (May 5th)—Gap in steel railway bridge repaired (May 
8th)—70 Fd Coy bridges Lagunbyin Chaung near Hlegu—Existing bridge 
repaired—American Colonel uses flooded airstrip for take-ofl—Summary of 
Engineer work up to capture of Rangoon—Allied Ps. of W. recovered from 
Japanese—Operations of 33rd Corps (Gen. Stopford) on Irrawaddy axis— 
Kyaukpadaung captured by 7th Div (April 12th}»—Yenangyaung taken (April 
22nd)—Taungdwingyi occupied by 20th Div (April 13th)—Magwe and Myingun 
captured (April 19th)—Allanmyo occupied (April 28th)—Prome entered (May 
2nd)—20th Div advances towards Rangoon—7th Div mops up near Prome— 
20th Div contacts 26th Div from Rangoon on Rangoon Road (May 20th)— 
Experiences of 422 Fd Coy (20th Div) on Irrawaddy—Yin Chaung crossing— 
Bwetgyi Chaung tank crossing—Bridging flooded Nawin Chaung near Prome 
(May 2nd)—Medium artillery taken across—Further bridging on Rangoon 
Road—422 Fd Coy halts at Hmawbi (May 25th)—Work of 7th Div Engrs— 
Ferrying at Kyaukye and Magwe—62 Fd Coy in pursuit down west bank— 
Ferrying at Allanmyo—Repair work in Prome—7th Div Engrs concentrate 
in Pegu area (June ’45)—33rd Corps Engrs raft stores down Irrawaddy (April 
°45)—“‘Red” and “White” fleets—Formation of 34th Corps under Gen. Roberts 
(May °45)—15th and 34th Corps to comprise Fourteenth Army under Gen. 
Dempsey—Fourteenth Army destined for invasion of Malaya—4th and 33rd 
Corps to comprise new Twelth Army under Gen. Stopford in Burma—Gen. 
Slim becomes C.-in-C., A.L.F.S.E.A., vice Gen. Leese, and controls both 
Armies—Twelth Army disposed along Toungoo-Rangoon Road—Rehabilitation 
of Rangoon—Airfields at Mingaladon—Japanese dispositions in Burma—4th 
Corps deployed between Toungoo and mouth of Sittang R.—Ordered to prevent 
escape of Jap forces eastwards—" Battle of the Break-out” (July ’45)—Few Japs 
escape—Sapper work in Pegu—‘‘Messervy” suspension bridge built (Aug. “45)— 
Jeep trains operated—Dukw service on canals—Airfield construction around 
Rangoon—64 Fd Coy (19th Div Engrs) on Thazi-Kalaw Road—29 and 65 Fd 
Coys on Toungoo-Mawchi Road—"tRamshackle Bridge’’—Tarpaulin raft 
designed for tanks—Bridging under fire—Mawchi reached (Aug. [5th, *45)— 
72 Fd Coy repairs Rangoon water-supply—7th Div Engrs in Sittang R. bend— 
“V.J. Day” (Aug. 15th)—Gen. Kimura orders Jap surrender in Burma—Brig. 
Armstrong accepts surrender for Gen. Stopford (Sept. 15th}—17th Div replaces 
7th Div in Sittang bend—Lt.-Col. Foulkes on Japanese attitude in defeat—Post- 
war experiences of 17th Div Engrs in Tenasserim—Jap engineers co-operate 
fully—Road construction between Moulmein and Ye—17th Div Engrs begin to 
leave Tenasserim (March °46)—19th Div Engrs extend Thazi-Kalaw-Hopong 


XXiil 


XXIV CONTENTS 


Road beyond Salween R. (Jan. ’46)—Reconnaissance to Kentung—New Myitnge 
R. bridge near Mandalay—4th Corps Engrs provide temporary pontoon bridge 
—Existing Bailey bridge removed (July °46)—Sapper officers work in diving 
suits—New bridge finished by P.W.D.—Title “Royal” bestowed on Corps of 
Indian Engineers (Feb. °46)—Few R.1.E. units remaining in Burma—7, 19 and 
64 Fd Coys detailed for Burma garrison (Feb. ’47)—19 Fd Coy secures evidence 
against murderer of Gen. Aung San—Last R.I.E. units recalled to India (Oct. 
°47)—History of connection of Corps with Burma .. : a ; ‘ 


CHAPTER XIV 
POST-WAR OPERATIONS IN MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 


Malaya and Indonesia ravaged by Japanese during occupation—Operations 
“Zipper” and “Mailfist” planned—Fourteenth Army to invade Malaya—34th 
Corps (Gen. Roberts) to land on west coast—15th Corps (Gen. Christison) to 
follow up—No opposition expected after Japanese surrender—1 5th Corps there- 
fore to proceed to Singapore—25th Div to disembark south of Port Swettenham 
on Sept. 9th, °45—23rd Div to land later south of Port Dickson—5th Div to 
follow 25th Div—Expedition sails from India and Burma late in Aug. ’45—Lt. 
Sandes on voyage of 78 Fd Coy (41 Beach Group)—Coy disembarks at Port 
Dickson (Sept. 12th)—Nature of coast—Few good beaches—Landings unop- 
posed—Sth Div therefore continues to Singapore—Many vehicles stuck in 
mud—Episode of bogged bulldozer—23rd and 25th Div Engrs prepare routes 
inland—23rd Div ordered to Java (Sept. 22nd)—25th Div Engrs improve com- 
munications and provide accommodation north of Johore State—Many additional 
Engineer units arrive in Malaya—Large bridges rebuilt at Gedong and Juru— 
Bridging on railways—Construction of Kuantan- Kota Bahru Road on east 
coast—93 Fd Coy commences bridging (Feb. °46)—472 A.G.R.E. starts main 
undertaking (June '46)—Ten I.E. Coys and an Engineer Bn employed-—Also 
four Bns of Japanese Ps.-of-W.—Work nearly completed (Nov. '46)—Events 
at Singapore—Sth Div (Gen. Mansergh) nears Singapore Island (Sept. 4th, 
*45)}—Arrival of Jap delegates awaited in H.M.S. Sussex—Gen. ltagaki signs 
surrender document—Terms of Malaya surrender—Sth Div lands in Singapore 
(Sept. 5th, °45)—Allied Ps.-of-W. liberated—Shocking condition of prisoners-— 
Repair work by 5th Div Engrs in Singapore and Johore State—Official general 
surrender at Singapore of all enemy forces in S.E. Asia (Sept. 12th, °45)— 
Admiral Lord Mountbatten presides at ceremony—Senior officers of Allied 
nations present—Jap delegation headed by Gen. Itagaki—Surrender terms 
signed—Union Jack hoisted—Boundaries of S.E.A.C. greatly extended—15th 
Corps redesignated “A.F.N.E.I.”—Ordered to Java and Sumatra—Brig. Swan 
as C.E.—Ist and 37th Bdes, 23rd Div, arrive Batavia (Oct. ’15)—49th Bde 
diverted to E. Java—Bde reaches Sourabaya (Oct. 25th)}—Situation in E. Java— 
Indonesians under Dr. Soerkano—Brig. Mallaby occupies Sourabaya and 
Darmo suburb—Armed revolt of Indonesians—Mallaby murdered—Decision to 
send 5th Div to E. Java—Description of Sourabaya—9th Bde (5th Div) dis- 
embarks (Nov. 7th)—Darmo evacuated—123rd Bde arrives—161st Bde diverted 
to W. Java—-Gen. Mansergh begins clearance of Sourabaya (Nov. 10th)—Town 
cleared (Nov. 28th)—Subsequent operations—Sth Div leaves E. Java (Jan. °46)— 
Experiences of 71 Fd Coy with 49th Bde—Massacre of Dutch women and 
children—71 Fd Coy besieged in Darmo barracks (Oct. 29th, ’45)—Gallantry of 
Capt. Floyer—Convoy of women and children leaves Darmo (Nov. 2nd)— 
71 Fd Coy follows (Nov. 6th)—Embarks with 49th Bde for W. Java (Nov. 25th) 
Bice Gir oo Re Coe installations repaired— 
*46)-—Last 5th Div troops leave E Java Gu Ops alrive Sourabaya (Feb. 4th, 


: ne ’46)—23rd Div i ee 
Indonesians troublesome—R.A.P.W.I. cisnmalion = Delch 4 a 


i inte < 

guarded—i6lst Bde (5th Div), 36th Bde (26th Div) and 5th Para Bde acne 
(Dec. °45)—Operations at Bandoeng (March '46)—Dutch troops begin to arrive— 
Coney: heavily attacked on Buitenzorg - Bandoeng Road (March 15th)— 
oh a ee Oat contre in W. Java—Last British-Indian forces leave 


ngineer work in W. Java—Dut i i 
Fd Coy prints newspaper—Operations in Sumatra b RD teen Cnbes) 


’ : Div sails from Madras (Oct. 
45)}—HQ established at Padang—Occ i , 
Dutch Engineer PI eek a ea of Medan and Palembang 


383- 


CONTENTS 


for India-—Operations in Thailand—7th Div (Gen. Evans) flown in from Burma 
(Sept. °45)—Japanese subservient—Jap methods of discipline—Composite 
62/421 Fd Coy arrives Bangkok (Sept. 7th}—77 Fd Coy follows by air (Oct. 
*45)—-331 Fd Pk Coy and 402 Fd Coy come later by sea—Amusing diary of 
62 Fd Coy-—Japanese Generals surrender swords to Gen. Evans (Jan. I tth, 
’46)—Brig. Cobb commands troops on parade—7th Div begins to leave Thailand 
for Malaya (Feb. 46)—421 Fd Coy remains till July—Operations in French 
Indo-China— 20th Div (Gen. Gracey) detailed to occupy Saigon area (Sept. 
*45)—Div Engrs study French—Description of Saigon—Annamese population 
hostile—Bravery of Major Lawler, R.A.E.—20th Div arrives mostly by sea— 
422 Fd Coy flown in from Burma (Sept. 29th)-—Other I.E. units come by sea— 
Sappers guard wells and repair installations—Col. Loomba on assistance given 
by Jap engineers-—Experiences of 422 Fd Coy--French troops arrive—Japs 
interned at Cap St. Jacques—Mahrattas of 92 Fd Coy billeted in Grand Hotel— 
92 Fd Coy assists French column—Coy transferred to Borneo (Dec. ’45}— 
Coy returns to India (May *46)—422 Fd Coy leaves Saigon (Jan. 21st, °46)— 
Voyages to Celebes Island—Repairs airfield near Macassar—Takes over stores 
from Australians—Malino hill station-—_422 Fd Coy embarks for India (July 
Ist)—481 Fd Coy and 332 Fd Pk Coy Jeave Saigon (Feb. 9th, ’°46)—Re-occupa- 
tion of Hongkong—-Mixed Force under Gen. Festing sails from Madras—Arrives 
Hongkong (Nov. 19th, °45)—Work of 96 Fd Coy in Hongkong—Coy returns to 
India (April °46)—Occupation of Japan by Allied Force under American Gen. 
MacArthur—-British Commonwealth Contingent under Australian Gen. 
Northcott includes British-Indian Div under Gen. Cowan—268th Ind. Inf. 
Bde under Brig. Thimayya represents Indian Army—Div Engrs include 429 
Fd Coy, R.I.E.—429 Fd Coy lands at Kure (March 2nd, '46)—HQ of “Brindiv” 
transferred to Okayama (June 4th)—Australian Gen. Robertson succeeds Gen. 
Northcott as “Brindiv’’ Comdr—363 Fd Coy and other R.I-E. units arrive in 
Japan—Assisted by Jap civilian labour—Ceremonial guard duties in Tokyo— 
Severe earthquake (Dec. 21st)—‘Brindiv” reduced to 268th Bde Group under 
Brig. Shrinagesh (May Ist, °47)}—363 Fd Coy embarks for India (Sept. 141h)— 
429 Fd Coy follows (Oct. 20th)—Last Indian units sail from Japan (Nov. ’47)— 
Malaya in 1947—Most R.LE. units depart before Independence Day (Aug. 
15th)—Their services urgently needed in India Sis 33 a0 aa a 


CHAPTER XV 


INDIA, 1944-47 


Corps of Indian Engineers enormously expanded in 1944-45—N.W. Frontier 
fairly quiet until 1947—Small expedition against Hazara gang beyond Oghi— 
Approach track bulldozed—Hazaras surrender (Jan. 47)—Rioting and arson 
in Dera Ismail Khan (April ‘47)—9 Fd Coy lays pipe-line—Gurkhas ambushed 
in Shahur Tangi (Sept. °47}—Non-combatants evacuated by air—Earlter events 
further south—14th and 39th Training Divs formed (Aug. °43)—Sappers attached 
for training in jungle warfare—Lt.-Col. Lindsell on Bangalore in 1943-44—Boys 
Bn formed (Oct. °43)—Training Bns—Instructional courses—Visit by Gen. 
Charles, Chief Royal Engineer (Dec. '43)—Bangalore News Letter_revived 
(July *44)—Posthumous award of George Cross to Sub. Subramaniam-— Training 
of Boys—Boxing—Visit by Gen. Auchinleck (April *44)—Strength of Madras 
Group (Sept. °44)—Engineer Officers’ Training School—Jungle Training Camp 
—IJndian Families’ Hospital—Women’s Club—Boys Bn moved to Jalahalli 
Camp (Jan, °45)—Boys’ Boxing team sent to Delhi--Senior officers in Madras 
Centre—Demobilization Centre formed (Aug. °45)—Resettlement training—- 
Madras Sapper Officers’ Association formed (Nov. "45)—Three Training Bas 
reduced to one—Lt. Pearson on events in Roorkee in 1944-—Bengal Group totals 
23,850 ranks (March ‘44)—School of Military Engineering established at 
Roorkee—Jungle training with 39th Training Div near Hardwar—33 Fd Sqo 
and 40 Fd Pk Sqn with 44th Armd Div in 1943 to defend east coast against 
invasion—44th Div converted to Airborne Div (April °44)—33 Fd Sqn personnel 
train as parachutists—Airborne role cancelled—Three Training Bns and Boys 
Bn at Roorkee Jan. °44)—-Depot Wing formed (March "44)—-Battle Schoo!l— 
Two O.C.T.Us.—Extracts from Roorkee News Letter (Jan. “44)—Visit by Gen. 
Charles (Nov. ’43)}—-Gen. C. A. Bird—Corps Parade—Lt.-Col. Connor on life 
in Roorkee in 1945—Remarks by Brig. Holloway—Kirkee in 1944-45—Three 
Training Bns at Dighi—Jungle Training School started—Brig. L. O. Clark on 
life in Kirkee—Clubs and Messes—Disbanding war-time Fd Coys—Condition 


XXV 


422 


XXVi CONTENTS 


of ex-Ps-of-W.—Few Regular R.E. officers remaining—Major Leslie-Jones on 
Boys Bn (1946)—Leadership training encouraged—Physical standards improved 
—Boxing popular—History of Engineer Groups in Punjab—Nos. 1, 3, and 6 
Groups at Lahore—No. 4 Group at Sialkot—No. 3 (Construction) Group 
raises 165 units—Remarks by Brig. Partap Narain—Disbandment ordered 
(May °45)—Demobilization begins (Nov. °45)—No. 4 Group provides nucleus 
for R. Pakistan Engineers after Partition in 1947—Gen. Gaussen on improve- 
ments noted in 1945 in Boys Bns and Sapper equipment and training—Value of 
14th and 39th Training Divs—Keen young officers—K.C.J.Os. already in many 
senior posts—Fateful years 1946 and 1947—Gen. H. Williams on the role of 
the Engineer in the defence of modern India—Gen. Roome as E.-in-C., India— 
Succeeded by Gen. Hasted (Jan. ’46)—Reception accorded to home-coming 
units—Capt. Spring—Smyth on welcome given to Sirmoor Fd Coy at Nahan 
(June °46)—7 Fd Coy re-formed as Sikh unit (Oct. '°46)—Muslim second-in- 
command very popular—Welcome given to 65 Fd Coy at Bangalore—Col. 
Loomba on process of demobilization—Lt.-Col. Lindsell on events in Bangalore 
in 1946—Title “Sappers and Miners” abolished—‘‘Regimental Centre” substi- 
tuted—Brig. R. C. R. Hill as first Col. Commandant of Madras Group—Gen. 
Roome for Bengal Group, and Gen. Nosworthy for Bombay Group—First 
re-union of Madras Sappers Officers Association (May 31st, °46)—Victory Parade 
in London—R.1E. contingent under Lt.-Col. Kochhar (June *46)—Madras 
Boys Bn wins All-India Boys Boxing Championship—Madras Sapper head- 
gear (“‘Doopta”’) abolished (Sept. °46)—Origin of the ‘‘Doopta’’—Process of 
demobilization at Roorkee—Story of C.O. Demob Bn and inspecting General 
—Title of “Royal” conferred on Corps of Indian Engineers (Feb. °46)—Post- 
war Class Composition of Bengal Group—Impressions of Roorkee in 1946 
by Brig. Duke—Many new buildings—Kirkee in 1946—Description in News 
Letters—Witty poem by Commandant—Communal feeding in Boys Bn— 
Sub.-Major Taj Din dined out—Self-Government for India-—Cabinet Mission 
in 1946—Lord Mountbatten appointed Viceroy vice F. M. Wavell (Feb. ’47)— 
Partition of India from Pakistan to be carried out—Gen. Tuker on attitude of 
troops—Army to be re-organized into communal classes—Impartially controlled 
contingent advocated—Problems of Partition—Retention of British volunteers— 
Transfer of most Muslim officers to Pakistan—Replacements needed—Gen, 
Steedman as E.-in-C., India—Gen. Hasted as E.-in-C., Supreme HQ—Partition 
decided—Announced by Prime Minister in Parliament (Feb. 20th, ’47)—Character 
of Lord Mountbatten—Partition Committees appointed (June !6th)——Partition 
date fixed as August 15th, 1947—-Basis of division of Army between India and 
Pakistan—Allotment of available units—Joint Defence Councils—F.M. 
Auchinleck in administrative control of Forces—Lord Mountbatten on speed of 
Partition—Army remains staunch—Effects of Partition on R.I.E. Groups— 
Madras Centre almost untouched—Bengal Centre loses half its strength— 
Bombay Centre loses 40%—New Class Composition of Bengal and Bombay 
Centres—Bengal Centre to supply bulk of equipment for R. Pakistan Centre at 
Sialkot—Disposal of silver and assets of R.E. Mess, Roorkee—Disposal of 
Thomason College workshop equipment—Thomason College becomes an 
University—History of S.M.E. in Thomason College—Transfer of S.M.E. to 
Kirkee begins (Aug. °47)—Commandant (Brig. H. Williams) appointed 
C.E. Southern Command—S.M.E. established in Kirkee (Dec. ’47)—Instruction 
commences (Feb. °48)-—List of Bengal units transferred to Pakistan—List of 
those remaining in Roorkee—Equipment and transport sent to Sialkot (July 
*47)—Seven British officers and nine Muslim officers elect transfer—Bengal 
Centre almost crippled—Regimenta! funds halved—Messes deniided—No 
instruments for Band—Floods add to difficulties—Col. Loomba on Partitio 
at Madras Centre—Uncertainty among British officers—Short T omnis: 
, ! erm Commis- 
sions proposed for V.C.Os.—Few Muslim Sappers elect for Pakistan——Event 
at Bombay Centre—Bombay News Letter (July °47)—A all 
British officers will have left India by June 1948—Shorta Sori Ce at i Mt 
See ie fe Bice Bn abolished (March 31st ay total 
fy y sune th— : 
pete eo Partition—Junior iodian ofc tae ta All nice op oltectts 
Lahore Districts TN AiE ae help to restore order in Sialkot and 
Sovereign States (Aug. 15th "47—-Earcell’ Monnens declared Independent 
to British troops—Partnership of British and I qin ke from F, M. Auchinleck 
from India—R.A.F. sail from Bomba (Al Fe eee ee 
Y (Aug. 17th)—F. M. Auchinleck closes 


Supreme Headquarters and leaves for U.K. (Nov. ’47)—HQ Briti i 

India transferred to Bombay (Dec. 22nd)—Gen. Whetler 2 SOREN ety 
ist Bn, Somerset L.I., remaining in India by Feb. ’48, and 2nd Bn, The Black 
Watch, in Pakistan—Somersets embark at Bombay (Feb. 28th, ’°48)—Impressive 
Ceremonial Parade—Farewell Message from Gen. Bucher, C.-in-C., India— 
Good feeling between Indian and Pakistan troops during Partition period— 
Independence Day celebrations peaceful—Union Jack lowered at Lucknow 
Residency—Indian National Flag hoisted—Last British units in Lucknow 
and Delhi—Transfer of military control—Indian Government agrees that 
Lord Mountbatten should remain as Governor General for seven months— 
Gen. Lockhart hands over command as C.-in-C., India, to Gen. Cariappa (Jan. 
’48)—Lord Mountbatten leaves India (June ’48)—Gen. H. Williams remains as 
E.-in-C. for eight years—Last British Commandants at R.ILE. Centres—2nd 
Lt. Rane wins Param Vir Chakra in Kashmir operations (April ’48)—Equivalent 
to Victoria Cross—Last R.E. officers leave Corps of Indian Engineers in 1948— 
“Sarvatra” (everywhere) the motto of the modern Corps—Corps Day celebrated 
annually on Jan. 28th .. xa oa ae si ae iv 6 iss 


APPENDIX A 


MADRAS ENGINEER GROUP 


APPENDIX B 


BENGAL ENGINEER GROUP 


APPENDIX C 


BOMBAY ENGINEER GROUP 


463 


501 


506 


S11 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


INDIAN ENGINEERS. A NAIK OF THE MADRAS GROUP; A _ SAPPER 
OF THE BENGAL GROUP; A SAPPER OF THE BOMBAY GROUP 
e ee 4 .. Frontispiece 


Facing page 

RECRUITS GOING THROUGH AN ASSAULT COURSE : : : 14 

SAPPERS AND MINERS REPAIRING THE ROAD TO BARENTU . 34 

CoLoneL P. S. BHAGAT, V.C. : ‘ , : . +. 36 
SAPPERS AND MINERS CLEARING A ROAD BLOCK BETWEEN 

ASMARA AND MASSAWA ‘ : ‘ : ‘ . 44 

INDIAN ENGINEERS LAYING RAILWAY TRACK IN IRAQ ‘ ¢. 236 


SAPPERS AND MINERS RUSH MINE DETECTING APPARATUS 
THROUGH A GAP IN ENEMY WIRE CLEARED BY A BANGALORE 


TORPEDO : i : : : ‘ ‘ : . 108 
MINE DETECTION IN TUNISIA . : : ; ; . 120 
USING A PNEUMATIC DRILL WHILE ROADMAKING IN TUNISIA . 132 
SUBEDAR SUBRAMANIAM, G.C. : ‘ % : : . 154 


INDIAN AND BRITISH ENGINEERS OF THE EIGHTH ARMY SPANNING 
THE RIVER PO WITH A 1,370 FEET PONTOON BRIDGE, THE 


LONGEST MILITARY BRIDGE IN ITALY ; : ‘ . 170 
JUNGLE TRAINING IN MALAYA ; : : ’ ; . 182 
TRANSPORT ON THE TAMU-PALEL ROAD : ‘ : . 236 
OlL TANK UNDER CONSTRUCTION BY GENERAL RESERVE 
ENGINEER FORCE AT DIBRUGARH : : . . . 248 
LANDING AT AKYAB_. : ; : . ‘ > . 300 
REINFORCEMENTS AND EQUIPMENT ARRIVING IN KOHIMA . 334 
FERRYING ARMOUR AND TRANSPORT ACROSS THE IRRAWADDY . 368 


INDIAN TROOPS IN ACTION AT SEYWA DURING THE ADVANCE 
TO MEIKTILA ; . 376 


65 FIELD COMPANY OPENING THE GATES OF FORT DUFFERIN 
AT MANDALAY, MARCH 20TH, 1945 . . ; . 380 


SUNSET OVER RANGOON HARBOUR 


CONSTRUCTING THE KEMAJARAN AIRFIELD NEAR BATAVIA . 442 


XXVili 


MAPS 


N. E. AFRICA ; : 
ERITREA AND SUDAN-ABYSSINIA BORDER 
BATTLE OF KEREN 

MIDDLE East 

NorTH AFRICA 

TUNISIA 

CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ITALY 

N. E. ITALy 

MALAYA 

Waw AREA : : 

Tippim Roap, CHINDWIN R. AREA 
ARAKAN 

MAUNGDAW AREA : 

7TH IND. Div. ADMIN Box, SINZWEYA 
LowER ARAKAN 

IMPHAL : 

Trppim Roan, MILESTONES 32 To 83 


Tippim Roap, MILESTONE 109 TO KALEMYO 


CENTRAL BURMA 

UPPER BURMA 

LOWER BURMA 
TOUNGOO-RANGOON AREA 
SouTH-EAasT ASIA 
LANDINGS IN MALAYA 


SOURABAYA 


XXIX 


Facing Page 


._,—-Y * 


50 


80 


138 


174 


208 
238 
272 


312 


344 


382 


420 


462 


THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 
1939-47 


CHAPTER |! 


INDIA, 1939-43 


T is a far cry from Dethi to Munich, and farther yet to Rome 
I. Tokio. Though the unprovoked invasion of Abyssinia by the 

Italians in 1935 had shown that Mussolini might follow Hitler, 
and subsequent Japanese training in amphibious landings and jungle 
warfare had given rise to much speculation, India seemed so distant 
from any possible danger zone that it might reasonably be supposed 
that she would not be drawn, to any great extent, into an armed 
conflict with Germany. Nevertheless, in 1938, long before cipher 
messages had begun to reach Simla with increasing frequency, prep- 
arations were put in hand and !5 Field Company was detailed to 
go to Malaya, although little of this filtered through to the man in 
the ranks. Indeed, in 1939 the normal round of daily work con- 
tinued everywhere as if no clouds were gathering on the western 
horizon. Some acceleration in a process of mechanization could be 
noted at the Sapper and Miner Headquarters at Bangalore, Roorkee 
and Kirkee, but on the North-West Fronticr the construction of 
fortified camps, bridge-building on the Kabul River and occasional 
demonstrations against recalcitrant tribesmen, continued in accord- 
ance with the usual routine. 

Perhaps the general atmosphere at the Sapper and Miner Head- 
quarters immediately before the war may be ilustrated by some 
extracts from the Adjutant’s News Letter written in Roorkee on the 
fateful morning of September 3rd, 1939. “We have received no 
warning orders of any impending mobilization and it is not clear 
what effort the Bengal Corps will be expected to produce in any 
war. Cipher wires have been arriving fairly frequently and every- 
one likety to be mobilized has been medically examined. All leave 
has been stopped, and all ranks have been recalled from leave. [n the 
meantime, work proceeds on plans for modernization. 1! and 2 Field 

' 


2 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Companies and 43 Divisional Company are due for modernization 
this cold weather and will get a large increase of motor trans- 
port and mechanical tools. 43 Divisional Company will become a 
Field Park Company after being modernized. 3 Field Company 
expect to have their work on the Wana Project completed by the 
end of December. Their destination after that is uncertain, but they 
hope to go to Nowshera in place of 15 Field Company which has 
gone overseas. In the meantime, they have been busy winning the 
Wana Brigade hockey tournament. We don’t know when to expect 
any officers from home, if at all. We had hoped to see Lieut-Colonel 
K. J. Lee (Commandant) about September 20th and Lieut-Colonel 
C. L. B. Duke some ten days earlier. They may be on their way 
now, via the Cape, but we have not heard. 4 Field Company, as 
a practice for the Mobile Column, marched through Saharanpur the 
other day and returned wearing gas-masks. The inhabitants were 
slightly taken aback, and the Mobile Column got extremely hot! 
The Training Battalion now do all their drill in threes, and other 
units have been practising the new drill although it has not yet been 
generally adopted. We have two Indian Commissioned Officers here 
for training—2nd Lieuts. Shiv Dial Singh and Arjan Singh. Major 
H. Williams is commanding a Field Squadron at Aldershot and 
writes that he is hard-worked but happy.” 

It is almost incredible that this could have been written only a 
few hours before news of the outbreak of a World War. Yet, at 
the end of the same letter is a short but momentous postscript. 
“Since writing the above, war has broken out with Germany. Vice- 
roy’s Commissioned Officers and N.C.Os listened to the King’s 
broadcast on September 3rd, 1939, in the V.C.Os’ Club.” Thus 
the terrible news reached the little station on the bank of the Solani 
River within sight of the Himalayan snows. 

On October 9th, the Roorkee Adjutant resumes his story. ‘*4 Field 
Company, the first to go overseas in the last war, has maintained 
its reputation and has just started for an unknown destination. One 
Section, left behind, has been experimenting with a mat bridge, a 
sort of magic carpet which floats on water. Most officers who were 
on leave in the United Kingdom have now rejoined. A cryptic 
cipher message reached Army Headquarters the other day stating 
that there were a large number of officers ‘in the Duchess’s bed”! 
This, however, proved to be merely a corruption of the name of the 
ship in which they sailed. We expect Ievers and Mangat Rai to 
return soon from an E. and M. Course at home. We were very glad 


INDIA, 1939-43 3 


to welcome General C. A. Bird on October 2nd. He had just arrived 
in India to take over as Engineer-in-Chief. The Faridkot Field 
Company of the Indian States’ Forces is now in Roorkee, training 
with us. They are a fine body of men. The Malerkotla Field Com- 
pany is at Rawalpindi. 5S Field Company is now fully Indianized 
and all the V.C.Os have left it’’. 

The next letter, written early in November 1939, states that the 
war had not yet made much difference in Roorkee; and another 
dated January 3rd, 1940, records that the only item of major import- 
ance during December had been the conversion of 41 and 43 Divis- 
ional Companies into one-class units, all Sikhs and all Mussulmans 
respectively. There is much about Sport. A Sapper team had reached 
the final of the Meerut Polo Tournament and five officers had gone 
to Gulmarg in Kashmir for ski-ing. The News Letters, however, 
necessarily give a rather one-sided picture, and lest it should be 
imagined that the Sappers and Miners at Roorkee, Kirkee and 
Bangalore were taking the war too lightly it may be well to emphasize 
that intensive training and expansion filled every hour of a long 
working day and that the Adjutant’s apparent fondness for social 
and sporting events was due to steadily increasing censorship. Polo 
began to languish, and after April 1940, when 35 Field Troop was 
mechanized, it became difficult to mount a team for any tournament. 
Social life declined. By July 1940, the Roorkee Club, which had 
been closed fifteen months earlier, had become a derelict cattle- 
byre, and No | Bungalow, once the Commandant’s residence, had 
lain unoccupied for years. As in Bangalore and Kirkee, the war was 
leaving its mark. Everything was being subordinated to military 
needs. The Sapper polo ground was converted into hockey and 
football grounds for the rapidly increasing garrison. New buildings 
were springing up in all directions. No 1 Bungalow was to be 
renovated to provide an additional Officers’ Mess. The New Year’s 
Parade on January Ist, 1941, saw all officers on foot for the first 
time and the men in field service dress in place of the former tunic, 
knickerbockers and blue putties. It would have been difficult for 
any pre-war Sapper to recognize the Roorkee of 1941. 

The enormous expansion of the three Corps after 1939 would 
have been impossible had not Indianization of the King’s Commis- 
sioned Officer ranks been started during the summer of 1934 when 
three Field Companies—5 (Bengal), 15 (Madras) and 22 (Bombay) 
—were selected for the purpose. The history of this process is des- 
cribed briefly in The Indian Sappers and Miners to which this volume 


4 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


is a sequel, but some recapitulation may be advisable. Indianization 
of other branches of the Indian Army had been initiated as early 
as 1923 as a natural consequence of political evolution and in re- 
cognition of gallantry displayed in the First World War, but for 
some reason it was withheld from the Sappers and Miners. In 1932 
an Indian Military Academy was opened in Dehra Dun to train 
cadets for commissions in the Indian Army, including the newly 
formed “Corps of Indian Engineers.”” The Commandant was Brig- 
adier L. P. Collins; and the Assistant Commandant, Colonel A. J. G. 
Bird, was a former Commandant of the Bengal Sappers and Miners. 
This institution was designed to replace the R.M.A. Woolwich and 
the R.M.C. Sandhurst in catering for the needs of the Indian Army. 
Half the cadets came through an open competition, whilst the remain- 
der were from the ranks. A number came from the Prince of Wales’ 
Royal Indian Military College at Dehra Dun, where boys were already 
being educated on military lines. Major H. Williams, R.E., joined 
the Staff of the Academy, and thus the Engineer element was well 
represented; but only those young Indian Officers of the Engineer 
Branch who returned to India after qualifying at Woolwich and the 
School of Military Engineering, Chatham, held King’s Commissions 
(K.C.I.Os), the entries from the Dehra Dun Academy being denom- 
inated I.C.Os (Indian Commissioned Officers). The Jatter had 
to undergo a further course of 3 years training in civil engineering 
at the Thomason College, Roorkee, before being posted to one of 
the three Sapper and Miner Corps. The first K.C.I.O., Lieut. R. E. 
Aserappa, reached India in 1935 and others followed. 2nd Lieuts. 
N. S. Bhagat and A. N. Kashyap, I.E., arrived in Roorkee from 
Dehra Dun in February 1935, and 2nd Lieut. Anant Singh in August, 
being followed, in February 1936, by 2nd Lieuts. J. S. Dhillon and 
A. D. Verma, I-E., and later by other I.C.Os. In October 1936, 
Major H. Williams took charge of the I.C.Os studying at the 
Thomason College. He was followed by Major C. D. Reed in 
November 1938. Only six officers completed the full training at 
the College, the remainder being withdrawn due to the outbreak 
of the war. The Officers’ Mess formed at the Thomason College may 
well be regarded as the first ‘‘Indian Engineers’ Mess”. It can 
be said to have been revived when the School of Military Engineering 
was established later during the war in the College buildings. When 
the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich was closed suddenly on 
the outbreak of the Second World War, the Academy at Dehra Dun 
became the sole means of normal entry for Indians to the King's 


INDIA, 1939-43 5 


Commissioned ranks of the Indian Engineers. It supplied hundreds 
of young officers who were often called upon to command Field 
Companies, or even higher formations, in battle and did so with 
marked ability and success. Several Indian officers had qualifed, 
long before the war, in the Staff Colleges at Camberley or Quetta, 
the most notable being Captain K. M. Cariappa, 7th Rajput Regi- 
ment, who was a Staff Captain in the Deccan District in 1937 and 
later became a General Officer and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Indian Army. 

Some details of the vast expansion which took place in the Corps 
of Indian Engineers from September 1939 onwards can be studied 
in the Appendices at the end of this volume which have been compiled 
by the Commandants of the three Sapper and Miner Groups. They 
need hardly be repeated in this narrative, for the average reader 
requires only a general picture; but before embarking on a brief 
voyage through the ever changing channels of a stream of reorgan- 
ization which soon developed into a mighty flood, we may pause 
to consider the contrast between the duties required of Sappers and 
Miners (or Indian Engineers) in the First and Second World Wars. 
In the 1914-18 War, the Sappers and Miners had to be expert in all 
forms of field works, bridging and demolitions, to be skilled in 
various trades, and to have considerable knowledge of water-supply, 
road and railway construction and electrical and mechanical plant. 
But in the 1939-45 War, far more was demanded. In addition to 
all their former accomplishments they had to be able to construct 
and maintain airfields, build large permanent bridges, lay and lift 
minefields, operate bulldozers and cranes, and provide and operate 
oil-pipe lines. They had also to be familiar with the technique of 
chemical, tank, amphibious and jungle warfare, and to have a working 
knowledge of surveying, forestry, quarrying, and docks for shipping. 
It is obvious that no Engineer soldier could hope to be even mod- 
erately efficient in all these branches, and hence the diversity of the 
new technical formations which appeared after 1939, bringing about 
an expansion in strength and an elaboration in training which none 
could have foreseen. 

When war was declared, the Madras Sappers and Miners com- 
prised only 11 field units—9 and 10 Field Companies, 11 Army 
Troops Company, 12, 13, 14 and 15 Field Companies, 16 Army 
Troops Company, 32 Field Troop (later re-designated “Squadron”), 
44 Divisional H.Q. Company (later re-designated ‘Field Park”) and 
51 Printing Section. Including a Training Battalion and Depot 


6 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


formations, the total strength amounted to only 51 Officers, 55 
British Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers, 65 Viceroy’s 
Commissioned Officers (V.C.Os), 3 Indian Warrant Officers and 
3,300 Indian Other Ranks. It is interesting to note that, when Japan 
surrendered, the Madras Group of the Indian Engineers was re- 
presented by 101 units including 667 Officers, 217 B.W. and N.C. 
Officers, 607 V.C.Os and no less than 30,630 Indian Other Ranks.} 
In 1939, the Bengal Sappers and Miners had 11 field units—1, 2, 3, 
4 and 5 Field Companies, 6 and 8 Army Troops Companies, 41 and 
43 Divisional H.Q. Companies, and 31 and 35 Field Troops. With 
a Training Battalion and Depot formations, the total strength was 
3,242. But in March 1944, when it reached its peak, the Bengal Group 
had 73 units and a strength of 23,800 ranks, or roughly seven times 
the 1939 figure. The Bombay Sappers and Miners started the war 
with 7 field units —18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 Field Companies, 42 Divi- 
sional H.Q. Company and 55 Printing Section. Including a Training 
Battalion and Depot formations, the strength was 3,006. Yet in spite 
of losing two-thirds of the regular units in the disaster at Singapore 
early in 1942, the Bombay Group comprised nearly 25,000 officers 
and men before the end of the following year. When the war ended, 
exclusive of the Transportation and Survey Branches but including 
the Military Engineer Services, the Corps of Indian Engineers totalled 
more than 7,000 Officers and 235,000 Other Ranks. The field units 
numbered 482 and were of 54 different types.2 Statistics, though 
irksome, are sometimes very revealing. 

“Expansion for the war started initially in the Sapper and Miner 
Corps”, writes the Engineer-in-Chief,3 ‘‘and such units as a Workshop 
and Park Company and a Railway Construction Company were 
taised. It was realized in 1940 that it would be difficult for the three 
Corps to undertake the whole production of the many and various 
types of Engineer units which would be required by the rapidly 
expanding Indian Army, so recourse was had to civilian tradesmen 
for the raising of Technical Corps and Army Engineer units, including 
Transportation units, and six Engineer Depots were formed to raise 
the new types of Indian Engineer units. These were No 1 Depot 


1 Bangalore News Letter, Sept. 1945. 


? “India’s Engineer War Effort’, by the E-in-C., India, appearing in The R.E. 
Journal, June 1946. 


3 “The Corps of Indian Engineers’, by the E-in-C., India, appearing in The R.E. 
Journal, March 1945. 


INDIA, 1939-43 ? 


for E. and M. Companies, Workshops and Stores units; No 2 for 
Railway units; No 3 for Artisan Works Companies and Heavy 
Bridging Companies; No 4 for Pioneer (later re-named Engineer) 
Battalions; No 5 for Docks and Inland Water Transport (I.W.T.) 
units; and No 6 for Excavating Machinery units. Towards the 
end of 1941, the various categories of Indian Engineers were renamed 
“Groups”, including not only the Sappers and Miners but also 
Nos 1, 3, 4 and 6 Depots. Transportation units, which originally 
were formed under the Engineer-in-Chief, had meantime passed to 
the control of the Quarter-Master-General, and the original Nos 2 
and 5 Engineer Depots had been re-designated Nos 2 and 1 Trans- 
portation Training Centres (T.T.Cs) respectively.” 

The Engineer-in-Chief adds that under his own orders were placed 
the three Sapper and Miner Groups, Nos 1, 3, 4 and 6 Groups and 
the Military Engineer Services (M.E.S.): under the Quarter-Master- 
General, the Railway Construction and Maintenance Groups, Railway 
Operating Groups, Railway Workshop Groups, Transportation 
Stores Groups, Docks Groups and J.W.T. Groups: and under the 
Chief of the General Staff, the Survey Group. The Sapper and Miner 
Groups comprised all Divisional Engineer units such as Field Com- 
panies, etc, and units of similar types with Corps or Army Troops, 
and also Quarrying Companies, Pipe-line Operating Units and Army 
Troops Companies. So great was the complication of this organ- 
ization that it must suffice merely to touch the fringe of the subject 
before embarking in later chapters on a narrative of front line opera- 
tions and the experiences of field units. 

Since rapid expansion depends on properly organized recruit- 
ment, urgent steps had to be taken to obtain the necessary personnel. 
Prior to 1932, each Sapper and Miner Corps was responsible for its 
own recruitment. This was a simple matter because there was no 
lack of applicants of the very best type to supply the modest needs 
of the comparatively small establishments centred on Roorkee, 
Kirkee and Bangalore. When recruits were required, all that was 
necessary was to send postcards to the Umedwars, or aspirants for 
entry, each of whom had previously come to the Headquarters at 
his own expense to be medically examined and interviewed and, if 
found satisfactory, placed on a waiting list for enrolment. Some 
had travelled hundreds of miles to receive this honour. Every man 
was vouched for by some relative or connection who was serving, or 
had served, in the Corps, and thus recruitment was, in fact, a family 
affair. But in 1932 the old system was abolished. Orders were issued 


8 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


that in future all recruiting was to be done through Recruiting Officers 
controlled by the Adjutant-General’s Branch. Family tradition and 
personal selection were to go by the board and be replaced by a 
cold, though highly efficient, regime which was better designed, no 
doubt, to meet increasing demands or any sudden emergency. Never- 
theless the Sappers and Miners, and particularly the Madras Corps, 
continued to do a considerable amount of their own recruiting. 

In September 1939, recruitment was accelerated to meet war 
requirements, but not to the extent that might have been expected 
in view of the bellicose attitude of Japan, and although all Reservists 
were Called up, the real flood of recruits did not begin until 1941. Boys 
Battalions were then formed in each Corps, and after 18 months’ 
training, these youths were admitted as Sappers. They were excellent 
material, well educated, good tradesmen and suitable for promotion 
from the ranks. The classes of men enlisted into the Bengal Sappers 
and Miners were Mussulmans (Punjabi Mussulmans, Pathans and 
Meos), Hindus (Brahmins and Chathris) and Sikhs (mostly Jats). 
The Bombay Corps enlisted Punjabi Mussulmans, Hindus (Mahrattas) 
and Sikhs (Mazbis and Ramdasias); while the Madras Corps en- 
listed Hindus, Mussulmans, Christians and Bhuddists who, even 
in these early days, fed together and ignored all class distinctions. 
In this respect the administration and maintenance of the Madras 
Corps was greatly simplified on active service, and it is happy to 
record that the system has now spread to both the other Corps. 

The initial slowness of expansion in the three Sapper and Miner 
Corps may be attributed not only to the neutrality of Japan and the 
improbability that Indian troops would be used against Germany in 
Europe, but also to a general shortage of equipment. In addition, 
there was the acute problem of finding the necessary number of 
officers. As in the 1914-18 war, the Army in India Reserve of Officers 
(A.J.R.O.) came to the rescue so far as possible, and young civilian 
engineers from Government Departments or firms flocked to the 
three Headquarters for training before being posted to units. Early 
in 1940, Officer Cadets Training Units (O.C.T.Us.) were established 
for all three Corps, and the intake from the Indian Military Academy 
at Dehra Dun was increased. Promotion of suitable Indian V.C.Os 
to 1.C.O. rank was encouraged and helped to some extent to ease 
the situation though not many such promotions were made during 
the war. The O.C.T.Us were soon replaced by an Engineer Officers’ 
Training School (E.O.T.S.) in Bangalore, affiliated to the Madras 
Corps and responsible for training all A.L.R.O. officers, and also 


INDIA, 1939-43 9 


cadets, for direct commissions. In addition, the School conducted 
special classes for officers and N.C.Os from West Africa, Burma 
and Afghanistan. Many of the cadets were Indians, though most 
were British who were drawn from the civil population of India; 
but when this source dried up, parties of British cadets were sent 
from England. The School had an excellent Mess which could accom- 
modate 120 cadets, and the catering was usually all that could be 
desired. But not invariably, for in the Mess records can be seen a 
chit written by a certain cadet to the Mess Steward. “I am going out 
this evening’’, it runs. “So whatever Officer Cadet Smith can eat of 
my dinner, please let him do so.” 

During 1940, a number of Engineer Training Centres (E.T.Cs) 
were formed throughout India. They were well equipped with work- 
shops and trained Other Ranks in all branches of military engineering. 
Additional Training Battalions were formed during 1941, and also 
Forming Troops Battalions to supervise the training of new units. 
The Engineer Training Centres were located at Rawalpindi, Secun- 
derabad, Quetta, Jhansi, Sialkot, Lucknow, Meerut, Nowshera, 
Dighi (Kirkee) and Kohat, and undertook the training of some 
new units and of tradesmen of all new field units. In 1941 the Com- 
mandant at Bangalore was Colonel P. A. Tucker, who was succeeded 
in April 1942 by Colonel J. F. D. Steedman. At Roorkee, the Com- 
mandant was Colonel H. N. Obbard, who had taken over from Colonel 
K.J. Lee in August 1940; and at Kirkee the Commandant was Colonel 
H. E. Horsfield, who was succeeded by Colonel H. P. Cavendish in 
September 1942, 

We come now to the enormous field of Transportation in all its 
various aspects. Although the Indian Army Transportation Services 
were controlled during the greater part of the war by the Quarter- 
Master-General, they. were officered and manned largely by the 
Indian Engineers and consequently require some notice. 

In Napoleon’s days, armies were said to move on their bellies; 
now they move more comfortably, and much more rapidly, by every 
form of land, sea and air transport. Long before armies became 
mechanized, the science of military logistics had begun to occupy 
the minds of commanders in the field. For instance, the first trans- 
portation unit in the British Army appeared in Egypt in 1882 when 
8 Company, R.E., was converted into a Railway Company}. In 


wes ee te 


1 Paper by Brigadier R. Gardiner, c.B.£., Director of Transportation, India Com- 
mand, 1942-43, 


10 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


India, a Military Railway Company was raised at Sialkot in 1902 
as a result of experience gained during the Third China War.) The 
original proposal was to raise six companies; but only one more 
appeared and this was formed in 1905. The two units, known as 
25 and 26 Railway (Construction) Companies, were vaguely affliated 
to the Bengal and Bombay Corps respectively. In 1914 they proceeded 
to East Africa and, with the addition of three more companies (27, 
28 and 29), developed into a Railway Battalion, Sappers and Miners, 
which rendered good service in Africa and elsewhere until abolished 
in 1921. 25 and 26 Companies remained in being as part of the Royal 
Bombay Sappers and Miners, but they also were disbanded in 1931. 
Thus, at the outbreak of the Second World War, the Army in India 
had no Transportation service whatever! There was no organization 
similar to those to be found in the British, American or Russian 
armies, nor even a nucleus from which such an organization could 
be expanded. Mr. Winston Churchill once said that Transportation 
was the greatest problem of the war. For India, the problem seemed 
well nigh insoluble; yet by enormous exertions, it was solved. 

A beginning was made in 1940 when two Railway Companies and 
two small Dock Companies were raised under the Engineer-in-Chief 
whose responsibilities for military transportation extended at that time 
from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Far East. The first to 
be formed was 101 Railway Construction Company of the Madras 
Corps. Early in 1941, No 2 Engineer Depot was established at 
Jullundur and the raising of a further eleven Railway companies 
was sanctioned?. In October, this Depot became No 2 Transportation 
Training Centre (T.T.C.) and was made responsible not only for 
raising all Railway units but also for their training and reinforcement. 
One month earlier, No 1 T.T.C. responsible for Docks units and 
Inland Water Transport units, had been established in Bombay and 
Deolali, having originated from No 5 Engineer Depot3. These 
reorganizations were undertaken by the Quarter-Master-General’s 
Branch to which all responsibility for military transportation had 
been transferred in May 1941, much to the relief, no doubt, of the 
Engineer-in-Chief. No less than 37 different types of transportation 


! The Indian Sappers and Miners, by Lieut-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.s.0., M.c., 
p. 689, Appendix F. 


*“Indian Army Transportation Service,” by Major Sharma, Engineers, appearing 
in The Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers (India), April 1950. 


*No 5 Engineer Depot had been formed in July 1941. 


INDIA, 1939-43 ll 


units were es in India during the war, and in October 1945, 
excluding a Defence of India Corps”, the Transportation Service 
had 217 units and a strength of 1,463 officers and 89,000 other ranks.1 
The Defence of India Corps was formed in 1943 to help in the main- 
tenance of communications for the war against the Japanese who 
seemed likely at that time to attempt an invasion of India. It ex- 
panded gradually until it included most of the civilian employees of 
the Indian railways and ports and of the I.W.T. companies operating 
against the enemy, and in time it reached a strength of more than 
200,000. The men were mostly Railway and Port employees. 

Some idea of the complexity of the Military Transportation Service 
may be gained from a list of the main types of units. The Railway 
units comprised Survey, Bridging, Construction, Maintenance, Tele- 
graph Maintenance, Operating, Yard Operating, Control and Work- 
shop Companies. The Transportation Stores units included Stores 
Companies and Docks Liaison Sections. The Docks and Ports 
units comprised Docks Operating and Docks Maintenance Companies, 
Stevedore Units, Boat Companies and Port Operating and Port 
Construction Companies; and the Inland Water Transport branch 
was represented by Operating Companies, Workshop Companies, 
Floating Workshop Companies, River Salvage Companies, “Z” 
Craft? Operating Companies, Craft Erection Companies and Riveting 
Companies. The list almost staggers the imagination. 

The Survey Group formed a small but important branch of the 
Indian Engineers during the war. Before 1940 there was no Military 
Survey service in India, all such work being undertaken by the Survey 
of India Department when occasion demanded. This arrangement 
had proved satisfactory in the 1914-18 War but was inadequate for 
the conditions of the 1939-45 War, and accordingly steps were taken 
to raise some Military Survey units resembling those of the British 
Army. A Survey Depot, formed in 1940, soon brought satisfactory 
results and during the following year a number of Survey units were 
sent overseas. In 1942, after the entry of Japan into the war, the 
Survey Directorate was expanded and units of many different types 
were formed including not only Field Survey Companies but also 
Air Survey Companies and formations dealing with Drawing, Map 
Reproduction and other branches. By 1945, the Directorate was 
pete et a BB et ee Se 

1“ India's Engineer War Effort, 1939-45”, by the E-in-C., India, appearing in 
The R.E. Journal, June 1946. 

27" Craft were powered barges of shallow draft. 


12 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


employing 206 officers and nearly 4,000 men, and most of the Field 
Survey Companies were busily engaged in mapping the wilder parts 
of Burma. 

The Military Engineer Services, an indispensable part of the Corps 
of Indian Engineers, did yeoman work behind the fighting fronts 
during the Second World War. They constructed and maintained 
buildings, defences and airfields on the lines of communication, 
together with roads, electrical and mechanical installations, water 
supply and drainage systems and a thousand and one other require- 
ments of the armies in the field, and not only for them but also for 
the Naval and Air Forces. The work was done mostly by contract. 
When the war ended, the Military Engineer Services had spent more 
than £260 million. They had provided living accommodation for nearly 
one million men and hospital accommodation for 150,000 and had 
completed 26 large bases and docks for the Royal Navy, and 215 
large airfields, 60 smaller ones and 260 hangars, for the Royal Air 
Force, not to mention a great number of Prisoner-of-War camps. 
They had constructed 1,600 miles of roadway and laid 1,191 miles of 
oil-pipe line. These statistics are sufficient to show that, together 
with the Transportation Services, they did everything possible to ensure 
that the forces in the field should lack nothing to ensure victory. 

After this outline of the organization and war expansion of the 
Indian Engineers we can revert to the events during the first half 
of the war which concerned the Sapper and Miner units still remaining 
on Indian soil. As already recorded, 4 Field Company of the Bengal 
Corps was mobilized at Roorkee in the middle of September 1939 
and 12 Field Company of the Madras Corps at Bangalore. Each 
was to have only three Sections instead of four, and no animals were 
to be kept; but the number of mechanical transport vehicles per 
unit was to be raised from four to no less than thirty-five. India had 
offered two brigades for service overseas, and each brigade was to 
be allotted one Field Company. Accordingly, in October 1939, 
4 Field Company departed from Roorkee soon after 12 Field Company 
had set out from Bangalore, heavily garlanded and much envied by 
those they left behind. They were bound for Egypt, though they did 
not know it. 11 Army Troops Company also started for Egypt 
from Bangalore, and 18 Company of the Bombay Corps had already 
gone from Kirkee. There was little unusual activity at any of the 
Sapper Headquarters at this early stage except that all reservists had 
been called up and intensive training was in progress in trades and 
mechanical transport. The idea still persisted at Army Headquarters 


INDIA, 1939-43 13 


that a whole year would be needed to produce an efficient field unit, 
primarily because of the very high standard of skill in trades demanded 
for modern warfare. “The M.T. training was pursued with vigour 
and a great deal of smoke”, writes Lieut. G. Pearson.! “The most 
up-to-date types of vehicles being unavailable, fabulous prices were 
paid to contractors to supply what they could. Asa result, an exciting 
circus of ancient buses, old private cars and a few lorries were gathered 
together, and these, puffing and shaking, made disjointed progress 
around the M.T. School’s training pitch. Many of them burnt too 
much oil, and some connections were made with string, all of which 
was good training for the smokescreens and hastily improvised repairs 
of the future.” Similar scenes might have been observed at the 
Headquarters of the Madras and Bombay Sappers, where only by 
the most strenuous efforts could the lag in mechanization be retrieved. 
The immediate problems facing all the Sapper units destined for 
battle fronts were shortages of motor transport and equipment. In 
this connection one calls to mind Mr. Winston Churchill’s description 
of a Democracy entering a major war. He said that during the first 
year the rate of munitions’ production was nothing at all; during 
the second year, very little; during the third year, quite a lot; and 
during the fourth year, ‘all that you want.’ Such was the experience 
of India. 

By the middle of 1940, in spite of problems of transport, equip- 
ment and training, the Sappers and Miners were able to despatch 
a number of field units overseas.2 The fall of France, and the entry 
of Italy as an ally of Germany, had widened the area of commitments, 
and the attitude of Japan was causing grave concern. Speed, and 
yet more speed, was demanded. In August 1940, 2 Field Company, 
6 and 8 Army Troops Companies and 2 Bridging Train (formed 
from the fourth Section of 4 Field Company) were mobilized by the 
Bengal Corps and set out for the Sudan to join the Sth Indian Division 
in fighting the Italians. 44 Field Park Company and 16 Workshop 
and Park Company went also from Bangalore; and in September, 
Roorkee began to assemble the Divisional Engineer units of an 8th 
Indian Division in Iraq, these being 7 and 66 Field Companies and 


1 Brief Histor} ‘y of the K. OG. V 50. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R. 1. LE, 
by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p.2. 

2.4 Short History of the Q.V’s O. Madras Sappers and Miners during World War H, 
1939-45, by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., p. 3. 

31In Bangalore the first new unit to be formed was 56 Field Company, which came 
into being on April 15th, 1940. 


14 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


47 Field Park Company. Then, at the end of the year and early in 
1941, the Bombay Corps made its great effort and despatched to 
Malaya no less than six field units—17, 19, 22 and 23 Field Companies, 
42 Field Park Company and 45 Army Troops Company—or more 
than two-thirds of its regular units, none of which was destined to 
return for they were lost in the tragedy of Singapore. 

The year 1941 saw a steady stream of units under formation, and 
as soon as they were ready they left for the various theatres of the 
war. Men were being trained everywhere, on the ranges, parade 
grounds and field works grounds, in the workshops, in boats on 
rivers and canals and in the jungles. Some units were on the North- 
West Frontier practising with Inglis and Hamilton bridges at Akora 
on the Kabul River; others were engaged on water supply schemes 
or building fortified camps; others again were in the Central Prov- 
inces or Southern Indian jungles, working under novel conditions. 
All were desperately busy. More than a dozen new Field Companies 
were raised in Roorkee alone during 1941 and 1942, and as fast as 
they were trained at Headquarters they disappeared eastwards to 
learn the more advanced technique of the jungle before meeting 
the Japanese. ‘‘To the Bengal Corps, early in the war’’, writes Lieut. 
G. Pearson,! ‘‘fell the lot of raising various specialist units such as 
Road Roller Platoons, Bridge Construction Sections and Line of 
Communication units; but soon the enlarging scope of the war 
forced the Corps to concentrate on the provision of Companies for 
the field.” The same may be said of the Madras and Bombay Corps. 
From directives, pamphlets and intelligence summaries, and the 
experiences of units at the front, it became possible to instruct new 
units in the latest methods of warfare, the use of new weapons, enemy 
tactics, and the best means of defence against air attack. When the 
Japanese entered the field and produced their elaborate ‘bunker’ 
system of defence, the Sappers and Miners had to experiment on 
similar lines and evolve a technique for demolishing the subterranean 
labyrinths. The experiments were not always successful. For instance, 
a certain Field Company, having decided to try the effect of ‘bee-hive’ 
charges on a bunker, placed a few chickens inside it to determine the 
amount of concussion and blast. The charges exploded grandly and 
everyone pressed forward to see the result. Out ran a few excited but un- 
injured fowls, and nothing was proved except that either the bunker 


eee 


" Brief History of the K.G.V’s O. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.LE., 
by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 39. 


asinod jnusse UB Ysnosy) Sulos syins99y 








INDIA, 1939.43 15 


was exceptionally well built or that the charges were insufficient or 
wrongly placed. Yet perhaps, after all, there was a lesson—the 
toughness, in more senses than one, of the average Indian murghi. 

At the beginning of 1942, in accordance with orders issued in 
October 1941, the three Corps of Indian Sappers and Miners were 
re-named ‘Groups’. Previously, Sapper and Miner units had not 
been shown as belonging to the Indian Engineers, but now they were 
required to adopt the suffix “I.E.” And here it may be appropriate 
to describe briefly the subsequent changes in nomenclature. In 
February 1946, in recognition of their services in the war, the Indian 
Engineers were honoured with the title ‘“‘Royal’, and so continued 
for several years; but at the same time all the field units had regret- 
fully to relinquish the time-honoured designation “‘Sappers and 
Miners.” The “Q.V’sO. Madras Sappers and Miners Group, Indian 
Engineers”’ became, for instance, the “‘Q.V’s O. Madras Group, Royal 
Indian Engineers.” The appointments of “Colonels” of the three 
Sapper Groups were abolished and replaced by those of ‘“‘Colonels- 
Commandant”, these being Brigadier R. C. R. Hill (Madras Group), 
Lieut-General Sir Ronald Charles (Bengal Group) and Brigadier- 
General G. H. Boileau (Bombay Group) who had previously held 
office as Colonels. The Regimental Centres! at Bangalore, Roorkee 
and Kirkee also relinquished the title of “Sappers and Miners” on 
adding the prefix “‘Royal’’, that at Bangalore becoming the “Q.V’sO. 
Madras Regimental Centre, R.I.E.”” But this was not the end, for 
in 1947 the word “Regimental” was changed to “Engineer.” The 
next important alteration occurred on January 25th/26th, 1950, the 
prefix ‘Royal’ being discontinued some 24 years after the partition 
of India from Pakistan when India was declared a Republic. The 
“Royal Indian Engineers” then became the ‘“Corps of Engineers.” 

Several Sapper and Miner units had some experience of active 
service conditions on the North-West Frontier before they were 
transferred to one or other of the major theatres of the war. The 
operations took place chiefly in Waziristan. On February 21st, 1940, 
our troops attacked a hostile gathering at the Tangal Algad in the 
Ahmedzai territory, and at the end of the year, and early in 1941, 
further operations were launched from Nowshera in the north and 


Seb al ohh ns he A 


1 The term “Centre” indicated the organization under the direct sain of a 
Commandant, including not only Group H.Q. the Depot Wing we hs af 
Battalions but also such field units at H.Q. as were not attached to highe ‘ 


The term “Group” meant the Centre plus all field units. 


16 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


against the Mahsuds around Tauda China in Western Waziristan. 
The Sappers were engaged also in strengthening the defences of the 
Khaibar Pass against a possible invasion by Russia because of the 
Russo-German treaty of friendship, though happily the invasion 
never materialized. In June 1941, some columns were despatched 
into the Tochi Valley of Northern Waziristan. They remained in the 
field until the end of August, and further operations were undertaken 
subsequently from Razmak against the Datta Khels. The unsettled 
state of Waziristan, however, was not allowed to interfere with the 
progress of several large Frontier projects, notably the Wana Project 
in Southern Waziristan on which 9 Field Company and 16 Army 
Troops Company of the Madras Corps were engaged. This was 
completed before the two companies returned to Bangalore in June 
1940. It was fortunate that no large rising of the Frontier tribes 
occurred early in the war to interfere with the despatch of regular 
Sapper and Miner units to the Middle East and Far East, and also 
that considerable assistance could be afforded on the Frontier by 
Engineer units of the Indian States’ Forces. 

Before the outbreak of the Second World War, five Indian States 
had their own Sapper and Miner formations, these being Faridkot, 
Malerkotla, Sirmur, Tehri-Garhwal and Mandi. Each maintained 
one Company, and these varied in strength between 233 and 129 
officers and men. Although their combined strength was less than 
1,000, the Indian States’ Sappers, under their own officers assisted 
by British ‘Special Service Officers’, were well trained and most 
enthusiastic. After the war started, recruits flocked in, and thus 
many of the Indian States’ Sappers were able to take their share in 
fighting the Japanese in Burma as well as working on the North-West 
Frontier, and consequently they will figure from time to time in this 
narrative. In 1940-41, a Mandi State Sapper Section was serving 
with the Zhob Independent Brigade at distant Fort Sandeman in 
Baluchistan. This Section was amalgamated in January 1942 with a 
newly formed 95 Royal Bombay Mandi Field Company, raised at 
Nowshera, which was transferred later to the Bengal Corps. As at 
the beginning of the First World War, the Rulers of the Indian States 
offered all they had to further the war effort, and their soldiers made 
a very welcome addition to the regular forces. 

Colonel M. M. Jeakes, who was in Bangalore during most of the 
war, gives some interesting details of life in the Madras Sapper 


INDIA, 1939-43 i 


Headquarters. ‘“Towards the latter part of 1940”, he writes,! “the 
Mess filled up rapidly and bungalow accommodation became very 
scarce. Cadets, as well as officers, were accommodated in the Mess, 
and there were two overcrowded sittings for every meal. There was 
little time for games or recreation. Early in 1941, when new camps 
were occupied at Jalahalli, the worst of the congestion in the Meannee 
and Assaye Lines was over. Expansion then went ahead steadily. 
Early in 1942, when the Japanese threat to Madras developed, things 
began to move quickly in Southern India, and by the end of the 
year there were camps and establishments all over the countryside. 
Few troops were stationed in Madras itself, and not many in Bangalore, 
so the Sappers were called upon to raise a “Brigade” to defend 
Madras. Three battalions of men were collected and armed with 
all the rifles available. These, however, were only sufficient for half 
the number, so the remainder carried picks, pick-helves, ‘Molotov 
cocktails’ and all manner of other weapons. Bangalore soon began 
to change completely. Canteens, Rest Camps, Leave Camps, P. of 
W. Camps, Hospitals, etc, appeared in every direction. Indeed, most 
of Southern India became a training ground for formations destined 
for the recapture of Burma and Singapore. Although many improvised 
Companies had to be provided in aid of the Civil Power, the formation 
of new Sapper units continued steadily and the standard improved 
perceptibly. As regards amenities, the Bangalore Hunt functioned 
throughout the war, and the Sunday morning meets were much 
enjoyed. The efforts of young Polo enthusiasts to knock a ball about 
were most amusing, as also those of the budding tent-peggers under 
instruction by a few veteran Field Troop Reservists. These old 
Sappers were thrilled when put in charge of riding classes of young 
officers and cadets. With the advent of petrol rationing in 1942, 
pony-traps reappeared on the scene and also some small Rudge 
motor-cycles. Occasional snipe and duck shoots were possible, and 
Brigadier R. C. R. Hill, our Colonel, who lived at the Club throughout 
the war, used to drive his trap out to the snipe grounds with a change 
of horses half-way. Overcrowding in the Headquarter Mess ceased 
when a new Mess was opened at Jalahalli. Guest Nights could then 


be held fairly regularly, the Christmas Party was revived, and period- 


ical dances were arranged. About 1942 it was decided that all the 


beer from the Bangalore Brewery should be reserved for British 


troops; but fortunately this decision was modified after protest so 
fe ange = eee 





1 Notes by Col. M. M. Jeakes, M.c., dated January 18th, 1952. 


18 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


that beer continued to be available for the Sapper Canteens. The 
Corps Hockey and Football Tournaments caused great enthusiasm, 
and in 1943 the first war-time Corps Athletic Sports Meeting was 
held. A very good Tamil Concert Party was organized which enter- 
tained Tamil troops in many places. The officers’ wives, and one 
officer’s mother, were indefatigable in their war activities. Three 
were awarded the Kaisar-i-Hind Medal. The Families’ Hospital 
continued to flourish, and in 1943 a Women’s Club was started to 
teach industries and provide relaxation. Canteen work, St. John’s 
Ambulance, W.V.S. activities, dispensing, car driving and W.A.C. 
duties were a few of the ways in which the women assisted the war 
effort. The British officers’ mother must have cut out thousands of 
garments for female working parties in addition to instructing Indian 
women in the Club. There was some criticism at the time about the 
so-called lack of effort displayed by British women in India, but 
this certainly could not be said of Bangalore. Push-biking along hot 
and dusty roads for considerable distances was no joke. To sum up 
about affairs at Bangalore. From 1939 to the middle of 1940, there 
was not much change. Thence to the middle of 1942, everything 
was hectic; and afterwards, to the end of 1943, there was steady 
improvement all round.” 

This brief sketch of India in the first few years of the war may be 
concluded, as it was begun, with some extracts from the Roorkee 
News Letters. In January 1942, the Adjutant writes: ‘Six months 
have elapsed since the last News Letter went out. The trouble was 
that at the end of September 1941 there was really nothing to record 
except the weather and some notable departures. Veitch and G. C. 
Clark were whisked away from us, the former to be C.R.E. of a 
Division and the latter to a Staff job overseas, but Veitch’s present 
address is Delhi. Stenhouse and Ievers returned to the fold and 
Murray (J.) was added to it, not to mention some very welcome 
drafts from the U.K. Rumours were floating around that Bill Williams 
was also returning, but he failed to make the last 100 miles except 
for a brief visit when the complete Orderly Room Staff of 1932 were 
once again assembled. I should like to give you some idea of our 
expansion to date, but I am afraid it would only get me into trouble. 
However, I can say that most of the empty spaces in the Cantonments 
are now built over, as also is the Grass Farm and right out to the 
Rifle Ranges. Our units overseas seem to be in good heart and doing 
excellent work, New units in India spend most of their time in 


INDIA, 1939-43 19 


intensive training. Shikar has been rather limited owing to petrol 
rationing and the decreased number of cars.” 

In July 1942, he writes: ‘Another six months have slipped by, 
and each time it becomes harder to write anything of real interest. 
The Bengal Group continues to expand and we have units every- 
where. Here in Roorkee we grow and grow and have even had a 
new railway siding built. Among the decorations and New Year 
and Birthday honours are a K.B.E. for Major-General L. V. Bond, 
a C.B.E. for Brigadier E. L. Farley, a D.S.O. for Colonel O. L. 
Roberts, and O.B.Es. for Lieut.-Colonels A. H. G. Napier and N. E. 
V. Patterson. Of sport, I fear, I have little to report as since the New 
Year only one party of four guns has managed to get to the jheels. 
No one has got a tiger, and two or three people who had blocks were 
unable at the last minute to get out to them. Polo has struggled on 
with reduced numbers and has been restricted to the odd day when 
sufficient players were forthcoming. An innovation in aid of War 
Funds was a Race Meeting on Sunday afternoon in which all the 
horses in the Station turned out. Some refused to start, some decided 
to run the course the wrong way, and some just parked their riders 
on the ground. However, sufficient finished to ensure a decision in 
each race and the War Funds benefited by Rs. 1,032.”’ In January 
1943, the Adjutant records that polo, played on the College maidan 
and often with only three a side, was made possible by the inclusion 
of a lady player. The old monsoon polo ground near the Malikpur 
estate could no longer be used as it was covered with Thomason 
College buildings. New married quarters had appeared in the area 
between the maidan and the Garrison Church and also on the spur 
above the Slaughter House. A branch of the Women’s Voluntary 
Service organization had been established and was doing excellent 
work, 

The Roorkee News Letters afford a glimpse of life in India far 
from any battle front, and they show that, even after four years of 
war conditions, the Sapper and Miner Headquarters had occasional 
relaxations from the wear and tear of intensive training and wholesale 
expansion. Such diversions kept them tuned to concert pitch and 
thus enabled them to send rapidly to many theatres of the war those 
highly skilled units without which our armies could have made 


little progress, 


CHAPTER II 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA, 
OCTOBER 1939-MAY 1941 


URING the autumn of 1939, long before Italy entered the 
Dae, India began to reinforce the overseas defences of the 

Empire. First to leave her shores was the 4th Indian Division 
which sailed for Egypt, and shortly afterwards the 12th Indian 
Infantry Brigade left for Singapore. This was the commencement 
of a steady flow of reinforcements to both East and West at a time 
when every man in Great Britain was needed for home defence. 
The Sth Indian Division was sent to the Sudan, the 3rd Indian Motor 
Brigade to Egypt, the 6th, 8th and 10th Indian Divisions to Iraq, 
the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions to Malaya, and other formations 
to Burma to form eventually the 17th Indian Division. Units voyaged 
to Kenya, Aden, British Somaliland, Borneo and Hongkong, and 
all this was accomplished while the Indian Army was in the throes 
of an expansion without precedent. 

It was fortunate that Great Britain had, in the Middle East, a. 
master of strategy in the person of General Sir Archibald Wavell. 
Operating on interior lines against Italian armies vastly superior in 
numbers and armament, Wavell accomplished in 1940 and 1941 a 
bluff unequalled in military annals. On June 10th, 1940, after 
Italy had announced that from June 11th she would consider herself 
at war with Great Britain and France though not with Egypt,! Wavell 
had at his disposal only 36,000 troops in Egypt and 9,000 in the 
Sudan, in addition to 5,500 in Kenya and 1,475 in British Somaliland. 
It is true that there were a further 27,500 in Palestine, 800 in Cyprus 
and 2,500 in Aden, but these could not be withdrawn for operations 
in Africa because the fall of France and the ascendancy of the Vichy 
Government had changed the entire situation in the Middle East. 
Facing Wavell in Libya were 215,000 Italians under Marshal Balbo, 
while a further 200,000 under the Duke of Aosta threatened the 
Sudan from Eritrea, Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. Our armour 
in Egypt was represented by the 7th Armoured Division comprising 
two poorly-equipped brigades, Our air-force was pitifully weak 


ee 


1 Egypt, however, broke off relations with Italy on June 12th. 


20 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 2] 


and obsolete in nature. Our sea communication through the Medi- 
terranean was precarious, and that round the Cape and through 
the Red Sea entailed enormous delay. Yet, isolated and out-numbered, 
Wavell struck and struck again, and thus retrieved a desperate situ- 
ation and broke the strength of a ponderous and boastful enemy. 

The Engineer units originally with the 4th Indian Division were 
4 Field Company (Bengal), 12 Field Company and 11 Field Park 
Company (Madras) and 18 Field Company (Bombay), the whole 
being under Lieut.-Colonel R. V. Cutler, R.E., as C.R.E. In 1940, 
6 Army Troops Company (Bengal) joined the Division. After an 
uneventful voyage from Bombay, the 4th Division disembarked at 
Suez during the autumn of 1939 and prepared to defend the Nile 
Valley in the event of Italy entering the war. The first Sapper and 
Miner unit to leave India for Egypt was 18 Field Company, under 
Major H. P. Cavendish, R.E., which sailed on August 3rd and landed 
at Suez on the 15th. Next came 12 Field Company, under Major 
J. B. Sutherland, R.E., and 11 Army Troops Company, under Major 
E. Waring, R.E. These sailed on September 22nd and landed on 
October 4th. Bringing up the rear was 4 Field Company, under 
Major A. H. G. Napier, R.E., which sailed on October 10th and 
reached Suez on the 2!st. 

Before 4 Field Company left Roorkee it was inspected by the 
local District Commander, none other than Major-General (after- 
wards Field-Marshal) C. J. E. Auchinleck under whom it was destined 
later to see much service. At Cairo it camped under peaceful con- 
ditions within sight of the famous Pyramids and began a course of 
training in the rudiments of desert warfare and the handling of 
Motor vehicles and new weapons. ‘Men who had driven a lorry 
for the first time only a few weeks earlier’, writes Lieut G. Pearson,} 
“had now to pilot their vehicles through the terrifying Cairo traffic 
and then to drive over soft desert sand, a lesson which involved 
hours of laborious ‘unbogging’ with portable steel channels and 
canvas mats. Then came formation driving, manoeuvring from 
column into fans and back again according to signal. Near the 
Nile delta, the desert was simply sand, but further west it was rock, 
sparsely covered with soil and tufts of shrub. Everywhere there 
was dust, as fine as flour, which gathered in the food and bedding, 
rifle barrels and lorry engines; while periodically, over the desert, 


bP pe ha ete ee cE a he A ets A ce 


\ Brief History of the K.G.V'sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.LE., 
August 1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., pp. 3, 4. 


22 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


blew the Khamseen, a wind which filled the air with sand, blotting 
out vision beyond twenty yards and making life thoroughly miserable. 
In 1939, Cairo had not yet felt the full impact of war, and one of 
the features of the Christmas festivities was a big concert in aid of 
the Red Cross, organized by a Royal Princess and attended by leaders 
of Egyptian Society. At this, some Pathans of 4 Field Company 
performed with great eclat what the programme described as ‘“‘Danses 
Indiennese-Khattak des Bengalis!’ A relief from training came 
early in 1940 when the Company was ordered to Fayid in the Suez 
Canal Zone to assist in preparing structures for the equivalent of 
two divisions. This camp was the nucleus of the enormous Rein- 
forcement Camp of a few years later.”” While 4 Field Company was 
thus engaged, 12 Field Company had been undergoing similar desert 
training, and afterwards, with 11 Army Troops Company, built 
hutted camps at several places and worked on an extensive defence 
system in the desert. 

At the beginning of May 1940, 4 Field Company moved westwards 
to Bagush, 30 miles short of Mersa Matruh, to develop a water- 
supply system from an oasis and to help the 11th Brigade to build 
a defensive position within 10 miles of Matruh.! This work was 
interrupted in June by the declaration of war against Italy and the 
start of what may conveniently be called the ‘First Libyan Camp- 
aign.’ Surprisingly enough, the campaign was initiated by General 
Wavell, the weaker of the two opponents, from a line of small defensive 
works stretching southwards from the Matruh area and facing 
Marshal Balbo’s army which lay in positions along the Egyptian 
frontier from Bardia far into the desert. Released by the fall of 
France from any menace from Tunis, Balbo had hurried six divisions 
eastwards along the North African coast in motor transport and 
stood ready to invade the Nile Valley. The British forces had one 
all-important standing order. They were to make one man appear 
to be a dozen, a single tank to look like a squadron, and a raid to 
seem a general advance.” 

Soon after the middle of June, Wavell attacked in small units, 
swiftly and by night, and although the campaign was really little 
more than a series of raids, it upset the Italian plans completely. 
Strong point after strong point fell in the enemy’s line. Fort Mad- 
dalena was occupied, then Fort Capuzzo. British vehicles roamed 





1 See the map of North Africa included in Chapter V. 
2 “African Trilogy’, by Alan Moorehead, p. 22. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 23 


along the enemy’s lines of communication. All was confusion and 
disorder, and Balbo called excitedly for reinforcements from Rome. 
This was almost his last act, for on June 28th he perished during a 
British air raid on Tobruk. His successor, Marshal Graziani, who 
arrived in August, was prepared to listen to Mussolini’s urging that 
he should launch a counter-offensive from the elaborate frontier line 
of wire and forts extending southwards from Bardia, and accordingly, 
on September 13th, the Fascist divisions rolled down the escarpment 
at Halfaya. Graziani occupied Sollum and advanced cautiously to 
Sidi Barrani, 75 miles west of Matruh, while our meagre forces fell 
back in good order, mining the coastal road and spoiling the sources 
of water-supply. At Sidi Barrani the Italians halted and proceeded 
to build another chain of defensive posts south-westwards into the 
desert. The 7th Armoured Division, Wavell’s striking force, had 
lost many tanks during the withdrawal and the enemy was much 
closer to Cairo, but the British had gained an all-important respite. 
During this brief campaign, which gave time for the arrival in 
Egypt of a large number of fairly powerful Infantry Tanks (‘I” 
Tanks),? the Sapper companies of the 4th Indian Division and the 
R.E. companies of the 7th Armoured Division were exceedingly 
busy. The Armoured Division Engineers accompanied every raid 
behind the enemy’s lines, lifting mines, clearing obstacles and de- 
molishing defences. They also reconnoitred frequently for water. 
The 4th Division Engineers, other than those employed on camp 
construction and water-supply, assisted the infantry in preparing the 
defences of a ‘Bagush Box’ and consequently they were seldom in 
close contact with the enemy. The Engineer troops of the Matruh 
garrison, under Lieut.-Colonel P. A. Ullman, R.E., constructed concrete 
defences and anti-tank obstacles and laid extensive minefields using 
Egyptian pattern mines which were dangerous to lay and still more 
dangerous to lift.2. When the situation had become more stable, 
4 Field Company was withdrawn to Fuka to resume its training. 
Before leaving the Western Desert to describe the operations 
already in progress on the Sudan-Abyssinia frontier, it may be well 
to deal with the Second Libyan Campaign which started with a 
victorious battle at Sidi Barrani and ended after a hot pursuit of 


pecscneeeieyey tis eeneancnn ee ena 
1 Previously, three types of tanks had been available—the Support Tank carrying ; 
light howitzer; the Cruiser Tank, fast, lightly armoured and carrying a oe sath 
and the Light Tank, with a 2 pr. gun but little protection. The “I’’ Tank, thoug 
slow, was better armoured, but it mounted only a 2 pr. gun. 
2 Notes by Lieut.Colonel P. N. M. Moore, R.E., dated Sept. Ist, 1947, 


24 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the enemy throughout the length of Cyrenaica. In October 1940, 
Lieut.-General Sir H. M. Wilson, commanding the British troops in 
Egypt, was instructed to examine the possibilities of an air attack; 
but early in November, Mussolini declared war on Greece, and 
General Wavell was then ordered to occupy Crete and send several 
air squadrons to help the Greeks. Consequently, an offensive in the 
Western Desert had to be postponed until December. At that time 
the Western Desert Force, the precursor of the famous Eighth Army, 
was commanded by Lieut.-General R. N. O’Connor and consisted 
of the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th Indian Division, two brigades 
of the 6th Australian Division and a regiment of “‘I’’ Tanks, in all 
about 31,000 men with 120 guns and 275 tanks. Opposing O’Connor 
was Graziani's army distributed along a line of seven fortified camps 
to the east and south of Sidi Barrani. These were at Maktila near 
the coast, ‘Point 90’, Tummar East, Tummar West, Nibeiwa, Sofafi 
East, and in the south, Sofafi West. The enemy numbered about 
80,000 men with 120 tanks, a powerful artillery and three times as 
many planes as the British. Our patrols, however, had discovered a 
wide undefended gap in the Italian line between Nibeiwa and the 
two Sofafis, and this gave O’Connor his opportunity. Supplies were 
pushed forward across the desert, and after dark on December 7th, 
1940, the advance began. During the 8th, the troops hid as best 
they could, and at dawn on the 9th our armour broke through the 
gap, swung northwards, and rolled up the enemy's defensive line. 
The Matruh garrison attacked from the east while the 4th Indian 
Division followed the Armoured Division through the gap and the 
Royal Navy and Air Force bombarded and bombed the Maktila 
fortress and the enemy defences at Sidi Barrani. Complete success 
attended the operations. At dusk, the 4th Division was on the coastal 
road to Bug Buq, 20 miles beyond Sidi Barrani, and the garrison of 
the latter place surrendered on the 10th. The Battle of Sidi Barrani cost 
the enemy the greater part of five divisions, and O’Connor captured 
38,000 men, 400 guns and a number of tanks. 

Sollum was occupied on December 16th. The demoralized Italians 
made no stand of any importance until our troops reached the escarp- 
ment beyond that place, and then their efforts failed to stem the tide. 
Bardia and Tobruk became the next objectives. Though both had 
been strongly fortified, Bardia was carried by assault on January 
22nd, producing a further haul of 75,000 prisoners, 689 guns and 
100 tanks. The advance on Tobruk was hindered by a terrific sand- 
storm on January 20th which completely blotted out the landscape. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 25 


So violent was the wind that it uprooted telegraph poles and over- 
turned dozens of vehicles, while the troops had to huddle on the 
ground, covered with blankets. Tobruk was no easy nut to crack. 
On high white cliffs above a small harbour lay the town itself, capable 
of housing many thousands of men. The outer defensive perimeter 
of forts, wire and minefields was 30 miles in length with both flanks 
resting on the sea: the inner perimeter was 19 miles long. Powerful 
artillery commanded every approach. Since the railway ended at 
Matruh, almost all our supplies had to be brought up to the front 
by road, mostly in captured Italian lorries, for little could be landed 
from ships at Sollum. 

After the fall of Tobruk, Marshal Graziani had only two strong 
detachments in Cyrenaica—part of his 60th Division at Derna, and 
a brigade, with 160 tanks, at Mekili, south of that port, the whole 
being under General Bergonzoli, a capable and very elusive com- 
mander familiarly known as ‘Old Electric Whiskers’. ‘““O’Connor 
decided to contain the Derna position and attack the Mekili Group”, 
writes Major-General Fuller,! “but during the night of 26th/27th 
January that group withdrew towards Barce. Thereupon Wavell saw 
O'Connor, and together they decided that while the 7th Armoured 
Division was to move across the desert by way of Mekili and cut the 
coastal road south of Benghazi, the rest of the Desert Army was to 
press the enemy along the road towards Benghazi. Early on the 
30th, the enemy began falling back on Barce, whereupon it was 
decided to move at once across the desert. The 7th Armoured Divis- 
ion set out from Mekili to Msus which was occupied by armoured 
cars at daybreak on February 5th. A few hours later, Major-General 
M. O’M. Creagh sent two detachments to cut the coastal road in 
two places some 50 miles south of Benghazi at a point called Beda 
Fomm. On the same evening, an enemy column, 5,000 strong, 
retreating southwards from Benghazi, suddenly came upon the 4th 
Armoured Brigade on the coastal road and forthwith surrendered. 
Next, on the 6th, the main enemy column appeared, including a 
large number of tanks; but coming into action piece-meal, it was 
destroyed piece-meal, 84 of its tanks being put out of action. Pinned 
down on almost 20 miles of road, blocked in front and attacked in 
rear, the 60th Division was so completely trapped that at dawn next 
day General Bergonzoli surrendered unconditionally, and 20,000 
prisoners, 120 tanks and 190 guns were added to the captures of the 


ee 


1 The Second World War, 1939-1945, by Major-General J. F.C. Fuller, p.97, 


26 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Desert Army. Thus ended one of the most audacious campaigns ever 
fought. In all, though never more than two full divisions were 
employed, an army of nearly ten divisions was destroyed between 
December 7th and February 7th, and 130,000 prisoners, 400 tanks 
and 1,240 guns were captured at a cost of 500 killed, 1,373 wounded 
and 55 missing.” 

O’Connor swept on to Agedabia and Agheila, nearly 200 miles 
south of Benghazi. Graziani’s army had disintegrated and no less 
than 19 Fascist Generals were in our hands. An area as large as 
England and Wales had been swept clear of the enemy. The Suez 
Canal was no longer in danger. The victory appeared complete, 
irrevocable. But appearances are often deceptive. Germany was 
already preparing to rescue her fallen ally, and our front in Cyrenaica 
had to be starved or reinforcements because of the urgent demands 
of the campaign in Greece. Thus the ground which we had won so 
rapidly, and more besides, was destined to be lost in the Third Libyan 
Campaign which is outlined later in this chapter. 

The Indian Sappers and Miners played a useful though unspectac- 
ular part in the Second Libyan Campaign. When General O’Connor 
set out from rail-head at Mersa Matruh on December 7th, 1940, 
the 4th Division Engineers were occupied in normal duties. 4 Field 
Company assisted the Sth Brigade in the capture of Tummar East 
and Tummar West, while 12 Field Company, 11 Field Park Company 
and 18 Field Company lifted mines, demolished obstacles, repaired 
desert tracks or worked on water-supplies. Owing to the mobile 
character of the operations, the featureless nature of the ground and 
the poor resistance offered by the enemy, there were few opportun- 
ities for the Sappers to come into the limelight. A detachment of 
4 Field Company moved with the “I”? tanks which were primarily 
responsible for the victory at Sidi Barrani, but no formidable obstacles 
were encountered. As soon as the Italian camps were entered, the 
Sappers began to collect and drive off enemy lorries piled high with 
equipment and stores. They also took spare parts from many vehicles. 
After two days of such work, during which a Khamseen raged and 
filled the air with sand, 4 Field Company was detailed to guard 
some 4,000 Italian prisoners who were only too glad to be out of 
danger and had not the least inclination to escape. The 4th Division 
Engineers also undertook water-supply duties and assisted the infantry 
in clearing away minefields around Sidi Barrani. Italian officers 
ee palin ee he paper the mines. Some of these 

ge their deep dug-outs for 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 27 


the stark realities of a prisoner-of-war cage, for the furniture, fittings 
and stores of wine and food in their subterranean quarters were 
luxurious and profuse. Silver-topped jars and bottles of scent adorned 
their dressing-tables, and gold-braided uniforms filled their ward- 
robes. 

Colonel D. B. Chopra, who was serving as a subaltern in 12 Field 
Company, has much to say about his experiences during the Battle 
of Sidi Barrank ‘“‘The Company”, he writes, “was in support of the 
16th British Infantry Brigade which formed part of the 4th Indian 
Infantry Division. After the capture of the objectives by the Sth 
and 11th Indian Infantry Brigades, our Brigade was to be launched 
during the early morning of December 9th, having completed the 
approach march the previous evening. To our surprise we found 
our night bivouac were uncomfortably close to the enemy positions, 
and as soon as we started moving, our vehicles came under fire. We 
dismounted and took up positions, and enemy planes began to 
‘strafe’ us. They flew so low that I wanted to engage them with the 
small arms of my Section, but I found that our rifles and Light Machine 
Gun had been left in the vehicles. Running to one vehicle, I retrieved 
the L.M.G. and began to engage the enemy, and the men then rushed 
to the other vehicles and got their rifles. Never again did I allow 
them to be separated from their arms! The 16th Brigade suffered 
heavy casualties in the initial stages of the battle when it was caught 
on the move in vehicles close to the enemy positions; but after the 
arrival of our tanks and Divisional Artillery, things began to improve. 
Before dark, we had over-run the Italian defences facing south and 
south-west. Streams of prisoners started pouring in, and I was told 
to take charge of them. I had a few thousands to look after and only 
my Section as escort. As I was marching them away from the grOnE 
line, enemy planes again came overhead and began to ‘strafe us. 
My escort took cover and the prisoners ran in all directions, while 
I shouted myself hoarse in efforts to check the stampede. However, 
after the air attack was over, I got the column re-assembled and 
marched it back some distance from the front line, where we hurriedly 
constructed a cage with concertina wire. I handed over the prisoners 
to another unit while my Section was sent to rejoin 12 Field Company, 
which was not far off; but afterwards I was unable to locate the 
Company in the dark so I decided to spend the night where I pe 
In the morning, to my great surprise, I found myself within 


Oe as ee ee ee 


1 Notes by Colonel D. B. Chopra, dated March 15th, 1951. 


28 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


yards of my own Section! After this incident, I made a habit of 
always recording compass bearings to important landmarks before 
darkness fell. Day dawned with the usual blinding sandstorm, 
reducing visibility at times to zero, and the entire Company, except 
Major Sutherland, myself and my Section lost its way and failed to 
arrive until the afternoon when the storm had abated”’. 

The scene now shifts from the Western Desert to the Sudan, whither 
the 4th Indian Division was sent early in January 1941, shortly after 
the Battle of Sidi Barrani, to join the Sth Indian Division while 
General O’Connor was chasing the defeated Italians to Benghazi. 
The 4th Division moved partly by sea to Port Sudan and partly by 
rail and boat up the Nile. The transfer was made by order of General 
Wavell in whose perspicacity and ability the Prime Minister had the 
greatest confidence. ‘‘Without this far-reaching decision,” writes 
Mr. Winston Churchill,! ‘‘the victory of Keren could not have been 
achieved and the liberation of Abyssinia would have been subject to in- 
definite delays”. That Mr. Churchill was resolved to support General 
Wavell to the utmost is proved by a telegram which reached the 
Headquarters in Cairo on December 18th, 1940. ‘‘See St Matthew, 
Chapter VII, Verse 7°’, it ran. A reference to the Bible will show that 
the message was ‘‘Ask, and it shall be given to you: seek, and ye shall 
find: knock, and it shall be opened unto you.” 

The political and military situation in the Sudan in the autumn 
of 1939, before Italy entered the war, was fantastic. Nobody wanted 
to fight, and least of all the Italians. Backed by small British and 
Egyptian garrisons far inland, the Sudan Defence Force, the local 
police and some irregular formations were responsible for watching 
1,200 miles of frontier as well as guarding Khartoum, Atbara, Port 
Sudan and other important centres.2 Friendly relations with the 
Italians in Eritrea and Abyssinia persisted long after Germany started 
the Second World War. For instance, on the last day of 1939, the 
Commander of the Troops in the Sudan dined with the officers of 
the Italian garrison at Metemma opposite our frontier post at Gallabat, 
and as late as May 1940, officers of the Sudan Defence Force in 
Gedaref and Kassala were receiving invitations to visit Asmara. It 
came as a shock, therefore, when friendships of many years standing 
had to be broken suddenly through the folly of a Dictator in Rome. 





1 The Second World War, by the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, Vol. I. 
® See the map of North-East Africa included in this chapter. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 29 


In August and September 1940, the 5th Indian Division under 
Major-General L. M. Heath voyaged from India to the Middle 
East. One of its three brigades, the 7th, was detached to join the 
4th Indian Division in Egypt, while the 9th and 10th Brigades, under 
Brigadicrs A. G. O. M. Mayne and W. J. Slim respectively, were 
sent up-country from Port Sudan to join a 29th Brigade under 
Brigadier J. C. O. Marriott, formed after a redistribution of the three 
British battalions already in the Sudan. The Engineer formations 
with the Division consisted of 2 Field Company (Bengal), 20 and 
21 Field Companies (Bombay), 44 Field Park Company (Madras) 
and 6 and 8 Army Troops Companies! and 2 Bridging Section 
(Bengal). Later additions were 16 Workshop and Park Company 
(Madras) under Major J. F. C. Reilly, R.E.; and 101! Railway Con- 
struction Company (Madras) under Major R. Gardiner, R.E. The 
forces in the Sudan were commanded by Lieut.-General Sir W. Platt 
whose anxieties must have been considerable before the advent of 
the 5th Division, the odds against him being 10 to 1. On December 
2nd, 1940, shortly before he initiated the attack on Sidi Barrani, 
General Wavell summoned to Cairo Lieut-General Platt and also Lieut.- 
General Sir Alan Cunningham who commanded the forces in Kenya. 
He told them that he wanted them to foster rebellion in Abyssinia 
and afterwards to carry out a gigantic pincer movement against the 
Italians in that country and Eritrea. The movement was to be from 
north and south simultaneously, one force being based on Khartoum 
and the other on Nairobi. African Divisions would advance from 
Kenya, and the 4th and Sth Indian Divisions from the Sudan. Hence 
the sudden transfer of the 4th Division from the Western Desert. 
Both pincers would encounter exceptionally difficult country—in the 
north, precipitous mountains, and in the south, immense and arid 
plains—and both would meet vastly superior strength. Daring and 
speed must overcome all obstacles. The enemy, however, could not 
be prevented from securing some early successes. They had occupied 
Kassala and Gallabat on the Sudan frontier. Columns had marched 
deep into Kenya, and in August 1940, British Somaliland had been 
over-run. They had secured from the Vichy French the use of the 
Red Sea port of Djibuti, far south of their main port of Massawa, 
and thus they could interfere with our line of communication ie 
Suez. East Africa presented a dark and depressing picture. 


i j Platt R. 
1The Os. C. Companies were Majors R. H. : 
G. E. H. Philbrick, R.E., R. W. W. How, R.E., H. Grattan, 

LE, 


E, H. E. G. St. George, R.E., 
R.E., and F. K. Moodie 


30 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The voyage of the Sth Indian Division Engineers to Port Sudan 
was accomplished safely, though not without minor difficulties. 
Colonel Arjan Singh, who was serving with 6 Army Troops Company 
under Major H. Grattan, writes as follows :— “The date of sailing and 
the destination were kept closely guarded secrets, and even the 
Captain of our ship did not know his destination until after he had 
left Bombay. As Quartermaster, I had to arrange for many different 
types of kitchens in the restricted space available in a ship not specially 
built for Indian troops, for in those days Hindus, Mussulmans, 
Sikhs, Madrassis, Bengalis and Mahrattas were each entitled to have 
a separate kitchen. The ship’s Chief Officer, however, had never 
heard of any such arrangement. ‘There is the galley” said he. **Get 
on with it.’ He recognized only two divisions in his crew—the 
Engineer group and the Deck hands—for which two galleys were 
sufficient. But after I had told him that I was myself an ex-sailor, 
he was persuaded to make certain alterations and, as it was impossible 
to have separate kitchens for every caste in each unit, it was decided 
that all cooking should be done in combined central community 
kitchens. Our convoy consisted of forty ships, some of which sailed 
from Karachi or Cochin. They all met in the Arabian Sea and were 
escorted by two warships. It was surprising that the Italians, who 
were in a strong position along the Somaliland and Red Sea coasts, 
made no attempt to interfere with us. Either their system of intelli- 
gence was poor or they lacked initiative. In any case, we arrived 
undamaged in Port Sudan where unloading from the ships and loading 
into trains was done at night to avoid air raids.”’ 

Both Kassala and Gallabat had been occupied by the enemy on 
July 4th, 1940; but Khartoum, though subjected to occasional air 
attack, was never seriously threatened, and with the advent of the 
rainy season a period of watching and waiting developed along the 
entire length of the Sudan-Abyssinia frontier. This was much to 
our advantage since it gave time for the 5th Indian Division to 
arrive and concentrate for offensive action. Artillery also began to 
reach the Sudan to supplement the single battery of 3.7” howitzers 
which till then had been the sole representative of that arm. Haile 
Selassie, the exiled Emperor of Abyssinia, was back in Khartoum, 
ready for an opportunity to return to Addis Ababa, whence he had 
been driven by Mussolini in 1935. His presence did much to encourage 


the patriots in his country and forced the Italians to increase their 
precautions against a rising in their rear. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 31 


In October 1940, the 9th and 10th Brigades of the 5th Indian 
Division took post on the frontier, the former on the Atbara River 
opposite Kassala and the latter in the Gallabat area to the south." 
A mobile force, known as “Gazelle”, composed mostly of Sudan 
Defence Force armoured cars, was formed under Colonel (later 
General) F. W. Messervy to harry the enemy north of Kassala. The 
level of the Atbara was falling and consequently the river was ford- 
able in many places. These fords were important in the defensive 
scheme, and the Sth Division was fully occupied in watching them. 
General Heath was obliged for a time to remain on the defensive 
because an advance into Eritrea was impossible until he was rein- 
forced. Nevertheless, his brigades frequently took the initiative in 
local actions. On November 6th, for instance, Brigadier Slim’s 
10th Brigade attacked and entered the fort at Gallabat, though it 
had to withdraw later under heavy bombing. The Sappers and 
Miners in this affair were represented by 21 Field Company, of the 
Bombay Group, which remained in the fort to the last moment to 
destroy buildings and stores. Slim’s policy was not to re-occupy 
Gallabat but to patrol vigourously and deny the fort to the enemy. 
His troops re-entered the place on November 9th, and again on the 
10th before retiring to their defensive positions. The Brigadier was 
recognized as a brilliant leader. There is a story that a Scottish 
soldier once shouted to him ‘‘Don’t you worry, Sir. We'll follow you 
anywhere”, to which Slim replied “‘Don’t you be so b.... sure of 
that. I’m going to follow you!’?. In the middle of December, the 
10th Brigade was relieved in the Gallabat area by the 9th Brigade 
which continued the policy of denying Gallabat to the enemy. 

During October, several units of the Bengal Sappers were busily 
employed further north. At Gedaref, which was second only to 
Kassala in road and rail importance, 2 Field Company provided a 
water-supply, carried out road reconnaissances and prepared bridges 
for demolition, and in November, it was at work on ford crossings 
of the Atbara south of Kassals.3 2 Bridging Section dug trenches at 
Gedaref and established an Engineer dump. 6 Army Troops Company 
began to improve the road communication between Port Sudan and 
Be ne ewe on ere en te ee ee et eee 


1 See the map of Eritrea and the Sudan-Abyssinia Border included in this chapter. 
2 “Ball of Fire. The Sth Indian Division in the Second World War”, by Antony 


Breet-James, p. 30, sai 
3 Brief History of the K.G.VsO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, .E, 
Aug. 1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E,, p. 7, 


32 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Kassala. A railway ran from Port Sudan to Atbara on the Nile, 
where it joined the main line connecting Khartoum with Wadi Halfa; 
but Kassala could be reached only along a branch line taking off 
at Haiya on the Port Sudan-Atbara line. There was no road con- 
nection between it and Haiya, and a new road, away from the coast, 
was needed between Port Sudan and Haiya. Accordingly, 6 Army 
Troops Company was stationed at Gebeit, in the Red Sea Hills, to 
prepare for the transit of the 4th Division coming from the Western 
Desert. A Section under 2nd Lieut. Arjan Singh, I.E., though assisted 
by 300 labourers, could not cope with some of the work, so Arjan 
Singh asked the commander of the Advance Party of the 4th Division 
(a Lieut.-Colonel) for the loan of three infantry companies. He met 
with a blank refusal, and it was only after he had appealed to his 
Chief Engineer and induced the senior infantry officer to examine 
the route in person that he got the working parties and was able to 
push a temporary road through with rapidity. The incident shows 
the difficulties which may arise on active service through a disparity 
in rank. While at Gebeit, 6 Army Troops Company, assisted by a 
detachment of 8 Army Troops Company of the Sth Division, built 
a very fine causeway, 500 yards long, through a sandy river bed. 

At Atbara, where the Atbara River joins the Nile, the main line 
of railway from Wadi Halfa to Khartoum crosses the tributary river 
by a large steel bridge, and as this structure was liable to damage by 
bombing, 8 Army Troops Company was detailed to build a boat 
bridge. The project was completed successfully with the help of 
local labour, though there was some delay because the water-level 
fell so rapidly that half the bridge had to be supported on piers 
instead of boats. The unit then moved southwards to a place about 
20 miles from Gedaref to build an advance base depot for the 5th 
Division. The design was ingenious for the depot was made to 
resemble a native village by the extensive use of circular grass huts 
known as tuk/s. Other Sapper units with the Sth Division were 44 
Field Park Company and 16 Workshops and Park Company, both of 
the Madras Corps. 20 Field Company, under Major H. E. G. 
St George, R.E.,and 21 Field Company, under Major G. E. H. Philbrick, 
R.E., were present also. 44 Field Park Company was stationed at 
first at Gebeit where it was employed in making a road to the old 
port of Suakin, preparing landing grounds, improving water-supplies 
and arranging for stores’ dumps.! Later, it went to Gedaref to remove 


eee 


1 Bangalore News Letter, January 1946. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA a3 


unexploded enemy bombs; and still later, in February 1941, it was 
at Barentu in Eritrea, engaged in salvaging stores from gold mines 
abandoned by the enemy during the British offensive.) The greater 
part of 16 Workshop and Park Company went to Khartoum to 
prepare Engineer Stores Base Depots (E.S.B.Ds.) in various large 
centres. A detachment left in Port Sudan suffered some casualties 
on December 16th through enemy bombing. After the general 
advance into Eritrea, the unit opened an E.S.B.D. at Kassala and 
finished the campaign at Asmara, where it took over a number of 
civil installations and quantities of abandoned enemy stores. Such 
employment, though unspectacular, should be given due credit, for 
without it the progress of the military operations would have been 
gravely hampered. 

Colonel R. A. Loomba, who served as a Captain in 16 Com- 
pany during this period, writes as follows:— “It was not until May 
1940 that it was decided to reorganize a Divisional HQ Company 
into a Workshop and Park Company for service overseas, and the 
establishment and organization of the new unit was almost the same 
as it is today. The Stores element was found from the M.E.S. and 
consisted of some 9 or 10 British Warrant Officers and about 20 
Indian subordinates who were hurriedly given elementary military 
training and put into uniform. They were on special terms and con- 
ditions of service but unfortunately had no Depot until an M.ES. 
Depot was formed later. The unit supported the operations in the 
Sudan and Eritrea, during 1940 and 1941, under most favourable 
conditions. There was no language problem, and the Stores’ procedure 
resembled that in the M.E.S. A British civilian Stores Officer from 
the Sudan P.W.D. was attached to the Chief Engineer’s Office for 
the local purchase of stores and liaison duties. Immediately on 
arrival, the Workshop and Park Company was split into two parts 
to run E.S.B.Ds. and E.B.Ws. at Port Sudan and Khartoum, and 
as operations developed, advanced depots were established and run 
efficiently by detachments ably assisted by MES storekeepers. After 
the fall of Eritrea and Abyssinia, large stocks of captured Engineer 
stores had to be taken over and sent to Egypt. In addition, sabotaged 
workshops had to be re-established quickly in order to produce 
articles needed by the occupying forces. The bulk of the unit was 
therefore concentrated in Eritrea, and the depot and workshops at 


Ro 
14 Short History of the Q.V'sO, Madras Sappers and Miners during World War 
If, 1939-45, by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., p. 5. 


34 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Khartoum were run almost entirely by civilians. During the operations 
the unit undertook tasks far beyond its normal role because of the 
shortage of manpower. For instance, at one period it established 
4 E.S.B.Ds. and ran 3 E.B.Ws. This was only possible because of 
the skilled labour available and the high quality of the M.E:S. staff 
posted to the unit.” 

The first contingent of the 4th Indian Division having landed at 
Port Sudan on January 7th, 1941, General Platt was able to assume 
the offensive and strike at Eritrea. The risk was great but he took 
it, for the tide was flowing against the Italians. Harassed continually 
by Messervy’s ‘Gazelle Force’’, General Frusci, the enemy com- 
mander on the northern front, had begun to withdraw to a defensive 
line along the edge of the high plateau running from Agordat and 
Keren, past Adowa, to Gondar, and this retrograde movement 
spread from north to south till it reached the Gallabat area. On 
January 19th, Platt marched into Eritrea and occupied Kassala, 
Sabderat and Tessenei, all of which the enemy had evacuated under 
cover of darkness. This was a bold stroke for he had at the moment 
only the 10th and 29th Brigades of the Sth Division and the 11th 
Brigade of the 4th Division. The role of the 5th Division was to 
take Tessenei and Aicota, while the 4th Division, with ‘‘Gazelle”’ 
under command, was to push through Sabderat towards Keru on 
the road leading to Agordat and Keren.! The troops made good 
progress through minefields and demolitions, and early on January 
21st the Sth Division occupied Aicota while ‘“‘Gazelle’’ entered the 
Keru Gorge. Considerable resistance was encountered in this rugged 
defile until] the enemy melted away after being attacked in rear by 
the 10th Brigade and the Sudan Defence Force operating from 
Aicota. On the 28th, the 5th and 11th Brigades of the 4th Division 
met bitter opposition in an attack on Agordat, but the “I’’ tanks 
knocked out the Italian armour on the 3lst and cut the enemy’s 
line of communication to Keren. Though now thoroughly demo- 
ralized, the Italians were saved from immediate collapse by the arrival 
of reinforcements from Abyssinia and by the terribly difficult nature 
of the country through which our troops had to advance. Neverthe- 
less, Mussolini’s African Empire needed only one strong push to 
send it tottering to ruin, and that push might have been given by 





7 “From Pyramid to Pagoda”, (History of the West Yorkshire Regiment, 1938-48), 
by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, p.s.o., M.c., Chapter VI. See also the map of 
Eritrea and the Sudan-Abyssinia Border included in this chapter. 


njuaivg 0} peo ou} Suuyedas ssauryay pu sasddug 





EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 35 


General O’Connor’s forces, then rushing on Benghazi, had it not 
been for the despatch from Egypt of three divisions under General 
Wilson to help Greece. It is an object lesson in the effect of opera- 
tions in one theatre on those in another. War is indeed a tangled 
skein which few can unravel. 

Although several Sapper and Miner companies took part in the 
general offensive which culminated in the Battle of Keren, a few 
were denied that privilege and among them 21 Field Company which 
had to remain with the 9th Brigade at Gallabat to hold the enemy 
in the south while General Platt delivered his blow in the north. 
The minor operations around Gallabat ebbed and flowed during most 
of January 1941. The Italians were now in Gallabat Fort and were 
holding tenaciously to Metemma on the other bank of the Atbara, 
but on January 30th they vacated the fort after dark as the first 
step in a general withdrawal. A small Mobile Column was then sent 
out to probe towards Metemma and beyond it to Wahni on the road 
to Gondar. The column included a detachment of 21 Field Company 
under the command of 2nd Lieut. Premendra Singh Bhagat, I.E. 
At first, it met with no resistance, though progress beyond Metemma 
was slow because the retreating enemy had mined the track extensively, 
but it would have been much slower had it not been for the gallantry 
of young Bhagat which brought the award of the first Victoria Cross 
earned by an Indian Commissioned Officer in the Second World 
War. The citation runs as follows:— ‘‘During the pursuit of the enemy 
following the capture of Metemma on the night of 31st January-ist 
February, 1941, 2nd Lieut. Bhagat was in command of a section of a 
Field Company, Sappers and Miners, detailed to accompany the leading 
mobile troops (Bren Carriers) to clear the road and adjacent areas 
of mines. For a period of 4 days and over a distance of 55 miles, 
this officer led the column in the leading carrier. He detected and 
supervised the clearing of 15 minefields, working at high pressure 
from dawn till dusk. On two occasions his carrier was blown up, with 
casualties to others; and on a third occasion, when ambushed and 
under close enemy fire, he carried straight on with his task. He 
refused relief when worn out with strain and fatigue (and with one 
ear-drum punctured by an explosion) on the grounds that he was 
now better qualified to continue his task to the end. His coolness 
over a period of 96 hours, and his persistence and gallantry not 
only in battle but throughout the long period during which the 
safety of the column and the speed at which it could advance were 
dependent on his personal efforts, were of the highest order”. A 


36 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


senior British Officer records that not until February 3rd did Bhagat 
relinquish his dangerous post, and then only on a peremptory order 
from the Column Commander who rightly decided that the young 
subaltern should be sent back for medical treatment. The column 
reached and bombarded Wahni and returned to Gallabat on the 7th, 
and so ended a very successful raid. The coveted Cross was presented 
to Lieut. Bhagat at a ceremony held in New Delhi early in November 
1941 in the forecourt of the Viceroy’s House.! It was bestowed by 
the Viceroy himself in the presence of General Wavell, then Com- 
mander-in-Chief, India, and a large gathering of military and civil 
officers. Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Horsfield, R.E., Commandant of the 
Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners, conducted Lieut. Bhagat to 
the dais, and an official account of the action for which the Victoria 
Cross was awarded was read in English and Urdu. This was a great 
day for the Corps of Indian Engineers, and particularly for the 
Bombay Group of the Indian Sappers and Miners. 

The exploits of some of the other Sapper companies during the 
Operations preceding the Battle of Keren deserve more than passing 
mention. In December 1940, when the offensive against the Kassala- 
Tessenai position was being planned, 2 Field Company intensified 
its work on the approaches to ford crossings over the Atbara, and 
on January 15th, 1941, moved towards the River Gash, south of 
Kassala, in support of the 10th Brigade. The bed of the Gash, at 
that time, was a dry expanse of soft sand, but the Company soon 
laid steel-mesh track across the sand and thus enabled the 5th Division 
to reach Aiccta rapidly. On January 19th, when the enemy withdrew 
from Kassala, the first unit to enter the place was 6 Army Troops 
Company. Led by ‘“‘Gazelle Force’, the 4th Division passed through 
the town in pursuit of the enemy, the objective being Agordat. 4 Field 
Company, which arrived in Kassala on the 21st, set to work imme- 
diately to improve the dry-weather track through the Keru Defile 
leading to Bishia and Keren, and cleared the defile of many anti- 
tank mines and obstructions. Meanwhile, 2 Field Company, with 
the 10th Brigade, was moving southwards to a position on the 
Agordat-Barentu Road, arranging water-supplies, laying track across 
sandy ravines and removing rocks. Next it was called upon to deal 
with a huge road-block, 8 miles north of Barentu, which was holding 
up the advance of the Sth Division. Masses of rock, many as large 
as a 3-ton lorry, had been blown down onto the road from an 


4 Supplement to The R.E. Journal, December 1941. 








Colone! P. S. Bhagat, y. c. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 37 


overhanging cliff. The obstruction was 200 yards in length and was 
often under enemy machine gun fire and sniping as well as dive 
bombing; but with some assistance, 2 Field Company got through 
at last after several days of furious labour, though the final clearance 
could not be completed until after the enemy had abandoned Barentu. 

4 Field Company did well while the 4th Indian Division, under 
Major-General N. M. Beresford-Peirse, was trying to annihilate the 
enemy entrenched in the hills around Agordat. On January 29th, 
when the 11th Brigade gained a hold on the crest of Mount Cochen, 
a lofty feature east of the town, 4 Field Company prepared tracks 
up the rough and thorny hill-side for the maintenance of the infantry 
and afterwards carried up ammunition and water. ‘“‘On the evening 
of January 30th” writes Pearson,! ‘‘the position was critical as the 
brigade was in imminent danger of being driven off the hill. A Section 
of 4 Field Company was ordered to reoccupy positions covering the 
direct approach to Brigade Headquarters which had been evacuated 
by the infantry, and O.C. Company was told to take charge and 
organize the defence of the summit still held by our hardpressed 
infantry. Later, other sections were used as infantry, and a detach- 
ment under Jemadar Kirat Singh led a bayonet charge to capture a 
machine gun post.2, Mount Cochen was held, and Agordat fell on 
January 31st’. 4 Field Company received high praise for its exploits 
on this occasion, for it had contributed in a large degree to the success 
of the operation. It was followed to Agordat by 6 Army Troops 
Company which took over the power house, pumping plant and 
water-points in the captured town and afterwards repaired bridges, 
improved roads and collected masses of abandoned enemy equipment. 

A detachment of 12 Field Company, under 2nd Lieut. D. B. Chopra, 
IE., served for a time with the mobile ‘“‘Gazelle Force” after the 
Company had arrived with the 4th Division from the Western Desert. 
‘“‘We moved up to the front immediately after landing at Port Sudan”, 
writes Chopra.2 “The enemy, in his withdrawal, had laid extensive 
minefields through which passages were cleared by my Section which 
was always with the leading brigade. The advance was so rapid that 
the Sappers worked literally 24 hours a day for several days, making 


! Brief History of the K.G.V’sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.1.E., August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 10. 

? Jemadar Kirat Singh was subsequently awarded the I.0.M. for bravery at Cochen 
and at the road-block at Keren, this being the first decoration won by a Bengal Sapper 
and Miner in the war. 


3 Notes by Colonel D. B. Chopra, dated March 15th, 1951. 


38 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


diversions through nalas which were always mined. I disarmed every 
new type of mine myself and showed the mechanism to the men 
before allowing mine clearance to proceed. As the advance outstripped 
the maintenance capacity of our transport columns, we had to make 
full use of the railway, but unfortunately the enemy had removed 
all rolling stock. Consequently, it was decided to deposit a small 
Sapper detachment behind the enemy lines in the hope of securing 
some rolling stock. I volunteered for the job and selected two 
Sappers from my Section to accompany me. We were to be picked 
up in the evening by a tank; but after waiting till midnight at the 
rendez-vous, we were told that as the enemy had withdrawn our 
mission was impracticable, and so we returned to the Company. 
Early next morning, I was ordered to join ‘“‘Gazelle Force’”’ with one 
Sub-Section, and in a few hours we overhauled it and were placed 
at the tail of the column. Though I pointed out that it was desirable 
that my detachment should be well forward in order to deal quickly 
with mines and obstacles, I was over-ruled. Later, when there was 
an abnormally long halt, I went forward and found that a bridge 
called the “‘Ponte Mussolini’! had been partly demolished and its 
approaches heavily mined and covered by fire. As both approach 
roads were on high embankments and the river was wide and sandy, 
I recommended a diversion and said that this would take at least 
8 to 10 hours. Work was started at once, and by the following day 
we had the entire ‘‘Gazelle Force’’ across the obstacle. I remained 
with ‘‘Gazelle’’ until contact was effected with the main enemy 
position near Keren’’. 

In order to reach the Italian capital at Asmara, General Platt 
had to force a passage through the Keren Gorge situated in country 
so fantastically rugged and mountainous that it was once described 
as ‘a stormy sea moved by the wrath of God’. Early attempts by 
General Beresford-Peirse’s 4th Division to penetrate this defile un- 
aided in the face of strong resistance had met with little success. 
The Italians were determined to hold it to the end and threw into 
it their last strategic reserves of any importance. Here, General 
Frusci massed a powerful force of artillery, and with his infantry 
securely entrenched on every height and having superb facilities for 
observation, he could afford to await the issue with some confidence. 
On the left of the road climbing up through the deep and winding 


1 The Ponte Mussolini spanned the Baraka River about 12 miles from ‘Agordat. The 
events described took place about February 2nd, after Agordat had been captured. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 39 


gorge were the hills known as Cameron Ridge, Sanchil, Brig’s Peak, 
Samanna and Mount Amba: on the right, Dologorodoc crowned 
by a fort, Falestoh, Zelale and Zeban!. ‘“‘The whole mass of moun- 
tains, like a bleak and jagged screen”, writes Antony Brett-James,? 
“looms up into the sky some 2,500 feet above the green valley of 
the approach. It is steep, high, immense, forbidding. The soil crumbles 
beneath your feet, and the rocks are easily dislodged if used as a 
lever to pull yourself up. At every step, spear-grass stabs through 
the toughest clothing and the skin is torn by prickly thorn-trees. 
It is no wonder that those of our soldiers, laden with equipment, 
rifles, ammunition and shovels, who actually reached the almost 
unclimable heights were momentarily too exhausted to make further 
effort. It was this moment of breathless exhaustion and strain that 
the Italians chose so often for delivering a counter-attack”. 

The story of the long and desperate struggle in and around the 
Keren Gorge begins on the night of February 3rd/4th, 1941, when 
the 11th Brigade of the 4th Indian Division failed in a gallant attempt 
to capture and hold the Sanchil height to the west of the road and 
railway. Italian guns fired down on the attackers and grenades were 
tossed among them, but the Cameron Highlanders managed to 
establish themselves on a ridge below the summit which thereafter 
bore their name. On the following night, the 3/14th Punjabis reached 
the crest of Brig’s Peak and held it for a few hours, but in the end 
they had to withdraw under intensive bombardment. The Sth Brigade 
now appeared on the scene and General Beresford-Peirse sent it 
against the Acqua Ridge to the right of the gorge between Falestoh 
and Zelale and at the head of the wide Happy Valley. Again he failed; 
but on February 10th he prepared to try once more, this time on both 
flanks simultaneously with the 29th Brigade of the Sth Division in 
reserve. Sanchil and Brig’s Peak on the left were stormed, but neither 
could be held, and the Acqua.attack fared no better. So the 4th 
Division, with only Cameron Ridge to show for much blood and 
sweat, settled down to await the arrival of the remainder of the 5th 
Division. The enemy made good use of the respite so gained. They 
had already blocked the road by a huge demolition at the most difficult 
spot and now they proceeded to pour reinforcements and guns into 
their elaborate defences. 





1 See the map of the Battle of Keren included in this chapter. 
* "Ball of Fire’, by Antony Brett-James, pp. 51, 52. 


40 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


With the Sth Brigade at Keren was 12 Field Company of the 
Madras Corps which, with 4 Field Company of the Bengal Corps 
and 18 Field Company of the Bombay Corps, had to bear the heavy 
burden of the engineering operations before the 5th Divisional Engi- 
neers began to arrive. Colonel D. B. Chopra, then a subaltern with 12 
Field Company, gives the following description of his experiences :— 
“The enemy had blown up a long stretch of road and had incorporated 
with it a strong road-block, and after seeing it in a tank from some 
distance, I reported the details of this obstacle. Meanwhile, the 4th 
Division had come up and it became apparent that a full-scale attack 
would have to be launched to capture the enemy positions guarding 
the obstacle before the main line of communication could be used. 
The 5th Brigade was detailed to take a ridge on the right and to get 
behind the enemy’s position at Keren, and I was sent with a recon- 
Naissance party to find a route by which transport especially tanks, 
could get as close as possible to the objective. The reconnaissance 
was conducted in broad daylight and in full view of the enemy. We 
had scarcely finished when the forward elements of the Brigade began 
to arrive in the area. I told the Brigade Major that there was a route 
further ahead which could be developed for transport without much 
labour, and he directed me to go as far as possible along it towards 
the enemy position and report exactly where the route met the ridge 
we were to attack. After obtaining this information, I was returning 
along the route when I was challenged suddenly by troops whose 
language I could not understand. It was very dark, so my Naik and 
myself took cover behind an embankment. I then told the Naik to 
find a way round the flank, but as soon as he started we were challenged 
again from barely 20 yards away. I replied in a few words of Arabic 
which I had picked up in Egypt and thereupon we were recognized 
and allowed to pass. It turned out that the men were Sudanese, and 
to this day I believe that I owe my life to those few Arabic words”’. 

Deeply involved in the tragic experiences of the 4th Division at 
Keren was 4 Field Company which was in support of the 11th Brigade, 
the first to attack. The tanks which accompanied the Brigade found 
the road through the gorge blocked by hundreds of tons of rock 
covered by fire from enemy positions in the hills. After Cameron 
Ridge had been secured, 4 Field Company began to make paths and 
mule tracks up the hill-side so that the infantry could be maintained 
in their exposed position by carriers and by pack transport which 
General Platt had been collecting for some time. The unit accom- 
panied the 3/lst Punjabis when that battalion seized and tried to 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 4] 


hold Brig’s Peak on February 10th. By day, the Sappers laboured 
on the paths and tracks: by night, they fought as infantry on the 
crest. This continued for 36 hours until, in the early hours of February 
12th, the peak was lost and the troops withdrew to Cameron Ridge. 
4 Field Company suffered many casualties and among them a Jemadar 
who died bravely while leading a bayonet charge. During the lull 
of nearly a month which followed the failure of all attempts by the 
4th Division, consolidation proceeded steadily on Cameron Ridge. 
Early in March, the 9th and 10th Brigades of the 5th Division arrived 
from the Tessenai area, and 2 and 4 Field Companies of the Bengal 
Corps met for the first time at the front and together prepared to 
take their part in opening the Keren Gorge road. 

Some weeks earlier, General Platt had initiated a subsidiary move- 
ment from the north which was designed to draw off a considerable 
part of General Frusci’s force at Keren. On February 9th, part of 
the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division, together with some French 
formations, had crossed the Eritrean frontier near the Red Sea coast 
and had taken Karora, 150 miles north of Keren. A few days later, this 
column, under Brigadier H. R. Briggs, occupied Kubkub, only 40 
miles from Keren, and on March Ist, broke through the Mescelit 
defile only 15 miles away. This threat to his communications with 
Asmara and Massawa forced General Frusci to look over his right 
shoulder and keep a reserve near the coast. As the coastal route 
was long and rough, it was decided to disembark a Company of 
infantry and a Section of 12 Field Company at an advanced point 
down the coast to improve landing facilities and receive supplies for 
the column. A jetty was built, washed away in a storm, and rebuilt, 
and by improvised means the Sapper detachment contrived to keep 
the force properly supplied until the race for Massawa started after 
the fall of Keren. The race was won by the advanced troops of the 
Sth Division; but some of the Sappers of the coastal column were 
only a few minutes behind. Havildar-Major Sampangi Raju of 12 
Field Company gained the Indian Order of Merit for gallantry shown 
in the coastal expedition and on many other occasions between March 
27th and 30th. The citation records that he displayed great courage, 
initiative, skill and devotion to duty in the destruction of well 
concealed minefields, in one of which, containing a new type of mine, 
he personally dismantled the first mine and cleared the most dangerous 
area after three men had been killed.! 

t Some of Havildar-Major (later Captain) Sampangi’s experiences are given in an 
article entitled “I will never forget.” 





42 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The assault at Keren opened with a roar at dawn on March 15th, 
1941, every gun being concentrated on a vital target. On the left, 
the 4th Division was to advance once again from Cameron Ridge 
against the heights of Sanchil and Brig’s Peak. On the right, the 9th 
Brigade of the Sth Division was to take Fort Dologorodoc and 
Falestoh beyond it, after which the 29th Brigade would capture 
Mount Zeban and advance on the town of Keren, which the 10th 
Brigade would occupy later. The 4th Division attack met with only 
limited success, yet enough was gained to warrant the start of the 
operations to the right of the road. By 6.15 a.m., Dologorodoc had 
fallen to the West Yorkshires, but the success of any further advance 
depended upon whether they could hold the place. This they did for 
several days under heavy bombardment and repeated counter-attacks 
and thus enabled the area of conflict to be extended. 2 Field 
Company, with infantry working parties, was busily employed in 
building a mule-track up to the captured fort. In the words of 
Brigadier F. W. Messervy, who was now in command of the 9th 
Brigade, the occupation of Fort Dologorodoc virtually sealed the 
fate of Keren, although the attempt by the 29th Brigade against 
Falestoh and Zeban on March 17th was unsuccessful. On March 
19th, the West Yorkshires were still hanging on grimly in Fort 
Dologorodoc under heavy fire from Sanchil, which the 4th Division was 
trying once more to capture. The 3/18th Garhwalis lost all their 
British officers, except one, in a desperate but abortive attack. No- 
thing then remained but to make a final thrust up the road through 
the gorge which the enemy had obstructed by an enormous block of 
rocks and rubble, thus effectively preventing the advance of our 
“I” tanks which were to lead the way to Keren and Asmara. 

The Keren road-block was more than 100 yards in length and 
cleverly sited at a spot where the road turned a corner and entered 
the narrowest part of the gorge. A cliff had been blown down onto 
the highway, and the obstacle was well covered by fire. The enemy, 
moreover, had perfect observation posts overlooking it. After the 
capture of Dologorodoc, a closer reconnaissance became possible, 
and on the night of March 16/17th an officer of 2 Field Company 
went out to examine the breach. He reported that there were two 
craters in the road, each about 20 yards long, and between them and 
beyond them, lengths of debris including many large rocks, but he 





“From Pyramid to Pagoda’, by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.S.0., M.C., 
Chapter VI. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 43 


estimated that a path of some sort for tracked vehicles might be 
opened in 48 hours. On the following night, Lieut.-Colonel A. H. G. 
Napier, R.E., now C.R.E. 4th Division, made a personal reconnais- 
sance with a detachment of 2 Field Company and some Indian infantry. 
He had hoped to be able to start clearing the debris at once and had 
arranged a programme of artillery and small arms’ fire; but the 
enemy were on the alert, and after the little force had come under 
fire, the work had to be postponed. 

On the evening of March 18th, 2 Field Company tried to break up 
some of the largest boulders but was prevented by heavy fire from 
an enemy picket beyond the block, and after another failure under 
still heavier fire from several directions on the 19th, it became 
apparent that no progress was possible until the surrounding ground 
had been captured and the enemy artillery subdued. A Divisional 
operation was therefore staged and it was arranged that all the 5th 
Divisional Engineers available, assisted by 4 Field Company, should 
be employed in turn on the road-block. By March 25th, the infantry 
had succeeded in clearing all small arms’ fire from the area and were 
over-running the lower slopes of Mount Sanchil so that 2 Field 
Company was able to start work at 6.30 a.m., on clearing the block. 
Thereafter, four Sapper companies relieved each other at 5-hour 
intervals, toiling night and day with picks and shovels and even 
bare hands. 2 and 4 Companies of the Bengal Corps, and 20 and 21 
Companies of the Bombay Corps, vied with each other in this 
stupendous task, and after 32 hours a track fit for ‘I’ tanks was 
Opened. Night was falling, however, so it was decided to use the 
hours of darkness to improve the track in order to allow the passage 
of a complete mobile column, including wheeled vehicles, and work 
continued accordingly. At last, on the morning of March 26th, “I” 
tanks, troops and transport poured up the Keren Gorge, entered 
Keren itself and pursued the enemy towards Asmara until held up 
for a time by a position, with further road-blocks, at Ad Teclesan. 
Keren was one of the few occasions on which the Italians fought 
with tenacity. They kept up the battle for 53 days and lost it mainly 
because they wore themselves out in eight fruitless attempts to retake 
Fort Dologorodoc. They left more than 3000 dead on the rugged 
heights and signed the death-warrant of their Empire in East Africa. 

At Ad Teclesan, where the road from Keren descends to the 
Asmara Plain, General Frusci made a last effort to stem our advance. 
The bulk of the 4th Division being already under orders to return 
to the Western Desert to reinforce the troops then retreating before 


44 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


General Rommel, the task of opening a way to Asmara fell to the 
5th Division. After an attack by the 28th Brigade on the Teclesan 
positions had failed, the West Yorkshires of the 9th Brigade carried 
them by assault on March 3lst and, on the following day, General 
Platt occupied Asmara. 20 Field Company distinguished itself during 
the advance to Teclesan by clearing a long road-block to help the 
29th Brigade, and 2 Field Company also removed many obstructions. 
Their work was typical of that of all the Sapper and Miner units in 
which officers and men constantly risked death or disablement as 
they formed the spear-head of every advance; and yet, unlike the 
other arms, they were seldom able to retaliate. No duty could demand 
greater courage. 

Thousands of Italian soldiers laid down their arms at Asmara. 
Vast quantities of equipment fell into our hands in addition to 
1,500,000 shells and masses of small arms’ ammunition. The Italian 
Army in East Africa was broken. Only General Frusci and a hand- 
ful escaped to the south to help the Duke of Aosta to muster the 
remnants holding out in Abyssinia. Already, the Emperor Haile 
Selassie was on his way back to Addis Ababa, where he resumed his 
rule on May 5th. The only remaining operation in Eritrea was 
now the occupation of Massawa. Admiral Bonetti, who was in 
command at the port, had been ordered to resist to the end, and 
accordingly, early on April 4th, the entire 10th Brigade started on 
a 60-mile march down the 7,000 feet descent to the sea. Already, 
2 Field Company, with infantry working parties, was hard at work 
in the Nefasit Gorge clearing the winding road of obstructions, one 
of which was 700 yards in length. The railway line had also to be 
cleared and mine-fields removed. A deliberate attack was planned 
on the Massawa defences which were held by 10,000 men, but little 
resistance was offered, and the town, and the harbour full of scuttled 
shipping, were seized by the 10th Brigade on April 8th shortly before 
the arrival of the 7th Brigade by the coastal route from the north. 
Reconstruction in an abnormally hot and humid climate claimed 
for a time the energies of 2 Field Company, while the detachment of 
12 Field Company which had been with the 7th Brigade column 
cleared the surrounding country of mines until it embarked with the 
4th Division for Egypt and the Western Desert. The work of re- 
construction on the Eritrean railway system was accelerated by the 
assistance afforded by 101 Railway Construction Company, of the 
Madras Corps, under Major R. Gardiner, R.E., which spent two 
months in the country before being transferred to Iraq in May. 


BAMESSE]A) pure Bivusy 
u9aMjoq YIO]G pol B Hulseap saourypy pue siaddug 





EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 45 


After Massawa had fallen, the remnants of the Italian forces with- 
drew southwards along the roads leading from Asfnara to Amba 
Alagi and Gondar, and the task of attacking the immensely strong 
enemy position at Amba Alagi, 235 miles from Asmara, was allotted 
to the 5th Division, now commanded by Major-General A. G. O. 
M. Mayne. This position was on a precipitous mountain, over 
10,000 feet in height, surrounded by subsidiary peaks and ridges. 
The chief burden of the engineering work fell on 2 Field Company. 
The rapid advance of the African troops under General Cunningham 
from Kenya had resulted in the capture of Dessie on April 28th; 
but the leading formation—the Ist South African Brigade—was too 
distant to co-operate until General Mayne was close to Amba Alagi. 
It was planned accordingly that the main attack on the mountain 
fortress should be carried out at dawn on May 4th by the 29th 
Brigade against the enemy’s western flank. A subsidiary force was 
to operate along a road further east which led to the Falaga Pass 
and thence swing westwards for the assault, while a third force made 
a direct approach along a main road in a valley. Each force had a 
detachment of 2 Field Company. The intricate manoeuvres which 
followed are fully described in the 5th Indian Division History,! 
and it must suffice to record here that they were eminently successful. 
The Sappers had to lay a special track up the mountain side, marked 
with white stones, to enable animal transport to carry supplies to 
the forward troops, and also to clear road-blocks, lift mines and 
arrange for water-supply; and when the South African brigade 
joined in the fray, they used Bangalore torpedoes to blow lanes through 
barbed wire. On May 16th, driven into his last defences, the Duke 
of Aosta asked for terms of surrender. The terms were generous, 
and on May 17th, 1941, 4,700 Italian officers and men, including 
many Generals, laid down their arms. Most of the prisoners were 
marched away, but 1,200 were kept for a time to help 2 Field Company 
in opening roads, clearing the battlefield and repairing captured 
lorries. The amount of transport, munitions and supplies which fell 
to the 5th Division was enormous. The Duke of Aosta was removed 
to Kenya where, worn out by the stress and anxiety of his campaigns 
against the British, Indian and African forces, he died of tuberculosis 
within a year. : 

The 5th Indian Division soon began to retrace its steps north- 
wards, and with it went 2 Field Company. 8 Army Troops Company 


Cae aes tence feces, Soak oa Mera ee ea ea 


1 “Ball of Fire,” by Antony Brett-James, pp. 101-136. 


46 7 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


remained in Abyssinia throughout the summer, being stationed for a 
time at Dessie. A Section assisted in the capture of Debra Tabor, 
and others kept operi the road to that place. At Adowa, the unit 
re-opened an airfield for the South Africans, who were assembling 
for an assault on Gondar, and in August it took part in an attack 
on a very strong position on the Wolchefit Pass. Fortunately, the 
enemy surrendered and the Company was then able to clear the 
road. It moved with other troops to capture Gondar at the end of 
November 1941, and finally, after the last pocket of Italian resistance 
had been liquidated, it followed the 5th Division to Egypt. 

Little need be recorded about the southern arm of the great pincer 
movement against Eritrea and Abyssinia because no Sapper and 
Miner units were concerned in it. While the northern arm under 
Lieut.-General Sir William Platt was clearing Eritrea, the southern 
arm under Lieut.-General Sir Alan Cunningham was making history 
by a wonderful march from the Indian Ocean. In September 1939, 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika were defended by only 6 front-line 
battalions of the King’s African Rifles. They had no field artillery, 
no armour, no engineers, no medical organization and hardly any 
motor transport. However, by the end of 1940, our forces had reached 
a strength of 3 divisions (Ist South African and 11th and 12th East 
African Divisions) and on January 24th, 1941, General Cunningham 
crossed the Kenya frontier into Italian Somaliland at the head of 
the 11th and 12th Divisions. He went from success to success. 
Forcing a passage over the Juba River on February 18th, he entered 
the port of Mogadishu a week later. Then he swung north across the 
desert, heading for Jijiga on the border of British Somaliland, which 
we had lost in August 1940. He entered Jijiga on March 17th, having 
averaged 37 miles a day since leaving Mogadishu. The Italians had 
been thrown out of British Somaliland on the previous day by a 
force from Aden. Next, with Berbera as a base, Cunningham turned 
south-westwards and set out for Addis Ababa. On March 27th, the 
llth East African Division captured Harar at the moment when 
General Platt broke through at Keren, and on April 6th the advanced 
troops entered Addis Ababa in triumph only 40 days after starting 
from Mogadishu, 1,100 miles away. The Ist South African Brigade, 
then moved northwards, captured Dessie and, as already related, 
combined with the Sth Indian Division in the attack on Amba Alagi. 
Thus, through the exercise of a mobility never before attained in 
war, the great pincer movement reached a _ successful conclusion. 
The 12th East African Division was already mopping up far inland 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 47 


in the region of the Great Lakes, and soon a triangle of country 
round Gondar was all that was left to the Italians. Gondar surrendered 
on November 27th, and with its fall the operations in East Africa 
came to an end. A million square miles of country had been occupied 
and 220,000 Italians accounted for; but it should be remembered 
that, except at Keren, the enemy rarely fought as the Germans did. 
Another phase of the great struggle, that in the Western Desert to 
which we now return, forms an object lesson in the unpredictable 
vagaries of modern mechanized warfare. 

In March 1941, the striking force in Cyrenaica, comprising the 
2nd Armoured Division (less one brigade in Greece) and the 9th 
Australian Division (less one brigade in Tobruk), was holding 
Benghazi and the coast to the south. The troops were in high fettle. 
Ably led by Lieut.-General O'Connor, they had smashed the Italians, 
and with adequate reinforcement there seemed to be nothing to 
prevent them from advancing to Tripoli or even to Tunis. But they 
counted without the Germans. The destruction of Marshal Graziani’s 
army had compelled Hitler to look towards Africa, and while General 
Wavell was depleting his reserves in order to find troops for Greece, 
General Erwin Rommel’s ‘Afrika Korps’ began to land in Tripoli- 
tania. German aircraft commenced to bomb Benghazi so persis- 
tently that shipping had to be unloaded at Tobruk, whence all supplies 
were transported for 200 miles in such vehicles as were available. 
The number of vehicles being insufficient to meet an emergency, a 
system of supply from large forward dumps was established, the 
Main petrol reserve being at Msus in the desert. Logistics began to 
govern strategy, a situation often encountered in war. 

The Third Libyan Campaign was opened by Rommel at the end 
of March 1941 when the bulk of our advanced forces under Lieut.- 
General Sir Philip Neame, V.C., who commanded in Cyrenaica, 
were in position near El Agheila, a coastal town south of Benghazi. 
Rommel had the 90th Light Motorized Division of the Afrika Korps, 
an Italian Armoured Division, an Italian Motorized Division and 
several weak divisions of Italian infantry. Cutting across the desert 
behind Neame and over-running our petrol store at Msus and a 
number of supply dumps, he quickly re-occupied Benghazi. Generals 
O’Connor and Neame were captured by a German patrol, and al- 
though most of the Australian Division managed to reach Tobruk 
on April 7th, the 2nd Armoured Division, hopelessly out-gunned and 
often out-manoeuvred, was virtually annihilated. Rommel’s armour 
swept forward. By April 11th, Tobruk was isolated and besieged and 


48 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


a German-Italian army stood on the Egyptian border above Sollum. 
Thus, in the brief space of twelve days, all our gains were swept 
away. It was a disaster of the first magnitude. 

Both sides now paused, exhausted; but the first to recover was 
Rommel. On May Ist, he tried to take Tobruk by storm. He 
failed and then resorted to siege operations and bombing. The Nile 
Valley, however, was once more in acute danger and it was fortunate 
that, owing to the success of the Eritrean operations, General Wavell 
was able to reinforce the Western Desert front with the 4th Indian 
Division. He decided to hold Tobruk, and consequently Rommel 
was obliged to invest that place with a large force which might other- 
wise have been available for an advance on Alexandria and Cairo. 
The strategical position developed into a stalemate and a race for 
reinforcements. But in this, Rommel held a great advantage. His 
reinforcements traversed an excellent road through Tripolitania, 
while Wavell’s had to voyage round the Cape. 

Few Sappers and Miners were concerned in this lightning campaign, 
for Rommel had already reached the Sollum escarpment before the 
4th Indian Division, now under Major-General F. W. Messervy, 
could arrive at the front. Such engineering work as was possible 
during the rapid withdrawal was carried out by the 2nd Armoured 
Division Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Mitchell, R.E., and 
the 9th Australian Division Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel T. Mann, 
R.A.E. The 4th Indian Division Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel 
H. P. Cavendish, R.E., moved out to Mersa Matruh soon after they 
reached Egypt from Eritrea and were engaged principally in laying 
mine-fields near the coast and developing a standard method of 
setting and recording them, known as the ‘Indian Rope Trick.’! They 
were concerned also with communications and with the improvement 
of the water-supply at Buq Buq, between Sollum and Sidi Barrani. 
In action against the Germans near Sollum, 12 Field Company 
helped to bring up ammunition and evacuate casualties. The only 
Sapper and Miner unit involved in heavy fighting was 35 Field 
Squadron of the Bengal Corps, attached to the 3rd Indian Motor 
Brigade, which had landed at Suez from India on February 7th and 
arrived in Mersa Matruh on March 9th. 

The sad story of 35 Field Squadron may be given in brief. Towards 
the end of March, shortly before Rommel started his sudden offensive, 
the Squadron was at El Adem, in the desert south of Tobruk, and 





1 Notes by Lieut.-Colonel P. N. M. Moore, R.E., dated September 1947. 


EGYPT, THE WESTERN DESERT, THE SUDAN AND ERITREA 49 


was ordered westwards to Mekili to ‘new training grounds’. The 
information available at the time indicated that no enemy patrols 
were within 250 miles of the place. Arrived at Mekili, “A” Troop 
went out to reconnoitre for water while “B” Troop laid mines. Neither 
got very far, for Rommel’s armour was already flooding in and 
Mekili was soon surrounded. The little fort, with its cluster of huts 
and a few water cisterns, was in no way suited for a long and stub- 
born defence even if that had been possible against overwhelming 
numbers. Not realising the proximity of the enemy tanks, orders 
had been made out for the day’s march of the Motor Brigade; but 
being low in the order of march, the officers and men of 35 Field 
Squadron were still waiting near their vehicles when five German 
tanks appeared south of the fort. The OC Squadron, Major P. F. 
Hayes, R.E., promptly went forward with Captain A. G. Hellicar, 
R.E., to stalk the tanks, though armed only with an anti-tank rifle 
and an ordinary rifle, and when the Mark III tanks rushed upon 
and over-ran the Brigade Headquarters and the remainder of the 
Squadron, they were completely isolated. Yet, in the general con- 
fusion, they managed to seize a stranded vehicle, and in it they escaped 
to Tobruk, where they helped to reorganize a few men and vehicles 
from another Squadron. All the other officers and men of 35 Field 
Squadron were captured and spent the remainder of the war in 
prison camps. 

The 5th Division Engineers reached Egypt too late to assist in 
‘stemming Rommel's onrush to the frontier. For instance, 20 and 
21 Field Companies did not disembark at Suez from Massawa until 
July. The burden of the early defensive preparations by Indian troops 
fell accordingly on the 4th Division Engineers—4, 12 and 18 
Field Companies, 11 Field Park Company and 6 Army Troops 
Company—and right well did they carry out their various tasks. 
The 4th Division had lost no time in reaching the Desert front. The 
5th Brigade arrived in Suez only eight days after leaving Keren and 
went straight through by rail. It was followed by the other two 
brigades, and by the end of April 1941 the Division was concentrated 
in the Bagush area, east of Mersa Matruh, where, with New Zealand 
troops, it had built a defended position some months earlier before 
it was transferred to Eritrea. The 5th Brigade, however, did not 
remain long in Bagush, for it was called away for service against the 
Vichy French in Syria and did not return until November. 

By the end of April 1941, the Germans were in Athens and the 
Greek adventure had failed dismally. Of the 60,000 British and 


50 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Dominion soldiers landed there, 15,000 never returned. And after 
Greece came the disaster in Crete, for by the end of May, Crete had 
succumbed to an air-borne invasion. In spite of Keren, in spite of 
Amba Alagi, British fortunes in the Middle East had reached their 
nadir. The fate of a large part of the British Empire hung precari- 
ously in the balance. But happily, such depressing considerations 
did little to lower the buoyant spirits of the average Indian Sapper 
and Miner, who was not much affected by matters of highstrategy. He 
laboured as stoutly as ever for the welfare and protection of the other 
arms of the Service and remained always confident in ultimate victory. 


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CHAPTER III 
THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 


EFORE the collapse of Greece, the Government of India had 
Bierce: to send a force to Iraq to counter German aggression 

in the Balkans, to checkmate enemy designs against neutral 
Turkey and to safeguard the valuable oilfields of Iraq and Persia, 
and accordingly, on April 19th, 1941, the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade 
was landed at Basra as the forerunner of the remainder of the 10th 
Indian Division under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. Another 
brigade disembarked on April 28th, and on May 7th Lieut.-General 
E. P. Quinan arrived by air to assume the supreme command in 
Iraq. The Germans were then in Athens and had crossed the Aegean 
Sea to occupy several Greek islands. It was hoped that we should 
be able to hold Crete, where Major-General B. C. Freyberg, V.C., 
was in command, but events soon proved otherwise. Despite great 
sacrifices by the Royal Navy and a dour defence on the ground, 
Crete succumbed to a mass air-borne assault during the last fort- 
night of May and thus the German tide crept still closer to the Syrian 
coast. The Vichy French forces in Syria, under General Dentz, 
amounted to about 35,000 men with 120 guns and 90 tanks. These 
misguided deserters from the Allied cause welcomed the German 
aeroplanes flying continually eastwards towards Iraq to support a - 
rebel called Rashid Ali who had overthrown the Iraqi Government. 
Baghdad simmered with intrigue. German agents were busy in 
Persia. It was obvious that Iraq would soon be occupied by German 
forces unless forestalled by British and Indian troops. Nevertheless, 
General Wavell viewed the situation in Syria as more immediately 
dangerous than that in Iraq and consequently, on May 25th, he 
forwarded a plan for the invasion of Syria from the south by Austra- 
lian, British and Free French forces under General Maitland Wilson, 
the chief objectives being Damascus, Beirut and Rayak, a few miles 
inland from Beirut. 

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean was further com- 
plicated by the strategic importance of the Dodecanese Islands which 
controlled the entrance to the Aegean Sea. This archipelago, held 
by the Italians, had many good harbours and airfields from which 
the Germans could interfere with our sea traffic and isolate Turkey, 

51 


$2 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


and therefore it was advisable that we should occupy the islands as 
soon as possible. By June 18th, the Axis threat to Turkey had become 
so great that the Turks actually ratified a treaty of mutual assistance 
with Germany, though this was promptly annulled when Hitler 
invaded Russia a few days later and thus disclosed the direction of 
his main bid for world domination. Russia had then to be assisted 
against her former ally, Germany, and the Turks, relieved of the 
threat of a Muscovite invasion, could be considered as friendly to 
the Allies. But could Wavell find sufficient forces on the shores of 
the Mediterranean to checkmate enemy designs both in Syria, Iraq 
and Persia? It was soon apparent that he could not, and therefore 
assistance, and still more assistance, was needed from India. 

We turn first to the events in Iraq, where Rashid Ali opened the 
ball. On April 30th, 1941, two Iraqi brigades, supported by artillery 
and armoured cars, began to concentrate around the British Can- 
tonment and R.A.F. Station at Habbaniya on the Euphrates to the 
west of Baghdad. Hostilities started on May 2nd. The Cantonment 
and Station were bombed and machine-gunned for several days by 
the Iraqi Air Force and there was a considerable amount of shelling. 
While some of our planes evacuated women and children to Basra, 
the remainder retaliated by bombing the enemy positions overlooking 
the area. The situation was serious, for the sole defenders on the 
ground were 1,200 R.A.F. Levies, comprising loyal Arabs, Kurds 
and Assyrians. Luckily, Colonel (now General Sir) O. L. Roberts, 
an ex-Bengal Sapper and Miner, was present and organized a stout 
defence. Nevertheless, even after the arrival by air of a British battal- 
ion from Basra, the garrison was greatly outnumbered. The enemy 
occupied Rutba on the oil-pipe line to Haifa and various oil stations 
and refineries elsewhere. Additional reinforcements could not be 
expected to reach Habbaniya quickly. A mechanized cavalry brigade 
group from Palestine arrived on May 18th, only to find that the small 
garrison had already defeated the enemy, twelve days earlier, capturing 
26 Iraqi officers and 408 men and driving the remainder in disorder 
towards Falluja and Baghdad. The Iraqi Air Force had been practically 
eliminated by the R.A.F in spite of some intervention by German and 
Italian planes. Assisted by loyal Iraqis, our troops entered Falluja on 
May 19th. Rashid Ali and most of his supporters were then in 
flight, and on May 3lst an armistice was signed in Baghdad. 

In the Basra district, there was little fighting, though some bombing 
was necessary to induce the rebel Iraqis to withdraw northwards. 
By May 7th, we had restored order in the port and its surroundings. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 53 


The most pressing task was, of course, to reach Baghdad and Habba- 
niya. A Gurkha battalion was sent to the latter place by air, and on 
May 27th the 20th Brigade Group began to advance up the railway, 
reaching Samawa on June 10th and Baghdad on the 12th. The line 
had been badly damaged but was re-opened as the troops progressed. 
The 20th Brigade Group set out by the Tigris River route and arrived 
in the capital on June 19th. This expedition had a salutory effect 
on the riverain tribes who were inclined to be hostile. Afterwards, 
no time was lost in despatching troops northwards by air and road 
to Mosul, where pro-Axis influence was particularly marked, and 
also to Kirkuk, Haditha, Rutba, and Falluja,! and the Iraq Campaign 
may be said to have ended on June 24th, 1941. 

We can now turn to the part taken by some Indian Sapper and 
Miner units in these operations. With the 20th Brigade was 41 Field 
Park Company (Bengal) under Major C. R. Mangat Rai, I.E. This 
unit disembarked at Basra on April 29th, being followed next day 
by 10 Field Company (Madras) under Major C. M. Bennett, I.A.R.O. 
The next to arrive was 9 Field Company (Madras) under Major 
L. A. B. Paten, R.E., which landed on May 19th, and on June Sth 
5 Field Company (Bengal), under Major I. G. Loch, R.E., came 
ashore. With this unit was Captain J. S. Dhillon, I.E. The 10th 
Indian Division, whose C.R.E. was Lieut.-Colonel L. I. Jacques, 
R.E., was short of one Field Company during the most critical period 
before the signing of the armistice, and hence 41 Field Park Company 
had to act for a time as a Field Company in addition to its normal 
workshops and stores duties. The remarks of its Commander are 
therefore of special interest. 

“The 10th Indian Division was the first to arrive in Iraq’, writes 
Brigadier Mangat Rai,? ‘‘and this being a relatively undeveloped 
country, there was much engineer work to be done. For the first 
month and a half, the Company stayed in Shaiba (Basra) with Divi- 
sional H.Q. and remained fully occupied with a miscellany of jobs 
at the base, the most important of which was the laying of a piped 
water system for Army camps. The unit built two slaughter-houses 
and a sun-stroke centre, but the latter did not receive many patients 
despite a temperature of 124 degrees in the shade. Outside Shaiba 
there was a big and interesting work. This was the repair of the 





1 See the map of the Middle East included in this chapter. 


2“ With 41 Field Park Company’, by Brig. C. R. Mangat Rai, appearing in The 
Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers, January 1951. 


54 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


railway line from Basra to Ur. The form the sabotage had taken 
was the removal of sleepers and the destruction of small culverts. 
The repair party, consisting of the Workshops Section under Lieut. 
Devonald, began work at the Basra end and moved up the line with 
a train following close behind. Work continued throughout the day 
under a blistering sun, but the party lived in comfort at night for the 
train was equipped with shower baths and electric fans. As the job 
took longer than had been expected, the party ran short of food. More 
food was then dropped from the air, and this is probably one of the 
earliest instances of supply-dropping in the war. When the task of 
repairing the line up to Ur was completed, the party was compli- 
mented by General Quinan, the Force Commander. It then returned 
to Shaiba after three weeks’ absence, the men being in very good 
heart though their bodies were covered with insect bites. In the middle 
of June, the 10th Division moved up to Baghdad and 41 Field Park 
Company was a part of the first big convoy of 400 vehicles to leave 
Shaiba. Many of the unit’s M.T. drivers had received only a hurried 
training in India, but they acquitted themselves well. At Ur and at 
Diwaniya, the two intermediate stages in the journey of 325 miles, 
the unit was responsible for providing water for the column. A 
water party, with canvas tanks and pumps, was sent with the leading 
vehicles and, on arrival at the destination, set up a water-point on 
the bank of a canal. This had to be kept open till late at night because 
stragglers among the vehicles kept coming in till morning. At 
Diwaniya the water party got no sleep at all, for the water-point 
had to be kept open all night. The cooks also got little rest. Immedi- 
ately on arrival they had to start their work, and as food was demanded 
till late at night, and again in the early morning before starting the 
day’s run, there was not much time for sleep except while on the 
move.” 

These extracts give a good idea of the experiences of all the Sapper 
units when traversing this arid land. The Sappers had to open 
a way for the troops and transport and to provide them with water, 
and although they saw little fighting, their work was essential to the 
success of the military operations. 

10 Field Company advanced with a Brigade Group to Ur at the 
end of May, reaching Baghdad on June 12th and Mosul on June 16th. 
9 Field Company entered Baghdad on June !4th after one Section 
had suffered a few casualties while accompanying a reconnaissance 
on the Basra- ‘Baghdad road. 1 Later, it joined the 21st Brigade at 


1 “Short ‘Histories of Units”, given in ‘Bangalore News Lenter, ‘December 1946. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 55 


Habbaniya. 5 Field Company remained for the most part in Basra 
as the advance party of the 3rd Corps Troops Engineers. This for- 
mation included also 1 Field Company (Bengal) under Major S. H. M. 
Battye, R.E., which arrived in September, and in addition, at later 
dates, 14 Field Company (Madras) under Major D. K. S. Cameron, 
I.E., and 301 Field Park Company (Bombay) under Captain J. G. 
Wood, R.E. Other Sapper units appeared during 1941 and were 
employed mostly on defences, improving communications and 
expanding supply bases. Among these was 52 Army Troops Company 
(Madras), under Major F. H. R. French, R.E., which landed on 
June 16th. 32 Field Squadron (Madras) under Captain D. J. 
Middleton-Stewart, J.A.R.O. arrived on July 3rd, 61 Field Company 
(Madras) under Major C. C. F. Russell, R.E., on August 9th, and 
49 Army Troops Company (Bombay) under Major C. G. Caffin, R.E., 
on September 11th. During July and August certain Bengal Sapper 
units reached Basra as 8th Divisiona! Engineers, for the 8th Division 
was reinforcing the 10th Division in Iraq. These were 7 Field Company 
(Major H. A. H. Radcliffe-Smith, R.E.), 66 Field Company (Major 
H. G. A. Elphinstone, R.E.), 69 Field Company (Major W. G. A. 
Lawrie, R.E.) and 47 Field Park Company (Captain W. H. Cooper, 
R.E.). In addition there was 1 Bridging Platoon of the Madras 
Sappers under Lieut. R. T. Gerrard, R.E. In August and September, 
27 Field Company of the Bombay Corps (Major H. W. Kitson, 
R.E.) and 57 and 58 Field Companies of the Madras Corps (Majors 
W. M. S. Lillie and G. C. Richards, R.E.) disembarked as 6th Divi- 
sional Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Armstrong, R.E. 6 Army 
Troops Company of the Bengal Corps under Major H. Grattan, 
R.E., came from the Sudan in September, and 302 Field Park Com- 
pany, of the same Corps, arrived under Captain D. H. Bardell, R.E., 
in November. Many specialist units were added during the summer 
and autumn of 1941. Among these were 101 Railway Construction 
Company (Major R. Gardiner, R.E.) and also 105 Railway Construc- 
tion Company and 104 Transportation Stores Company. Other 
specialist units followed in 1942 and 1943, such as Electrical and 
Mechanical, Workshops and Excavating formations, but these cannot 
be dealt with in this narrative. At least 9 Railway units worked in 
Iraq or Persia during or after the military operations! and by repairing 


1 In an article entitled “‘My Experiences in Paiforce” Capt. Harbans Singh mentions 
101, 105, 106, 120, 136 and 137 Railway Construction Companies and 121, 129 and 
145 Railway Maintenance Companies. 


56 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


damaged lines and laying new ones helped to consolidate our position. 
So much for the technical aspect of a vast programme of rehabilitation. 

When the Regent of Iraq returned to Baghdad at the beginning of 
June 1941 the first task was to establish, at all main centres, sufficient 
forces to keep order while preparations were made to deal with a 
possible German invasion through Persia. Two battalions reached 
Mosul on June 3rd, and by June 18th the 20th Brigade H.Q. were 
at that place and a battalion was guarding the oilfields at Kirkuk. 
The 10th Division H.Q. were in Baghdad, and there were Gurkha 
detachments at Haditha, Rutba and Falluja. The 2Ist Brigade was 
posted at Kut-al-Amara, the scene of the historic siege in 1915-16.! 
At Shaiba, near Basra, were the 17th and 25th Brigades, and another 
brigade was in the process of landing. The lines of communication 
were adequately protected and it seemed that our forces should be 
able to devote all their energies to strengthening their positions, 
particularly around Mosul. But events dictated otherwise. Serious 
trouble had been brewing for some time in Syria, where the Axis 
powers were establishing powerful air-bases within two hours’ flying 
distance of Baghdad, and thus the process of pacifying and strengthen- 
ing Iraq suffered its first interruption and the war spread to the 
Levant. 

The situation in Syria under the French mandate was most peculiar. 
Before France fell, General Weygand had massed a strong army 
there, and even after the surrender it was hoped that he would return 
to help the Allied cause. The country was honeycombed with intrigue. 
The Vichy French wanted to maintain their mandate; the British 
wanted a new ally; the Germans wanted a spring-board in the 
Middle East. The Vichy Government tried a series of administrators 
all of whom failed. Then they appointed the pro-German General 
Dentz and the enemy took virtual control of the country. They 
passed their aircraft through to help Rashid Ali in Iraq and start 
the encirclement and isolation of neutral Turkey. 

The Syrian Campaign under General Maitland Wilson opened on 
June 8th, 1941, when the 7th Australian Division, less one brigade 
in Tobruk, began to advance northwards from Palestine with the 
assistance of a British brigade and a formation of Free French. 
**The essence of this campaign was tragedy”’, writes Alan Moorehead,? 





1 See Jn Kut and Captivity, by Major E. W. C. Sandes, m.c., R.E., (the present 
author). 


2 African Trilogy, by Alan Moorehead, p. 47. 


beay ul yous) Aemiies Sure, sisousuq uRIpUy 





THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 57 


“for in fighting their enemies the British were forced to fight also 
men who had been their friends.” And worse still. Frenchmen 
fought against Frenchmen. At first there was little resistance on the 
road to Damascus and Beirut, but bitter warfare soon developed as 
casualties began to mount. The tough Algerians and Foreign Legion 
soldiers under Dentz took a heavy toll of the Australians and British 
on the Litani River, south of Tyre. To the east, a mobile British 
column fought its way into the desert city of Palmyra. Sidon was 
captured and the Australians, British, Indians and Free French 
drove onwards up the coast towards Damascus supported by the 
British fleet and many squadrons of bombers. The Vichy French 
then counter-attacked and regained much ground south of Damascus. 
Two weeks of stubborn fighting ensued before reinforcements 
enabled General Wilson to capture Damascus by a three-way thrust. 
At last, General Dentz asked for terms and an armistice was arranged 
on July 7th. The brief campaign ended on July 12th, 1941, after 
which Dentz withdrew his battered troops northwards to Tripoli. 
He was soon interned by the British and thus the second phase of 
the war in the Middle East was brought to a conclusion. It left 
behind it a legacy of much bitterness; but German machinations 
had been defeated, and not alone by the troops sent from Palestine 
but also by others despatched from the recently subdued territory 
in Iraq. 

It had been decided that troops from Iraq should undertake the 
protection of the portion of the railway from Anatolia to Iraq which 
ran through Syrian territory, and that two Indian Infantry Brigade 
Groups should advance into Syria from the east. Accordingly, 
orders were issued that the 2Ist Brigade Group, then at Baghdad, 
and the 25th Brigade Group and 13th Lancers at Basra, should move 
up the Euphrates valley. The 21st Brigade, under Brigadier C. J. 
Weld, was to protect the line of communication between a forward 
base at Haditha and an advanced base to be formed at Deir-ez-Zor, 
which had to be occupied as quickly as possible. By June 30th, the 
2Ist Brigade and 13th Lancers were at Abu Kemal, and the advance 
from that place began on the following day. Meanwhile, a small 
column from Mosul was driving the Vichy French from Ras-el-Ain in 
order to secure the use of the railway as far as the Turkish frontier 
near Nisibin. On July 6th, the 17th Brigade (Brigadier D. D. Gracey) 
arrived in Mosul from Basra, and three days later Ras-el-Ain was 
clear of Vichy troops. The 10th Division, less the 20th Brigade, 
remained for several weeks in Syria until required for operations in 


58 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Persia. It may be remarked here that its commander was Major- 
General (now Field-Marshal Sir) W. J. Slim, who had assumed the 
appointment on June Ist, 1941, and held it until March 29th, 1942, 
when he became Commander, 4th Indian Corps, in India. 

9 Field Company (Madras), under Major L. A. B. Paten, R.E., 
took part in the Syrian Campaign and was with the 2lIst Brigade 
Group when Deir-ez-Zor was captured on July 3rd after a battle 
lasting three days. The unit remained there until the middle of the 
month and then moved up the Euphrates to Meskene where it stayed 
until it returned to Basra in August. Another Engineer unit which 
shared in the Syrian Campaign was 18 Field Company of the Bombay 
Corps. This unit left Bagush in Egypt on May 16th and reached 
Deraa in Trans-Jordan on June 8th with the Sth Brigade. It took 
part in an attack on enemy positions at Mezze, west of Damascus, on 
the night of June 18/19th, when the brigade was trying to cut the 
Beirut road and railway, and one Section was over-run when the 
Vichy French re-captured their lost positions. 31 Field Squadron and 
41 Field Park Company, both of the Bengal Corps, also served in Syria. 
The former moved from Egypt through Deir-ez-Zor to the Turkish 
frontier where it remained until required in August, 1941, to support 
the operations against Persia near the Pai Tak Pass at Khaniqin.} 

As regards the experiences of 41 Field Park Company, Brigadier 
Mangat Rai writes as follows?:— ‘“'The 10th Indian Division did not 
get the opportunity of halting long at Baghdad. It arrived there at 
Taji Camp on June 18th and began its advance into Syria on the 
30th. It was to attack the Vichy forces from the east along the 
Euphrates valley. Fawzi Quwachi, who had come to help Rashid 
Ali in Iraq, had retreated to his base in Syria along this line, leaving 
a trail of sabotage in his wake. The bridge over the Khan Naquta 
canal, 10 miles outside Baghdad on the way to Habbaniya, had been 
destroyed. An F.B.E. bridge had been erected, but something stronger 
was needed and this task was given to 41 Field Park Company. 
Only two days were allowed for the work. We were able to get most 
of the stores from the Iraq railways, and working round the clock 
by the light of vehicle headlamps at night, a 42-feet bridge of sleeper 
trestles and rolled steel joists, capable of taking Class 30 loads, was 








1 Brief History of the K.G.V'sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.L.E., (August 
1939-July 1946), by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 17. 


?“With 41 Field Park Company”, by Brig. C. R. Mangat Rai, appearing in The 
Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers, January 1951. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 59 


ready in time for the advance of the Division. During the advance 
to, and capture of, Deir-ez-Zor, the main work of the unit was to 
supply water to the troops, mostly by repairing sabotaged pumping 
stations. Among these was that at Al Qaim (beyond Haditha) 
from which water was pumped to Station T.1, 13 miles from the 
Euphrates, where Divisional H.Q. were established for some days. 
The Vichy French had air superiority and we had no anti-aircraft 
guns, so our Anti-Tank Battery Commander conceived the idea of 
using his 18-pounders in an anti-aircraft role on fixed lines. To do 
this, he needed help from the Sappers in making emplacements and 
special fittings to enable the guns to fire at high elevation. This we 
did for him, and soon his guns were in a circle round Divisional 
H.Q. pointing in the air. Not long after the capture of Deir-ez-Zor, 
the fighting in Syria came to an end and the Division was able to 
pause for about three weeks. Deir-ez-Zor is a pleasant place on the 
Euphrates and more habitable than Iraq in the summer. The Divi- 
sion held a Sports Meeting in which the Company did best among 
the smaller units. It was a fitting finale to a hard-fought campaign.” 

Life in Southern Iraq for those Sapper and Miner units whose 
fate it was to be stationed there during the summer of 1941 can 
best be described by quoting from the official story entitled 
“‘Paiforce.”’! ‘“‘Men.can exist and work prodigiously for a long time 
when they lack nearly all of what are usually considered necessities, 
but they cannot exist without water and food. No | Engineer Base 
Workshops Company at Basra, consisting largely of raw recruits, 
was hardly ashore before it was required to lay an 8-inch water 
pipeline for the R.A.F. compound at Magil, across the desert to 
Shaiba, a distance of 15 miles. Sections of pipe were arriving a few 
ata time. Each joint required one pound of yarn and twelve pounds 
of lead. Neither yarn nor lead was available, and there was nothing 
like the necessary equipment of tools. ‘‘The impossible we do at 
once. Miracles take a little longer.” The O.C. unit, Major Adcock, 
started to comb the bazaars, buying out of his own pocket every 
appropriate tool he could see and trusting that the Army would 
refund the money (which the Army did). He discovered Captain 
John Morris, Chief Engineer of the Port of Magqil. Morris lent his 
own tools, all suitable stores he could find, and even his own skilled 
tradesmen. The task of laying 700 tons of pipe, with 20 tons of lead, 
went ahead, the men working from 5 a.m. till 4 p.m. and camping 


: ' Paiforce. The Official Story of the Poise and Iraq C paananh 1941-46, pp. 55- 59. 


60 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


at the point the pipe had reached. The shifting camp grew till it 
contained 1,350 men. The shade temperature rose to 128 degrees, 
but in 25 working days the whole job was done. The size of the 
main base increased steadily and the centre of gravity moved forward. 
Depots were opening in and about Baghdad, at Haditha, at Kirkuk, 
as far as Mosul. An advanced base was started at Musaiyib, 40 
miles south of Baghdad. It was Shaiba over again. There were 
dust-storms on five days out of seventeen. Work was impossible 
then. Men wrapped themselves in blankets and waited through the 
hours for the storm to subside. Tents were sent scurrying across the 
desert, iron roofs were torn from walls and pitched a hundred yards 
away. As long as the office-tent remained in its place, the O.C. and 
his Adjutant sat in pools of sweat at either side of the folding table, 
took papers from the heaped ‘Action’ tray and tried to think of an 
answer before the paper was blown away or covered with liquefying 
sand. The sweat ran in rivers down their faces, down chest, back 
and legs, and the sand, driven hard against these dripping surfaces, 
turned instantly to mud. The nights were free from storm, but at 
dawn the flail of sand began again. And when the storm was finally 
over, there were the heat and sandflies and the arrears in the pro- 
gramme to contend with.’’ Many of the Sapper field units had similar 
experiences. It is indeed a matter of some wonder that the War 
Diaries of the various companies could be faithfully and clearly 
written up day by day. Yet such was the case. 

Long before they were thwarted in Iraq and Syria, the Germans 
had coveted Persia, and when Great Britain and Russia became 
allies, it was obvious that their first joint task must be to establish 
contact through that difficult country. Persia offered a valuable 
prize to either side. Outside America, her oilfields were the largest 
in the world and they supplied the Allied armies and navies in the 
Middle East. Persia was, in fact, a country in which the Germans 
might almost win the war outright. It became necessary, therefore, 
to consolidate our position by operations within it, both in the 
south-east and south-west, and accordingly a very brief campaign 
was launched in August 1941 against the pro-Axis elements in the 
country. As early as July 22nd, General Quinan had been ordered 
to occupy Abadan and the Naft-i-Shah oilfields at the head of the 
Persian Gulf, and later, those further north and north-west, and early 
in August he made certain preparations. The 24th Brigade of the 
8th Indian Division (Major-General C. O. Harvey) was to seize the 
Abadan Refinery and an adjacent village called Khurramshahr, 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 61 


while the 25th Brigade and 13th Lancers advanced northwards 
through Ahwaz. Simultaneously, the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade 
(Brigadier J. A. Aizlewood) was to begin an advance on Kermanshah 
from Northern Iraq, joined later by the 9th Indian Armoured Brigade 
which was expected shortly from Palestine. Bandar Shahpur, a port 
at the head of the Perisan Gulf, was to be occupied by a small naval 
and military force. Little opposition was expected anywhere. 

The 18th Brigade from India joined the 8th Division on August 
10th, 1941, in time to assist in the operations which began before 
dawn on August 25th. At Abadan the 24th Brigade found Persian 
troops asleep in their barracks and captured many of them while 
the remainder fled in lorries. The 18th Brigade was soon in 
Khurramshahr. On the 26th, a ferry was established across the 
Karun River, and the brigade crossed on the 27th and advanced 
beyond Dorquain Pumping Station to a point half-way to Ahwaz. 
Meanwhile, the 25th Brigade had occupied Qasr Shaikh. Bandar 
Shahpur also was in our hands. On the 28th, the 25th Brigade moved 
up the west bank of the Karun to within 25 miles of Ahwaz. Both 
brigades then advanced on that town, astride the river. They met 
some resistance en route, but as they were approaching their objective 
the news arrived that the Shah of Persia had ordered his troops to 
cease fire and consequently the operations ended suddenly. 1! Bridging 
Platoon of the Madras Corps, under 2nd Lieut. R. T. Gerrard, R.E., 
was concerned in the ferrying operations over the Karun, and 9 Field 
Company, under Major L. A. B. Paten, R.E., accompanied the 18th 
Brigade and ferried vehicles across the wide stream on improvised 
equipment. On the 27th, 9 Field Company handed over the ferry 
to 7 Field Company of the Bengal Corps (Major H. A. H. Radcliffe- 
Smith, R.E.) and rejoined the 18th Brigade before the occupation of 
Ahwaz. The stores and spikes for the ferrying rafts were supplied 
by 47 Field Park Company (Bengal) under Captain W. H. Cooper, 
R.E. 

The operations between Abadan and Ahwaz were facilitated by the 
provision of a floating bridge across the Shatt-al-Arab at Basra. 
This was accomplished in about a week by 5 Field Company under 
Major I. G. Loch, R.E., with Captain J. S. Dhillon, 1E., as second- 
in-command. Loch had the assistance of one Section of 7 Field 
Company, an Indian Pioneer Battalion, and two Indian Artisan Works 
(or Army Troops) Companies.! The bridge was composed of mahailas 





' Notes by Colonel I. G. Loch, 0.8.E., dated June 5th, 1952. 


62 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


(Arab dhows), and progress depended largely on the rapidity with 
which suitable craft could be secured. The structure was in two 
sections, 970 feet and 830 feet in length, on either side of Coal Island, 
and not only was it the first bridge to span the Shatt-al-Arab but 
also, at that time, the longest boat-bridge in the world. The section 
to the west of Coal Island was attached, upstream and downstream, 
to steel wire cables, while that to the east was secured by anchors 
in order to allow a navigation cut. Gunwale loading, using short 
joists, had to be adopted at first because of a scarcity of long rolled- 
steel joists for central loading, and consequently the roadway needed 
much stiffening to prevent excessive rolling of the mahailas under heavy 
traffic.! The bridge was opened on August 14th, 1941, shortly before the 
Persian Campaign, and within a few weeks no less than 1,000 vehicles 
a day were rolling across the wide river instead of a possible 80 
vehicles carried by ferry. Thus 5 Field Company played a notable 
part in expediting the supplies needed by Russia. It may be remarked 
here that, as soon as the necessary materials became available, the 
bridge was remodelled to provide central loading. Railway sleepers 
were used for the decking. 

The mahaila bridge did not remain long in existance for in January 
1942 a Section of 57 Field Company, under 2nd Lieut. G. Horne, 
R.E., which had been maintaining it and working the cut, was engaged 
in dismantling it while the rest of the unit was employed on a defensive 
position at Pul-i-Tang, north of Andimishk in Persia.2, Some months 
later it seemed probable that if large-scale operations opened against 
German forces in Persia about 2,000 tons of war material would 
have to go forward daily from Basra across the Shatt-al-Arab. 
Ferrying in barges to the railway terminus at Tanuma, near Abadan, 
could not meet the situation, nor could a mahaila bridge cope with 
the demand, and accordingly General Maitland Wilson ordered the 
rapid construction of a more permanent structure, to take both road 
and rail traffic, and a site was selected close to the Basra airport.3 
The work was directed by Brigadier G. B. G. Hull.4 This bridge, 
like the mahaila bridge (afterwards converted to pontoons), was in 
two sections divided by Coal Island. The bridge had to provide for 





! The author was faced with the same problem in 1915 when bridging the Tigris at 
Kurna and Amara. (See In Kut and Captivity.) 


? Notes by Major G. Horne, R.E., dated August Sth, 1952. 
3 Paiforce. The Official Story of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941-46, p. 120. 
‘Brig. Hull held an R.E. Regular Emergency Commission. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 63 


the passage of river traffic, but lack of time and materials prevented 
the incorporation of a rising centre span. An ingenious solution was 
therefore adopted. The centre span in the eastern section was made 
to sink instead of rise so that vessels could pass over it when it was 
submerged. Most of the pile-driving was done by Engineer units, 
and the new bridge was opened for use on August 20th, 1943, after 
considerable delay caused by floods. It was still operating success- 
fully in 1947.1 

Although the operations in the Abadan-Ahwaz area between 
August 24th and 28th, 1941, were necessary as a safety precaution, 
the major operations in the brief Persian Campaign took place further 
to the north-west in the Naft-i-Shah—Pai Tak region. The Persian 
forces in that area had been strongly reinforced, but in the nick of 
time the 9th Armoured Brigade reached Khaniqin from Syria to 
support the 2nd Armoured Brigade under Brigadier Aizlewood. 
“Hazel”? Force was then formed from the two brigades and two 
battalions of Gurkhas. On August 24th, Major-General W. J. Slim, 
Commander, 10th Indian Division, was placed in charge of the 
operations planned for the capture of Naft-i-Shah and an advance 
on Shahabad through Gilan. He was reinforced by the 21st Brigade 
which he decided to employ against the Pai Tak Pass positions in 
co-operation with a turning movement through Gilan. The Naft-i- 
Shah oilfields and Qasr-i-Shirin were seized early on August 25th, 
and on the following day Gilan was entered and the advance 
continued unopposed towards Shahabad through a number of road- 
blocks. Shahabad was occupied on the 27th. The 21st Brigade, 
having found the Pai Tak Pass empty, had moved on to Karind, 
where patrols of the 9th Armoured Brigade were met. Forward 
reconnaissance showed that Persian troops were holding positions 
overlooking the route to Kermanshah, and on the 28th, they shelled 
the road. However, when General Slim was preparing to attack, a 
Persian officer appeared and asked for a truce. This was approved 
by General Quinan, and General Slim was instructed to occupy the 
oi! refinery at Kermanshah forthwith. When ‘Hazel’ Force had 
accomplished this task, a column under Brigadier Aizlewood was 
sent forward to contact the Russians who were advancing on 
Kermanshah from Senna, and on Hamadan from Kasvin. They were 


'“A Short Description of the Hull Bridge across the River Shatt-al-Arab at Margil 
(Basra), Iraq,” by G. B. G. Hull, c.z.E., M.LC.£., appearing in The Civil Engineer 
in War, Vol 1. 


64 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


met at Senna on August 29th, and near Kasvin on the 31st. As 
there were indications that the Persians did not intend to satisfy 
our demands for the surrender of Axis nationals, it was then arranged 
that a joint Anglo-Russian advance to Teheran should be under- 
taken and should culminate in a simultaneous entry into the capital 
on September 17th. Cordial relations were established with our 
new allies and the plan was duly carried out. The campaign in North- 
West Persia ended in prolonged festivities in Teheran for those officers 
and men who were fortunate enough to be present. Our casualties 
had been negligible. Indeed, in the fighting in both theatres in Persia, 
we lost only 22 killed and 42 wounded. 

The 6th Indian Division, under Major-General Thomson, began to 
arrive in Basra on September 12th, 1941, and was ordered to relieve 
the 8th and 10th Indian Divisions in the Mosul area and Western 
Persia. During October, however, after the abdication of Raza Shah 
Pahlevi and a combined British-Russian parade in Teheran, our 
troops withdrew gradually to Sultanabad and Hamadan. Persia had 
been thoroughly subdued and Axis agents rounded up, but there was 
still considerable unrest and some danger of a German invasion. 
Many rifles, abandoned by the Persian troops, had fallen into the 
hands of recalcitrant tribesmen who now had the finest products of 
the German arsenals to help them in their traditional occupations of 
blood-feuds and highway robbery, and we were saddled with the task 
of restoring confidence and security in a country larger than South 
Africa. 

Several Sapper units took part in the advance to Kermanshah and 
Teheran in August 1941. One of these was 41 Field Park Company, 
of the Bengal Corps, and others were 32 Field Squadron, 61 Field 
Company and 1 Bridging Platoon of the Madras Corps. ‘The 
Persian campaign was in the nature of a holiday’’ writes Brigadier 
Mangat Rai.! ‘‘The unit was not involved in any fighting, and after 
the deserts of Iraq and Syria, the mountains of Persia, with their 
cool breezes and crystal streams, were a paradise. There was not a 
great deal of work to do, and water-supply presented no problems. 
The unit carried out several road reconnaissances, and there were 
the usual workshop jobs. Special mention must be made of our 
workshop lorry. This was an old Thornycroft which could not 
stand the pace of ordinary convoy running and always had to move 


1 With 41 Field Park Company”, by Brig. C. R. Mangat Rai, appearing in The 
Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers, January 1951. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 65 


by itself. It was affectionately known as “Lizzie.” With an attendant 
15 cwt. truck, “Lizzie”? usually started well before dawn, and moving 
at a maximum speed of 10 m.p.h., arrived just before dark at the 
night’s staging place.” 

32 Field Squadron, which had disembarked at Basra early in July, 
joined the 2nd Armoured Brigade and crossed with it into Persia. 
It was fully occupied in removing road-blocks and mines. On August 
30th, after the Persian surrender, it took part in a triumphal entry 
into Kermanshah and subsequently pushed on with the armoured 
forces to Hamadan which was reached before midnight after covering 
120 miles of very rough road in 4 hours. This was considered to be 
a record at that time. The unit participated in festivities with the 
Russians at Kasvin, when it is recorded that “there was much eating 
and drinking.’! After some road reconnaissances, the Squadron 
was present at Teheran at the Victory Parade on October 17th before 
moving back to the Mosul area. 61 Field Company reached Khanigqin 
on August 25th, just in time for the advance into Persia. It repaired 
roads, and one platoon worked with the leading column which 
entered Karind. The unit reconnoitred routes and arranged water- 
supplies at Khaniqin, Kermanshah and Senna before returning to 
Iraq in the middle of October 1941 with the 25th Brigade. 1 Bridging 
Platoon was also with the advance, repairing culverts and under- 
taking a variety of other engineering duties. 

The link with Russia having been forged, attention could be con- 
centrated on defence. The defensive area selected in the summer of 
1941 in Northern Iraq was shaped like an inverted triangle with its 
apex on Baghdad, the Tigris and Diyala rivers as its two sides, and 
its base, in the north, running along the Turkish border. Mosul, 
and Kirkuk thus came within the triangle. General Quinan had 
estimated that he would require 10 divisions to defend Iraq, but he 
had only the 6th, 8th and 10th Divisions in addition to the 2nd 
Armoured Brigade, and the 6th and 8th Divisions had each only 
two brigades.2, Meanwhile, Hitler’s armies were driving hard towards 
Kharkov and into the Crimea north of the Black Sea. Time was 
very short. When the 6th Division arrived, it assumed responsibility 
in Persia, but with only one brigade as the other was detailed to 
help a brigade of the 10th Division on protective duties throughout 





1 “Short Histories of Units”, appearing in Bangalore News Letter, December 1946. 


2 The Sth Indian Division made a brief appearance in September 1941 but soon 
returned to fight in the Western Desert. 


66 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Iraq. The remainder of the 10th Division prepared defence works 
in the Baghdad area and two brigades of the 8th Division took over 
the defence works around Mosul. A perimeter had to be constructed 
at Mosul from which armoured forces could advance and operate 
freely. General Harvey planned originally to prepare positions for 
two brigade groups on the west side and one on the east, while a 
fourth group was to be centred on Zakho, 80 miles to the north. 
At each sector there were to be obstacles, sited in depth, at which 
the enemy could be checked and then counter-attacked. The plan 
had to be modified because of lack of man-power, but even so it 
involved a huge programme of digging in very hard ground. 

The lay-out finally adopted for the Mosul fortress involved the 
provision of a wide defensive ring around the city, together with a 
subsidiary fortified area at Qaiyara about 20 miles to the south, and 
the construction of 1,181 concrete pill-boxes and gun emplacements, 
110 miles of anti-tank ditch (much of which was in solid rock), 186 
miles of road and 23 air-strips. Works units, Engineer battalions, 
Sapper units, Pioneer and civil labour were all busily engaged. The 
Infantry also were called in to help the overworked Sappers who 
concentrated rapidly after the conclusion of the Persian campaign. 
Civilian labour was recruited mostly from the local tribes, and at 
the peak some 20,000 labourers were at work. These men had to be 
fed and housed in addition to being taught their job. The troops 
lived in tents, and when rain began to fall in the autumn, their camps 
became deep in mud. This titanic defensive scheme was the most 
pressing Engineer task in Iraq during 1941 and 1942, and it was of 
the utmost importance because rumour had it that by May 1942 the 
Germans might have no less than five divisions poised on the border 
and ready to sweep into the country. General Quinan had not only 
to defend Iraq but had also to help the Russians. ‘‘You will take 
steps’’ ran an order from General Wavell, “‘to develop such road, 
rail and river communications as are necessary to ensure the maximum 
possible delivery of supplies to Russia.” As ever, logistics had a 
far-reaching effect on operational planning. 

The Deputy Chief Engineer, Defences, Northern Iraq, at this 
period was Colonel L. D. Grand, (late R.E.) under whom were 
Lieut.-Colonel C. M. MacLachlan, R.E., C.R.E. 8th Division, who 
was responsible for the right bank sector at Mosul, and the C.R.E. 
Army Troops, responsible for the left bank sector. By September 
1941, most of the Sapper units were able to apply themselves to 
oilfield defence. The 3rd Corps was made responsible for the 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 67 


oil-fields. Its Engineer Troops, whose headquarters were composed 
wholly of Bengal Sappers, came to Iraq in September. They included 
1 and 5 Field Companies (Bengal), 14 Field Company (Madras) 
and 301 Field Park Company (Bombay), and all four units moved 
up to the Mosul area in support of the 8th Divisional Engineers. 
Mosul, one of the world’s greatest oil reservoirs, and Kirkuk, whence 
the oil was pumped across 550 miles of desert to Haifa and Tripoli, 
had natural protection on the north and east afforded by successive 
ranges of almost trackless hills. The only approach from the north- 
east was through the precipitous Ruwandiz Gorge on the Persian 
frontier, and from the north, through the lofty Zakho Pass. The 
Sappers were required to improve these natural obstacles by adding 
artificial ones, blasting hill-sides for defence works, repairing and 
making roads, and demolishing any structures which might help 
an invader. ‘“‘It was the special task of the Engineers’’, writes Lieut. 
G. Pearson,} ‘‘to supervise large parties of infantry and local coolie 
labour and to plan the technical work. No bulldozers were avail- 
able, and digging was difficult in ground which was often solid rock. 
Work was always against time, and the men were eternally trying 
to make themselves understood by people who spoke another language 
and had not the slightest notion of how or why the job was to be 
done. 69 Field Company was placed in charge of camouflage. Mean- 
while the other 8th Divisional Engineers (7 and 66 Field Companies), 
together with the 3rd Corps Engineers, built concrete defence works 
and dummy weapon posts and spread camp roads with shingle.” 
The winter, that year, was the bitterest in living memory. Some 
quotations from 1 Field Company’s War Diary will show the extreme 
discomfort experienced in January 1942. ‘‘Snow started to fall early 
and continued all day. This was a miserable day for everyone and 
work was called off at 10 a.m....... The next few days were bitter, 
being especially hard on those men who had not yet received woollen 
underclothing. There were 20 degrees of frost one night and great 
trouble was experienced in keeping the M.T. vehicles going. Ten 
coolies died one night. By day, the sun shone and melting snow 
turned roads into a quagmire, but work continued though at a slower 
pace.’’ In spite of these hardships, however, the men remained in 
good spirits and indulged in many snow-ball fights. They slept 
soundly at night although the lorry engines had to be kept running 
most of the time. 


1 “Brief History of the K.G.V's O. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.I.E., August 
1939-July 1946", by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 19. 








68 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The chief task of 47 Field Park Company, apart from building up 
dumps, consisted in providing steel shuttering for concrete defences. 
Meanwhile, 5 Field Company built camps, shingled camp roads, 
completed demolitions in the Zakho Gorge and made mined road- 
blocks in the Mosul area. Also, with the assistance of 1 Field Com- 
pany and 301 Field Park Company (Bombay), it provided a ferry 
across the Tigris at Qaiyara. At Habbaniya, in March 1942, 41 
Field Park Company began defence work in the Falluja area. Rifles 
had to be closely guarded, for many thieves prowled around at night. 
Indeed on one occasion the C.S.M. felt his greatcoat being drawn 
off him! The winter cold had been very severe. Five men had been 
frost-bitten during wet bridge training. April opened with sand- 
storms and a plague of sandflies, so it was with much relief and 
satisfaction that in May 1942 the unit left Iraq for Egypt. By that 
time, the northern defences were far advanced and demolition charges 
were in position at all strategic points. 

Other Sapper units engaged on road or defence work during 1941 and 
the first half of 1942 were 9, 10, 57 and 58 Field Companies, 32 Field 
Squadron, 39 Field Park Squadron and 52 Army Troops Company, 
all of the Madras Corps, and 20 Field Company and 49 Army 
Troops Company of the Bombay Corps.! On September 7th, 
1941, after the occupation of Ahwaz, 9 Field Company returned 
to Iraq to build defences at Habbaniya and the Hindiya Barrage on the 
Euphrates, and from March till May 1942, when it left for Egypt, 
it was employed on a defensive position at Taji near Baghdad. 10 
Field Company reached Mosul on June 16th, 1941, and prepared 
defences at Zakho, Qaiyara and other places until March 1942. In 
April, the unit built a pontoon bridge over the Euphrates, and having 
handed over to 52 Army Troops Company, departed for Egypt where 
it met its fate in the Western Desert on June 28th, 1942. The greater 
part of 57 Field Company worked on defences at Pul-i-Tang in 
Persia, and 58 Field Company supervised the labour of large gangs of 
Arabs on the Pai Tak Pass defences until April 1942. In July, 58 
Field Company was transferred to Egypt, but it was back in Iraq 
by the end of the year. 32 Field Squadron worked during the winter 
of 1941-42 on defences between Nisibin and Qaiyara, and in June 
1942, moved to Kermanshah in Persia where it was joined by 39 


1The Os.C. were Majors L. A. B, Paten, R.E., C. M. Bennett, ILA.R.O., W. M. S. 
Lillie, R.E., G. C. Richards, R.E., D. J. Middleton-Stewart, J.A.R.O., W. B. J. Arm- 
strong, R.E., F.H. R. French, R.E., C. G. Caffin, R.E., and J. C. Winchester, R.E., 
respectively. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 69 


Field Park Squadron, newly arrived from India. These units then 
built tank tracks towards the Russian zone in North Persia as part 
of a defensive system in case Stalingrad succumbed to the Germans. 
20 Field Company, arriving in Iraq from Egypt on September 3rd, 
1941, reconnoitred routes into Persia from Kirkuk before returning 
to Egypt in October en route for Cyprus. 49 Army Troops Company, 
arriving also in September, worked mostly in the Basra and Baghdad 
areas. 

Some of the experiences of 52 Army Troops Company are worthy 
of record. After landing at Basra on June 16th, 1941, the unit was 
employed on water-supply until it moved by road to Baghdad in 
October. In November, it joined 14 Field Company at Mosul for 
work on the ‘“‘Wavell’’ Defence Line near Faida Village. The line 
ran for about 35 miles, mostly along a high ridge, and included an 
anti-tank ditch with pill-boxes on the forward slope. Water was 
pumped from springs in the plain to storage tanks on the ridge. 
The only explosives available were dynamite and gunpowder, and, 
as fuses were scarce, gunpowder-trains were often used. The cold 
during the winter was so severe that five men lost fingers and toes 
through frost-bite. There were no fires except in the cookhouses 
and the men had to live in widely spaced tents. When the defence 
line was practically completed in March 1942, 52 Army Troops 
Company moved to Altun Kupri near Kirkuk to construct an under- 
ground hospital for 800 beds distributed in 12 wards, each 60 feet 
by 16 feet.1 

Afterwards, the unit worked on staging camps in the desert along 
the Kirkuk-Haifa oil-pipe line, and September 1942 found it building 
a 900 feet floating bridge across the Tigris, two miles downstream of 
the Maude Bridge at Baghdad—a 5 months’ job. Then it went to 
Kut-al-Amara to erect workshops, and before it left Iraq in April 
1943 it had rafted 250 tons of Engineer stores down the Euphrates 
for 200 miles to Habbaniya. Such diverse employment was typical 
of that which fell to the lot of many Sapper units. 

Throughout the summer of 1942, the situation in the Middle East 
remained serious and even menacing. The Russians were still retreat- 
ing and in Egypt it was doubtful whether the Alamein line could be 
held. By September, Rommel was within 50 miles of Alexandria and 
planning to sweep up the Nile Valley. Stalingrad was invested, and 





1A still larger underground hospital was built at Mosul during the winter. It was 
designed for 1,450 beds and had every convenience. The wards were extensions of 
some marble quarries. This hospital was in use for some yeats. 


70 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


German troops were thrusting towards the Caucasus region, whence 
they might reach Northern Persia by November. It was possible 
also that Hitler might invade Anatolia and enter Iraq from that 
direction. The burden placed on General Quinan as Commander, 
10th Army, was obviously becoming too great, for while he was 
engaged in operational planning he could not administer properly 
the immense lines of communication behind his forces. Consequently, 
in August 1942, it was decided that the Persia and Iraq Command, 
represented by the 10th Army, should be designated ‘‘Paiforce’’ and 
that General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson should be in command. 
An Inspector General of Communications was to take over the 
general administration, while an area command, known as “‘Pibase’’, 
dealt with internal security and local administration on the lines of 
communication. General Wilson, with headquarters in Baghdad, 
was then able to integrate the activities of both the 10th Army and 
L. of C. formations and thus, in September 1942, ‘‘Paiforce’’ was 
born. By that time, the defence systems in Northern Iraq and the 
adjacent tracts of Persia were far advanced and the over-riding 
consideration had become the acceleration of aid to the hard-pressed 
Russians. 

Much has been written about the convoys which gallantly fought 
their way from Great Britain round the North Cape to Archangel, 
but little has been recorded about the supplies sent by land along 
the 3,000-mile road from North-West India through Duzdab and 
Meshed in Persia to Askabad on the nearest railway in Russia, or 
about the supplies poured northwards along the Trans-Iranian 
Railway from Bandar Shahpur on the Persian Gulf, and Tanuma 
opposite Basra, through Ahwaz, Andimishk, Dorud, Sultanabad and 
Qum to Teheran and thence to Bandar Shah on the Caspian. The 
Trans-Iranian Railway had been built, before the war, by engineers 
of several nations. From Bandar Shahpur the main line crossed 
150 miles of desert and then climbed into the mountains to a height 
of 7,000 feet, reached through 130 tunnels. Next it dropped 3,000 
feet to Teheran, 500 miles from its start, and finally ran for another 
300 miles through difficult country to Bandar Shah, whence supplies 
could be carried to Russia by ship or Jorry. Branch lines were under 
construction towards Tabriz and the Caucasus region, and eastwards 
to Meshed and south-eastwards to Yezd. In October 1941, the railway 
could carry only 200 tons a day. Twelve times that tonnage was 
needed for Russia. Colonel Sir Godfrey Rhodes, late R.E., then 
General Manager of the Kenya and Uganda Railways, was appointed 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 71 


to secure this result with the assistance of Lieut.-Colonels H. A. Davis 
and A. R. Mais, R.E., and a staff of British and Indian railwaymen 
who had been engaged in the original construction. The magnitude 
of the problem facing Colonel Rhodes is shown by the following 
extract from ‘‘Paiforce.”’! ‘‘There were no train control offices, no 
system of controlling the distribution of wagons, no arrangement for 
classified yard working. The freight time-table was largely ornamental. 
Wagon doors were fastened with bits of string. Thieves haunted the 
line. Brakesmen had a habit of screwing down their hand-brakes 
and going to sleep. On one stretch it was the custom of the driver 
and fireman of the second locomotive (when two were drawing the 
train) to alight for a glass of tea at the lowest loop, leaving their 
locomotive to make its own way, with regulator fully open, to the 
station at the top loop where, by moving smartly across 300 yards 
of country, they resumed control.” 

The winter cold was cruel in the mountains traversed by the line, 
and the summer heat of 1942 was terrible in the plains. At Andimishk, 
the shade temperature by day stayed at 130 degrees F. for weeks, 
and water left outside a tent was too hot for washing, even after 
the blazing sun had gone down. Road supply supplemented rail- 
way transport both in East and West Persia. In the west, hundreds 
of lorries carried supplies from the rail-head at Khaniqin through 
Kermanshah and Hamadan. The names of Brigadier J. L. French 
and Lieut.-Colonels A. J. R. Hill and G. W. Kirkland, R.E., will 
always be associated with the road-supply to Russia. Supplies also 
flowed in by road along the route from Quetta through Duzdab 
(Zahidan) to Meshed.2, Then came the treacherous attack by the 
Japanese at Pearl Harbour on December 7th, 1941, which brought 
America into the war. American engineers soon began to assume 
responsibility for the eastern supply routes through Persia, and 
when Field-Marshal Von Paulus surrendered at Stalingrad in February 
1943 our American Allies were pouring in supplies and munitions by 
the Trans-Iranian line which British and Indian engineers had done 
so much to develop. 

Units of the Indian Engineers (prior to October 1941 called ‘Sappers 
and Miners’) accomplished a great deal during some stages of the 
railway supply to Russia and in all stages of the road supply. For 





! Paiforce. The Official Story of the Persia and Irag Command, 1941-46, pp. 94, 95. 


? See “The Supply Road to Reisen" appearing in The Journal of the United Service 
Institution, May 1948, 


72 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


instance, 105 Railway Construction Company under Captain Harbans 
Singh, I.E., which was transferred to Andimishk in February 1943, 
did useful work in remodelling railway yards and providing crossing 
stations. Other railway units were similarly engaged. Until the 
likelihood of a German invasion decreased, the Field Companies of 
Indian Engineers were employed chiefly on defence works, but after- 
wards they were able to help road supply by repairing bridges and 
keeping road surfaces in reasonably good condition. 

As an example of the experiences of many Indian Engineer field 
units in Iraq and Persia in 1942-43, some extracts may be given here 
from a description of the adventures of 5 Field Company, written by 
Brigadier Mangat Rai,! who then commanded the unit. The Brigadier, 
at that time a Major, was one of the earliest Regular officers of the 
Corps of Indian Engineers and among the few K.C.I.Os. and I.C.Os. 
serving in the Corps at the outbreak of war. Others in the same 
category, who appear in the records of ‘‘Paiforce”, are Brigadiers 
R. E. Aserappa, J. S. Dhillon and A. D. Verma, and Colonels R. A. 
Loomba, Shiv Dial Singh and A. L. Gomes. Some of the remainder— 
Brigadiers Harkirat Singh, Partap Narain, R. K. Kochhar, K. N. 
Dubey and D. B. Chopra, and Colonels N. S. Bhagat, A. P. Nanda 
and A. N. Kashyap—were spared the hardships of service in Iraq 
though they had their share elsewhere.2, Major Mangat Rai took 
over command of 5 Field Company from Major I. G. Loch, R.E., 
on April 10th, 1942, when the unit was constructing a defensive area 
at Baquba on the Diyala River above Baghdad: ‘‘The works con- 
sisted entirely of field defences’ writes Mangat Rai. ‘No concrete 
was used. We carried out some of the more complicated work, but 
the remainder was done by contract labour. It was unpleasant 
because of the intense heat and the difficulty of controlling a large 
body of heterogeneous composition. The coolies were mainly Iraqis 
but also included Persians, Kurds, Armenians and Jews. Simultane- 
ously with this work the unit prepared demolitions in the area Diltawa- 
Baquba-Shahraban-Kifri which was more interesting. All the major 
bridges, both road and railway, were prepared for demolition. After 
finishing the Baquba defences, the unit moved to Kirkuk and on 
June 26th into Persia to Kermanshah for more training. The change 





1 Notes by Brig. C. R. Mangat Rai, dated March 1951. 


? Others among the earliest officers (ranks as held in October 1941) were the following: 


Capts. L. M. H. Wadia and M. G, Bewoor, T/Capts. Mahomed Anwar Hussain, 
V. Panch and J. S. Paintal, and Lieut, Anant Singh. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 73 


was very welcome because of the cool summer climate of Kermanshah. 
A chain of defensive positions was to be made in Persia, and we went 
finally to Sarwandhar to construct a position on a mountain pass. 
There we remained from July 14th to November 20th, 1942, working 
under the 8th Division whose H.Q. were at Charaveshah, 20 miles 
away, on the main road from Ahwaz to the Caspian. The C.R.E. 
8th Division, Lieut.-Colonel C. M. Machlachlan, R.E., had been a 
Bengal Sapper for many years and knew the unit well. Our camp 
was at 6,000 feet and pleasantly cool throughout the summer, though 
before we left in November it had become wet and cold. We had to 
work against time, yet we enjoyed it as there was little interference 
from above. The defensive position was sited by a team of all arms 
from the 8th Division. Major-General C. O. Harvey, the Commander, 
stayed with us for about a week to give his approval. He was very 
popular and took the keenest interest in the smallest detail. Before 
work was started, Lieut.-General A. G. O. M. Mayne, the Corps 
Commander, inspected the site and stayed with the unit for a couple 
of days, living in a caravan which was parked below the Officers’ 
Mess. A small ‘ablutions’ tent used by officers had been pitched 
below the Mess, and one morning, while General Mayne was in it, 
it was pelted with a fusillade of earthen clods thrown from higher 
up the hill. The whole tent shook. Naturally surprised, the General 
emerged from it only to discover that the culprit was the junior 
subaltern of the unit who, on seeing him, was greatly alarmed. How- 
ever, the subaltern apologized and explained that he had thought 
it was a friend of his who was in occupation and the General received 
his apologies with good humour. Nevertheless, when he went to the 
tent next morning, he placed his ‘brass hat’ carefully on the apex.” 

5 Field Company had the assistance of two companies of auxiliary 
Pioneers, but the actual work on the defences was done as usual 
mainly by contract labour. Early in November 1942, the defensive 
position was nearing completion. Meanwhile, the threat to the 
Persian oilfields had diminished owing to the increasing Russian resist- 
ance to Hitler’s armies. Rain and cold retarded digging operations 
and finally, on November 15th, it was decided to stop work. All 
defences were covered up as far as possible to protect them from snow, 
and the unit motored back to Iraq, reaching Tuz Khurmatli, near 
Kirkuk, on November 26th. Early in April 1943, after spending the 
winter months in training and the erection of camp structures, it moved 
to Egypt. A hard fate seemed to dog the footsteps of 5 Field Company 


74 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Year by year passed and it saw no fighting, but the men were not 
discouraged and looked forward confidently to what the future might 
hold in store for them. 

The amusing incident in which General Mayne figured has its 
counterpart in another in which Brigadier F. W. T. Hards, Chief 
Engineer 3rd Corps, was concerned. Major A. B. Rhodes, R.E., who 
commanded 97 Field Company of the Royal Bombay Engineers 
writes as follows:— “After the unit reached Basra in November 1942 
it moved to Qasr-i-Shirin in Persia to join temporarily the 6th Indian 
Division, and early in 1943 it became part of the 3rd (British) Corps 
Troops Engineers under Brigadier ‘Daddy’ Hards, an old Bombay 
Sapper. The Brigadier paid us a surprise visit and spent the night, 
and as we had no Guest tent, the Canteen tent was emptied and made 
available for him. After dinner, when we had all retired to our tents, 
we were horrified to hear a very loud-voiced Sapper beating on the 
Canteen tent with a stick and shouting ‘““Oh! Canteen wallah! Give 
me some cigarettes.” Brigadier Hards kept silent for a few minutes, 
but the beating was resumed and the Sapper started to undo the 
tent fly and looked inside. He must have been considerably skaken 
when, instead of the Canteen wallah, he came face to face with the 
irate occupant. However, by breakfast time next morning, the Briga- 
dier was prepared, in his usual kindly way, to overlook the incident.”’ 

During April and May 1943, the 8th Division moved from Iraq 
into Syria for further training, and with it were 1 and 5 Field Com- 
panies who had been in winter quarters at Khanigin near the Persian 
border. Despite the considerable exodus of Engineer units which 
followed news of the relief of Stalingrad, there was still much to be 
done in Iraq, especially in building up supply depots, improving 
communications and expanding airbases, though units of the Bengal 
Group took little part in the work. However, Lieut. Pearson records 
some of the doings of two Bengal units from the autumn of 1942 
onwards. ‘In September 1942", he writes,! “8 Army Troops Com- 
pany arrived in Khanigin from Egypt and began to build water- 
supply tanks, sheds and hutting and to provide electric installations. 
6 Army Troops Company was already in the country, engaged on a 
great variety of jobs such as workshops at Andimishk in Persia, 
ice-plants and sheds for the R.A.F., Hamilton and Inglis bridges in 
Basra, and the re-erection of wireless masts for the R.A.F. In December 





eee 


! Brief History of the K.G.V’sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, 


f R.LE., August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson R.E., pp. 44-46 and 93-95. ‘i 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 75 


1942, amore united effort was required of 6 Army Troops Company. It 

sailed for some islands beyond the Persian Gulf to complete R.A.F. 
aerodromes. A detachment was dropped at Ras-al-Hadd and the 
main party went on to Masirah Island,! where stores had to be 
landed in Arab dhows. The aerodromes were already in use, but 
hard standings and camps for the R.A.F. and American personnel 
were yet to be built. By March 1943, the Wireless Telegraph Station 
and the Operations Block were nearly finished and a power house 
was under construction. At Ras-al-Hadd, an extension to the run- 
way was continued. In April, the accommodation at Masirah was 
completed, and in the following month 6 Army Troops Company 
left for Suez. Meanwhile, in February 1943, 8 Army Troops Company 
had been occupied mainly in improving two tented General Hospitals 
at Khaniqin and building an ice-factory. It was given a hundred ice- 
chests and some inadequate drawings and told to prepare ice! In 
September it moved to Basra to erect wireless masts at a Naval 
Station while detachments travelled round the Persian Gulf for a 
similar purpose. It re-assembled, in May 1944, in Bahrein Island to 
build a R.A.F. Station and worked there throughout the summer in 
extremely trying climatic conditions. In November 1944 it moved to 
Kermanshah. The cold of the Pai Tak Pass was but an introduction 
to a winter of snow, rain and hard work.” 

The transport of material to Russia came to an end in 1945 when 
five million tons had passed through Persia alone. ‘‘Paiforce’’ had 
nobly fulfilled its mission, not only in this great undertaking but in 
protecting and developing Iraq. Many Indian Engineer units had 
shared in the work besides those already mentioned—so many, in 
fact, that a mere outline of their movements must suffice. Of the 
Bombay units, 20 Field Company was in Iraq during the spring of 
1943 before returning to India and 27 Field Company in Persia 
throughout the year. 31 Field Squadron (Bengal) spent the greater 
part of 1943 in Iraq before transfer to Egypt, as also did 32 Field 
Squadron (Madras). 39 Field Squadron (Madras), 44 Field Park 
Company (Madras) and 47 Field Park Company (Bengal) were also 
there for a time in 1943, and 57 and 58 Field Companies (Madras) 
were in Iraq or Persia for most of the year. Early in 1943, 69 Field 
Company (Bengal) was in Iraq and 97 Field Company (Bombay) in 
Iraq and Persia. 301 Field Park Company (Bombay) spent part of 





* Ras-al-Hadd is a cape, 120 miles south-east of Muscat at the entrance to the Gulf 
of Oman. Masirah Island lies 150 miles further south on the shore of the Indian Ocean. 


716 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


1943 in Iraq, and 302 Field Park Company (Bengal, formerly Bombay) 
and 322 Field Park Company (Bengal) were in Iraq or Persia through- 
out the year. 16 Workshop and Park Company also served in Iraq 
and Persia where it arrived early in 1942 after employment in Syria 
on organizing the stores required for defensive works. In general, 
however, it may be said that in 1944 the services of the Field Com- 
panies of Indian Engineers were more urgently needed in Italy or 
Burma than in the Middle East and consequently most of these units 
were to be found in one or other of those theatres. 

Sapper units in the Middle East enjoyed an occasional but very 
welcome change of scene in the island of Cyprus which became an 
important bastion in our Mediterranean defences after the German 
invasion of Greece and consequently required much fortification. But 
long before the fall of Greece, Cyprus had been used as a rest centre 
for troops who had fought in the Western Desert. Its defences had 
not been neglected by the 50th British Division, which was there in 
the summer of 1941; but when the 5th Indian Division relieved the 
§0th Division in November 1941, the possibility of an air-borne 
attack had to be envisaged. Major-General Mayne, the Divisional 
Commander, was told by General Auchinleck that the island must 
be held at all costs and that there must be no repetition of the fiasco 
in Crete. It was considered that an air-borne invasion of Cyprus 
might be possible from Southern Anatolia as well as from Crete and 
the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea. The 5th Divisional 
Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel A. H. G. Napier, R.E., prepared 
accordingly to demolish the runways of all aerodromes and the 
installations at all harbours, particularly on the south coast, and to 
block all vital roads. Plans were drawn up for the destruction of 
dumps. Prohibited areas were announced. Camouflage began. New 
camps and new roads were prepared and existing roads widened. 
Great attention was given to coast defences. The Sapper companies 
of the 5th Division were assisted by infantry and civilian labour. 
It was a very busy scene. Cyprus is a large island, 140 miles in length 
and 60 miles wide at the centre. Two parallel mountain ranges 
traverse it from east to west with a wide alluvial plain between. 
With the exception of Nikosia, the capital, the largest towns, such as 
Famagusta, Larnaka and Limassol, lie on the southern coast, and the 
population numbers about half a million. The island is a British 
colony and a very important one. 2 and 20 Field Companies and 
44 Field Park Company were there in 1941, and during the following 
year, for varying periods, 11 Field Park Company, 12, 20 and 21] 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 17 


Field Companies, 41 and 44 Field Park Companies and 61 Field 
Company. In 1943, 9, 10, 14, and 21 Field Companies were present 
and also 41 Field Park Company and 61 Field Company. Thus 
many units of the three Groups of Indian Engineers helped to garri- 
son and strengthen Cyprus during the war and found the island 
invaluable also as a training centre. 

We come now to the tragic fate which overtook most of 9 Field 
Company of the Madras Group in 1943 in the Dodecanese Islands. 
Since June 1940, when Italian aircraft from these islands had bombed 
our fleet in Alexandria, the Italian forces holding the Dodecanese 
archipelago embracing Rhodes, Kos, Leros, Samos, Kalymnos, Symi, 
Stampalia and Kastelorizo (the last named being close to the Ana- 
tolian coast at the eastern end of the group) had closed the Aegean 
Sea to our shipping. ‘“E’’ Boats and submarines infested the small 
harbours, especially in Leros, and after the fall of Crete in 1941 it 
was reported that landing craft were being massed for the invasion 
of either Cyprus or Syria. Early in 1943, the possibility of capturing 
Rhodes and opening up the Aegean was considered most carefully 
by our High Command, but the scheme had to be abandoned because 
of the demands of our advance in North Africa, and later, the assault 
on Sicily. At the beginning of September 1943, Italy having surrend- 
ered, we tried to encourage the Italians in the Aegean Islands to 
resist any German incursions yntil we could reinforce them with 
British and Indian troops in small parties, and some of the islands, 
including Kos, Leros and Kastelorizo, were thus reinforced at con- 
siderable hazard; but in Rhodes our emissaries were unable to 
prevent the Italian Governor from surrendering unconditionally to 
the Germans. It was considered that, even if Leros could be strongly 
occupied by us and the Kos airfields seized and defended, we should 
not be in a sufficiently secure position unless Rhodes was also in 
our possession, and this we were unable to accomplish. 

However, the 234th Brigade had been training for some time for 
landings in the Dodecanese Islands as the major component of a 
Beach Landing Group known as “Brick Force.” A programme of 
combined training was carried out in the Suez Canal area by com- 
posite formations of British and Indian troops known as ‘36 Brick” 
and “37 Brick”. 5 Field Company had joined ‘36 Brick’* from 
Syria in June 1943 to prepare for landing operations in September, 
and 1! Field Company from Iraq had joined ‘'37 Brick”. 97 Field 
Company was also posted to ‘Brick Force’. Vehicles were water- 
proofed, equipment marked, and loading tables prepared for 


78 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


ships.1 The mechanical transport was to be loaded at Beirut and Haifa 
and the personnel at Egyptian ports, but 5 Field Company had just 
completed its final exercise in Suez Bay when news came that the 
operation was postponed and in October that it had been aban- 
doned. The reason was the failure of the initia] attempts to defend 
Cos and Leros, the story of which may now be told. . 

Before dawn on October 3rd, 1943, part of an invading force of 
Germans, bound apparently for Rhodes, had landed at Kos and 
captured the small island in spite of the stubborn resistance offered 
by a British battalion which had been installed there. The loss of 
the Kos airfields, whence fighter cover could be given to our warships, 
prevented the transit by sea of adequate supplies to our small garrison 
on Leros. This garrison, consisting of another British battalion and 
some details, was slightly reinforced at the end of October; but in 
November a large enemy convoy began to move into the Kos-Kalym- 
nos area and the German invasion of Leros started on November 
12th. Our garrison resisted stoutly, though ammunition was running 
short. By November 16th, the situation was critical. Incessant 
bombing and fighting had reduced our men to the last stages of 
exhaustion and during the afternoon of that day they were obliged 
to surrender. A few only managed to escape in native boats. After 
the fall of Leros, the small British garrison of Samos was withdrawn, 
and the greater part of the still smaller garrison of Kastelorizo was 
also removed, leaving only an outpost for observation purposes. 

On September 17th, 9 Field Company under Major P. G. O. 
Landon, R.E., was in support of the 234th Brigade of ‘‘Brick Force’, 
then embarking at Haifa, but owing to transport shortages only 
three platoons and a Tactical H.Q. accompanied the brigade. No. 1 
Platoon was landed on Kastelorizo, No. 2 on Cos and No 3 on 
Leros, and soon afterwards Major Landon perished when the flying- 
boat in which he was returning from Cos to Leros was shot down 
by enemy fighters.2, An Order of Battle shows that 9 Field Company 
had 60 other ranks and perhaps one officer on Cos,? and 62 other 
ranks and 3 officers on Leros, when the garrisons were forced to 
surrender. Of these, only 3 other ranks escaped by boat to Anatolia 








'“History of 5 Field Company, April 10th, 1942-January 6th, 1944,” by Brig. 
Mangat Rai, dated April 1951. 


2A Short History of the Queen Victoria's Own Madras Sappers and Miners during 
World War II, 1939-45”, by Lieut-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., p. 13. 


* Also on Cos were 32 other ranks of 74 Field Company, R.E. 


THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 79 


and thence made their way to Syria. All communications between 
the Company H.Q. at Haifa and the platoons on Cos and Leros 
ceased on September 17th; but although there was no communication 
with No 1 Platoon on Kastelorizo, the greater part of the detach- 
ment was evacuated in December 1943, and 9 Field Company, 
then under Major P. A. D. Radcliffe, R.E., began to re-form at 
Haifa preparatory to joining the !0th Indian Division at Gaza. It 
was not sufficiently strong, however, to accompany that division to 
Italy in March 1944 and accordingly joined the 9th Anny in Syria. 
The small party left behind on Kastelorizo rejoined in September 
1944 when 9 Field Company, reinforced by drafts from 57 and 58 
Companies, was at last reunited and could efface all traces of the 
Aegean tragedy. 

The Company served in May 1945 with an Armoured Division 
detailed to intervene in a Franco-Syrian dispute, and the O.C., then 
Major N. M. R. Moody, R.E., was placed in command of the British 
garrison at Palmyra. An interesting, and occasionally very enter- 
taining, account of the operations in this region has been written by 
Brigadier A. Mc. G. Stewart, who was the C.R.E. at that time.! 
9 Field Company built a road in the mountains, and the other 
Engineer units were concerned chiefly in making hard-standings. 
While in Palmyra, 9 Field Company had to keep the peace between 
the few remaining French and the local inhabitants. All the French 
were supposed to leave as soon as possible, except the officers of a 
camel unit, so Moody was much annoyed one day when he saw two 
European women strolling in the town. He sent a subaltern to find 
out who they were: but the youngster, having used his best French, 
got a very caustic reply in his native tongue. The ladies turned out 
to be the English wives of two engineers from one of the desert 
pumping stations. Later, the main task of the Divisional Engineers 
was to pass French convoys through Homs on their way to evacuation 
from Beirut. 31 Field Squadron had to picket some corners in the 
road. There was considerable opposition from the Syrians, so a 
Subedar who knew some Arabic addressed the hostile crowd and 
pointed out that it did not help the proceedings if they threw stones. 
The leaders then explained quite amicably that they had no real 
intention of offending and would therefore throw over-ripe tomatoes 
instead, which they accordingly did! 9 Field Company and 39 Field 





I “Notes on the Divisional Engineers, 31st (later Ist) Armoured Division, 1945-46”, 
by Brig. A. Mc. G. Stewart, dated July 15th, 1951. 


80 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Park Squadron were both at Homs early in August 1945. The former 
returned to Egypt in September and to India in October. 

The last active operations in the Levant in which units of the 
Indian Engineers took part were those in Greece in 1944. Ever 
since the British evacuation in April 1941, the Germans had held 
Greece in an iron grip, but in August 1944 they began to leave the 
country. They were then everywhere on the defensive. General 
Eisenhower’s armies were sweeping through France, General 
Alexander’s armies were struggling through the mountains north of 
Rome, and the Russians were driving through Rumania and Bulgaria. 
In September 1944, ‘‘Arkforce’ was born, a force designed for the 
re-occupation of Greece, and in it, as the only Indian Army unit 
and also the only Engineer formation, was 6 Army Troops Company 
of the Bengal Group. The Company left the Suez Canal in October 
and entered the Piraeus harbour through many minefields. The 
enemy had damaged the dock area very badly. Sunken ships blocked 
the waterways: quays were cratered and littered with debris. How- 
ever, 6 Army Troops Company soon cleared the quays and wharves 
sufficiently to enable General Scobie’s troops to disembark and 
spread into Athens and beyond. Other Engineer units appeared 
gradually from Italy with the 4th Indian Division. These were 4 
Field Company (Bengal) under Major H. C. Colter, R.E., 1! Field 
Park Company (Madras) under Major L. C. Hall R.E., 12 Field 
Company (Madras) under Major E. B. Wheaton, R.E., 21 Field 
Company (Bombay) under Major J. R. G. French, R.E., and a 
Bridging Platoon.) The Chief Engineer was Brigadier F. W. T. 
Hards. In December, after the withdrawal of the Germans, civil 
war broke out between the rival Greek factions known as “E.L.A.M.” 
and “E.L.A.S.”, the latter being hostile to the Allies. 6 Army 
Troops Company was entrusted with the defence of the dock area 
at Piraeus and the maintenance of the existing electric system. 4 
Field Company arrived in the nick of time, when the fighting was at 
its height, and was employed on wiring and road-block clearance. It 
re-embarked in January 1945 and sailed for Volos where it was the 
first unit ashore. Meanwhile 21 Field Company had repaired the 
Patras-Corinth Road. 

The main Engineer operations in Greece during 1944 and 1945 
were based on Salonika in the northern province of Macedonia, and 





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THE LEVANT, IRAQ AND PERSIA, 1941-46 81 


a full account of them has been given in The R. E. Journal.’ “During 
November and early December 1944”, writes the C.R.E. (Lieut.- 
Colonel Paten), ‘‘reconnaissances were pushed out as far as the 
Axios Plain to the west and to beyond the Struma Valley to the east. 
Sapper interests were focussed on two major physical obstacles, the 
Strimon (Struma) River and the Axios (Vardar) River, which offered 
bridging problems of the first order.”’ E.L.A.S. commenced hostilities 
in Athens early in December, and by the 15th the 4th Indian Division 
was hemmed in at Salonika. This state of affairs persisted till the 
middle of January 1945 when, as a result of a truce with E.L.A\S., 
the Division was able to send out patrols to a distance of about 
18 miles in all directions. Peace terms were accepted on February 
12th. This was the signal for greatly increased Sapper activity, and 
by the end of the month all roads leading out of Salonika, with the 
exception of the Axios route, had been opened up. A major work 
demanding instant attention was the repair of the Axios River Bridge. 
4 Field Company and 21 Field Company arrived from the south 
during March to help the other Engineer units. By providing a 
ferry across the Aliakmon River near the Serbian border a route for 
light traffic was restored between Salonika and Athens. During April, 
work was in progress over most of Macedonia. Five bridges were 
opened across the Aliakmon and Strimon Rivers in July 1945 and 
others elsewhere. In fact, the Sapper units excelled themselves in 
bridging and road making. They built or repaired 15 permanent 
structures and erected 5 large timber bridges and 18 Bailey bridges, 
and thus they helped materially to restore the communications in 
Northern Greece. 

The war in the Middle East, with which this chapter has dealt, 
was fought in extremes of heat, cold and terrain and usually with 
quite inadequate forces. The story is one of improvisation and yet 
more improvisation. Nevertheless, complete victory wassecured. Who 
knows what might have happened had Germany succeeded in over- 
running Persia and Iraq? The Indian Engineer units which fought 
in those countries, and on the shores of the Mediterranean, have 
reason to be proud of their achievements. 





‘“The 4th Indian Divisional Engineers in Macedonia,” by Lieut.-Colonel L. A. B. 
Paten, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, March 1946. 


CHAPTER IV 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941 -AUGUST 1942 


N Chapter II we left the battered Western Desert Force, the pre- 
| ae of the Eighth Army, holding precariously a position to the 

east of the Egyptian frontier after Rommel had swept through 
Cyrenaica during May 1941 and had failed to take Tobruk by storm. 
By that time the 4th Indian Division, under Major-General F. W. 
Messervy,} had reached the Desert front from Eritrea and was con- 
centrated in the Bagush area where a defensive position had been 
constructed in the previous autumn. On arrival with the 11th Brigade, 
4 Field Company began at once to prepare anti-tank obstacles in 
the Bagush Box and to clear the old defences and dug-outs of sand. 
The weather was extremely hot. Indeed, one day the temperature rose 
to 137° F. The other Divisional Engineers—12 and 18 Field 
Companies, 11 Field Park Company and 6 Army Troops Company 
—followed in due course and were soon very busy at the front or 
behind it. Both the opposing armies needed reinforcements and 
equipment before they could attack; but General Wavell, taking a 
considerable though justifiable risk, was able to forestall Rommel in 
the offensive and nearly succeeded in relieving the beleaguered garri- 
son of Tobruk. To quote a well known doggerel ‘‘Twice blest is he 
who has his quarrel] just; but three times he who gets his blow in 
fust’”. Working on this principle, Wavell launched an attack early 
in June. The primary objective was the destruction of all the enemy 
forces east of Tobruk, but it was hoped also that time would be 
gained for the arrival of important reinforcements from overseas. 
The main body of the enemy was grouped around Tobruk and 
obviously preparing to renew the assault, for the fortress was like 
a festering sore in Rommel’s side. The German armour roamed the 
desert between Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier while an advanced 
screen of Axis infantry and artillery was entrenched at Bardia and 


Sollum on the coast, at the Halfaya Pass, and on the high escarpment 
at Fort Capuzzo.2 


J d 
1 Ma Or -Gener al Sir Noel Ber esfor -P elrse had been pr omoted to the chief command 


2See the ma ica j : e 
fee p of North Africa included in Chapter V but referring also to this 


82 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941-AUGUST 1942 83 


The Western Desert Force was organized for the attack as a ‘Coast 
Force’ and a ‘Plateau Force.’ The former was to storm the Halfaya 
Pass, while the latter, which had most of the armour, was to sweep 
round westwards and northwards and cut the enemy’s communica- 
tions. With the Coast Force, comprising the 11th Brigade Group, 
was 4 Field Company. On June 14th, the Plateau Force, consisting 
of the 22nd Guards Brigade Group, set off with the 7th British 
Armoured Brigade and during the ensuing night our tanks penetrated 
deep into enemy territory; but shortly after dawn, when Plateau 
Force had taken Fort Capuzzo and was pressing on along the escarp- 
ment towards the top of the Halfaya Pass, it began to meet heavy 
resistance. On the 16th, many of the tanks were knocked out by 
enemy 88 m.m. guns and gradually the force was brought to a stand- 
still. Tank battles developed, always in favour of the German heavy 
armour, and raged around Sidi Omar until the morning of the 17th. 
Meanwhile, Coast Force had also run into trouble. It had failed 
repeatedly to force a passage up the Halfaya Pass, and on the 16th 
its few ‘I’ tanks entered an uncharted minefield under heavy enemy 
fire. ‘It now became a Sapper’s job’’, writes the official historian.} 
“Before the tanks could be removed, the extent of the minefield had 
to be discovered. Yet there were the tanks, stuck among the mines 
and only 500 yards from the enemy. Lieut. N. B. Thomas of 4 Field 
Company carried out a reconnaissance alone under intense fire. 
Coolly and deliberately he searched the ground, the tank commander 
being killed while actually hearing his report. Then the Sappers 
came forward and removed the mines—dangerous, cold-blooded 
work—and during the following night the tanks were recovered.” 
Thomas was awarded an immediate M.C. for his gallantry on this 
occasion and he brought back with him the first “Tellermine’ seen 
by our troops. 12 Field Company, with Plateau Force, was also 
concerned in the attack. It distinguished itself during the capture 
of a key point called Omar Nuovo and did useful work in mine- 
lifting and improving communications.? Late in the evening of June 
17th, the last parties of Plateau Force descended the escarpment and 
Coast Force also withdrew. Both forces then made their way to 
Sofafi and finally returned to the Bagush Box. 





1“The Tiger Kills.’ (M.O.I. Publication), p. 16. 


24 Short History of the Q.V’sO. Madras Sappers and Miners during World 
War If, 1939-45", by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., p. 7. 


84 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The Battle of Sollum, as it is sometimes called, was a tactical failure, 
though perhaps it may be deemed a strategical success because it 
undoubtedly gave a respite to hard-pressed Tobruk. Yet it resulted 
in a very serious situation. We had lost almost all our tanks, we 
had no reserves, and Egypt lay wide open to invasion, This was 
General Wavell’s last Middle East campaign, for in July he was 
transferred to India as Commander-in-Chief in place of General Sir 
Claude Auchinleck who came to relieve him in Cairo. Happily for 
Auchinleck, the change coincided with a gradual improvement in the 
aspect of the war in the Middle East. Iraq was subdued, Syria rescued, 
Tobruk furnished with supplies, and the Western Desert Force 
strengthened. East Africa gave no anxiety, and the threat to Cyprus 
had ceased when Germany declared war on Russia on June 22nd. 
Auchinleck needed only look to the west to find his enemy. His 
responsibilities, however onerous, were far less intricate than those of 
his distinguished predecessor, but he shouldered them bravely and 
competently and soon confirmed his previous reputation as a dour 
fighter whom nothing could dismay. 

Much was learnt from the Battle of Sollum, and the 4th Divisional 
Engineers began to cogitate deeply on the question of anti-tank mines, 
how the Germans laid them and the best method of clearing them. 
“At that time’, writes Pearson,! ‘“‘mine-detectors were not available 
and there was little conception of the size to which the mine problem 
would grow. 4 Field Company evolved a drill for locating mines by 
prodding with bayonets Which was provisionally adopted by the 
Division, and from study of suspected German methods of laying 
mines the C.R.E. 4th Division (Lieut.-Colonel H. P. Cavendish, R.E.) 
got the idea of the ‘knotted cord drill’ for minelaying which eventually 
became the standard method of the British Army. For two months, 
4 Field Company worked again on the defences of the Bagush Box, 
building concrete pill-boxes and laying minefields, and late in August 
it moved forward to build sandbagged protective pens for fighter 
aircraft and buildings for Royal Air Force personnel at Sidi Barrani. 
On September 20th, work was begun on an extensive minefield in the 
Sofafi area in defence of an advanced base. This minefield was over 
9 miles in length with more than 50,000 mines laid according to the 
new drill, Apart from an early alarm, work continued without 


incident into November 1941 and flame fougasses were installed to 
cover gaps,” 

G.V's O. Bengal Sappers and Miners “GPouD: RLE,, 
» by Lieut. G, Pearson, R.E., pp., 82. 


“Brief History of the K. 
August 1939-July 1946” 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941 - AUGUST 1942 85 


The story of the Western Desert during the summer and autumn of 
1941 is really the story of Tobruk where the first British experiment in 
the theory of fortress areas was proving highly satisfactory. When 
Auchinleck succeeded Wavell on July 5th he decided to maintain a 
defensive policy and did so until October, although he had no intention 
of awaiting passively a renewed attack by Rommel. He watched his 
enemy carefully, patrolled the frontier wire incessantly, occupied the 
desert oases of Siwa, Jarabub and Jalo, far inland from his southern 
flank, and covered the small port of Mersa Matruh and its airfields 
with belts of minefields situated about 125 miles east of Sollum. In 
Tobruk, the 70th British Division, with the 32nd Tank Brigade and 
some Polish troops, stood firm as a rock under Major-General 
R. Mac K. Scobie, late R.E., a very able commander; but as the Indian 
Army was represented by only one cavalry regiment and no Indian 
Engineers were present, the defence of Tobruk hardly comes within 
the scope of this narrative. It must suffice to record that with the 
support of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force the garrison was able 
to frustrate every attempt at infiltration until relief came in November 
1941. 

Meanwhile, General Auchinleck was busy with preparations for 
a winter offensive. The campaign was given the code name ‘“‘Crusader’”’, 
and with the arrival of reinforcements a new army came into being. 
At the end of September the “Western Desert Force’? became known 
as the “Eighth Army’, and on November 18th, Lieut.-General Sir 
Alan Cunningham, the victor of East Africa, was appointed as its 
Commander. The Eighth Army was born at a critical period in 
Britain’s fortunes. On it depended the fate of the Middle East, 
perhaps of the British Empire. It had first to be trained and then to 
turn defeat into victory over an experienced enemy provided with 
powerful armour and operating in a desert which has been aptly 
described as the tactician’s paradise and the quartermaster’s hell. 
The saviours of the troubled quartermaster have often proved to be 
Engineer troops, and so it was in the Fourth Libyan Campaign when 
units of the British, Indian, and Dominions’ Engineers enabled 
the transport to reach the battle front while others accompanied the 
forward troops into the fight. 

The new-born Eighth Army comprised the 13th Corps under 
Lieut.-General Godwin-Austin (4th Indian Division, New Zealand 
Division and Ist Army Tank Brigade) and the 30th Corps under 
Lieut.-General W. Norrie (7th Armoured Division, 4th Armoured 
Brigade, Ist South African Division and 20Ist Guards Brigade 


86 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Group). In addition, there was the Tobruk garrison, and in Army 
Reserve, the 2nd South African Division and the 29th Indian Infantry 
Brigade. Rommel’s army was roughly one-third German and two- 
thirds Italian. He had the German Afrika Korps (15th and 2ist 
Panzer Divisions and 90th Light Motorized Division) and a German 
Infantry Division, and also the Italian Ariete Armoured Division 
and six Italian Infantry Divisions. He was superior in air 
strength and much superior in armour, not numerically but in 
gun-power, for Cunningham's 2 pr. tank and anti-tank guns were 
almost useless against Rommel’s 50 m.m. and 75 m.m. weapons and 
the British ‘Il’ tanks had inadequate protection and were generally 
unsuitable for desert warfare.} 

Cunningham opened the ball with a surprise attack on November 
18th, 1941, against Rommel’s right flank in the desert and during 
the next few days there was fierce fighting which culminated on the 
22nd and 23rd in one of the largest tank battles of the war. This 
took place in the Sidi Rezegh- El Adem region, south of Tobruk. The 
beleaguered garrison tried hard to co-operate but could make little 
headway. Victory went to the German armour, and the vital escarp- 
ment of Sidi Rezegh, occupied for a time by Norrie, had to be 
abandoned. Rommel now launched his Panzers eastwards to smash 
Norrie’s communications and so great was the resulting confusion 
in what may be called the ‘“‘Battle of the Omars’ that Cunningham 
wished to withdraw to Mersa Matruh; but Auchinleck promptly 
flew to the desert, forbade any withdrawal, removed Cunningham 
from the chief command and appointed in his place Lieut.-General 
N. M. Ritchie, a very forceful but rather junior leader. Yet the 
choice seemed justifiable, for after Sidi Rezegh had changed hands 
twice Rommel began to retreat westwards on December Sth and 
Tobruk was disengaged four days later. This event was the occasion 
of a wise-crack by Godwin-Austin. “Tobruk is relieved”’, said he, 
“‘but not half so relieved as [ am!” 

Rommel continued to withdraw rapidly along the coast of 
Cyrenaica and by the middle of January 1942 was back at his starting 
point at El Agheila. Italian garrisons, left behind on the Egyptian 
frontier, had been mopped up by our troops and Sollum and Halfaya 
re-occupied. It seemed now that Auchinleck was within an ace of 
complete victory. But Rommel thought otherwise. Ritchie was too 


1“From Pyramid to Pagoda” (History of The West Y 


orkshire Regiment, 1938- 
48), by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.S.0., M.c., p. 124 . 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941 -AUGUST 1942 87 


far from Egypt to be adequately supplied, yet he decided to stand 
where he was, and Rommel, a master tactician and an able strategist, 
saw his opportunity and seized it with his customary vigour. On 
January 21st, 1942, he rushed his armour across the desert, over- 
ran our forward dumps of petrol and supplies, struck northwards 
towards the coast and re-captured Benghazi on the 28th. Ritchie 
rallied his army to the east of Gazala and finally brought the enemy to 
a halt on the Gazala Line consisting of a number of defended loca- 
lities or ‘Boxes’ with minefields between them. Thus the end of the 
Fourth Libyan Campaign found us far into Cyrenaica though in a 
very exposed position. Both sides proceeded to consolidate and 
reinforce, but men and materials reached Rommel more rapidly 
than Ritchie. Nevertheless, despite the withdrawal in January, the 
campaign seemed to have ended in our favour. Tobruk had been 
rescued and the immediate threat to Egypt removed. Also, the 
Gazala Line was much stronger than the Sollum Line. 

During the confused fighting between armoured formations in the 
early stages of this campaign a new task devolved on the Divisional 
Engineers. This was the complete destruction of crippled enemy 
tanks to prevent their recovery and repair during Axis counter- 
offensives. Any German tank which was not blown absolutely to 
pieces might soon be in use again for Rommel’s tank-recovery units 
were very efficient and highly trained. Except during an assault on 
Sidi Omar by the 4th Indian Division and the capture of Bardia by 
the 2nd South African Division, there was very little mine clearance 
to be done. Both Divisional Engineers and Corps Troops Engineers 
were employed mostly in constructing forward airfields and in opening 
up ports such as Tobruk, Derna and Benghazi. When the withdrawal 
eastwards began, the 4th Divisional Engineers carried out extensive 
demolitions in Benghazi, and when they reached the Gazala Line 
they laid mines and helped the infantry to prepare anti-tank defences. 
After half a million mines had been laid; mine-laying outstripped 
production at the base, so the Divisional Engineers were able at last 
to devote some time to training. 

The experiences of 4 Field Company of the Bengal Corps, under 
Major J. G. A. J. O’Ferrall, R.E. are described by Lieut. G. Pearson. 
“With great foresight’, he writes,! ‘tthe new Commander-in-Chief, 
General Auchinleck, had selected a position at El Alamein in which 





1“Brief History of the K.G.V'sO. Bengal Suppers and Miners Group, R.1.E., 
August 1939-July 1946”, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., pp. 32, 33. 


88 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the Army could cover the Delta if ever again the desert fighting went 
against us. During the preparatory stages of the new offensive, 4 Field 
Company patrolled and laid mines on the frontier. There followed a 
short period of training with the 7th Brigade with special attention to 
the breaching of minefields. The advance began on November 19th. 
4 Field Company cleared mines to get the 7th Brigade into the Sidi 
Omar camps, but in the desert warfare that followed there was little 
engineer work. Long and confused battles raged between Tobruk 
and the frontier until the Eighth Army, joined by the Tobruk garrison, 
eventually swept into Derna on December 18th. Next day, the Derna 
airfield was reconnoitred by 4 Field Company and the northern 
perimeter was cleared of some 800 mines. The water supply in Derna 
was restored and cratered roads were repaired. The advance conti- 
nued and on December 24th the Company was called forward to 
remove road-blocks holding up our armoured cars. In miserable rain 
it moved to Cyrene, to Barce and into the Benghazi area. There was 
a huge road-block to be cleared at the Tocra Pass, and it was not 
until January Sth, 1942, that all the sections reached Benghazi. The 
place was a dismal sight. Bombing had wrecked the large installations 
in the town, and the harbour facilities had been ruined. While the 
tanks fought out a great battle at Ajedabia, 4 Field Company worked 
on the power station and pumping plant at Barce and began to 
restore the harbour facilities in Benghazi. Then, on January 26th, 
it heard that the tank battle had gone against us. A rapid withdrawal 
had become necessary. Some demolitions were done in Benghazi 
before leaving, and in the Tocra Pass the road was mined and the 
whole route left full of blown culverts. In particular, very successful 
demolitions were carried out on February Ist to the west of Cyrene. 
A new defence zone was formed, east of Derna, on the Gazala-Bir 
Hacheim line. The Company remained in this line for several days, 
laying extensive minefields. During one night, 3,000 mines were laid 
in just over 12 hours, and many thousands more were put down 
before the unit was relieved on February 22nd. An interval then 
occurred in the fighting. 4 Field Company returned to Sollum for 
defence work and in April moved with the 4th Division to Kabrit, 
on the west side of the Bitter Lakes, for a period of rest, refitting and 
ae cae was a large tented camp area forming part of a 
cao ere oe stretching north from Suez 
until May 1942 and then a es : same oe ae 
Cnet aie a to Palestine.” However, 4 Field 

: urroundings at Hadera on the Palestine 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 194] - AUGUST 1942 89 


coast was destined to be very brief for within a few weeks the unit 
was ordered back to the Desert where, as will be seen later, it shared 
in the desperate efforts to halt a renewed enemy offensive. 

A Madras Sapper unit which did Trojan work in the Fourth 
Libyan Campaign was !2 Field Company under Major J. B. Sutherland, 
R.E. While confused fighting was in progress on December Sth 
around El Gubi, south of Tobruk, a large dump of German ammuni- 
tion, petrol, oil and food was discovered a few miles away and 12 
Field Company, with some Sappers of an Armoured Division, was 
sent to destroy it. The stores were widely scattered, and sometimes 
buried to avoid air observation, so that it was quite possible to drive 
right through the dump and be none the wiser. For many days the 
Company was busy on this demolition job and the blazing petrol and 
exploding ammunition made a wonderful spectacle. The work was 
interrupted on one occasion by the arrival of enemy tanks in search 
of fuel and the Madras Sappers wisely withdrew; but they were 
soon back again to continue the process of destruction until nothing 
was left in the dump. There can be no doubt that the loss of this 
vast quantity of supplies must have had a marked effect on the mobility 
of the enemy’s armour and may even have been the primary cause of 
the Axis retreat to the west. 

Although the 5th Division, under Major-General A. G. O. M. 
Mayne, had reached the Western Desert in April 1941 too late to 
assist in stemming Rommel’s first rush to the frontier it was soon 
giving full support to the hard-pressed 4th Indian Division. By July 
1941, it was concentrated in the Bagush area with the exception of 
the 5th Brigade which had been called away for service in Syria. 
The 5th Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel A. H. G. Napier, 
R.E., (2, 20 and 21 Field Companies and 44 Field Park Company) 
worked in two positions near El Alamein. These were known as 
“Fortress ‘A* ’’ on the edge of the Qattara Depression and “Fortress 
‘B’ ’’ midway between the Depression and the coast. However, on 
August 22nd, digging and mine-laying were interrupted suddenly 
when the Division was ordered to Iraq for possible operations in 
Persia. Only the 29th Brigade, with which was 2 Field Company, 
was left behind to guard some desert oases. The other two brigades 
returned to Egypt at the beginning of October 1941 but were trans- 
ferred, early in November, to Cyprus. These divisional or brigade 
transfers did not necessarily involve the attached Engineer units. For 
instance, 21 Field Company (Major R. W. W. How, R.E.) did not 
move with the 5th Division to Iraq in August 1941, nor to Cyprus 


90 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


in November. It arrived in Bagush from Eritrea on August 6th and 
worked there for several months on landing grounds and defences, 
Rest and relaxation were rarities for the Engineer soldier until the 
Egypt was removed. c 
rote esiees capabilities of the Bombay Sappers were strikingly 
shown in an action at a spot called ‘Point 204’, south of Gazala, 
on December 15th, 1941, the unit concerned being 18 Field Company 
commanded by Major N. L. Stuart, R.E. The Company, while 
attached to the 5th Brigade, had worked in the Bagush region until 
it moved with the brigade to Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Iraq in 
May and June, but on October Sth it was back at Sofafi in the Western 
Desert and early in December it was advancing with the 5th Brigade 
Group west of Tobruk. The garrison of Point 204 consisted of a 
battalion of The Buffs, some artillery, a few tanks and No. 3 Section 
of 18 Field Company. At 2 p.m. the enemy opened a furious artillery 
bombardment and then attacked with 40 heavy tanks supported by 
guns and lorried infantry. Our tanks were knocked out. Our gunners 
had no proper cover and were soon mowed down. The guns were 
literally rolled into the ground by the German armour. When the 
Panzer rush had passed, small parties of the Buffs, Sappers and 
Gunners were still fighting gallantly and met the advancing enemy 
infantry with a blaze of fire, but by nightfall all was silent at Point 
204. The War Diary records ‘‘No. 3 Section destroyed in action with 
the Buffs by enemy tanks after heavy shelling all day. Nine men 
came back, of whom three were wounded. Remainder, including 
Lieut. E. G. Cox, R.E., and all N.C.Os., are missing. It is hoped 
that most of these are prisoners-of-war.’’ The desperate resistance 
at Point 204 probably saved the bulk of the Sth Brigade from complete 
destruction and so enabled the 4th Division to resume the pursuit 
along the coast towards Benghazi while the 7th Armoured Division 
followed up the enemy armour retreating through the desert by way 
of Mekili. 

When Barce was occupied on December 22nd, 18 Field Company 
was at Derna aerodrome. Benghazi fell to the 4th Division on 
December 24th. On Christmas Day, General Messervy is said to have 
received an intriguing message. It ran as follows. “C. I. H. patrols 
reached Benghazi 1800 hrs yesterday. Dancing girls arrived three 
hours previously.” Entrancing expectations, however, were destined 
to be unfulfilled for the ‘dancing girls’ proved later to be merely the 
advanced elements of the Kings Dragoon Guards. The year 194] 
ended with the 4th Division elated by recent victories though scattered 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941-AUGUST 1942 91 


widely along the rain-sodden ridges of Western Cyrenaica. Rommel 
had escaped annihilation and his armour had even struck back at 
Antelat midway in the desert between Fort Msus and Ajedabia. On 
January 2nd, 1942, Major-General F. W. Messervy handed over 
command to Major-General F. I. S. Tuker on appointment as Com- 
mander, Ist British Armoured Division, and thus resumed the mobile 
role which he had filled so capably when leading the small ‘Gazelle’ 
Force of armoured cars in the Sudan and Eritrea. 

The nature of the country traversed by the Indian Engineer units 
before they reached the more fertile Jebel region around Benghazi 
is described most graphically by Antony Brett-James in his history 
of the 5th Indian Division.1 ‘The landscape of the Desert was 
painted in colours of brown, yellow and grey, and the fighting men 
learned to hide themselves by the skilful use of these same colours 
in the paints and camouflage nets that adorned their vehicles. It 
was a land of fawn and black rocks, of beige sand: a scene without 
interest, being drab in its slight undulations, its occasional low ridges, 
its steep escarpments. If you wanted to go to a certain point on the 
map, you could go there on a straight course provided your naviga- 
tion was sound. Sometimes the ground was firm and rocky, some- 
times it was powdered dust that swirled up when a vehicle’s wheels 
rolled through it. The Desert has been described as ‘miles and miles 
and bloody miles of absolutely damn all.’ There was a seeming 
eternity of barren inhospitable nothingness. This lack of physical 
features was particularly baffling to the newcomer. You learned to 
move by map, compass and speedometer. You were never really 
certain that you were actually at the point from which you thought 
you were starting and you had to take your map reference on trust: 
there was no guarantee. It was hard to tell how far away the horizon 
was. Your sense of direction was befuddled. You were haunted by 
the constant risk of losing your way. After a time you developed a 
sense of direction in daylight; but at night it was no light matter to 
Ppin-point a unit or a rendezvous. You might search for a group of 
tanks reputed to be leaguered at a certain map reference and spend 
hours driving around, when all the time the tanks were only a mile 
distant. Unless it was extremely urgent that they should be found, 
it was wiser to camp for the night and wait until daybreak, for usually 
the tanks were then visible towards the horizon.” Campaigning under 





1 “Ball of Fire”, by Antony Brett-James, pp. 164, 165. 


92 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


such conditions, and in fast moving vehicles, was a completely novel 
form of warfare. Each side groped for the other. Surprise assumed 
a new importance. Wireless communication was paramount. Every 
locality had to be prepared for all-round defence. Existence depended 
on water: safety, on petrol. The ‘Desert Rats’ of the Eighth Army 
lived a spartan life, sometimes lonely, often exhausted and always 
exposed to extremes of heat or cold, but it was a life that bred a 
camaraderie unequalled in military history. 

As was only natural in such a country and under such conditions, 
the Indian Engineer units in the field experienced the greatest diffi- 
culty in maintaining their mechanical transport. No motor vehicle, 
however well built and well tended, could be expected to survive for 
long when driven hard, day in day out, in swirling clouds of dust or 
cloying mud, over the roughest of rough tracks. ‘Vehicles in very 
bad state’ runs 18 Field Company’s War Diary of January 9th, 1942, 
when the unit was at Barce. ‘‘We have 13 different types, which makes 
spares hard to obtain. Only 38 vehicles present. Thirteen are more 
than two years old and worn out. Seven others are relics which 
towed trucks up the Keren railway in Eritrea and were not replaced 
as promised. Their engines are finished. Steering is deplorable and 
frames are out of alignment. Six more are a year old and have been 
in the Sudan, Syria and Libya. Of the remainder, one is a captured 
French lorry of uncertain vintage, one was recovered and repaired 
after being blown up on a minefield, and another had a shell burst 
under it and is still full of holes.” The Company transport on the 
move must have presented a sorry sight. Indeed, it is wonderful 
that it ever succeeded in moving anywhere; but move it did, and 
quite rapidly too so long as the vehicles held together. 

A Sapper unit closely involved in the sudden counter-offensive with 
which Rommel opened the Fifth Libyan Campaign in January 1942 
was 12 Field Company of the Madras Corps, under Major E. Waring, 
R.E. At that time, General Tuker’s 4th Indian Division was much 
scattered as only the 7th Brigade was at the front. The 11th Brigade 
was still in Tobruk waiting for transport, and the battered Sth Brigade 
was reorganizing in Derna. Tuker was also short of guns, for his 
artillery was being transferred piece-meal to the armoured forma- 
tions. On January 2st, Rommel burst out from El Agheila, and on 
the 22nd, having reached Antelat in force, he decided to exploit to 
the limit in the desert what was originally intended to be only a demon- 
stration. The next two days were fateful ones for the Eighth Army. 
The Ist Armoured Division clashed with the German armour and 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941- AUGUST 1942 93 


was badly mauled. Our 2 pr. guns were outranged and outweighted 
by the German weapons. Only the 25 pr. guns of the artillery could 
cope with the powerful Panzers. Rommel caught us at the precise 
moment when our dumps in the desert were piling up nicely and had 
few troops to protect them, and at a time when our attention was 
concentrated on solving problems of supply in preparation for an 
advance into Tripolitania. Just as Rommel’s projected invasion of 
Egypt in June 1941 had been forestalled by Wavell’s offensive, so 
Ritchie’s projected advance beyond El Agheila was forestalled by 
Rommel, but at considerably less risk. The Sapper units were repairing 
the desert tracks, now inches deep in mud, and much of our meagre 
transport was unfit for use. The 7th Brigade of the 4th Division took 
up positions along a series of minefields some 12 miles south of 
Benghazi. A battalion was sent forward by the Sth Brigade. The 
llth Brigade was summoned from Tobruk. Some guns and tanks 
were rushed to the front. The plan now was that the 4th Division 
should hold a line inland from the coast through Beda Fomm, a 
place about 60 miles south of Benghazi, but at midday on the 25th 
news came that the Ist Armoured Division could no longer defend 
the Msus dump area in the desert. Nevertheless, the 7th Brigade, 
and with it 12 Field Company, advanced southwards from Benghazi 
to Soluch, half-way to Beda Fomm, though its safety depended 
largely on the ability of our armour to hold the Germans east of 
Msus. 

On the morning of January 28th, the 7th Brigade was operating in 
three mobile groups, two forward and the other in reserve at Soluch, 
where 12 Field Company was in position. Just as the brigade was 
about to ascend the escarpment to attack eastwards it was learned 
that German tanks and lorried infantry were advancing up the coast 
and might reach Benghazi in a few hours if unopposed. Brigadier 
H. R. Briggs, who afterwards commanded the Sth Indian Division, 
immediately turned his brigade southwards to meet the enemy, and 
24 German tanks then cut in behind his left flank, making for Soluch. 
Meanwhile, the Armoured Division had been forced back further into 
the desert beyond Msus. It was obvious that Benghazi could not be 
saved and consequently the destruction of all supplies and installations 
was started and a general withdrawal ordered. A group of the 7th 
Brigade had reached a point on the coast near Beda Fomm when 
news came that both roads leading eastwards out of Benghazi had 
been cut by the enemy and that the desert offered the only route of 
escape. 12 Field Company and some other troops joined this group 


94 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


which then marched further southwards, hid for the day, and finally 
turned eastwards to by-pass Msus and make for Mekili. The column 
of 300 vehicles avoided many roving enemy tanks and reached El 
Adem on the afternoon of February Ist, but by that time 12 Field 
Company had lost 40 men. Indeed, it was lucky to be still in existence. 

The break-out from Benghazi showed our troops at their best, 
and it succeeded because of the boldness and determination displayed 
by all ranks. No less than 4,100 officers and men escaped from the 
place and brought with them 800 vehicles. But until January 30th, 
General Tuker could get no news of the wandering 7th Brigade. It 
was obvious that he must withdraw, yet not too rapidly because 
the Sappers must be given time to destroy the roads and blow up 
all dumps of stores and ammunition. 18 Field Company did this 
most effectively, and when the enemy pressure on the I 1th Brigade 
became almost insupportable, the unit volunteered to go into the 
line and fought for a whole day alongside the infantry. Thus, after 
a series of stubborn rearguard actions, Tuker was able to assemble 
the 5th and 11th Brigades at Tmimi on February 3rd, and on the 
following day both brigades arrived in a position at Acroma, west 
of Tobruk and well behind the Gazala Line. The retreat was over, 
and the 4th Divisional Engineers resumed their usual tasks of 
mine-laying and defence work. 

The 4th Indian Division was now due for relief in the Desert by 
the 5th Indian Division and its three brigades were soon scattered 
far and wide—the Sth Brigade in Palestine, the 7th in Cyprus and 
the 11th in the Canal Zone. 4 Field Company left the Gazala Line 
on February 22nd for defence work at Sollum, and later, after spending 
a month at Kabrit, was transferred in May to Palestine. 12 Field 
Company moved in February to Cyprus. 18 Field Company reached 
Sollum towards the end of March, and after handing over to 2 Field 
Company of the Sth Division, went to the Canal Zone for 
training, but at the end of May it was back at Sollum with Captain 
N. B. Thomas, R.E., in command. In May 1942, the Engineer units 
of the 5th Indian Division were all present in the Western Desert 
under the able leadership of Lieut.-Colonel A. H. G. Napier, R.E., 
as C.R.E. They comprised 2 Field Company (Bengal), 20 and 21 
Field Companies (Bombay) and 44 Field Park Company (Madras). 20 
Field Company (Major J. C. Winchester, R.E.) arrived in Alexandria 
from Cyprus on April 8th after relief by 12 Field Company and reached 
Tobruk with the 9th Brigade on May Ist. 21 Field Company (Major 
R. W. W. How, R.E.) which had been working on the Tobruk defences 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941-AUGUST 1942 95 


during March, joined the 29th Brigade in the Sollum area in the 
middle of May and moved with it to the El Adem Box at the end of 
the month. 44 Field Park Company (Lieut. J. H. Partridge, 1.E.) 
was there also, having come from Cyprus in April. The Sth Indian 
Division was now being reinforced in the Western Desert by the 10th 
Indian Division whose Engineer units were 9, 10 and 61 Field Com- 
panies (Madras) and 41 Field Park Company (Bengal), the whole 
being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Saegert, R.E. as 
C.R.E. 9 Field Company (Major P. G. O. Landon, R.E.) came to 
Sollum at the end of May with the 21st Brigade from Iraq and took 
over the Gambut defences from 2 Field Company. 10 Field Com- 
pany (Major C. M. Bennett, I.A.R.O.) and 61 Field Company (Major 
C. C. F. Russell, R.E.) arrived in due course, the latter reaching 
Mersa Matruh on June 4th but the former not until June 25th. 41 
Field Park Company (Major G. T. Roche, R.E.) came also in June. 
Another unit which appeared about the same time was 66 Field 
Company of the Bengal Corps, under Major H. G. A. Elphinstone, 
R.E. 31 Field Squadron of the Bengal Corps, under Major J. M. 
Griffith, R.E., which had moved from Syria in February, went 
far up into the Western Desert, towards the end of May 1942, 
with the unfortunate 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. These details must 
suffice for the present to show the kaleidescopic changes in Sapper 
representation in the field before and after Rommel struck. 

Suddenly, on May 27th, 1942, the opening of the Sixth Libyan 
Campaign changed the whole aspect of the war in North Africa. 
Heavily reinforced from Italy and full of confidence, Rommel launched 
a powerful offensive against the Gazala Line, aiming at a locality 
called ‘Knightsbridge’, a road junction on General Ritchie’s main 
line of supply. Having by-passed a French desert outpost at Bir 
Hacheim during the night, the Axis armour plunged due north in 
three columns in rear of the Gazala defences, on the left the Italian 
Ariete Division, in the centre the 2I!st Panzer Division, and on the 
right the 15th Panzer Division. The enemy plan was to take “Knights- 
bridge’ and the Sidi Rezegh-El Adem defences, then to wheel west- 
wards to overrun the Gazala Line from the rear, and finally to turn 
about and storm Tobruk. While the armour struck, the Italian 
infantry divisions were to pin down the Gazala defenders and their. 
engineers were to open a passage through the Gazala minefields to 
shorten the supply line to the roaming Panzers. This bold design, 
if successful, might have meant the annihilation of the Eighth Army. 
The fact that it did not succeed fully was due to the gallantry and 


96 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


self-sacrifice shown by our own armour and particularly to the stub- 
born resistance offered by the small garrison of Free French in Bir 
Hacheim on our left flank in the desert. At 7.30 a.m., the Panzers 
crushed out of existence the 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade and soon 
afterwards drove back the 4th Armoured Brigade, the nucleus of 
the 7th Armoured Division. Then, rushing onwards in clouds of 
dust, they surprised the 7th Divisional Headquarters and captured the 
Divisional Commander, Major-General F. W. Messervy.! They ended 
the day by engaging the Ist Armoured Division in bitter tank battles 
around “Knightsbridge.” It seems that they had not yet begun to 
feel the lack of petrol which was later to prove a very severe handicap. 

The unique story of General Messervy’s lightning capture and 
escape must not go unrecorded. Before he and his staff were taken 
prisoners, they took the precaution of tearing off their badges of 
rank. Soon they found themselves in a German lorry following hard 
behind the enemy tanks. At a dressing station a German doctor 
looked at ‘Private’ Messervy with some surprise and said “You are 
old to be serving in the desert.” “Yes, yes’’, replied the General, 
“but you see I am a very good batman.” Later, in the heat of battle, 
Messervy and two of his officers jumped from the lorry and hid 
under a tarpaulin in an old gun emplacement. The Germans did not 
trouble to waste much time in hunting for a few ‘other ranks’ and 
so, after three hours under cover, the party crept out, found some 
water and threaded their way for sixteen miles through enemy- 
infested country until they met a British unit. Thus, in less than 
eighteen hours, the 7th Armoured Division regained its commander 
and the enemy let slip a captured General. 

By the evening of May 27th, the German advanced forces had 
reached Acroma, El Duda and Sidi Rezegh, but the Gazala Line still 
stood firm and Bir Hacheim had not yet fallen. Desperate fighting en- 
sued in the “Cauldron” area, west of “Knightsbridge”, and armoured 
clashes continued for several days. On the 28th, the enemy succeeded 
in clearing two lanes through the Gazala minefields and protected 
them with anti-tank guns. The tank battles reached a climax on the 
29th when the British suffered very heavily. On June Ist, Rommel 
overwhelmed a Brigade Box between the two lanes in the mine- 
fields and so widened his corridor of direct supply from the west, 
and finally Ritchie decided to pinch out the German bulge into the 


a re 


1 General Messervy, orginally appointed Commander, Ist Armoured Division, had 
assumed command of the 7th Armoured Division. 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941-AUGUST 1942 97 


“Cauldron” by a vigorous counter-attack. On June 5th, part of the 
50th Division, supported by tanks, attacked the bulge from the 
north, and the 9th and 10th Brigades of the 5th Indian Division, 
also with tank support, attacked from the east. The northern venture 
failed completely; the Sth Division made some headway; but both 
brigades were heavily counter-attacked and almost wiped out. Dis- 
aster stared us in the face. Over confidence was exacting a dire 
penalty. The French under General Koenig, after a glorious stand at 
Bir Hacheim, were forced to retire on June 10th, and four days 
later, ‘“‘Knightsbridge’’ was evacuated. The loss of this position 
uncovered the coastal road and exposed the Ist South African and 
50th Divisions to attack from the rear as planned by Rommel. Ritchie 
therefore ordered the entire Eighth Army, with the exception of the 
Tobruk garrison, to withdraw to the Egyptian frontier, and the 
manoeuvre was accomplished successfully under strong air cover 
and after desperate fighting on the part of the Ist Armoured 
Division. The Ist South African Division carved a way past Tobruk, 
and the 50th Division, under the redoubtable General ‘Straffer’ Gott, 
escaped by first attacking westwards and then marching southwards 
into the desert and finally eastwards. Until June 17th, the 30th 
Corps kept open the exits from Tobruk. Then it had to withdraw 
and Tobruk was isolated once more. On this occasion there was no 
long siege. By heavy air attack and engineer co-operation, Rommel 
blasted a way through the minefields on June 20th. His armour 
rushed in and spread throughout the fortress area. Resistance ceased 
on the following day and Tobruk was his together with 25,000 prisoners 
and immense booty. The news of this disaster was one of the greatest 
shocks experienced by the Allies in the Second World War. It rivalled 
that of the fall of Singapore only a few months earlier. 

Auchinleck reacted strongly and energetically. He flew at once to 
the Western Desert and took over personal command from Ritchie. 
The fragments of the Eighth Army fell back sullenly into Egypt, 
leaving only some outposts at Halfaya, Sollum and further out in the 
desert. On June 23rd, Rommel crossed the frontier between Fort 
Maddalena and Sidi Omar and Auchinleck ordered a withdrawal to 
Mersa Matruh screened to the south by the 9th and 29th Brigades of 
the Sth Indian Division, the 2nd New Zealand Division and an 
Armoured Car Brigade. On the 26th, the Panzers were south of 
Matruh and Italian infantry was closing in on the place. The enemy 
armour by-passed Matruh, swung northwards, and tried to isolate 
the defenders, but most of the Sth Division and New Zealanders 


98 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


fought their way out. Rommel pressed on furiously, and on the 
afternoon of June 30th began to arrive before the El Alamein Line, 
The next four days were critical. Though exhausted and with little 
serviceable armour, the Germans launched a powerful attack only 
to be promptly counter-attacked and repulsed. This was the turn of 
the tide. Static operations replaced mobile warfare. The race for 
reinforcements was resumed with the British no longer at a disadvant- 
age. So ended the Sixth Libyan Campaign. Our prestige was now at 
its lowest ebb throughout the Middle East, and a situation had arisen 
which only the most rigorous measures and the most determined 
leadership could retrieve. Happily, a man was found who was pre- 
pared to take those measures and could give that leadership. 

The experiences of the Indian Engineer units in this campaign afford 
some interesting reading. The chaotic conditions of a general with- 
drawal in desert country forbade any constructional work, and often 
the units suffered severe losses. Such, for instance, was the fate of 
31 Field Squadron of the Bengal Corps which was with the 3rd 
Indian Motorized Brigade when the latter was overrun. Early on 
May 27th, the Squadron was warned that action was imminent on the 
south face of the Brigade Box and all vehicles prepared to move to 
a ‘B’ Echelon area. Shelling started and a large number of enemy 
tanks appeared on the sky line. Major J. M. Griffith, R.E., at Brigade 
H.Q., asked for orders and was told that his Squadron was to retire 
at once to the ‘B’ Echelon. A few minutes later, Lieut. Bennett, who 
had been at a mine-dump, arrived and reported that a large column 
of tanks was actually entering the Squadron position from the east. 
These tanks opened machine-gun fire before Bennett could reach 
Griffith and before orders to withdraw could be passed back to the 
Squadron lines, where Captain Johnson was in charge. The unit’s 
vehicles were widely dispersed, ready to move. They started for ‘B’ 
Echelon, but the Panzers were now scouring the area and fire was 
coming from all directions. ‘“B’’ Troop was soon surrounded and 
captured. The remainder escaped with the loss of a valuable water- 
truck. Orders then came from ‘B’ Echelon to move with them some 
10 miles north-eastwards towards Fort Capuzzo, and on the 28th 
the Brigade was directed to collect at Buq Buq, east of Sollum. 
Meanwhile, a truck which had been sent forward for Major Griffith 
was. hit as it arrived and went up in smoke. The occupants lay down 
behind a bush while the enemy tanks passed to right and left and the 
crews threw grenades at them. One tank rolled right over a shallow 
trench containing three men without harming any of them. Major 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941 - AUGUST 1942 99 


Griffith, with Lieut. Black, collected fourteen men of the Squadron 
and a few from other units and got them into slit trenches where they 
remained until the tanks roared away. The whole party then piled 
into the only two carriers available and with great difficulty induced 
the engines to start. One carrier, with Havildar Rahmat Khan, went 
ahead and was not seen again. It was captured, with other Brigade 
vehicles, while trying to find a way through the enemy’s tank for- 
mations. Nevertheless, the Havildar and 6 men rejoined at Buq 
Buq on June 23rd with a party of 24 others of the unit who had 
escaped after being taken prisoner. The second carrier, with Major 
Griffith aboard, joined a Gunner column which weaved an erratic 
course hither and thither until nearly midday when a Bofors tractor, 
with gun in tow, was hit. The carrier then took the gun in tow and 
the crew crowded onto the already grossly overloaded vehicle. The 
remainder of the column was now out of sight ahead. This was 
lucky for Griffith’s party because the column was soon surrounded 
and captured. As a result of attempting to tow the gun and at the 
same time to carry 23 passengers, the long-suffering carrier now 
developed engine trouble, so it was parked, with the gun, behind the 
smoke from two burning tanks until the fault could be located and 
remedied. The party remained undetected by the enemy although 
a German officer was observing them at times through field glasses 
from a car only a short distance away. Not until the carrier consented 
to move and the men made a dash to get on board it did the enemy 
open fire, and finally, long after darkness had fallen, the small party 
reached the 30th Corps Headquarters. 

Despite recent heavy losses in men and equipment, 31 Field 
Squadron was able to move forward again on June 16th after receiving 
suitable reinforcements. It left Buq Buq with the Brigade, operating 
in three columns. Each column had a detachment of Sappers in 
three trucks and another detachment accompanied Brigade H.Q. 
Between June 22nd and 25th, the columns were heavily engaged. A 
Party under Lieut. Black was caught west of a minefield and split 
up while trying to get through a gap. Black was reported missing 
but rejoined on July Ist in Egypt after an exciting 5 days’ trip with 
an armoured column. A detachment under Major Griffith shot up 
the tail end of an enemy column passing through a gap and destroyed 
2 guns and 3 vehicles. At the end of June, 31 Field Squadron was 
back in the Canal Zone, its adventures, for the time being, ended. 
The story of this unit has been given at some length because it shows 
that Sapper units were not always relegated to technical work in 


100 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


support of other troops. Often they were in the thick of the fighting, 
and then it was that their careful training in infantry duties stood 
them in good stead. 

Other Bengal Sapper units concerned in the fighting were 2 and 
4 Field Companies and 41 Field Park Company. On June 2nd, 
2 Field Company, under Major W. H. D. Wakely, R.E., moved into 
the ‘Cauldron’ in support of an infantry attack.) Its task was to 
clear enemy minefields and destroy enemy equipment and stranded 
tanks. The attack failed, and while withdrawing the Company lost 
some men and vehicles. After the fall of Tobruk the unit thickened 
various minefields and finally arrived in the Bagush Box. On the 
26th it was fortunate enough to be transferred to El Alamein and 
so avoided encirclement when the enemy cut the road behind Bagush 
on the following day. 4 Field Company, under Major J. G. A. J. 
O’Ferrall, R.E., was not solucky for it was at Bagush when the attack 
came; but most of the officers and men succeeded in making their 
way singly or in small parties to El Alamein. 41 Field Park Company, 
formerly under Major C. R. Mangat Rai, I.E., but now under Major 
G. T. Roche, R.E., was the greatest sufferer. Many of its officers 
and men were engaged at the time on demolitions in Matruh itself. 
These were cut off and less than half got through to El Alamein. 
Not a single officer or V.C.O. reached that place. The survivors 
were collected and withdrawn to Cairo, whence they followed the 
10th Division later to Cyprus. 

Here is the story of part of 41 Field Park Company as told by 
Havildar Chanan Singh. “On June 26th we were moving towards 
Tobruk when we were ordered to camp at Mersa Matruh. On the 
27th we were given the task of demolishing supply dumps. On the 
28th our O.C. ordered the H.Q. Platoon and Office (later captured) 
to move back while two other platoons began to net the supplies 
with electric wire and charges. The enemy was now quite near and 
began to shell the supply area continuously. At 4 p.m., German 
bombers set all the petrol dumps on fire, but we continued our work. 
By 8 p.m., the supplies had been prepared for demolition and we 
were cut off by the enemy east of Matruh. Our Platoon Com- 
mander, Lieut. N. S. J. Devonald, told us that we had to withdraw 
without support but that in any case the enemy was not to benefit 
by the supplies. The demolitions were then started. Terrible 


ee 


1“ Brief History of the K.G.V'sO Bengal Sa, i 
: i, ppers and Miners Group, R.LE., August 
1939-July 1946", by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 34. : 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941 - AUGUST 1942 10] 


explosions rent the sky. There was fire all around us. The water- 
supply system was destroyed and we withdrew, having orders to 
push straight towards the desert for forty miles and then seek the 
main road. This had to be done in impenetrable darkness, lit only 
by huge enemy fires, and without maps as we had received no maps 
from Headquarters. Every track, road and field was new to us. 
We started with heavy hearts but determined to slip through the enemy 
lines. The 50th Division and 10th Indian Division fought many 
dispersed battles that night. Every man had to act on his own initiative. 
There was no link, no organization. Three times, I, with my party 
of five in a truck, found ourselves very close to the enemy and pushed 
our way through in hand to hand fighting, but we never failed to 
regain the truck though we lost two men. By 4 a.m., most of the 10th 
Division columns had been captured. Many times our troops clashed 
with each other. Exhausted Germans and Italians were attacked 
while asleep. The thick morning fog added to our difficulties and 
sometimes we had to stop to regain direction. At dawn | found 
myself leading four other vehicles of my unit about 20 miles south 
of the main road to El Alamein, the rest of the convoy having vanished. 
I stopped the vehicles and went to each one. I found two wounded 
Sappers, so we did first aid and then pushed on. We had covered 
only a few more miles when two armoured cars were seen standing 
400 yards away to the right. This made us believe that the road was 
near and that we had contacted our own troops, but as my vehicle 
passed the cars it was fired upon heavily. Those in rear promptly 
turned back and I told my driver to do the same; but all in vain, 
for my truck was immobilized. The enemy cars approached and we 
were taken prisoners. The other four vehicles managed to escape. 
We were taken back to Mersa Matruh, reaching it by nightfall, and 
I saw the supplies still burning. When we asked for food and water 
the Germans took us round the devastated area and asked whether 
we were worthy of being given anything at all. ‘You should die of 
hunger’ they said. Yet, in spite of all this, we survived.” 

9 Field Company, another unit of the 10th Division, reached 
Tobruk from Gambut early in June 1942 and began to mine the 
beaches in relief of 20 Field Company of the 5th Division. On June 
Sth it was at Sidi Rezegh, whence it moved forward towards the 
‘Cauldron.’ However, it was soon turned back owing to the German 
breakthrough and retired .to Sidi Rezegh where it found 18 Field 
Company at work. From the 9th till the 14th it laboured on the 
defences of the Gambut aerodrome. Then it moved through Sidi 


102 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Omar to Halfaya to prepare defences along the southern face of the 
Sollum-Halfaya Box and to thicken the existing minefields to a 
density of one mine per yard. It also blasted many gun-pits out of 
solid rock. News of the fall of Tobruk changed the policy of defence 
to one of evacuation and complete demolition, and during the night 
of June 23/24th the unit destroyed 25 tons of 25 pr. ammunition, 
6,000 E.P. mines, 50,000 gallons of bitumen and the water-supply 
system for the 21st Brigade. After dark on the 24th, Lieut. J. L. 
Banerjee, LLE., was unfortunately killed when an anti-personnel 
mine was detonated accidentally. Apparently, 9 Field Company 
had no serviceable mine-detectors and Banerjee’s party was with- 
drawing after clearing and marking a gap when the mishap occurred. 
By 11 p.m.,, the 5th, 21st and 25th Brigades were on the move and 
the Sollum defences were blown a quarter of an hour later. The 
defences at Halfaya Pass went up soon after midnight. The demo- 
lition parties of 9 Field Company, together with those of 4 and 61 
Field Companies and two Australian companies, then made their 
way back to Mersa Matruh to block gaps in our minefields and 
prepare further demolitions. 

The decision to abandon and demolish Matruh was reached on 
June 26th. 9 Field Company set to work to prepare bridges for 
crossing anti-tank ditches and place explosive charges in barracks. 
These jobs were handed over on the 28th to 61 Field Company which 
was helping the 25th Brigade in a rearguard action. Thesameevening, 
9 Field Company received orders to break out of Matruh and make 
for Fuka which, unknown to Headquarters, was already in enemy 
hands. Preceded by some infantry it started on its perilous journey, 
but after covering only ten miles it ran straight into Rommel’s 
Headquarters which was lining both sides of the road. The column 
was swept with machine-gun and anti-tank gun fire. It was almost 
impossible to distinguish friend from foe for the Germans were 
mostly using captured British vehicles. Those of the Company’s 
vehicles which escaped immediate destruction scattered in all direc- 
tions and then turned southwards into the desert and finally east- 
wards; but as the enemy now held the entire coastal plain for a distance 
of 90 miles to El Daba, the chances of evading capture were poor. 
Yet a fair number got through the enemy cordon and on July Ist 
trickled gradually into Amiriya, near Alexandria, where Major 
Landon proceeded to reorganize the unit. Although the known 
casualities were only 3 killed and 3 wounded, no less than 69 were 
missing, including 2 officers and 2 V.C.Os. The Company had also 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941 -AUGUST 1942 103 


lost 16 trucks, a lorry, a compressor and 2 motorcycles and was 
therefore unfit to take the field; yet when the 10th Divisional Engineers 
moved to Cairo on July 4th to re-equip, no equipment could be 
obtained and consequently all the companies were immobilized for 
some time. It was not until July 23rd that 9 Field Company was 
able to return with the 21st Brigade to the Alamein Line where it 
laid mines near the Ruweisat Ridge until the middle of August before 
moving back to the Alexandria-Cairo Road to protect aerodromes and 
build desert tracks. 

10 Field Company, under Major C. M. Bennett, I.A.R.O., suffered 
more heavily even than 9 Field Company in the break-out from 
Matruh. It arrived just in time to be involved in the catastrophe 
for it did not reach Matruh from Iraq until June 25th. Two days 
later, a Section under Captain Spencer was sent forward towards 
Bagush. After dark on the 28th the Company got the order to break 
out from Matruh and moved off at once, leaving a party of 2 officers 
and 14 men to complete the work of destruction. Its experiences 
were very similar to those of 9 Field Company. Only | Officer, 2 
B.N.C.QOs., 3 V.C.Os., 125 men and 25 vehicles reached E] Alamein 
for it had lost 4 officers, 2 V.C.Os. and 102 men en route. In July 
it went to Cyprus, where it remained till the end of the year. 

61 Field Company, under Major C. C. F. Russell, R.E., also 
suffered severely. After reaching Matruh from Iraq on June 4th 
it did defence work in the Bel Hamid-Sidi Rezegh area until it moved 
back to Sollum on the 21st for water-supply duties. On June 22nd 
it prepared to demolish the defences and dumps in Sollum and the 
Halfaya Pass and to arrange booby-traps in the Sollum Box, and 
after dark it began to withdraw with the exception of one Section 
which stayed behind for a time to carry out final demolitions. Three 
days later, the Company was in position behind the minefields at 
Matruh engaged in clearing gaps and laying additional mines. Its 
experiences on June 28th are recorded as follows in the War Diary. 
“Capt. Locock, with “‘B’ Echelon and 1 Section, left at 1400 hrs 
along coast road to rendezvous with Brigade ‘“‘B” Echelons at Kilo. 
29. All were found later halted at Kilo. 26, enemy tanks and guns 
being in position across the road and firing. At about 21.30 hrs, 
“B” Echelons moved back towards Matruh and attempted to break 
out through minefields and behind enemy. Rear party of remaining 
4 officers and 14 Sections, after acting as infantry, were warned to 
move at 21.00 hrs. Lieut. Shamsher Singh was detailed for demo- 
lition work near coast road west of Matruh but did not return. 


104 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Company tried to break out to the south, being completely cut off 
in the dark. Major Russell was last seen under heavy fire about 
midnight. 2nd Lieut. Stevenson was not seen after leaving Matruh.” 
The casualities in 61 Field Company were 3 officers, | B.W.O., 
1 B.N.C.O., 1 V.C.O., and 93 men. On the following evening, part 
of the unit reassembled at El Alamein and on the 30th it moved 
to Amiriya. 

Everything goes to show that the 10th Divisional Engineers were 
very severely mauled in the retreat from Mersa Matruh and, inci- 
dentally, they lost their C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Saegert, R.E. 
Saegert had been supervising in person the final demolitions at 
Matruh and was wounded and captured during the withdrawal. The 
circumstances are recorded by Havildar Clerk G. Francis.! ‘‘The 
C.R.E’s staff became prisoners in three different places in the desert 
and at different times. In the third group was a station wagon 
containing the C.R.E., Lieut. Nash and two Sappers. The C.R.E. 
found it was too late to escape in his vehicle, so after setting fire 
to it he and the Sappers tried to get away on foot by the coastal 
route. They walked by night and hid during the day; but on the 
third day they were sighted by the ‘Jerries’ while hiding in a cave 
and were captured.’’ Francis goes on to record his personal adven- 
tures. ‘I was travelling in a truck in the first group and followed 
another until we came to a large minefield and sighted some vehicles 
in flames. It was here that the enemy started a terrific bombardment 
from the air. My truck got blown up by a mine, but luckily I was 
not injured though thrown out of the vehicle. We loaded our stuff 
into the other two vehicles and tried to keep contact with the main 
convoy which in the meanwhile had gone out of sight. All our efforts 
failed, and when daylight came we found ourselves surrounded by 
enemy tanks and had to surrender when they opened fire. We were 
taken first to Tobruk and then to Benghazi. The British officers 
were evacuated by air to Italy. There were about 30,000 prisoners of 
war at Benghazi where the camp was run by the Italians. The ‘Ities’ 
themselves did not have sufficient rations so it is no wonder that the 
prisoners were poorly fed. Our day’s ration consisted of a loaf of 
bread (about 10 ozs.), 4 oz of fish and half a teaspoonful of coffee. 
We were given no baths, clothing or blankets. From Benghazi the 
‘Ities’ began to evacuate the prisoners gradually when shipping permit- 
ted. A batch of 2,900 men was evacuated to Italy in August. Their ship 








1 Notes by Havildar Clerk G. Francis, dated January Sth, 1943. 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941-AUGUST 1942 105 


was torpedoed and sunk by a British submarine and, as usual, the 
escorting vessels did not attempt to pick up survivors. My own plan 
was to escape when a British ‘push’ started, and therefore I tried to 
remain in Libya until the spring for I could not walk the distance to 
El] Alamein. We dug a cave below our tent, and when the ‘Ities’ 
began to empty the camp we hid in it, buried under some planks 
and sand and breathing through small tubes. After dark we emerged 
and in pouring rain and cold walked for six days without food before 
meeting British troops.” 

Two units of the Bombay Corps, belonging to the Sth Indian 
Division, were involved in the withdrawal from Mersa Matruh. On 
June 20th, 20 Field Company (Major J. C. Winchester, R.E.) moved 
to Sofafi and on the following day to Bagush. There it learned that 
Major R. W. W. How, R.E., who commanded 21 Field Company, 
was missing. 20 Field Company laid a number of mines and early 
on the 26th withdrew about five miles eastwards. During the after- 
noon, when the enemy had penetrated south to Matruh, the Company 
withdrew again to a Sth Division rendezvous where it was dive- 
bombed and split up. On the 27th, in small parties, it reached the 
Rear Headquarters and, on the 29th, proceeded through Hammam 
to Amiriya. Not until July 17th was it fit to return to the front where 
it rejoined the 9th Brigade on the Ruweisat Ridge at El Alamein. 

21 Field Company, under Major How, was in the El Adem Box 
in the middle of June engaged in blasting gun-pits under considerable 
artillery bombardment. On June 17th it moved back in small parties 
to Bir Gibni, when How and 22 men were found to be missing. Two 
days later, the unit reached Sofafi with the 29th Brigade, and on the 
21st it arrived in the Bagush Box where Major P. P. Miles, R.E., 
took over command. Next it went to a place called Hamza, 15 miles 
south of Matruh, to close a 10-mile gap with minefields. Then came 
the enemy break-through and the 29th Brigade withdrew 20 miles 
eastwards. 21 Field Company reached Fuka with the brigade, and 
July 3rd found it in the Nile Delta reorganizing and training. 18 
Field Company was fortunate enough not to be involved in the 
Mersa Matruh affair, and thus, as a whole, the Bombay Engineer 
units escaped more lightly than their comrades of the other two 
Corps. 

66 Field Company of the Bengal Corps, under Major H. G. A. 
Elphinstone, R.E., was rushed to the Western Desert from Iraq in 
June 1942 with a brigade of the 8th Division and after a journey of 
nearly 700 miles reached Bagush on June 26th. According to 


106 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Elphinstone, the amount of traffic on the road to Bagush was beyond 
anything his drivers had ever seen. Heavy lorries, driven at high 
speed and at 25 yards intervals, streamed without a break in both 
directions. On the 27th the unit was ordered to move to E! Alamein 
through 160 miles of desert as the coastal road had to be kept clear. 
Alamein was reached on the following day. No food was available 
there, and the column in which the unit marched was ordered to 
proceed 10 miles southwards to take up a defensive position at 
Ruweisat, which it did under periodical bombing. On the 29th, 
Elphinstone writes “Most of the morning we tried to find out what 
was happening, but failed. We have been allotted 400 yards of front. 
Ground mostly solid rock and weapon pits require blasting. No 
explosives to be got, but fortunately we have brought 100 lbs of 808 
Gelatine from Iraq. Compressors at work all night. The South 
African Sappers are magnificent. They won’t stop working.” On 
June 30th he adds “All our men are flat out digging. Heartbreaking 
work in the rock.’’ This heavy labour, often interrupted by raids and 
alarms, lasted until August 25th when the unit was sent to the Delta 
to assist in preparing a position covering Cairo. Two months later, 
it returned to Iraq. 

A Madras unit present at this period was 58 Field Company 
under Major G. C. Richards, R.E. It arrived in Amiriya from Iraq 
on July 13th after the retreat of our forces to the Alamein Line and 
began at once to lay ten miles of minefield belts to cover Alexandria. 
During August it laid more than 20,000 mines and, with infantry 
assistance, built 13 miles of double wire fencing. In September it 
left Egypt for Syria. No clearer proof of the defensive policy which 
gripped the Eighth Army at this period is needed than that supplied 
by the stupendous number of mines laid by Engineer units not only 
at the front but far behind the line. This was a policy which, as will 
be seen later, was soon to be changed suddenly and dramatically. 

After July Sth, 1942, mobile warfare gave place gradually to static 
operations and the initiative in the Western Desert passed slowly 
but surely to the British, now firmly based on the Alamein Line in 
which the predominant natural features were two low tidges of 
considerable length. The Ruweisat Ridge, about 12 miles from the 
coast and only 200 feet above sea-level, ran east and west, while the 
Alam el Halfa Ridge, further to the southeast, was slightly higher 
and trended in a north-easterly direction. General Auchinleck’s plan 
of defence was to hold strongly the area between the sea and the 
Ruweisat Ridge and to establish a powerful defensive position on 


THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941 - AUGUST 1942 - 107 


the Alam el Halfa Ridge from which he could threaten any advance 
round his left flank between that ridge and the deep and practically 
impassable Qattara Depression to the south. He had not sufficient 
troops to hold firmly the entire line from the sea to the Depression, 
but neither had Rommel sufficient strength to mass his forces all along 
that line. The vital section was in the north, near the sea, where lay 
the main road and railway; but the security of that section depended 
on the defence of the two ridges in the central sector and hence the 
bitter fighting on the Ruweisat Ridge, the more advanced of the two. 
On July Ist, hurrying towards the western tip, the newly arrived 18th 
Brigade had been over-run, though the Germans had been thrown 
back, two days later, by supporting troops. Then, on the night of 
July 14/15th, the 5th Brigade attacked westwards along the ridge, 
gained some ground and repulsed an enemy counter-attack. The 5th 
Brigade attacked again on the 17th, supported by the 9th Brigade, 
and made a slight advance, and on the 18th it renewed the attack, 
repelled another counter-attack, and gained half a mile. Into this 
ding-dong battle came 20 Field Company whose unenviable job it was 
to lay a minefield around our forward positions. The unit went 
forward to ‘Point 63’, a locality on the Ridge which the 2nd Battalion, 
The West Yorkshire Regiment, had just captured, and attempted to 
lay E.P. Mark III mines to the west and north. The mine-laying 
lorries, however, were illuminated at once by German flares and four 
of them blew up when struck by small-arms fire. Curiously enough, 
the driver of one lorry was unhurt except for a slight cut on his head. 
20 Field Company erected 1,100 yards of fencing on the Ridge and 
throughout the remainder of the month parties were daily in the 
front line mine-laying and improving the defences. 66 Field Company, 
further to the rear, was also busily employed on defence work. 

After the end of July 1942, both the 5th Indian Division on the 
Ruweisat Ridge and the Germans ensconced in the Deir el Shein 
Depression beyond it led a trogdolytic existence. Both sides had 
fought themselves practically to a standstill. Flies swarmed every- 
where. A sickening odour of unburied corpses polluted the air. 
The sun beat down pitilessly on trenches and sangars. The slightest 
Movement brought down intense artillery fire. Sleep was almost 
impossible by day owing to the glare, the flies and frequent dive- 
bombing. By night it was interrupted by dazzling flares and heavy 
bombs. Nerves were stretched to breaking point and sickness took 
its toll. Ruweisat was a very near approach to hell. Yet the defenders 


108 - THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


carried on with grim determination, knowing that such a purgatory 
could not last for ever. 

On August 5th, Mr. Winston Churchill, with Lord Alanbrooke and 
Generals Wavell and Smuts, visited the Western Desert, and soon 
afterwards many changes took place in the higher Army commands. 
Lieut.-General Gott was appointed to command the Eighth Army, 
only to be killed within a few days by a bullet from a Messerschmidt. 
Lieut.-General B. L. Montgomery was then given the chief command 
in the field and arrived in Cairo by air from England on August 
12th. General Sir Harold Alexander, of Dunkirk and Burma fame, 
succeeded General Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. 
Montgomery, full of confidence and enthusiasm, immediately toured 
the front and addressed his officers. He said that, under Alexander, 
he was going not only to hold the enemy at El Alamein but to defeat 
and utterly destroy all the Axis forces in North Africa. If anyone 
doubted this, he must go. Further retreat was out of the question. 
They would stand and fight where they were. All plans dealing with 
withdrawal and the defence of the Nile Delta were to be burnt forthwith. 
Every man, aeroplane, gun and tank was to be used to strengthen the 
front. Living conditions in the desert must be improved without 
delay. Two fine divisions—the 44th and 51st—and also two armoured 
divisions—the 8th and 1!0th—were arriving. Given a fortnight’s 
respite, the Eighth Army would be secure. Given a month’s grace, 
victory was certain. Thus the new commander brought confidence 
and hope to troubled minds and dispelled the melancholy sense of 
isolation which the desert is apt to breed. The Eighth Army became 
in a night an instrument of victory. 

Towards the end of August 1942, Rommel made his last bid for 
Egypt by opening what may be called the Seventh Libyan Campaign. 
Alexander had four armoured and seven infantry divisions as against 
Rommel’s four armoured and eight infantry divisions, but most of 
Rommel’s infantry was Italian and of little fighting value. The 
German plan was to break through our lightly held line of observation 
on the southern flank of the Alamein defences and then, turning 
north, to drive to the sea and encircle our centre and right. This 
plan, when put into operation, led to the Alam el Halfa Battle, or 
First Battle of Alamein, which took place in September. Then, in 
October, followed the Battle of Alamein itself, and finally the glorious 
pursuit of the beaten enemy through the length of Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania and the surrender in Tunisia which ended the war in 
North Africa in May 1943. These Stirring events, however, must 


opedio} asojpesueg & Aq paiRaja a41MK 
Awoua ut des e ysnoayy snjesedde Suyjsojep aul ysni sisuly pur suaddeg 





THE WESTERN DESERT, MAY 1941- AUGUST 1942 109 


form the subject of another chapter. We are concerned for the present 
only with the experiences of the Indian Engineer units up to the time 
when Montgomery began to prepare for his great offensive. 

When the 10th Division was evacuated to Cyprus in July and the 
4th Division was relieved at the front by the 5th Division, some of 
the Indian Engineer units in the Ruweisat region were left behind to 
continue their work of blasting gun-pits, laying mines, putting up 
barbed wire and covering desert tracks with wire netting. This was 
hard luck but was accepted as the fortune of war. The Alamein Line 
had to be held at all costs, and held it was though with much blood 
and sweat. The fighting in July emphasized the problem of opening 
passages for vehicles through minefields immediately behind the 
leading infantry. It was apparent that the existing haphazard 
methods of clearing mines were unsatisfactory when the ground was 
swept by enemy fire and that a proper drill must be evolved. A 
‘preaching’ drill was therefore invented and instruction given in it, 
and the advent of a large number of really efficient mine-detectors 
(Polish Mark III) simplified matters. All the Engineer units soon 
became expert in both mine-clearance and mine-laying. In the preli- 
minary stages of the attacks along the Ruweisat Ridge, 4 Field 
Company gapped many minefields and then helped to protect the 
forward troops by laying new minefields and extending earlier ones; 
and on August Ist, 2 Field Company, now under Major A. Selkirk, 
R.E., laid 900 mines south of the ridge. These are but two examples 
of the fine performances of Indian Engineer units. 

The Ruweisat Ridge position, the key to the Alamein Line, was 
gradually rendered almost impregnable. The line itself, once no 
more than groups of weary and desperate men, was now as tight 
as a bowstring with an arrow on it, an arrow which Montgomery 
would soon loose and would follow by a coup de grace for the enemy 
in North Africa. The atmosphere in the sweltering desert was one 
of profound suspense. Who could foresee what the next few months, 
even the next few weeks, might hold in store? Yet hope reigned 
supreme, and impatience too, for the Eighth Army was straining at 
the leash. 


CHAPTER V 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA, 
AUGUST 1942 - MAY 1943 


HEN the E! Alamein Line was finally stabilized towards the 
Wiens of July 1942, it extended for about 40 miles between the 

Mediterranean coast in the north and the impassable Qattara 
Depression in the south.! The country was bare, stony and featureless 
except for a few low ridges. In the north, close to the coastal road 
and railway, was the Tel el Eisa Ridge, and 5 miles further south, 
the Miteiriya Ridge. Ten miles from the coast and slightly in rear 
of the Miteiriya Ridge was the Ruweisat Ridge, a hotly disputed 
position, and still further to the south and rear the more commanding 
Alam el Halfa Ridge, the key to the whole defensive line since it 
could be used to defeat any threat to our communications with 
Alexandria. Reinforcements were now pouring into Egypt, and 
Rommel was well aware of that fact. Montgomery was being pressed 
by the Cabinet to take the offensive but would not be hurried. “If 
the attack starts in September’’, he replied, ‘‘it will fail. If we wait 
until October, I will personally guarantee a great success and the 
destruction of Rommel’s army. Am I to attack in September?” 
Thereupon, the Cabinet agreed to a postponement. They could 
hardly do otherwise. 

Now was Rommel’s opportunity. On August 29th he determined 
to make a final attempt to burst the line which covered Egypt. He 
announced to his troops that within two or three days they would 
be in Alexandria, and on August 30th, strengthened by new 
divisions, he began his attack ‘for the final annihilation of the 
enemy.’ He intended to cut Montgomery’s communications, but he 
knew that the first step must be the occupation of the Alam el Halfa 
Ridge. So on August 31st, 1942, the Battle of Alam el Halfa, some- 
times called the ‘First Battle of Alamein’, developed with three 
simultaneous enemy thrusts. Montgomery had then had a fortnight’s 
grace in which to make his plans. Also, he had two new divisions 
in position. He was ready for the fray, and not only ready but eager. 


eee 


1 See the map of North Africa included in this chapter. 


110 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA U1 


The Axis thrusts developed in the north, centre and south, the 
most serious being the southern attack. This was launched between 
the left flank of the 2nd New Zealand Division and an isolated hill 
called Himeimat near the Qattara Depression. The {5th and 2Ist 
Panzer Divisions and the 90th Light Motorized Division broke 
through our minefields and three Italian divisions tried to follow. 
Once clear of the mines, the German armour swung northwards 
against our positions on the Alam el Halfa Ridge. This was exactly 
the move anticipated by Montgomery whose Staff had succeeded in 
‘planting’ a faked map on the enemy. It had been arranged that one 
of our scout cars should get blown up on a mine near the enemy’s 
minefields and the crew rescued by another car. Stuffed away in a 
dirty haversack in the abandoned car was a falsified map, covered 
with tea stains, which showed a patch of sandy ground as ‘good 
going.’ An enemy patrol pounced on that map, and the consequence 
was that Rommel’s tanks, on their way to the Alam el Halfa Ridge, 
used gallons of precious petrol and wasted hours of valuable time 
in floundering through deep sand. That, at least, is the story, and it 
bears the hall-mark of probability. Why else should the tanks have 
taken such an uninviting route? 

Once Montgomery was sure that the main attack was directed 
against Alam el Halfa he moved the bulk of his available armour 
to fill a gap between the New Zealanders and the rest of the Alamein 
Line. Soon he had 400 tanks concentrated in the gap, and the ridge 
itself strongly held. Under heavy artillery fire and continuous bomb- 
ing, the floundering Panzers were brought to a halt and Rommel 
Tealized that he had failed. Early on September 3rd, he began to 
withdraw westwards. Much of his armour got away, but nevertheless 
the battlefield was littered with damaged tanks and vehicles which 
he could not retrieve. By the morning of September 6th, no large 
enemy concentrations remained east of our minefields although some 
Axis forces still clung to a few strong points in certain gaps. Montgo- 
Mery then decided to break off the action and resume the process 
of building up a powerful striking force for a major offensive. He 
had got the bulk of the enemy forces concentrated in the south where 
he wanted them, for he intended to launch his offensive in the north. 
So ended Alam el Halfa, Montgomery’s first battle as Commander 
of the Eighth Army. Some regard it as his greatest, for it won him 
the complete confidence of his men. 

Several units of the Indian Engineers helped to pave the way to 
Victory in this critical struggle although the main battle raged far 


112 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


to the south of the Ruweisat Ridge where they were stationed. The 
War Diary of 2 Field Company, under Major W. H. D. Wakely, R.E., 
records that on September Ist enemy tanks were reported as approach- 
ing the Ridge from the south, and the Company, together with 20 
Field Company under Major J. C. Winchester, R.E., laid mines till 
dark. The Sappers had to do this almost unaided for the infantry 
were not then accustomed to the work. 4 Field Company, under Major 
J. G. A. J. O’Ferrall, R.E., had recently moved up to the Ridge. 
11 Field Park Company (Captain A. C. Cooper, R.E.), and 12 Field 
Company (Major J. A. Cameron, R.E.), were on their way from 
Cairo after a few months in Cyprus and therefore they were not 
present when Rommel attacked. Thus the brunt of the engineering 
work in strengthening the Ruweisat positions in the centre of the 
Alamein Line fell on 2, 4 and 20 Field Companies of the Sth Indian 
Division. After Rommel’s failure, the 5th Indian Division was pulled 
out of the line and replaced by the 4th Indian Division, but 2, 4 and 
20 Field Companies remained at Ruweisat to continue their work of 
minelaying and mine-lifting. Lieut.-Colonel A. H. G. Napier, R.E., 
C.R.E. 5th Indian Division, handed over charge to Lieut.-Colonel 
J. H. Blundell, R.E., C.R.E. 4th Indian Division, and Major A. 
Selkirk, R.E., became O.C. 4 Field Company. By September 9th, 
the Sapper companies at the front were 2, 4 and 12 Field Companies 
and 11 Field Park Company, the first two being Bengal units and 
the last two Madras units. Parties frequently supported the infantry 
in raids and reconnaissances but they were not involved in any set 
battle. 

The remainder of September passed without major incident. Both 
sides were feverishly active in preparations for battle. Rommel took 
the opportunity to fly to Berlin where he was duly lionized by the 
Press. “I have not advanced to El Alamein’’, said he, “with any 
intention of being flung back. You may rely on my holding fast to 
what I have got.”” With the General Staff, however, he took a very 
different line, asking for reinforcements and refusing to attack 
unless he got them. To Hitler himself, he was completely subservient. 
The Fuhrer had decreed that there must be no retreat and therefore 
there could be none. So Rommel had to stay and be slaughtered. 
In the end he was grudgingly promised a division from Crete, but 
only one battalion arrived because the rest were sent to the bottom 
of the Mediterranean. During the first three weeks of October, 
Allied air superiority accounted for three-quarters of the Axis sea 
transport. Very little could get through to any port east of Benghazi. 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 113 


On October 11th, the Germans and Italians renewed their violent air 
attacks on Malta in a desperate attempt to protect their sea-route 
between Sicily and Tripoli. They did great damage but the effort 
came too late to affect the balance of power in the Western Desert 
before Montgomery put his fortunes to the final test. 

The Eighth Army was now almost ready to open the Seventh 
Libyan Campaign from the El Alamein Line. The Axis forces in 
position amounted to 4 armoured and 8 infantry divisions, in all 
about 96,000 men, of whom more than half were Germans. They 
had nearly 600 tanks, of which more than half were Italian. Mont- 
gomery had three Corps at his disposal — the 10th, 13th and 30th — 
commanded respectively by Licut.-Generals Sir Herbert Lumsden, B.C 
Horrocks and Sir Oliver Leese. They comprised 3 armoured divisions, 
7 armoured brigades and 7 infantry divisions, a total of about 
150,000 men with 1,114 tanks. Montgomery therefore had a marked 
superiority on the ground and his strength in the air was overwhelming. 
The Royal Navy protected his right flank: the Qattara Depression, 
his left flank. In the absence of General Rommel the Axis forces 
were commanded by General von Stumme who had committed the 
egregious error of spreading his troops evenly along the whole front 
instead of concentrating his armour in rear in readiness to counter- 
attack.! Nevertheless, the Axis line was most formidable. Barriers 
of mines and wire provided the deepest defence system ever con- 
structed in Africa and one which could not be outflanked. In front 
of the main position, consisting of a number of great fortified en- 
closures, was a forward system joined to the main line by a series 
of minefields resembling the rungs of a ladder. These ‘rungs’ were 
designed to ‘canalise’ any assault into low ground where it could 
be destroyed by murderous artillery fire before it came up against 
the main position. Actually, many of the enemy’s minefields had 
been laid originally by us and altered subsequently by the Germans 
to suit their own requirements. There was, however, a notable 
difference between the enemy’s technique and our own. The Germans 
concealed their minefields and used their mines as weapons. We 
made our minefields easily visible and used them chiefly as deterrents, 
the edges being marked with single strands of wire on which were 
hung scores of tin triangles which glinted in the sunlight.2 One 
St oe ts te at ee ne ee a le oe ee ee 

1 The Second World War, 1939-1945, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, p. 235. 

? See “Tin Triangles” by Col. J. M. Lambert, 0.n.£., late R.E., appearing in The 
R. E. Journal, December 1952, pp. 329-338. 


114 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


advantage of our method was that we could mark an area as mined 
when not a mine had been laid and thus force an attacking enemy 
either to sweep it laboriously with detectors or to risk the destruction 
of his infantry and tanks. 

Montgomery, being obliged to attack frontally, decided to break 
through in the north, where the road and railway lay, using the 
30th Corps in the area between the Tel el Eisa and Miteiriya ridges. 
The Corps formations, reading from north to south, were the 9th 
Australian Division near the coast, 5lst Highland Division, 2nd 
New Zealand Division, 9th Armoured Brigade and Ist South African 
Division. The 30th Corps was to make gaps by infantry attacks 
supported by heavy tanks. Then the 10th Corps, consisting of the 
Ist and 10th Armoured Divisions, was to advance from well behind 
the northern sector, go through the gaps and deal with the enemy 
armour in the open country beyond. Further to the south, the [3th 
Corps and the 7th Armoured Division were to attack also in order 
to pin down any enemy forces opposite them. The forward move- 
ment of the 10th Corps was to be most carefully concealed, and every 
possible measure was to be taken to make the enemy imagine that 
the main attack would be made in the south. The 4th Indian Division 
of the 13th Corps was to raid the enemy posts on the Ruweisat Ridge 
in the centre, while the remainder of the Corps—S0th Division, 44th 
Division and Free French—prolonging the line southwards to the 
Qattara Depression, carried out the deceptive role assigned to it 
and if possible opened a way for the advance of the 7th Armoured 
Division. The general offensive was to be preceded by a fortnight 
of intensive bombing by 700 aircraft in order to ground the Axis air 
forces and destroy the enemy’s ports along the coast. The massed 
artillery was to remain silent, awaiting the zero hour. Such in general 
was the plan of attack. The hostile front at Alamein has been com- 
pared to a door, hinged at its northern end. To push at the face 
might make the door swing back some way before serious damage 
was done; but a successful blow at the hinge would dislocate the 
whole front and throw the doorway wide open. Montgomery there- 
fore concentrated at first on the hinge in the north. 

No more than a mere outline of E] Alamein can be given in these 
pages, but some description is needed to explain the movements and 
record the experiences of the Indian Engineer units at the front. 
On the eve of battle, Montgomery issued a stirring message to his 
troops. ‘When I assumed command of the Eighth Army”, he wrote, 
“IT said that the mandate was to destroy Rommel and his army and 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 115 


that it would be done as soon as we were ready. Weare ready NOW. 
The battle which is now about to begin will be one of the decisive 
battles of history. It will be the turning point of the war. The eyes 
of the whole world will be on us, watching anxiously which way the 
battle will swing. We can give them their answer at once. It will 
swing our way. We have first class equipment, good tanks, good 
anti-tank guns and plenty of artillery and ammunition, and we are 
backed up by the finest air striking force in the world. All that is 
necessary is that each one of us, every officer and man, should enter 
this battle with the determination to see it through, to fight and kill, 
and finally, to win. If we do all this, we will hit the enemy for ‘six’ 
right out of North Africa ...... Let no man surrender so long as 
he is unwounded and can fight, and let us pray that the Lord AI- 
mighty will give us the victory”. 

Up to 9.40 p.m. on the fateful day October 23rd, 1942, the battle- 
field at El Alamein lay strangely still and quiet under a brilliant moon. 
The silence was broken only by occasional desultory shelling and the 
noise of aircraft. The infantry crouched in their trenches. Gun 
crews were grouped closely around their weapons. Then, with a 
crash which seemed to rend the sky, 800 guns opened fire simultane- 
ously on a six-mile frontage in the northern sector against the enemy 
batteries. A vast crescent of flame illuminated the rolling clouds 
of dust which soon blotted out the landscape. For 20 minutes the 
barrage continued and then switched to the support of the advancing 
infantry. Meanwhile, the artillery in the centre and southern sectors 
had followed suit. The infantry of the 30th Corps, accompanied by 
engineers, followed the northern barrage and by 5.30 a.m. on October 
24th had made two gaps through the main belt of enemy minefields. 
At 7.0 a.m. they occupied the Miteiriya Ridge, whereupon the Ist 
and 10th Armoured Divisions advanced up to it. The subsidiary 
operations of the 13th Corps in the south not having met with much 
success, the 7th Armoured Division was ordered to the north. In 
the northern sector, the 51st Highland Division, Ist South African 
Division and 2nd New Zealand Division poured through the south- 
ernmost of the two gaps with two Armoured Brigades in close support 
and the 10th Armoured Division following. The 9th Australian 
Division went through the northern gap, followed by the Ist Armoured 
Division. A narrow wedge was thus driven into the enemy's line, 
but the armour could not penetrate to the open country. The line 
was merely dented, not pierced. Von Stumme had withdrawn most 
of his troops and guns from their forward positions and had thus 


116 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


in effect turned his original front line into an outpost position. The 
bulk of his forces, and his guns, had still to be dealt with. This was 
his last action, for on the 25th he was killed in an air raid and the 
command of the Axis forces then devolved on General von Thoma. 
The operations of the 13th Corps in the south, though not spectacular, 
had the desired effect of holding the 21st Panzer Division and an 
Italian Armoured Division for a time in that sector and thus diminished 
the resistance encountered by the 30th and 10th Corps in the north. 
Indeed, it was not until the night of October 26/27th that the enemy 
moved these armoured divisions to the northern sector, a concen- 
tration which may have been due to the controlling hand of Rommel 
himself, for he had just arrived post-haste from Berlin to resume 
command. By that time, the battle was raging all along the line but 
with particular fierceness in the north where the Australians had 
attacked northwards from the narrow salient and had almost reached 
the sea. 

On October 27th, Rommel launched a series of violent counter- 
attacks against the 30th and 10th Corps in the northern sector. 
Under cover of these offensives he wished to withdraw westwards for 
some miles; but Hitler intervened again and ordered him to stand 
and fight, and accordingly he stayed and fought and thereby signed 
the death warrant of his army. Yet the resistance which he offered 
was so stubborn that, as day succeeded day, it became more and 
more evident that a British break-through in the Miteiriya region, 
followed by a drive southwards as planned, could not succeed and 
Montgomery therefore decided to re-group his army and alter his 
strategy. His new plan was to strike westwards and then northwards. 
The 30th Corps was to deepen the salient already established, the 
10th (Armoured) Corps was to withdraw and reorganize for the final 
thrust, and the 13th Corps was to revert to a defensive role. The 2nd 
New Zealand Division was pulled out of the line and its place taken 
by the Ist South African Division which moved northwards. The 
South Africans were relieved in turn by the 4th Indian Division, the 
next in the line. Thus the Indian Division found itself nearer to the 
centre of fighting in the north. 

On October 28th, Rommel attacked once more and sent part of 
his armour to extricate his 90th Light Division which had been 
almost surrounded by the 9th Australian Division on the coast. 
Heavy fighting continued in this area until November Ist. During 
the night of November Ist/2nd, the 30th Corps resumed the offensive 
north of the Miteiriya Ridge and a feature beyond it called ‘‘Kidney”, 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 117 


making an advance of 4000 yards at the point of junction of the 
German and Italian forces and penetrating the final Axis minefields 
though at heavy cost. The !0th Corps then advanced through the 
opening and throughout November 2nd fought a series of violent 
tank battles in comparatively open country against the 15th and 21st 
Panzer Divisions. When dawn broke on November 3rd, the German 
armour had at last been thoroughly beaten and shortly afterwards 
General von Thoma was captured. Rommel now began to abandon 
his line, at the same time plugging the yawning gap with all the anti- 
tank guns he could muster. But Montgomery had another trump in 
hand. The 4th Indian Division came into the picture once more, 
together with the 5Ist Division. The Indians broke south-west 
through two Italian divisions and into this new gap poured the 7th Ar- 
moured Division. “‘With one final shattering and cataclysmic blow”, 
writes Alan Moorehead,/ “‘the entire Axis army collapsed and fell to 
pieces. Thousands upon thousands of exhausted and bewildered 
Italians simply gave themselves up. The rest, with the Germans 
in the van ( because they had grabbed most of the vehicles ) set 
off pell-mell in wild disorder down the coast road in the long and 
dangerous attempt to escape into Libya’. 

The victory was absolute and complete. On November 5th, 
Montgomery’s armour was streaming along the coast road to capture 
the enemy’s dumps at Daba and beyond and if possible to encircle 
the roaring Panzers before they could climb the escarpment west of 
Mersa Matruh. Only 80 German tanks remained and they were 
pursued by 600 British tanks. Nose to tail and two deep, the vehicles 
of the Eighth Army poured westwards and in the other direction 
marched seemingly endless columns of German and Italian prisoners, 
the Germans sullen and dejected, the Italians happy to be out of it 
all. The Battle of Alamein cost the enemy 59,000 casualties, of 
whom 34,000 were Germans, while the British lost only 13,500 men. 
Each side lost between 400 and 500 tanks, but the enemy had in 
addition to abandon hundreds of guns and thousands of vehicles, 
none of which could be recovered. Italian morale was completely 
broken and German morale greatly lowered. Thus in every respect, 
Alamein stands out as one of the most decisive land battles in history. 

It is time now to see in what way the Indian Engineers shared in 
this great struggle. Rarely were they in any heavy fighting, but they 
took an honourable part with the remainder of the 4th Indian Division 





1 Montgomery, by Alan Moorehead, p. 138. 


118 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


in holding the ring while the main battle was fought in the north. 
Yet they were no mere spectators. Raiding and patrolling proceeded 
unceasingly, and such activities required the services of parties of 
Engineer troops. Sometimes there were more extensive operations. 
For instance, on the night of October 23rd, when the battle began, 
a full scale attack was launched against ‘Point 62’ on the Ruweisat 
Ridge and a detachment of 12 Field Company advanced with the 
2nd Gurkhas to lift mines. On November Ist, when the final break- 
through in the north had begun, some Indian Engineers helped the 
5th Indian Infantry Brigade to cut a lane through the enemy mine- 
fields and defences to a depth of 8,000 yards so that the tanks could 
go forward. At Alamein, for practically the first time in the North 
African campaigns, Divisional Engineers were employed as a whole, 
directly under the command of their C.R.E., on specified tasks 
instead of being attached to, and at the disposal of, brigades. Better 
co-ordination of work was thus secured, and 2, 4, 11 and 12 Companies 
of the 4th Indian Division, under Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Blundell, R.E., 
proved themselves equal to the best. Their main efforts during the 
battle were concentrated on opening gaps in minefields behind the 
assaulting infantry so that vehicles could pass through quickly. A 
‘gapping’ drill was used which proved very successful. The Sappers 
were called upon also to complete the destruction of dozens of crippled 
and abandoned enemy tanks and guns and they became exceedingly 
quick and expert in this work. Previous training and experience had 
taught them exactly the sizes of the necessary explosive charges and 
where these should be placed to secure the best results. 

Some extracts from the War Diary of 12 Field Company will show 
the general nature of the work of all the Indian units. Major J. A. 
Cameron, R.E., writes as follows:— ‘23rd October 1942, 1600 Ars. 
12 Field Company moves to battle positions north of 4th Div. HQ. 
2130 hrs. A compressor of 11 Field Park Company is going full 
blast on the front wire. Its object is to preserve the normal atmos- 
phere up to the last possible moment and to drown the noise of the 
carriers. 2140 Ars. Counter-battery fire begins. The compressor is 
as loud as ever. 2155 Ars. “C” Company, 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 
pass through the wire in brilliant moonlight. The Sappers follow. 
The compressor reaches a crescendo of noise on the hardest rock it 
can find. 2200 Ars. 600 guns open fire from Ruweisat to the sea. 
The compressor packs up, its task accomplished. Meanwhile the 
Gurkhas, led by Capt. Carrick, have pulled away the wire with 
grapnels and their leading platoon has reached its objective. The 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 119 


following platoon is not so lucky and the men with made-up charges 
are halted—so also the Sappers behind them—and this state of 
affairs continues for the allotted 10 minutes of the operation until 
the leading Gurkhas return and the Sappers with them”. 

The chief obstacles at Alamein were enemy anti-tank minefields 
laid in great depth but containing relatively few anti-personnel mines 
or booby traps. It was thus possible to pass infantry through a 
minefield without serious casualties and then to clear the mines 
under their protection. After Alamein, the enemy used much larger 
quantities of anti-personnel mines and it became almost impossible 
for infantry to move through a minefield at night without heavy 
loss. This necessitated the fitting of mine-clearing devices to our 
tanks. At Alamein, however, the infantry were able to make their 
own way readily through the enemy wire and minefields, assisted by 
small detachments of Sappers to deal with occasional booby traps 
and blow gaps in the wire with Bangalore torpedoes if required. 
Behind the infantry came minefield task forces to widen the gaps 
for the passage of tanks and vehicles. Once the main minefields 
had been traversed, a difficult problem arose. This was to locate 
the forward edges of any minefields further in rear, for if sweeping 
with detectors was begun when the first mine was encountered much 
time might be wasted because the mine might merely be one of a few 
scattered haphazard between the fields. Nevertheless, the method 
of mine-clearance usually adopted at Alamein was that of employing 
a detachment of engineer troops provided with detectors and it was 
found that one Section could clear a 16-yard gap to a depth of 400 
yards in 2 hours. If detectors were not available, the engineers and 
infantry had to resort to prodding with bayonets. An Engineer 
Mine-clearance Detachment was divided into a number of parties. 
First came a Reconnaissance Party following close behind the leading 
infantry to determine the exact extent of the minefield and the best 
starting point for the gap. Next came a Tape Party to mark an 
initial gap 8 yards wide, and behind it a Detector Party of three men, 
each of whom swept a width of 3 yards assisted by a man who marked 
any mines discovered. A Mine Disarming and Lifting Party followed, 
and then a Gap Marking Party to mark the edges of the gap with 
metal signs by day or screened lamps by night. A Control Party 
remained at the entrance and also a Reserve Party to replace any 
casualties. This elaborate organization shows how carefully the 
Sappers had to be trained and how many men were needed for mine 
clearance. Fortunately, they were not usually required to clear gaps 


120 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


in our own minefields before an attack. That task fell to the infantry, 
but the Sappers had to determine the sites and mark them. Mine 
clearance was dangerous work and the Indian Engineer units in the 
Ruweisat region had their fair share of it, particularly when they 
had to make gaps for the break-through of the 7th Armoured Division 
late in the battle. 

The pursuit of Rommel’s broken army out of Egypt, across Cyre- 
naica and into Tripolitania, was maintained at a prodigious speed so 
long as the weather permitted. Yet only four of Montgomery's 
twelve divisions were immediately available for the chase. These 
were the 51st Highland Division, the 2nd New Zealand Division and 
two Armoured Divisions. Others had to be re-equipped or had to 
provide garrisons along the route, and the unfortunate 4th Indian 
Division was soon left behind to clear up the Alamein battlefield. The 
main problem was to arrange that the pursuit did not outstrip the 
supplies. Tobruk is 360 miles from El Alamein, Benghazi 300 miles 
further on, and El Agheila another 160 miles. The meagre water- 
supplies along the coast road had been spoilt by contamination with 
bone-oil, and the pipe-line from Alexandria was unreliable and did 
not extend very far. Until the railway could be restored, the leading 
troops had to be supplied entirely by road and the number of lorries 
available was strictly limited. Our shipping could not use the various 
small ports along the coast until these had been cleared of mines 
and wrecks. Such obstacles, however, did not affect the Indian 
Engineer units tied to El Alamein. There was much disappointment 
among them for they felt that they deserved something better than 
picking up scrap. Yet they did it with a will for they knew that the 
sooner they completed the tedious job the sooner they might rejoin 
the forward troops. The Sapper units cleared the smaller minefields, 
marked the larger ones, destroyed enemy tanks and vehicles and gave 
advice on the salvage of no less that 1500 tons of material daily. 
These Jabours continued until December 1942 when 4 and 12 Field 
Companies and 11 Field Park Company began to move westwards 
and 2 Field Company left for Iraq en route to Burma. 

Another Indian Engineer unit which now came into the picture 
was 9 Field Company, under Major P. G. O. Landon, R.E., which 
afterwards met disaster in the Dodecanese Islands.! Until November 
Sth it had been guarding aerodromes in the Nile delta, but on the 
6th it was detailed to work with a Bomb Disposal Company on the 


' See Chapter III. 


BISIUR,, Ul UOIDaJap aur] 





THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 121 


clearance of mines and booby traps along the railway line from El 
Alamein to Tobruk. This single-track line, which ran for 500 miles 
along the route of the pursuit, had been extensively mined and damaged 
by the retreating Germans. Our forces advanced much more rapidly 
than the line could be repaired and cleared, but 9 Field Company 
completed the work along the 360 miles to Tobruk in 10 days 
during which it lifted 141 mines, 3 booby traps and 39 unexploded 
charges. Subsequently it continued mine-lifting on the roads as far 
as Derna before leaving in December for Egypt and Cyprus. 

By November Sth it had become clear that Rommel’s thoughts 
were centred solely on saving the remnants of his armour comprising 
his two depleted German Panzer Divisions and the survivors of 
two Italian Motorized Divisions. He tried to make a stand on the 
Fuka escarpment, and our Ist and 7th Armoured Divisions, in hot 
pursuit, prepared to deal with it. Early on the 6th they broke through 
the enemy’s rearguard and then, resuming the race westwards, reached 
the escarpment south of Mersa Matruh and re-occupied that port. 
At this moment, when Rommel’s armour might well have been totally 
destroyed, heavy rain began to fall. It was an outrageous piece of 
bad luck. Our tanks, whirling through the desert to cut off the 
retreating enemy, became bogged down in thick mud while the 
Panzers continued to pound along the coast road, and when the 
weather cleared on November 8th, Rommel had escaped. The vile 
weather had interfered also with the operations of our air force. 
Afterwards, however, the 10th Corps made rapid progress. Tobruk 
was entered on November 13th, Gazala on the 14th, and by 
the 15th we had seized the important airfields around Martuba 
beyond Tmimi. This was a notable achievement because our planes 
could then give cover to a vital sea convoy due to leave Alexandria 
for Malta. That island was in desperate need of supplies, and if the 
garrison had had to surrender, the enemy could have safely poured 
troops into North Africa from Sicily. The convoy got through and 
so a major disaster was avoided by the narrowest of margins. It is 
a lesson in the intricate pattern of war strategy. Benghazi was entered 
on November 20th, and three days later the 7th Armoured Division 
forced the enemy out of a position at Ajedabia. Rommel then retired 
to El Agheila, whence he had launched his counter-offensive on 
January 2Ist,1 and there he prepared to make a resolute stand in 
an exceptionally powerful position in a narrow gap between a marsh 


1 See Chapter IV. 


122 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


and the sea. The approaches were packed with anti-personnel mines, 
and in addition to anti-tank mines, some of the minefields had belts 
of ‘S’ mines seven rows deep, each mine being only 2 feet from the 
next. A pause of three weeks was therefore necessary for reconna- 
issance and to allow time in which to build up a strong force for a 
major attack. On December 11th, after we had made some probing 
attacks, the enemy completed his withdrawal from El Agheila and our 
advance was resumed along the now heavily mined coast road into 
Tripolitania. The delay had enabled Rommel to dig and mine another 
position at Buerat further along the coast. 

The general situation in North Africa had recently undergone a 
Startling change, for on November 8th, 1942, British and American 
troops had landed in the extreme west as the forerunners of a great 
army under General Eisenhower. On November I1th, the leading 
formations of the British First Army under Lieut.-General K. A. N. 
Anderson were re-embarked and transferred further eastwards from 
Algiers. They landed in Tunisia and on November 25th one division 
was at Medjez el Bab only 30 miles south-west of Tunis.1 The Germans 
reinforced their Tunisian garrison by air, and by Christmas, although 
Medjez el Bab was still held by the First Army, difficulties of supply 
had brought about a stalemate which persisted until the middle of 
February 1943. Thus it became more and more necessary that the 
Eighth Army should break the deadlock by invading Tunisia, and 
the question was whether this was possible without outrunning its 
supply services. During the first week of January, a terrific storm 
wrecked the ships in Benghazi harbour, the only large supply port 
on the long line of communication. The Eighth Army was then 
facing the enemy in position at Buerat, 600 miles beyond Benghazi, 
and it was doubtful whether the land supply line could be stretched 
to cover the further 200 miles to Tripoli, the next large port. If not, 
the army would have to turn back, which was unthinkable. Such 
was the difficult problem which confronted Montgomery at this stage. 
The Army Commander wisely decided to reduce his striking force 
by immobilizing the entire 10th Corps at Benghazi so that its vehicles 
could carry supplies forward from the railhead at Tobruk. The 
railway from Alexandria to Tobruk was working to its utmost capacity. 
Closely eoncerned with this undertaking was 115 Railway Operating 
Company, R.LE., under Major D. Robathan, the only Indian Railway 
Company to be awarded the Eighth Army clasp. The line was 





1 See the map of Tunisia included in this chapter. 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 123 


operated with old Diesel locomotives which were kept running by 
using spare parts taken from still older ones.’ It was a triumph of 
ingenuity. 

On January 12th, reorganized and properly supplied, the Eighth 
Army was ready to attack at Buerat. A personal message was issued 
by Montgomery. “The Eighth Army is going to Tripoli” it ran. 
“Nothing has stopped us since the Battle of Egypt began on October 
23rd. Nothing will stop us now. Some must stay back to begin with, 
but we will all be in the hunt eventually. ON TO TRIPOLI!” But 
already Rommel had begun to withdraw, and soon the Eighth Army 
was on the move again. Before dawn on January 23rd, 1943, the 
leading elements of the 7th Armoured Division entered Tripoli. 
The Army had advanced 1,400 miles in three months and its indepen- 
dent mission had ended. Henceforth its strategy would be controlled 
by General Eisenhower from Algiers and not by General Alexander 
from Cairo. 

After the Battle of Alamein the 4th Indian Divisional Engineers, 
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Blundell, R.E., included 2 Field 
Company under Major A. Selkirk, R.E., with Captain A. E. Scott, 
R.E., as second-in-command, 4 Field Company under Major W. J. A. 
Murray, R.E., with Captain R. D. Penney, R.E., as second-in-command, 
11 Field Park Company under Captain T. E. Potts, R.E., and 12 
Field Company under Major J. A. Cameron, R.E. The Bombay 
Group was not represented. Of these units, 2 Field Company took 
no share in the pursuit into Tripolitania for, as already stated, it 
was transferred in December 1942 to Iraq, so that when the Divi- 
sional Engineers were allowed to leave El Alamein and follow the 
other troops westwards the chief burden of the field work fell on 
4 and 12 Field Companies. The men had suffered a keen disappoint- 
ment soon after the end of the battle. “The desert is full of vehicles” 
runs the 4th Company War Diary of November Sth. “‘It is a grand 
sight. We march until almost dark and halt below a steep escarpment. 
There are lots of Verey signals going up all round us’. Then came 
the unwelcome order to return to clear up the battlefield and the 4th 
Divisional Engineers sadly retraced their steps. However, in mid- 
December, 4, 1! and 12 Companies moved forward to the Tobruk 
area and on January Sth, 1943, 4 Field Company was approaching 
Benghazi in heavy rain. ‘‘The going is very bad’, writes Murray. 


1 See “Accounts about 119 Railway Workshop Company”, by Lieut.-Colonel Kuldip 
Singh, 1.E., dated January 1951. 


124 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


“Right from the start, vehicles are getting bogged. At one point the 
advance party are stuck 7 miles in rear of the Brigade column. At 
the lunch halt, only 17 vehicles of the Company transport are to- 
gether in position, but after that the going is not too bad and we 
halt for the night about 2 miles from Msus. The drivers are not 
choosing their routes but following rigidly the vehicle in front. If it 
gets bogged and has to be pulled out, the driver behind thinks it is 
his inevitable fate to be bogged and pulled out too! The ground has 
become a complete quagmire through rain.” 

On January 8th, 4 Field Company arrived in a pleasant camp at 
Benghazi and was soon busily employed on harbour works and 
water-supply. ‘‘We are asked to open up a water-point at the Lete 
Grotto, 6 miles from here’ continues Murray. “It is a wonderful 
place, an underground reservoir composed of three lakes about 
120 feet below the surface. It is quite dark down there and it would 
be easy to get lost if one pushed off in a boat without a life-line for 
retracing one’s route. We have found a _ well-shaft on the 
surface leading down to the lakes and have decided to have our 
pumping engine on the surface and to use the flex drive on the unit 
pumps down to the water. The maximum head is about 90 feet. 
The ‘Waters of Lete’ (or Lethe) are famous, and it is said that anyone 
partaking of them forgets everything.”! 4 Field Company brought 
the first water to the surface on January 18th and we can only hope 
that the efficiency of those who drank it did not suffer! 

At the end of the month, Murray received some shoulder emblems 
with the new Divisional sign—a Red Eagle on a black background. 
These were issued at once to the British and Indian officers pending 
the arrival of a full supply for all ranks. They had been secured 
through the good offices of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Premier of 
the Punjab. Each was mounted on a piece of cardboard bearing the V 
sign and the words “The Punjabis are proud of you. With best 
wishes for final victory’. The emblems and the accompanying 
message were greatly appreciated. 

4 Field Company left Benghazi in the middle of February, and 
before the end of the month 11 Field Park Company and 12 Field 
Company arrived from the El Adem region. A fortnight later, they 
also took the road towards Tripoli. During March, 21 Field Company 


1 According to Greek mythology, the Lethe was a river of the nether regions from 
which departed spirits drank to obtain forgetfulness of the past. The name itself 
implies forgetfulness. 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 125 


under Captain P. H. Fraser, R.E., appeared from Egypt and soon 
followed the others. All the Sappers units were very busy while in 
Benghazi for there was a great variety of work to be done and little 
time in which to do it. Barges driven ashore during the great storm 
were refloated, roads built or repaired and wireless masts erected. 
Courses of instruction in mine-laying and mine-lifting were run for 
the benefit of recruits. Relaxation was provided by occasional E.N. 
S.A. entertainments and by Indian films. “It was a very pleasant 
interlude” writes Pearson.! ‘“Benghazi’s white buildings glistened in 
the sun and the two domes of its cathedral dominated the sky-line. 
The blue skies overhead were dotted with silvery balloons, about 
twenty-two in all, the only outward signs of war.” 

Beyond El Agheila, 4 Field Company found many examples of 
the latest German booby-traps. According to Murray, the retreating 
enemy had shown the utmost ingenuity in planning these devilish 
devices. Large craters would be blown in the coastal road and ‘S’ 
mines buried beneath the metal splinters lying around the edges. 
These splinters prevented the use of mine-detectors. Again, an 
abandoned vehicle might have traps fixed to the brake or gear levers 
so that when an attempt was made to tow the vehicle clear of the 
road a mine exploded beneath it. Alternatively, the vehicle might 
be left clear of traps and several mines buried in the only empty 
space off the road to which it might be towed. To make certainty 
doubly sure, a mine might be buried just in front of a front wheel. 
Sometimes the enemy prepared a sham grave near the road with 
a cross leaning crazily to one side. The short path to that grave was 
sown with ‘S’ mines and any attempt to straighten the cross caused 
a mine beneath it to explode. Yet again, the side of the road would 
be undermined and a couple of Tellermines inserted beneath the 
metalling. A few vehicles might then pass safely, but when the crust 
of the undermined portion collapsed under further traffic the mines 
exploded. Occasionally, trip wires, as fine as gossamer threads and 
almost invisible, were attached to a barbed wire barrier across the 
road. The wires led to ‘S’ mines buried beneath the barrier. Oil 
drums, half filled with rubbish, were often strewn across the road, 
each with a pull-ignition arrangement attached to a Tellermine 
below. The lessons learned on the Agheila Road made the Sappers 
So suspicious that it is surprising that they could ever bring themselves 





1 Brief History of the K.G.V’s O. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.I.E., August 
1939-July 1946", by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 37. 


126 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


to move anywhere or touch anything, but move they did and with 
remarkable rapidity. Fortunately, they were no novices at the game 
and consequently they suffered few casualties, but the leading troops, 
now far ahead, could have told a different tale. 

While at Tripoli, the Eighth Army was honoured by another 
visit from Mr. Winston Churchill who took the salute on February 
3rd at a great parade. The countryside afforded a welcome change 
from the arid stretches of the Western Desert. Flowers gladdened 
the eye, and fresh water from rippling streams eased many a parched 
throat. The coastal belt was well cultivated, but it was not so pictures- 
que as Tunisia whose rolling downs and springy turf still lay far 
ahead beyond Rommel’s army. Wadis galore, running down to the 
fertile coast from inhospitable inland tracts, afforded Rommel 
a series of ideal positions in which he might attempt to prevent a 
junction of the Eighth and First Armies, and as he had now received 
reinforcements of tanks and guns, he was determined to make a 
resolute stand. His Germans were still the same dour fighters: his 
new Italian divisions were composed mostly of enthusiastic youngsters. 
Knowing that Montgomery was not yet ready to move forward 
from Tripoli, Rommel marched a large part of his army onwards 
into Tunisia, encountered the Americans on February 14th and six 
days later broke through them to the Kasserine Pass, whence he 
advanced in two columns, one northwards towards Thala and the 
other north-westwards towards Tebessa, where the First and Eighth 
Armies might be expected eventually to meet.1 He was repulsed 
after some fierce fighting, but not until he had succeeded in creating 
considerable disorganization in Tunisia. Then he turned back to face 
Montgomery in Tripolitania. He occupied the formidable Mareth Line 
of fortifications, about 200 miles west of Tripoli, which had been built 
originally by the French to guard against a possible Italian invasion 
from Libya. When France fell, the Italians had stripped this line, 
but it had recently been re-equipped by the retreating Axis forces. 
On February 17th, though much delayed by bad weather, Mont- 
gomery’s advanced troops captured Medinine, 18 miles short of the 
Mareth Line, and he then proceeded to extend his position southwards. 
The 51st Division, 7th Armoured Division and 22nd Armoured 
Brigade had reached the front, and during the next fortnight the 2nd 
New Zealand Division, 8th Armoured Brigade, 201st Guards Brigade 
and some units of the 50th Division were rushed forward. On March 








! See the map of Tunisia included in this chapter. 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 127 


6th, Rommel attacked our positions at Medinine with massed armour 
but was repulsed with the loss of 52 tanks. Yet the situation had been 
sufficiently serious for Montgomery to issue stringent orders that 
there must be no withdrawal anywhere and, of course, no surrender. 

The 4th Indian Division soon began to arrive on the scene and 
with it 4, 11 and 12 Companies under Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Blundell, 
R.E. After Divisional Headquarters had been set up a few miles 
north-east of Medinine, the 7th Brigade moved forward to take over 
a sector of the front from the 7th Armoured Division.! The Mareth Line 
was exceedingly strong. Its left lay on the sea coast, along its front 
ran the Wadi Zigzaou, a formidable obstacle 50 feet deep and 70 
yards wide with a muddy bottom, and its right rested on the Matmata 
Hills which were believed to be impassable to wheeled traffic. South 
of Medinine, a pass in the hills led to a village called Foum Tatahouine, 
and 40 miles west of Mareth there was a strongly fortified gap called 
‘Plum’ Pass. To outflank the Mareth Line by way of Foum Tata- 
houine and Plum Pass would entail a journey of 150 miles over 
broken ground. ‘“‘Nevertheless’’, writes General Fuller,2 ‘‘“Montgo- 
mery decided to attempt it. While the 30th Corps pinned the enemy 
down by a frontal attack against his left flank, the 2nd New Zealand 
Division and the 8th Armoured Brigade were to move over the 
Foum Tatahouine Pass, link up with General Leclerc’s small French 
force which had come up from Lake Chad, storm the Plum Pass 
and then fall upon the enemy’s rear. Heavy air support was to be 
used not only against the enemy airfields and in a preliminary bom- 
bardment but also in closest co-operation with the troops attacking 
the narrow frontage at the Plum Pass. At 10.30 p.m. on March 
20th, 1943, the 50th Division of the 30th Corps, under cover of a 
tremendous artillery barrage, stormed the Wadi Zigzaou and gained 
a footing on its western side but was driven back across it on the 22nd 
by the 15th Panzer and 90th Light Divisions. Next day Montgomery 
ordered the !0th Corps H.Q. and the Ist Armoured Division to 
move after dark and join the 2nd New Zealand Division, and rein- 
forcing the 30th Corps with the 7th Armoured Division, he ordered 
it, after withdrawing the 50th Division, to open a new attack against 
the enemy’s centre’’. 

Meanwhile, the 2nd New Zealand Division had successfully 
traversed the Foum Tatahouine Pass but was held up at the Plum 





! The Tiger Kills, (M.O.1. publication), pp. 159-160. 
* The Second World War, 1939-1945, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, pp. 246, 247. 


128 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Pass until the way was opened on the 26th by an overwhelming air 
and artillery barrage. Onthe 27th the New Zealanders met increasing 
opposition, and when they had nearly reached El Hamma, a few 
miles west of Gabes on the coast, they were stopped by anti-tank 
gun fire. However, they were now far out on the Gabes plain and 
well in rear of the Mareth Line. This left hook was a fine achieve- 
ment, but it succeeded mainly because of the energetic action of the 
4th Indian Division, under Major-General F. I. S. Tuker, in finding 
an intermediate and shorter way to the Gabes plain through the 
Matmata Hills along almost unknown tracks. 

The 4th Division had started out on March 24th. The mountain 
tracks which it followed meandered between rocky heights and across 
deep ravines. Everywhere they were sown with mines. Cliffsides 
had been blown down to block the tracks, and the Sappers and 
infantry had to clear the debris, day and night and often under 
heavy fire, so that the advance could proceed. The pace increased 
gradually and the retreating enemy was overhauled until a Sapper 
officer with our forward patrols was able to observe some Italian 
engineer troops actually mining a track after their rearguard had 
passed through and thus could send his men to lift the mines with- 
out further search. On the 27th, the Division was almost through 
the mountainous country. The Sappers continued to clear the tracks 
and bridge the worst gaps, and on the afternoon of March 28th the 
5th Brigade burst out into the Gabes plain and joined the New 
Zealanders. By that time, Rommel’s armour had been defeated and 
our tanks were in Gabes. The Mareth Line was open. This was 
Rommel’s last battle in North Africa. He was a sick man, a mere 
shadow of his former self, and handing over command of the Axis 
forces to the Italian General Messe, he flew to Berlin. Some say 
that he left before the battle, though the energetic handling of the 
German armour would seem to indicate his presence. 

Mareth was certainly a transcendent victory, but that it was nearly 
a disastrous defeat is shown by the story of the struggle to cross the 
Wadi Zigzaou at the opening of the battle. The Wadi resembled the 
fosse of an old-fashioned fortress of feudal times and our troops 
advanced to the assault carrying fascines and scaling ladders as 
some of their forbears had done at the storming of Badajoz in the 
Peninsula War. On the night of March 20th/21st a brigade of the 
50th Division forced its way across the wadi in the face of direct 
and enfilade fire and established a precarious bridgehead. The Sth 
Brigade of the 4th Indian Division then moved up to pass through, 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 129 


but it was decided not to send it across until the bridgehead was 
more secure. Some Valentine tanks had cut up the bottom and banks 
so badly that no more vehicles could pass until the crossing sites had 
been repaired. In the pitch darkness before the moon rose some 
R.E. units of the 50th Division tried to make a causeway for vehicles 
but suffered such heavy casualties that they had to be withdraw. 
Prominent at every danger point was Brigadier F. H. Kisch, the 
Chief Engineer, who was always to be found directing the engineering 
operations in person on such occasions. 

During the afternoon of March 22nd, the 15th Panzer Division 
counter-attacked in heavy rain and almost obliterated the bridgehead. 
This set-back resulted in a decision not to commit the 4th Indian 
Division to a direct attack across the wadi but to leave the task to 
the 50th Division after proper crossing places had been made. These, 
however, were to be prepared by the 4th Divisional Engineers, a 
decision which led to some heroic efforts by 4 and 12 Field Companies. 
A reconnaissance had been made by Lieut.-Colonel Blundell and 
some of his officers, and as a result, 11 Field Park Company had 
been ordered to prepare 150 fascines, each about 10 feet long and 
2 feet in diameter. These were to be placed in position in the wadi 
and covered with steel mesh to form a causeway for vehicles. Cuttings 
were to be dug in the steep banks, and ramps built as required. 4 and 
12 Field Companies would have to complete the crossing begun by 
the 50th Divisional Engineers and prepare a second crossing about 
150 yards away. 

11 Field Park Company had been very hard at work during March 
21st and 22nd. Two bulldozers were parked in 12 Field Company’s 
lines to help with the earthwork if the enemy’s fire could not be 
subdued sufficiently, and every available man was busy collecting 
brushwood or making fascines. On the 22nd, Blundell ordered 11 
Field Park Company to load up all available fascines, reserve tools 
and explosives and during the afternoon 100 fascines were despatched 
in lorries to a forward dump whence they were guided by men of 
12 Field Company to the bank of the wadi. This was done between 
dusk and moonrise. Considerable shelling was in progress and one 
lorry was hit and the driver killed. It had been decided that the 
causeways must be built before the infantry could renew the assault 
and that therefore the Indian Engineer units must lead the way. 

In the early hours of March 23rd, 1943, under the light of a full 
moon, 4 and 12 Field Companies approached the wadi and dropped 
down into it through gaps in the precipitous eastern bank. Above 


130 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


their heads sped thousands of tracer bullets and hundreds of mortar 
shells from which happily they were screened, but they could not 
avoid a certain amount of enfilade fire from concrete pill-boxes on 
the far bank. British and German guns were both laying down heavy 
barrages. Between these two walls of shell, the Sappers worked 
like beavers in the muddy depths. Blundell was there, of course, 
exhorting his men and pointing out how safe they were when one of 
his height could walk upright without risk. But he did not display 
a bullet hole already showing in the peak of his cap. The eastern 
approaches to the wadi soon became blocked with vehicles bringing 
up infantry for the assault and the lorries carrying the steel mesh 
for the causeways could not get through. Consequently, the assault 
had to go in over surfaces unsuitable for tanks and armoured cars. 
Having done all they could, 4 and 12 Field Companies were with- 
drawn, carrying their tools and marching slowly and in good order 
through the barrage and past the waiting infantry who were much 
impressed by their cool and confident bearing. The infantry rushed 
down into and across the wadi. Dust and flames spouted from it 
far up into the sky. The gallant Tynesiders established themselves 
on the further bank, and vehicles began to stream across over the 
rapidly deteriorating surface. However, it soon became evident 
that further Sapper assistance would be needed if progress was to be 
maintained so 4 and 12 Companies returned into the holocaust and 
set to work to repair the causeways with fascines and stones as the 
steel mesh had not yet arrived. For another hour and a half they 
sweated and floundered in the mud until at last they were satisfied 
that the causeways would bear wheeled traffic, and dawn was breaking 
when for the second time they withdrew from the wadi. Yet all 
their labour was wasted. A heavy storm broke over the areas, and 
under cover of the downpour the Panzers bore down again on the 
infantry and tanks on the far bank. This was the end of a bitter 
struggle. With the exception of a small foothold maintained for a 
time and subsequently relinquished, the infantry and tanks had to 
withdraw and both sides settled down to a fire-fight across the swirling 
flood. We were back where we had started. The Sapper units 
rejoined the remainder of the 4th Indian Division and moved with it 
into the Matmata hills, making for the Gabes plain. 

A curious incident at the Wadi Zigzaou must not go unrecorded. 
While 4 Field Company, under Major W. J. A. Murray, was laying 
fascines in the bottom, a British officer of another unit asked for 
help to extricate a wounded Indian soldier who was buried beneath 





Using a pneumatic drill while roadmaking in Tunisia 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 131 


a blown-up truck. A Sapper dressed in an overcoat, and with his 
face covered with mud, immediately volunteered to rescue the man 
and did so at considerable risk. A few days later, Murray received 
a message from Divisional H.Q. stating that Army H.Q. wanted to 
know the name of this Sapper. He made enquiries but could not 
trace any such man in his unit and replied accordingly. However, 
the British officer who had asked for help insisted that there was 
such a man and an indentification parade was arranged so that the 
wounded man could pick out his rescuer. Still there was no result; 
but as the wounded man was leaving the parade ground he happened 
to pass an officer whom he saluted smartly. Then an expression of 
the utmost amazement came over his face. “‘Wuh Admi !"’, he shouted, 
and pointed to Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Blundell. The ‘Sapper’ who had 
saved him was the C.R.E. 4th Indian Division.! 

During the advance through the Hallouf Pass in the Matmata 
Hills, the Division was held up by a huge demolition in a narrow 
gorge. “‘It was here’’, writes Pearson,? “that 4 Field Company further 
distinguished themselves. Their work with two compressors and a 
bulldozer was recorded in a B.B.C. despatch from Cairo. The machines 
were gingerly taken down the narrow trail, watched anxiously by 
officers on the heights above, and as the bulldozers filled the hole 
and the compressor drills cut away the overhang, swarms of men, 
directed by the Sappers, brought up stone from the bottom of the 
ravine to build the retaining wall, and slowly a new road grew, both 
there and further down the gorge. After eight hours, the first twelve 
thousand men and two thousand vehicles edged their way along the 
path and thus the 4th Division came down from the mountains to 
link up with the other division”. On one day the Sapper companies 
worked continuously for no less than eighteen hours in getting the 
other troops and their transport along the mountain tracks. The 
E. and M. Section of 11 Field Park Company distinguished itself 
while operating with the 7th Brigade in the advance. On March 
25th, when a large minefield was encountered covering the whole 
of a valley, a young Sapper drove a pilot vehicle through it in order 
to help 12 Field Company to clear it. The mines were deeply buried 
and therefore difficult to locate, and the Sapper had never before 


a 


1 Notes by Lieut.-Colonel N. B. Grant, R.E., (undated). 


2 Brief History of the K.G.V'sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.LE.. August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 38. 


132 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


driven a pilot vehicle into a minefield, yet he carried on with the 
utmost coolness and bravery until the concrete rollers of his vehicle 
were blown to pieces. 

Having been driven from the Mareth Line, the enemy had to 
build a new defensive bastion against the advance of the Eighth 
Army. The battle in Tunisia was not going too badly for the Germans 
and Italians. The British First Army was held up in the Medjerda 
Valley west of Tunis, and the Americans had been defeated at 
Kasserine, west of Sbeitla in the central region. In the south, and only 
80 miles north-west of Gabes, the American 2nd Corps was trying 
with little success to force a passage past Gafsa towards the Eighth 
Army. Unfortunately for us, a replica of the Mareth position, so 
far as the physical features were concerned, existed about 20 miles 
north of Gabes. Here the coastal plain narrowed again to a few 
miles and was crossed by the Wadi Akarit, a deep and wide chasm 
running inland for a distance of ten miles. This natural obstacle had 
been prolonged for another two miles by an anti-tank ditch, the 
approaches to which were flanked by some low hills, and in rear 
towered a lofty range with two groups of peaks, Roumana to the 
north and Fatnassa to the south. The ditch linked up with the northern 
escarpment of Fatnassa. The enemy therefore had two lofty features 
for observation and fire control, and the approaches to his defences 
could be raked by oblique fire. In such a case Montgomery could 
not adopt his favourite ‘left hook’ tactics. He had to burst through 
in strength on the coastal plain itself, but to accomplish this he must 
first secure the heights beyond. He met General Eisenhower and 
explained his plans. The scheme was to storm the Fatnassa peaks, 
which lay directly north of the main road, and afterwards to over-run 
the ‘hog’s-back’ which connected them with the Roumana group. 
Fatnassa was a tangle of ridges, escarpments and deep ravines. Every 
approach was under direct observation and fire and could be enfiladed 
by guns on the hog’s-back. Montgomery re-grouped his forces 
and was ready by April Sth. The 50th, Sist and 4th Divisions 
were to breach the defences, after which the 10th Corps, supported 
by the 2nd New Zealand Division, would burst through and make 
for the enemy’s airfields beyond. The most difficult role was that of 
the 4th Division which was to secure command of Fatnassa. General 
Tuker considered that infiltration under cover of darkness offered 
the best chance of success and therefore proposed to attack silently, 
without artillery preparation, some hours before the assault by the 
50th and Sist Divisions. His 7th Brigade was to be directed Straight 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 133 


on Fatnassa, and if it succeeded, the 5th Brigade would then press 
swiftly through and turn the strongly held anti-tank ditch positions 
which defended the hog’s-back. 

Accordingly, after dark on April 5th, 1943, the Battle of the Wadi 
Akarit began with the 4th Indian Division moving silently across 
the rolling country below the main peaks. In the ensuing fight the 
Gurkhas, Royal Sussex and !6th Punjabis of the 7th Brigade performed 
prodigies of valour in bloody hand-to-hand combat. They won 
Fatnassa at heavy cost and the Sth Brigade turned the anti-tank 
ditch. At 8.45 a.m., General Tuker was able to report that he had 
captured 6,000 yards of the enemy’s position. “The gate is open’”’ 
said he. “Turn your armour loose’. On the coastal plain, the 51st 
Highland Division had already crashed through and taken 5,000 
prisoners, but unfortunately there was some delay in launching the 
armour through the gap, so the enemy took new heart and bitter 
fighting ensued in the hills. 

On April 6th, while the enemy guns were bombarding the northern 
slopes of an escarpment called Ras-el-Zouai, already captured by 
the Gurkhas, and also some tracks through the hills behind a length 
of abandoned anti-tank ditch, the 4th Divisional Engineers were 
sent forward to finish a half-completed crossing of the ditch and to 
construct another. This dangerous operation was marked by a most 
tragic event. According to the War Diaries, 4, 11, and 12 Companies 
were working on the crossings, when, shortly after 4.0 p.m., Lieut.- 
Colonel J. H. Blundell, the C.R.E., came to the ditch and stood on 
the bank talking to Major W. J. A. Murray, O.C. 4 Field Company 
and Lieut. J. R. S. Baldwin of the same unit who were watching the 
Sappers at work. The crossings were in a bowl in the hills, and our 
tanks had just started to move through when the enemy began to 
shell the area. Two shells in quick succession struck the Sapper 
group. Murray, Baldwin, an American officer and several men were 
killed outright and many others wounded, among whom was 
Blundell himself. He lived only a short time and characteristically 
his last words were a message for his successor. Blundell was uni- 
versally acknowledged as a first rate officer in every way and had 
already won a D.S.O. for his exploits at the Wadi Zigzaou. ‘His 
death is the greatest individual loss this Corps has so far suffered” 
wrote the Commandant of the Bengal Group. Another deplorable 
casualty at the Wadi Akarit was Brigadier F. H. Kisch, the brilliant 
Chief Engineer of the 30th Corps, who was killed by a mine while 
examining the enemy’s defences after the battle. Major J. A. Cameron, 


134 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


R.E., O.C. 12 Field Company, took over as C.R.E. 4th Division 
and Major E. B. Wheaton, R.E., relieved him as Company Comman- 
der. The command of 4 Field Company fell to Major R. H. Eagan, 
R.E., from 21 Field Company. 

In the opinion of General Alexander, the battle at the Wadi 
Akarit was heavier and more savage than any since El Alamein. 
Attack and counter-attack clashed unceasingly in the hills, and the 
Germans, and many Italians too, showed ruthless determination and 
unimpaired morale. Alexander gives the major credit for the victory to 
the 4th Indian Division. Only through a number of vigorous counter- 
attacks launched by the 15th Panzer and 90th Light Divisions was 
General Messe able to extricate his army after dark in some sort 
of order. His casualties were very heavy, particularly in prisoners. 
No less than 7,000 of the more peace-minded Italians laid down their 
arms. Major-General de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, 
relates an amusing incident in connection with one of these mass 
surrenders. ‘‘During the fighting’, he writes}, “we received a report 
that the enemy were forming up in considerable strength for a counter- 
attack, so we at once started laying on an air attack. But just as 
the aircraft were about to take off, we were asked to cancel the bom- 
bers. It transpired that this alleged ‘counter-attack’ was in reality a 
formation of Italians preparing themselves for surrender. They had 
been paraded and had marched over to us, each carrying a little 
suitcase packed as if for a week-end visit. “Sir. I beg to report my 
unit all present and correct for surrender’’. It was indeed surrender 
par excellence \” 

During the afternoon of April 7th, 1943, an American patrol met 
a Gurkha patrol of the 4th Indian Division on the road between 
Akarit and Gafsa, and thus at last the two armies from east and 
west made contact. The men shook hands, grinned at each other, 
and exchanged cigarettes. Though they had made history, they took 
it as a matter of course. The Eighth Army was now part of a con- 
tinuous Allied front. Long convoys felt their way to the north along 
the coastal road while the advanced troops fought several minor 
actions against the enemy’s rearguards. Sfax was occupied on April 
10th and Sousse on the 12th, and by the evening of April 13th the 
leading troops were up against the powerful anti-tank defences of 
the Enfidaville position. But by now the wear and tear of a long 


i ee 


! Operation Victory, by Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, x.B.E., C.B., 
D.S.0., p. 267. 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFTICA 135 


campaign had sadly reduced the strength of the Eighth Army. In- 
stead of the eight infantry divisions arrayed at El Alamein there 
remained only a single British division, a British brigade, and the 
4th Indian Division consisting of two brigades. Elements of three 
armoured divisions, with their lorry-borne infantry, were also to 
hand, but it was recognized that in the mountains of Tunisia the 
role of armour would be very restricted. On April 19th, in order to 
pin the enemy down in the south and thus ease the difficulties of 
the Britsh First Army and the Americans in the north and centre, 
Montgoimery was ordered to attack Enfidaville which he did on the 
following day, carrying the defences and advancing a few miles 
beyond them. Enfidaville proved to be a pleasant little place at 
the entrance to a narrow strip of coastal plain. Behind it, among 
olive groves and fields strewn with buttercups and poppies, the 4th 
Division enjoyed a brief rest and prepared for its next task. 

The Axis forces, now under the German General von Arnim, 
were in a bad way though they had been strongly reinforced by air 
from Sicily. The British, Indian and American forces in the field 
were commanded by General Alexander, who had become General 
Eisenhower's deputy. On April 26th, the British First Army captured 
‘Longstop’ Hill overlooking the Medjerda Valley west of Tunis, and 
on May 3rd the American 1st Armoured Division took Mateur 
only 20 miles from Bizerta. Meanwhile, as the Eighth Army had 
been unable to make further progress in the Enfidaville sector, 
Montgomery had suggested to Alexander that a part of his command 
might be more usefully employed elsewhere. Alexander agreed, and 
the result was a very long march for the 4th Indian Division. For 
the final drive on Tunis, Alexander assembled on his left the American 
2nd Corps and on his right most of the Eighth Army. In the centre, 
for the main thrust, he organized a new 9th Corps composed of the 
4th British Infantry and 6th Armoured Divisions of the First Army 
and the 4th Indian Division, 201st Guards Brigade and 7th Armoured 
Division of the Eighth Army, the whole being under the command 
of Lieut.-General B. G. Horrocks. This assault force was supported 
by overwhelming air strength. 

The plan for the final attack was simple and straightforward. 
After pressure had been applied along the whole front, the two 
infantry divisions of the 9th Corps were to break through in the 
Medjerda Valley, and when the enemy’s anti-tank defences had been 
over-run, the two armoured divisions were to head straight for 
Tunis from Medjez el Bab. The battle opened during the early hours 


136 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


of May 6th with intense bombing by the Allied air forces and a con- 
centrated bombardment by more than 1,000 guns. At 3.30 a.m. 
parties of Sappers went forward to lift mines and cut gaps in the 
wire. Masses of infantry followed and by 11.0 a.m. had penetrated 
the main defensive belt. Then came the tanks. By nightfall they 
were far ahead, and on the afternoon of May 7th they were in the 
streets of Tunis. On the same day, Bizerta fell to the Americans. 
Yet even now von Arnim continued the hopeless contest. He with- 
drew into the Cape Bon Peninsula, the base of which was guarded 
by a range of hills with only two entrances; but during the night 
of May 8th/9th the 6th Armoured Division broke through the 
northern entrance and roared towards Cape Bon past German 
airfields, workshops, dumps and gun positions. “In a contagion of 
doubt and fear’’, writes Alan Moorehead,! ‘tthe German army turned 
tail and made up the Cape Bon roads looking for boats; and when 
on the beaches it became apparent to them at last that there were 
no boats, nor aircraft either, the army became a rabble’. Fighting 
ceased on May I 1th, 1943. The last shot had been fired in Africa. 
The Indian Engineers were in at the death although they were 
unable to take an active part in the final stages of the hunt. On April 
19th, 4 and 12 Field Companies and 11 Field Park Company were 
happy to welcome 21 Field Company of the Bombay Group. This 
unit arrived shortly before the Eighth Army became engaged in a battle 
on Mount Garci near Enfidaville which is said to have equalled 
Keren in violence but provided no immediate tasks for engineer 
troops. “In April we moved some 200 miles nearer to Tunis’, writes 
Cameron as C.R.E., “‘and though there was no lack of work for the 
companies, we were not heavily committed in any operation and 
suffered few casualties. May has opened with the 4th Divisional 
Engineers making a forced march by night from the Eighth Army at 
Enfidaville to the First Army at Teboursouk. Both the 4th Indian 
and 7th Armoured Divisions have been switched over at a few hours’ 
notice to take part in what we hope will be the final breakthrough to 
Tunis. Our vehicles are old and decrepit and many have no lights. 
There is no moon, so we are floundering along unknown roads in 
closest column, and every time a vehicle stops, those following bump 
noisily into each other like the trucks of a goods train. The nightmare 
journey comes to an end at last and H.Q. R.E. sort themselves out 
in a cornfield at Teboursouk”. On May Sth he continues ‘‘The 





' The End in Africa, by Alan Moorehead, p. 201. 


THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 137 


battle has begun. The 4th Indian and 4th British Divisions are to 
advance side by side and capture certain hill features near a 
farm, and the 6th and 7th Armoured Divisions are then to go through 
and take Tunis. Sappers are to be prepared to deal with pill-boxes 
and mines and have ‘Scorpions’ and pilot vehicles under command. 
Tracks are to be made as we advance. At first there is heavy shelling 
and opposition, but suddenly the enemy seems to melt away and 
further objectives are taken without difficulty. Little or no Sapper 
work is needed’’. On May 7th, the 4th Indian Division advanced 
a short distance, and on the following day 11 Field Park Company 
moved up behind it. On the 12th, when Cameron visited !2 Field 
Company, which was operating with the 7th Brigade, he was an 
eye-witness of the historic surrender of General von Arnim to Major- 
General Tuker. Major Wheaton, the Company Commander, after- 
wards claimed that, but for a stroke of bad luck, 12 Field Company 
would itself have had the honour of capturing the German Army 
Commander.! 

The main German capitulation began during the night of May 
11th/12th when Colonel Nolte of the Panzer Grenadier Regiment 
came into the lines of the Royal Sussex Regiment seeking terms of 
surrender for his unit. He was given his instructions and 3,000 German 
Grenadiers capitulated soon after dawn on the 12th. The Royal 
Sussex moved on, and later in the morning a German Staff Officer 
arrived in a car with a personal letter from von Arnim which was 
passed on at once to Divisional H.Q. The 2nd Gurkhas, under 
Lieut.-Colonel L. J. Showers, who had been mopping up from another 
direction, came suddenly upon nearly 1,000 Germans forming up 
on parade while a Staff Officer waved a white flag. These men, 
veterans of the Afrika Korps, were smartly dressed, clean shaven 
and with boots nicely polished. They did not appear in the least 
down-hearted for they seemed to consider that they had done quite 
enough for their Fuhrer and that others could now bear their 
share of the burden. A senior German approached Showers and 
informed him that Colonel Nolte had already left to sue for terms 
of surrender, so Showers and some German envoys proceeded in a 
German staff car to 7th Brigade H.Q., meeting on the way a British 
officer who was returning to place a guard over von Arnim’s Head- 
quarters. Soon afterwards, Lieut.-General Sir C. Alfrey, the 5th 


1 A Short History of the Queen Victoria’s Own Madras Sappers and Miners during 
World War H, 1939-1945, by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., p. 12. 


138 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Corps Commander, and Major-General F. I. S. Tuker, the 4th Indian 
Division Commander, arranged the terms of capitulation. Von 
Arnim emerged before sunset from his caravan to surrender to 
Tuker. His staff had already lined up and gave a punctilious display 
of Prussian military etiquette. The German Commander-in-Chief 
then entered an open car and was driven away, standing in true 
Hitler fashion and acknowledging the salutes of his men. 

Some years after the great events described in this chapter, Field 
Marshal Viscount Alexander of Tunis wrote as follows:— ‘‘The 
campaign which culminated in the Battle of Tunis was the first 
wholly successful one against the Axis. The final victory in Africa 
was a complete example of the battle of annihilation. Never before 
had a great army been so totally destroyed. A quarter of a million 
men laid down their arms in unconditional surrender; 663 men 
escaped. Immense stock of arms, ammunition and supplies of all 
natures were the booty of the victors. Our own casualties in the 
final battle were less than 2,000 men. At 2.15 p.m. on May 13th, 
1943, I sent the following signal to the Prime Minister:— “‘Sir. It 
is my duty to report that the Tunisian Campaign is over. All enemy 
resistance has ceased. We are masters of the North African shores’”’. 
In all, the Axis casualties in Africa had amounted to nearly a million 
men. And what had our enemies to show for this stupendous wastage? 
Nothing whatever, except perhaps a brief respite for Hitler. 

The Tunisian Campaign having ended, the 4th Indian Division 
was withdrawn by easy stages to Egypt, and with it went the Divi- 
sional Engineers. They left the Tunis area about May 18th, and on 
June Ist most of the Sappers were getting very sunburnt on the 
pleasant beaches at Misurata, 140 miles east of Tripoli. They had 
well earned this brief and delightful interlude. On June 13th, how- 
ever, Major H. W. Kitson, R.E., who was commanding 4 Field 
Company, heard that his unit was to take part, with the others, in 
a big parade at Tripoli, and accordingly 4, 11, 12 and 21 Companies 
all vacated their palm-grove camps at Castel Benito and set off west- 
wards along the well-known coast road. The parade, held on Saturday 
June 19th, was the occasion of a review of the 4th Indian Division 
by H. M. King George VI. The Royal car passed slowly along the 
ranks of 11 and 12 Companies and stopped opposite Lieut.-Colonel 
J. A. Cameron. The King shook hands with him and Cameron 
asked permission to present Subedar Narinder Singh. “Can he speak 
English?”’ asked the King, and being assured that this was so, enquired 
how many year’s service he had. ‘‘Seventeen years, Sir’, replied the 















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THE WESTERN DESERT AND NORTH-WEST AFRICA 139 


Subedar. “A good lot” said the King. Cameron then called for 
three cheers for His Majesty, which the King acknowledged standing 
up at the salute in his car. He was wearing a bush shirt without 
medal ribbons, a matter of some disappointment to a few of the 
men who had expected to see him in ermine robes and wearing a 
crown! As the cheers died away, the Royal car moved on, the King 
still standing and looking at the Sappers as he passed. It was an 
occasion the men never forgot. 

On June 20th, the Sapper companies returned to Misurata and a 
few days later started on a journey of 1,500 miles to the Nile Delta. 
They reached Benghazi at the end of the month. On July 4th they 
were at Tobruk and four days later came to rest outside Alexandria. 
Their work in Africa was done. Many of their comrades lay buried 
on the battlefields between El Alamein and Tunis, and among those 
who returned, many wore proudly the ribbons for gallant conduct in 
the field; but all, living and dead alike, had maintained the high 
reputation of their Corps in a life and death struggle under terrible 
conditions against the pick of the German and Italian armies and 
had helped to secure an overwhelming victory for the Allies which 
changed the whole aspect of the Second World War. 


CHAPTER VI 


ITALY, 1943 — 45 


N the middle of April 1943, some weeks before the German 
Tee in Tunisia, the Allies were discussing plans for the 

invasion of the ‘soft under-belly’ of the Axis powers in Europe. 
Time was all-important, and Marshal Stalin was calling insistently 
and peremptorily for the opening of a second front. Three plans 
were considered—the invasion of Southern France, the invasion of 
Greece as a prelude to entry into the Balkans, and the invasion of 
Sicily and Italy. The French route was abandoned because of lack 
of shipping and air cover, and the Greek route because of uncertainty 
regarding the success of the Russian drive through Rumania and 
Marshal Tito’s partisan movement in Jugoslavia. There remained 
the Italian route, much favoured by Mr. Winston Churchill and his 
advisers. Success here would make the Mediterranean safe for our 
convoys and bring Southern Germany within easy bombing range. 
So the invasion of Italy was approved. But unfortunately there 
was considerable delay in launching the operation. Landing craft 
were scarce, and the repercussions which might follow a repulse 
were unthinkable. The Allies therefore played for safety and bombed 
the small island of Pantellaria, south of Sicily, until it surrendered 
tamely to a sea-borne force on June 11th. 

The invasion of Sicily, a necessary prelude to that of Italy, was 
to be carried out by the American Seventh Army (24 divisions) under 
General Patton and the British Eighth Army (44 divisions) under 
General Montgomery, the whole being under General Alexander. 
After a change in the original plans, it was decided that both armies 
should land near the south-east point of the island, Patton advancing 
north-westwards to Palermo and then swinging eastwards along the 
northern coast to Messina while Montgomery pushed up the east 
coast through Syracuse and Catania to the same destination. Sicily 
was garrisoned by five Italian infantry divisions and a similar number 
of inferior Italian coastal divisions, so that the only really stubborn 
resistance was likely to be from the German 15th Panzer and Hermann 
Goering Divisions which lay in reserve in the western part of the 
island. But once again it was considered advisable to spend some 


140 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 14) 


weeks in heavy bombing as a preliminary to assault, and conse- 
quently it was not until July 9th that a powerful air-borne force was 
able to land, followed on the 10th by the main sea-borne invasion. 
The Eighth Army met little serious opposition until it neared Catania, 
and the Americans occupied Palermo on July 22nd. Montgomery 
was held up at Catania for about three weeks; but after the 78th 
Division had come across from Tunisia to help him, he was able to 
fight his way slowly northwards. The race to Messina was won by 
Patton who entered the place on August 16th, 1943, after the Germans 
had made good their escape across the straits. Thus Sicily was con- 
quered in about five weeks. It was a most propitious start. 

Italy presented a very different proposition. Mussolini had re- 
signed, and Marshal Badoglio was trying to gain time by negotiations. 
The Germans used this respite to pour thirteen divisions into the 
country. Not until September 3rd did Badoglio agree to surrender 
unconditionally, and by that time Field-Marshal Rommel held 
Northern Italy in a powerful grip and Field-Marshal Kesselring 
controlled Rome, Naples and all the territory to the south. Italy 
had become, in fact, a German province. The Allies had hoped 
that as soon as an armistice was announced, the Italian Army would 
change sides and help them in ejecting the Germans. Few Allied 
commanders envisaged a campaign throughout the winter of 1943-44, 
and none imagined that the fighting could possibly last until 1945. 
It was expected that Kesselring would withdraw at once to the Po 
Valley in the far north. Instead, within a month:of Montgomery’s 
crossing the Messina straits at Reggio on September 3rd, it became 
clear that the German commander had no such intention. Thus, 
as Alan Moorehead puts it,! the whole character of the Mediterranean 
war and the Italian campaign was changed, and all possibility of a 
quick run through Italy and the release of the Balkans vanished. 
The Allied forces were committed to a war of rivers and mountains 
in bitter icy rain, a winter campaign along some of the highest ranges 
in Europe. 

The primary object of the invasion was the destruction of the 
German armies; but another, almost as important, was the establish- 
ment of strategic air bases in the Foggia district, on the Adriatic 
coast level with Naples, from which those parts of German Europe 
which were inaccessible from England might be heavily bombed. 
The Eighth Army, under General Montgomery, was to advance up 





| Eclipse, by Alan Moorehead, p. 51. 


142 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the east coast, and the Fifth Army, under the American General 
Mark Clark, composed of the American 6th Corps and the British 
10th Corps, was to land shortly afterwards on some beaches near 
Salerno on the west coast in order to capture Naples, which lay a 
few miles to the north.) An advanced sea-base would thus be secured. 
After the Italian surrender, it was decided also that a British 
Air-borne Division, followed by the 78th Division, should occupy 
Taranto in the heel of Italy and the other southern ports of Brindisi 
and Bari on the Adriatic coast. 

If ever there was an Engineer war, this was it. “The advance up 
Italy was a veritable Calvary’ writes Major-General de Guingand, 
Montgomery’s Chief of Staff.2 ‘Our speed was determined by the 
capacity of the Sappers to repair bridges and other demolitions. 
The country was ideal for delay and the Germans had evidently 
worked out a most efficient plan”. Let us consider for a moment 
the configuration of the peninsula. If it had been flat, Alexander's 
task would have been fairly simple, for both his flanks rested on 
the sea and he had command of the sea and air. But unfortunately 
the country had a central and increasingly lofty spine composed of 
the Apennine range with peaks rising to 7,000 feet or more. An 
invading army advancing up the 600 miles’ length of Italy had to 
negotiate an endless succession of rivers, ravines and spurs at right 
angles to the central spine, each offering a natural line of defence 
which could only be stormed frontally. “It made no difference if 
you captured some river valley” writes Moorehead. ‘Another lay 
just beyond, and beyond that, more mountains, more valleys, more 
impossibly entrenched positions. Huge convoys were bogged along 
the roads, and sometimes were halted altogether for hours or even 
days. A piercing wind kept sweeping down from the Apennines, 
and the Adriatic turned from cobalt blue to a sullen grey. Success 
seemed to be forever just round the corner; but each time the com- 
manders reached forward to grasp it, something went wrong’. There 
were few good tarmac roads in Italy in 1943: on the east coast, 
only one. On the west, from Naples onwards, two main roads led 
to Rome, and thence several others ran northwards to Florence, 
but they were often steep and winding and had long stretches still 
untarred. The Italians were among the best road-builders in the 


1 See the map of Central and Southern Italy included in this chapter. 


® Operation Victory, by Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, K.B.E.,C.B.,D.S.0., 
p. 318. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 143 


world, but money was scarce. The railway system was fairly elaborate 
though easily rendered unserviceable. Some of the rivers presented 
formidable obstacles. To the west of the Apennine backbone were 
the Volturno (350 feet), Garigliano (350 feet), Tiber (600 feet) and 
Arno (450 feet), all perennial and with high banks: to the east, the 
Biferno, Trigno, Sangro and a host of smaller streams, each liable 
to become a raging torrent after a storm of rain.! Lack of shipping 
and landing craft prevented General Alexander from attempting any 
extensive by-passing of the land obstacles ahead of him. He had 
to burst through each in turn. 

On September 9th, 1943, six days after the bulk of the Eighth Army 
had crossed the narrow Straits of Messina unopposed, the Air-borne 
Division landed at Taranto and the Fifth Army began to disembark 
on the western beaches near Salerno. The Eighth Army advanced 
rapidly up Calabria, the southernmost province of Italy, in spite of 
many wrecked bridges and cratered roads, and by the middle of the 
month it was in contact with the right flank of the Fifth Army and 
co-operating with it in opening up the first important lateral com- 
munication through Potenza, a road and railway junction 60 miles 
east of Salerno. The Fifth Army met stubborn opposition soon 
after landing at Salerno, but on September 22nd it broke out from 
its beach-head in the direction of Naples, which fell to the British 
10th Corps on October Ist. At once, the Germans began to draw 
in their horns. They had already evacuated Sardinia, and now they 
proceeded to abandon Corsica. Kesselring stood firm on the Volturno 
River, where the Fifth Army attacked him on October 12th and 
accomplished its first major river crossing. The fighting lasted four 
days and the Engineer units excelled themselves in bridging exploits. 
Kesselring then retreated to the Garigliano where he had decided 
to make a more determined stand. Meanwhile, on the Adriatic coast, 
the Eighth Army had occupied Bari and Foggia in spite of countless 
demolitions and steadily increasing resistance. Alexander had now 
got the airfields which he needed for strategic bombing, and also a 
major port on the west coast; but it was decided that, in order to 
safeguard these acquisitions and secure an adequate defence in depth, 
his armies should advance still further, say to a line running across 
the peninsula from Pescara to a point south of Rome, and if to that 





1 “An outline of Engineer Work in the Italian Campaign”, by Major-General N. A. 
Coxwell-Rogers, C.B.,C.B.E.,D.8.0., appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 1946, 
pp. 189-206. 


144 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


line, of course he must have Rome itself. Thus the lure of Baghdad, 
which led to the loss of the 6th Indian Division at Kut-el-Amara in 
1916,1 found its counterpart in Italy in 1943, though happily without 
such a disastrous result. Politically, the occupation of the Italian 
capital was certainly very important. 

For some time after the fall of Naples, the Fifth Army could make 
little use of its facilities as a port. The place had been cruelly bombed. 
Most of the inhabitants were starving. Ragged children swarmed 
everywhere, crying for food. Looting was rampant: murder, com- 
monplace. The black market, and vice of every sort, flourished 
exceedingly. All the public services had broken down. The sewers 
discharged into the streets. Typhus had begun to take its toll. The 
docks were a shambles. Wharves, sheds and cranes had been demo- 
lished by the Germans. Wrecks filled the harbour. The Fifth Army 
engineers had to produce order out of chaos, and they did it with 
remarkable speed in spite of time-bombs left behind by the enemy 
in such places as post-offices and telephone exchanges which exploded 
weeks later and killed hundreds of men, women and children. Gradu- 
ally, Naples became a port in more than the name and after a few 
months was able to handle most of the supplies and munitions for 
the armies further north. But meanwhile came the first warnings of 
a very severe winter. Soon, half the elaborate paraphernalia of modern 
war was to become almost useless. The burden then fell on the 
infantry, ‘“‘the man crawling in the mud”’ to quote a modern writer. 

Such was the position in Italy shortly after the first units of the 
Indian Engineers had set foot on its soil in September 1943. The 
units were 7, 66, and 69 Field Companies and 47 Field Park Company, 
all of the Bengal Corps, under Lieut.-Colonel C. M. Maclachlan, 
R.E., as C.R.E.,? and they arrived with the 8th Indian Division 
which, with the 78th British Division, was to form the 5th Corps of 
the Eighth Army. After the Tunisian campaign, the 4th and 8th 
Indian Divisions had been withdrawn at first to Alexandria and the 
10th Indian Division to Cyprus, and all three had been put 
through an elaborate course of training in amphibious and mountain 





1See In Kut and Captivity, by Major E. W. C. Sandes, m.c., R.E., (the present 
author). 


2 Lieut.-Colonel C. M. Maclachlan, R.E., was wounded on December 19th, 1943, 
and succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel P. L. Kirwan, R.E., who was killed on May 9th, 
1944. Lieut.-Colonel B. M. Archibald, R.E., then became C.R.E, 8th Ind. Div. Engi- 
neers until relieved on November 21st, 1944, by Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Calvert, R.E. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 145 


warfare in Syria, Cyprus or elsewhere though the Engineers had still 
to carry on their normal duties in addition. The three divisions had 
been ear-marked for Italy where proficiency in mountain warfare 
was a sine qua non, and for the Engineers, proficiency also in bridging. 
“Among the 8th Divisional Engineers’, writes Pearson,! ‘69 Field 
Company completed extensive camp structures at Burg-el-Arab. 
Later, while 66 Field Company and 7 Field Company did bridging 
training in various parts of Syria at Meskene, Hama and Litany 
camps, 69 Field Company began assault landing training at Burg-el- 
Arab. During the months that followed, the units were much on 
the move—to Kabrit for ‘wet-shod’ training, to Djedeide where 47 
Field Park Company spent some time, to Damascus, Haifa and 
Suez, wherever there was bridging training or combined operations 
to be had. In September, however, all moves coincided, and the 8th 
Divisional Engineers went to Alexandria and sailed for Italy’. 

As the 4th and 10th Indian Divisions followed the 8th Indian 
Division later to Italy, it may be convenient at this point to enu- 
merate the Indian Engineer field units which served with all these 
divisions or with other formations in that country. The list is as 
follows :— 8th Indian Division, 7, 66, and 69 Field Companies (Bengal) 
and 47 Field Park Company (Bengal): 4th Indian Division, 4 Field 
Company (Bengal), 12 Field Company (Madras), 21 Field Company 
(Bombay) and 11 Field Park Company (Madras): 10th Indian Division, 
10, 14 and 61 Field Companies (Madras) and 41 Field Park Company 
(Bengal). In 1944, however, 5 Field Company (Bengal) replaced 
14 Field Company. A body called ‘466 Corps Troops Engineers’ 
was formed in 1944 and included | Field Company (Bengal), 14 
Field Company (Madras) from the 10th Division, 97 Field Company 
(Bombay) and 301 Field Park Company (Bombay). 52 Army Troops 
Company (Madras) rendered good service on the lines of communi- 
cation from February 1944 to July 1945, and there were in addition 
some Artisan Works Companies, several technical units and two 
Indian Engineer Battalions. From the foregoing list it appears that 
16 Field units of the Indian Engineers fought in Italy, a very small 
number compared with the total of about 120 such units of British, 
Dominions, Armoured and Allied formations. Nevertheless, though 
outnumbered by more than seven to one, the Indians gave a very 
good account of themselves under conditions completely foreign to 
their previous experience. 


1 Brief History of the K.G.V'sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.LE., August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 59. 





146 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


On September 24th, 1943, the three Field Companies of the 8th 
Divisional Engineers disembarked at Taranto after an uneventful 
voyage from Alexandria and 47 Field Park Company landed a week 
later. ‘Sunny’ Italy belied its reputation by providing a light fall of 
snow. It was cold and rather dreary. 7 Field Company was com- 
manded by Major G. V. J. M. Smith, R.E., 66 Field Company by 
Major W. H. Cooper, R.E., 69 Field Company by Major R. G. G. 
Higham, R.E., and 47 Field Park Company by Major J. McLean, R.E. 
Within the next few days the units reached the battle ground near 
the German ‘Gustav’ Line, south of the Biferno River, having moved 
up the east coast by rail through Bari and past the captured Italian 
airfields around Foggia. The 13th Corps of the Eighth Army had 
recently crossed the Fortore River under fire, and now, on October 
11th, the Sth Corps (78th British and 8th Indian Divisions) was 
resuming operations in the coastal sector while the 13th Corps (Sth 
British and Ist Canadian Divisions) battered its way northwards 
through the foothills of the Apennines to Termoli. ‘‘The Engineers 
brought new tools for battle” writes Pearson.! ‘‘Bulldozers began to 
push their way northwards, impressing everyone with the amount 
and speed of their work. The Bailey Bridge, whose versatility equalled 
the simplicity of its construction, began to create temporary diver- 
sions and roadways as well as crossing the river gaps with astonishing 
ease. Rain turned streams into torrents overnight, sodden roads 
crumbled under unaccustomed traffic, retaining walls slid away from 
steep hillsides, and earth was churned into mud. Every bridge had 
been destroyed, and the approaches to fords and likely diversions 
had been heavily mined. The programme of the Engineers was 
therefore filled with road-mending, mine-clearance and continual 
bridging from the very start, and 7 Field Company opened it by 
bridging the Biferno, a minor stream covering the approaches to the 
more substantial Trigno”’. 

Late in October, heavy rain began to fall as the 5th Corps came 
up to the Trigno. A crossing was forced by the 78th British Division 
while the 8th Indian Division held the enemy in front, and early 
in November, the Eighth Army, with the 5th Corps on the right 
and the 13th Corps on the left, reached the River Sangro behind 
which the Germans had withdrawn. The Sangro presented a formid- 
able obstacle. High ridges overlooked both banks, and to the north 








* Brief History of the K.G.V’sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.I.E., August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., pp. 60, 61. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 147 


were greater heights which gave the enemy perfect observation over 
the whole valley. Near the coast the river bed was about 1,000 feet 
wide, narrowing to 400 feet some miles inland. There were a number 
of fordable channels, but after heavy rain these might combine 
suddenly to form a raging torrent. Here the enemy had established 
his ‘Winter Line’, making no attempt to defend the river itself but 
concentrating his attention on the ridge beyond it, and so the Battle 
of the Sangro was really a fight for this ridge. Four or five times 
Montgomery had to alter his plan of assault, for as soon as one 
scheme was drawn up the rain pelted down, transport was bogged, 
supplies were lost and the troops could not move from their start 
lines. At last, on November 28th, a fine day dawned, and from a 
bridgehead already established across the river, the assaulting forces 
carried the ridge and the heights beyond and the German Winter 
Line was broken. 

During these operations, the 8th Divisional Engineers were occupied 
mostly in road maintenance and mine clearance though they did a 
certain amount of bridging. The approaches to the Sangro were 
improved by laying Sommerfeld track, often under considerable shell- 
fire, and when the river had been crossed, the ground beyond it 
was found to be so thick with minefields that a small party of 47 
Field Park Company removed no less than 261 Tellermines in two 
days. The scene during the Sangro battle is described most graphically 
by General Coxwell-Rogers. ‘On November 20th,” he writes,! 
“heavy rain fell and the river rose quickly, putting all fords out of 
action. Only one folding boat ferry could be kept in operation. 
On the night of November 21st/22nd, work was started on low-level 
Bailey bridges and by next morning one crossing for vehicles had 
been completed and another to provide a tank crossing. On the 
following night, a third Bailey was built. Then came the first serious 
spate. Nothing could be seen of the bridges except the tops of the 
girders in the middle of a sea of water 1,000 feet wide. Next day, 
however, the water level dropped quickly and it was found that the 
only damage was to the approaches to the bridges. By November 
26th, three low-level bridge crossings were in action. The main 
attack was launched that night and a fierce battle ensued, but it was 
not until November 30th that the enemy was driven off the high 





' “An Outline of Engineer Work in the Italian Campaign”, by Major-General N. A. 


Coxwell-Rogers, C.B.,C.B.E.,D.S.0., appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 1946, 
pp. 189-206, 


148 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


ground. During this time, two of the bridges across the river were 
knocked out by direct hits and replaced. On December 4th a high- 
level bridge, 350 feet long, was opened to traffic, but two hours 
afterwards the river had risen 6 feet and was flowing at 10 knots. By 
midnight, one pier had collapsed and every other bridge had become 
impassable. The 8th Indian Division, the 78th Division and the Ist 
Canadian Division, who were relieving them, were thus cut off from 
road communication with the south bank. However, by the afternoon 
of the next day, December Sth, the river level had fallen sufficiently 
for the work of repairing the high-level bridge to be started, and at 
the same time, the construction of another 350 feet bridge (partly 
of folding boat equipment and partly of Bailey equipment) was 
begun. Both these bridges were in operation on December 7th and 
an anxious period came to an end’’. This record furnishes an example 
of the sort of crisis which so often faced the British, Indian and 
Dominions Engineers in Italy in 1943 and 1944. The field units, and 
the formations which followed them, worked together in perfect 
harmony and with only one end in view—to help the other arms in 
their long and painful pilgrimage to the north. 

Reviewing in more detail the work of the 8th Divisional Engineers 
during the Trigno and Sangro crossings it is recorded that on the 
Trigno 7 Field Company started by making a skidway down to the 
river and then a diversion round a demolished bridge. Afterwards it 
moved forward with the 17th Brigade and repaired other diversions. 
66 Field Company, with the 19th Brigade, built a trestle bridge over 
the river and cleared mines, while 69 Field Company made a road 
up to the river and built a 70 feet Bailey bridge across it and a larger 
one further in rear. On the Sangro, 7 Field Company prepared 
approach roads before the battle and then, with 47 Field Park 
Company, completed a 100 feet Bailey bridge across the river which 
was shelled heavily on November 21st. Afterwards, moving with the 
17th Brigade to the far side, it made a diversion round two craters 
which were holding up the tanks supporting the assaulting infantry 
and then cleared the road ahead of mines. Meanwhile, 66 Field 
Company had been lifting road-mines under fire. On November 
27th it worked for most of the night on a floating bridge until held 
up by heavy shelling, and it also carried out much Bailey bridging 
over gaps. 

A notable bridge should be mentioned here although the Indian 
Engineers did not build it. This was the ‘Montgomery’ Bridge, a 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 149 


1,200 feet Bailey across the Sangro erected at the site of a demolished 
structure. At that time it had the distinction of being the longest 
Bailey bridge in the world. Work began on December 7th, when the 
floods had subsided sufficiently, and continued day and night until 
December !7th when the bridge was opened to traffic. The project 
was remarkably well organized, for all the equipment, plant and 
stores had to be brought forward along a single narrow road crowded 
with the maintenance traffic of three divisions. 

There is a story about a party of Russian officers who appeared 
during the Sangro battle as an official mission sent to view the Italian 
front. They arrived full of bravado, boasting about the heroism 
of the Soviet armies and the desperate nature of the fighting during 
the advance from Stalingrad. So they had to be taught a lesson. 
They were taken up to a particularly ‘sticky’ sector to see how the 
fighting in Italy compared with that in Russia. This had the desired 
effect. On the second day of being under heavy fire, their leader 
remarked “Thank you. We have seen enough bravery for one day. 
Now we should like to have a little sleep!” From which one may 
gather that they were prepared to admit at last that their ‘capitalist’ 
allies could and did fight. 

Pushing steadily forward from the Sangro, the Eighth Army 
occupied Lanciano on December 3rd, 1943, and was soon faced with 
a crossing of the small river Moro which barred the way to the port 
of Ortona. It was not until December 10th that the Canadians were 
able to establish a bridgehead across the Moro, and thereafter the 
advance towards Ortona was fiercely contested, particularly by some 
German paratroops. The 8th Divisional Engineers were very busy 
during the approach to Lanciano, building or repairing bridges, 
making diversions and sweeping the roads clear of mines, but their 
most spectacular feat was the construction over the Moro of what 
came to be known as ‘“‘The Impossible Bridge”. This was accomplished 
by 69 Field Company on December 9th. The scheme was considered 
impossible because the Bailey equipment could not be launched 
from the near bank owing to a right-angle bend in the road, and 
therefore it had to be done from the enemy side where there was 
sufficient room. Although the work was most hazardous, some bull- 
dozers at once cleared a space for the bridging lorries. Detachments 
of 69 Field Company then crossed the river, cleared an area of mines, 
and cut steps in the far bank. Others waded across with stores, and 
by the afternoon a 100 feet Bailey spanned the Moro. On the 


150 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


following day, 7 Field Company added a third truss and made the 
bridge a ‘Class 30° structure capable of taking most medium tanks.! 
Afterwards, it was lengthened and improved by 66 Field Company. 
The ‘Impossible Bridge’ brought great credit to the 8th Divisional 
Engineers. 

69 Field Company was presented with the Army Commander's 
flag for its work on the Moro. Later, with the other companies, 
it co-operated with the infantry advance on Ortona by building 
bridges, clearing mines and supervising Italian labour gangs. Ortona 
fell at Christmas, and with that event the operations on the Eighth 
Army front came virtually to a standstill while preparations were 
made for the winter. Some Italian Engineer units were formed to 
provide additional labour for roadwork and skilled tradesmen to 
help in 47 Field Park Company’s workshops. 

After Mr. Winston Churchill had visited the battle front with 
Generals Eisenhower and Sir Alan Brooke (C.1.G.S.), some notable 
changes ensued in the high command in the Mediterranean. Eisen- 
hower was transferred to England to become Supreme Commander 
for the invasion of Northern France, and Montgomery followed him 
to command the 21st Army Group, the spearhead of the invasion. 
General Sir Maitland Wilson assumed the post vacated by Eisenhower, 
and General Sir Oliver Leese became Eighth Army Commander in 
Italy where both the Fifth and Eighth Armies remained under General 
Alexander. On December 3lst, 1943, Montgomery handed over 
charge to Leese. He had already said goodbye to his senior officers 
and had read aloud a Farewell Personal Message which was issued 
later to his troops. ‘‘It is difficult to express to you adequately what 
this parting means to me” ran the Message. ‘I am leaving officers 
and men who have been my comrades during months of hard and 
victorious fighting and whose courage and devotion to duty have 
always filled me with admiration. What can I say as I go away? 
When the heart is full it is not easy to speak. But this I would say 
to you. You have made this Army what it is. You have made it a 
household word all over the world. Therefore, you must uphold 
its good name and traditions. I would ask you to give to my successor 
the same loyal and devoted service that you have never failed to give 


‘In general terms it may be said that the Classification number given to a bridge 
represented the gross weight in tons of the vehicles which it could support when spaced 
at 50 yards intervals. Thus a Class 30 bridge could carry most medium tanks except 
Shermans; but heavy Churchill tanks needed a Class 40. A Class 9 bridge could 
take 3-ton lorties, and a Class 5 bridge, 30 cwt. lorries and cars of all sizes, 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 151 


to me. And so I say Goodbye to you all. May we meet again soon 
and serve together again as comrades in arms”. It was a stirring 
message and no doubt it helped the Eighth Army greatly in its hard 
passage to the north while engaged in operations so different from 
the open fighting of the Western Desert. Perhaps Montgomery was 
more fortunate than those he left behind. That was probably the 
opinion of most of his officers and men. 

Shortly before General Montgomery's departure, another con- 
tingent of Indian Engineers had arrived in Italy with the 4th Indian 
Division, a veteran formation of Eritrea and the Western Desert. 
The Engineer units, under Lieut.-Colonel E. E. Stenhouse, R.E., 
were 4 Field Company (Bengal) under Major C. C. Fraser, R.E., 
12 Field Company (Madras) under Major E. B. Wheaton, R.E., 
21 Field Company (Bombay) under Major R. H. Eagan, I.A.R.O., 
11 Field Park Company (Madras) under Major M. C. Butterfield, 
R.E., and 5 Bridging Section (Bengal). 4 and 2! Companies and the 
Bridging Section had embarked at Port Tewfik (Suez), and I1 and 
12 Companies at Alexandria, and on December 8th, 1943, they all 
landed at Taranto. Thence, they’ moved with the Division to the 
Potenza area and spent some weeks in bridging, constructing diver- 
sions and removing road-blocks. In January 1944, they proceeded 
northwards to take over a sector on the Adriatic coast beyond the 
Sangro River. Another Indian Engineer unit disembarked at Taranto 
in February. This was 52 Army Troops Company (Madras) under 
Major J. G. Brown, R.E., and it was sent to the Foggia district to 
build camps. Later in the month, most of the 4th Divisional Engineers 
were transferred, with the Division, to the west coast to help General 
Mark Clark’s Anglo-American Fifth Army in the bitter struggle 
which was raging at Cassino, 50 miles north of Naples. 

After the Volturno crossing in October 1943, the Fifth Army had 
been faced by a crossing of the Garigliano River and the flooded 
Pontine marshes before Rome could be reached. With winter rapidly 
approaching it was evident that a direct advance would be both long 
and difficult, so a plan was evolved for a sea-borne landing by 
several divisions at Anzio, 30 miles south of the capital, in order 
to cut the enemy’s communications behind the Garigliano and 
thus force his retreat. The American 6th Corps (3rd U.S. and Ist 
British Divisions) was to make the landing while the British 10th 
Corps attacked across the Garigliano and the American 2nd Corps 
across the Rapido, a tributary of the Garigliano which ran south- 
wards through Cassino. Before the Anzio landing was launched the 


152 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


5th British Division was sent across from the Eighth Army to replace 
the Ist British Division in the American 6th Corps. The ball was 
opened on January 12th, 1944, by an attack by a French Corps on 
the right of the Fifth Army in order to threaten Cassino, and three 
days later the American 2nd Corps reached the entrance to the Liri 
Valley, a few miles south of that vital point. On the 17th, the 10th 
Corps launched an attack against the right of the ‘Gustav’ Line across 
the Garigliano. The river had been strongly fortified, and on the 
19th the attack was held up. The American 2nd Corps then tried to 
cross the Rapido to the right of the 10th Corps and failed, and thus 
the main body of the Fifth Army was unable to join hands with the 
troops already landed at Anzio. No units of the Indian Engineers 
were concerned in these abortive operations. The Anzio landing was 
made on January 22nd, 1944, and achieved a tactical surprise, but 
unfortunately this advantage was not pressed to the full extent. The 
enemy held commanding ground a few miles inland, and the Allied 
forces were held up after penetrating only ten miles. Gradually the 
initiative passed to the Germans, who had been strongly reinforced, 
and within a week the beachhead was effectively sealed off. Once 
again, no Indian Engineers were present for they had not yet arrived 
from the Eighth Army sector, and thus they were spared some very 
unpleasant fighting in bitterly cold weather. However, their turn 
was soon to come. 

Cassino, on the Rapido River about 20 miles inland from the 
west coast, was undoubtedly the keystone of the ‘Gustav’ Line. Its 
famous monastery, crowning a steep hill above the town, dominated 
the Liri Valley which led northwards towards Rome. The ist German 
Parachute Division, every man a fanatical Nazi, held the Monastery 
hill and the adjacent heights with the utmost determination. Cassino 
was bombed and shelled till it was nothing but a wilderness of 
rubble, but the parachutists had the deepest of dug-outs and could 
not be ejected. Bombing only increased the horrid conglomeration 
of shattered brick and stone until it became almost impassable for 
our tanks, and so the burden of the assault fell entirely on the infantry. 
Most of the Eighth Army moved gradually from the coast towards 
Cassino to help the Fifth Army, leaving only the 5th Corps on the 
Adriatic side, and soon the 4th Indian Division, 78th British Division 
and 2nd New Zealand Division were in the fight. Three unsuccessful 
attempts were made to capture Cassino, but the towering Monastery 
height, and the village below it, remained in German hands. During 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 153 


these attacks, the Engineer units laboured on the improvement of 
mountain tracks so that tanks might be brought into action. The 
enemy had inundated large areas of the valley below and had thus 
obstructed the passage of vehicles, and every piece of open ground 
was mined. For more than six weeks the 4th Indian Division was 
heavily engaged at Cassino. 4 Field Company came under concen- 
trated shell-fire immediately on arrival, and then, after twelve days 
of digging in drenching rain, made mule tracks towards our hill 
positions and a jeep track known as ‘Roorkee Road’. Meanwhile, 
21 Field Company had been busy on another remarkable jeep track 
which was called ‘Cavendish Road’. This work was finished on March 
Iith by 4 Field Company and a New Zealand Field Company. The 
track led through the mountains north of Cassino and in one place 
had a gradient of 1 in 4. It was decided to widen it for the passage 
of tanks and make a new alignment to avoid a hairpin bend. The 
process of widening began on March Ist, and with the aid of com- 
pressors and blasting it was completed within the next ten days. 
Some entries in 21 Field Company’s War Diary make depressing 
reading. ‘February 29th. Everyone wet through. Work called off. 
All slit trenches collapsed. C.R.E. holds conference in 12 Field 
Company’s lines about future of widening the jeep track for tanks 
and general maintenance of tracks forward of the River Rapido’. 
And later. “March 8th. Roadwork as before. Camp being shelled 
regularly during daylight. Decision made to keep all men out of 
camp from 1600 to 1830 hrs to avoid casualties”. On the night of 
March {1th/l2th, the shelling was so severe that the men had to 
move into an adjacent nullah in order to get any sleep. Shell and 
mortar fire continued day and night, and 12 Field Company, which 
was building a close support track up Monastery Hill, worked under 
incessant bombardment. Many brave deeds were performed by the 
officers and other ranks of all the Sapper units. For instance, Lieut. 
A. Murray, R.E., of 12 Field Company, actually entered the ruins 
of the Monastery itself and so earned a Military Cross. Accompanied 
by a New Zealand sergeant, he was leading a small party of his men 
on a night reconnaissance when he accidentally passed into the enemy’s 
forward positions. Noticing that the armed men around him seemed 
to be Germans, he and the sergeant hid behind a house, and then, 
descending into a cellar, ran straight into a party of the enemy. The 
sergeant was killed, but Murray shot three men and escaped from the 
trap. Outside, he shot another German before making his way back 


154 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


to our positions below Castle Hill where 4 Field Company was 
working on a tank track. Murray and his men are believed to have 
been the only Allied soldiers ever to set foot in the Monastery until 
it was finally stormed by Polish troops in June 1944. 

The first award of the George Cross to a member of the Indian 
Forces occurred at Cassino. This honour was accorded posthumously 
to Subedar Subramaniam of 11 Field Park Company who on February 
24th, 1944, was in charge of a small party of Sappers engaged in 
locating and clearing mines on the ‘Cavendish’ track. The Subedar 
was operating a mine-detector and behind him was a Lance-Naik 
marking the path with white tape. The Lance-Naik trod on a Schu- 
mine, and the Subedar, hearing the small initial detonation and 
realising that within the next four seconds the canister would be 
thrown into the air and explode with great violence, turned instantly, 
pushed his companion aside, and deliberately flung himself onto the 
mine. As a result of the explosion he died a few minutes later, but 
his extraordinary heroism undoubtedly saved the lives of Lieut. 
Young and five others who were close to the spot. “‘Greater love 
hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends’. 

On March 25th, the 4th Indian Division left the stalemate at 
Cassino and returned to the Adriatic front to help the Sth Corps. 
It was now the turn of the 8th Indian Division to attempt to burst 
through the Cassino barrier by forcing a crossing of the Rapido 
River below the town and fighting north-eastwards to turn the 
Monastery defences. The enemy’s ‘Gustav’ Line followed the west 
bank of the Gari, a part of the Rapido, behind which was hinged 
yet another series of defences forming what was known as the ‘Hitler’ 
Line. Three crossings of the Gari were needed on the right of the 
8th Divisional front. Minesweeping parties from the Sapper units 
went forward to clear the approaches to the river, levelling and 
widening the rutted tracks and covering them with shingle. All 
the work had to be done at night, and through unmarked minefields, 
because the enemy on the heights above could observe every move- 
ment by day. “On the night of May 11th’, writes Pearson,! ‘‘an 
artillery barrage set the plan in motion. A platoon of 66 Field 
Company swept the opposite bank for mines, and the rest of the 
Company, with 69 and 7 Field Companies, began rafting and bridging 
operations. The infantry went across and the sappers then turned to 


a a 
* Brief History of the K.G.V’sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.I.E., by Lieut. 
G. Pearson, R.E., p. 65. 








Subedar Subramaniam, G.C. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 155 


solve the problem of supply. Three bridges, named ‘Oxford’, ‘Cardiff’ 
and ‘Plymouth’, were begun. ‘Oxford’ was thrown across under 
intense artillery and small-arms fire by 7 Field Company under 
cover of smoke. The first tanks rumbled across. ‘Plymouth’ bridge 
was a triumph of mechanical improvisation, the result of collaboration 
between 69 Field Company and the Canadian Engineers. Built and 
carried on a tank, with another to push, it was run into place at 
high speed. With these two bridges as supply routes, the infantry west 
of the Gari were saved from probable defeat. Work was carried 
out in smoke and thick mist, but when the mist cleared, the shelling 
became very severe and bulldozing was dangerously unpleasant. 
‘Plymouth’ bridge soon became restricted in use, but at ‘Cardiff’ 
the prolonged efforts of 7 Field Company were at last successful, 
and despite further shelling this bridge was able to ease the congestion 
of traffic. Fierce fighting drove the enemy back, and after the capture 
of San Angelo, ‘London’ Bridge, built by the Corps Sappers, was 
taken over. The 8th Divisional Engineers then did road maintenance 
and mine clearance in and around Cassino. Previously, Jemadar 
Sher Ali of 69 Field Company had won the M.C. in rafting operations, 
and now, at the ‘Oxford’ bridge site, Havildar Balkaran Singh of 
66 Field Company won the M.M. and at ‘Plymouth’ bridge Naik 
Shazada Khan and Sapper Ghosi Khan of the same Company gained 
similar awards. Shelling caused many casualties, particularly in 
66 Field Company while doing maintenance work on the ‘Oxford’ 
and ‘Cardiff’ bridges, and in 7 Field Company also as the 8th Indian 
Division moved forward to the Liri River. The Battle of Cassino, 
however, was won, and the brigades began to leap-frog with the 
Field Companies in close support”’. 

Before leaving the Cassino front it may be well to give some more 
details of the extraordinary ‘Plymouth’ bridge constructed by 69 
Field Company and the Canadians, for this was the first Bailey 
assault bridge built in the field. It was a single-double Bailey, 100 feet 
long, carried forward on two Sherman tanks. On the front tank 
it rested on rollers so that when this tank reached the gap the bridge 
could be launched by the rear tank by pushing. To complete the 
launching, both tanks moved forward, the one in front descending 
into the gap. The operation was carried out successfully although 
the front tank toppled into the river and was lost. The site came 
under heavy fire, and in an effort to launch the landing ramp the 
tank officer and one of the crew were killed and three Sappers were 


156 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


killed and five wounded, but an improvised ramp was made and the 
tanks were then able to cross.1 

The general plan after the rupture of the ‘Gustav’ Line was that 
both the Eighth and Fifth Armies should attack simultaneously. 
The Eighth Army was to advance with the Polish Corps on the right, 
to the north of Cassino, and the 13th Corps on the left, to the south 
of that place. Then the Canadian Corps would attack on the left 
of the 13th Corps, breach the ‘Hitler’ Line and drive forward up the 
Liri Valley. Meanwhile, the Fifth Army would press onwards nearer 
the coast. The attack was launched with spectacular results. On 
May 23rd, 1944, the ‘Hitler’ Line was broken and thence-forward the 
the two armies progressed side by side. On the 25th, General Mark 
Clark’s Fifth Army linked up at last with the Anzio beachhead 
force, and on June 4th it occupied Rome, which was found to be 
quite undamaged. Thus American troops secured the honour of 
being the first to enter the Italian capital—an event which was not 
quite in accordance with General Alexander’s plan of campaign— 
but the capture of Rome was too important from a political point 
of view to warrant any critical examination of the methods by which 
it was secured. Rome fell exactly two days before the Allied 
landings on the coast of Normandy. Those landings were destined 
to have very serious repercussions on the Italian front where a process 
which Mr. Winston Churchill described as ‘‘dragging the hot rake of 
war up the length of the peninsula’ was to be slowed down almost 
to vanishing point through lack of men, equipment and material. 

While the final mopping up at Cassino was being done by a special 
Task Force, the 8th Divisional Engineers were engaged in rapid 
bridging during the general advance northwards. The Germans had 
been very thorough in their demolitions. 7 Field Company cleared 
road-blocks at Veroli, a few miles north-east of Frosinone, and 
66 Field Company built a Bailey bridge further on. On June 7th, 
69 Field Company encountered extensive demolitions at Subiaco, 
30 miles east of Rome, and 7 Field Company came up to assist in 
building a Bailey bridge across a gap and in clearing road-blocks 
cleverly sited at hairpin bends. Mine-sweeping parties were constantly 
at work, and many small Bailey diversions were made across craters 
while bulldozers cleared the rest of the road. The work was often 
very dangerous. 7 Field Company, for instance, lost twenty men 





1 History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. VIII, by Major-Ge 1 P 
Pakenham-Walsh, c.B., M.C. pe Peres 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 157 


when a scout car was blown up on a deep mine. The pursuit of the 
enemy now passed far beyond the region of Rome, the rate of advance 
being governed mainly by the speed with which the Sapper companies 
could clear the road of mines. Heavy rain fell unceasingly and added 
to the difficulties of the situation. However, when the 8th Division 
reached Terni, 50 miles north of Rome, the advance began to quicken 
and several bridges, prepared by the Germans for demolition, were 
captured intact. Near Foligno, another 30 miles to the north, enemy 
resistance increased. Every demolition was covered by fire and 
progress became slow and laborious. This was not surprising, for 
only 75 miles further north the Germans were already hard at work 
on their next fortified zone, the ‘Gothic’ Line. June 29th found the 
8th Division in the mountains south of Perugia, and afterwards, 
having covered 220 miles in 5 weeks, it was withdrawn to the Foligno 
area for a well-earned rest. 

A few months earlier, while the 4th Divisional Engineers were 
enduring a purgatory of shell-fire at Cassino, a third contingent of 
Indian Engineers had landed in Italy with the 10th Indian Division 
or as Corps or Army Troops. In the latter categories were 97 Field 
Company (Bombay) under W. F. Eason, R.E., and 52 Army Troops 
Company(Madras) under Major D. H. Boydell, R.E. The two units 
disembarked at Taranto in February 1944 and moved up the east 
coast, 97 Company repairing bridges and roads and 52 Company 
building camps and jetties in the Foggia region. With the 10th 
Indian Division on March 28th came 10, 14 and 61 Field Companies 
(Madras) under Majors R. A. Lindsell, F. F. Radford and A. C. 
Cooper, R.E., 41 Field Park Company (Bengal) under Major G. T. 
Roche, R.E., and “‘A”’ Bridging Platoon (Bengal) under Captain T. C. H. 
Bateson, R.E. The C.R.E. was Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Hutchinson, 
R.E. Towards the end of April, the Division went to Ortona on the 
east coast beyond the Sangro River and joined the 5th Corps of 
the Eighth Army. Alongside it was the 8th Division until the latter 
left for the Cassino operations. Another Indian Engineer unit which 
landed at Taranto in March 1944 was 5 Field Company (Bengal) 
under Major M. J. Youngs, R.E.. This Company was first classed 
as ‘independent’ and was later posted to 466 Corps Troops Engineers. 
In June, as already stated, it joined the 10th Divisional Engineers 
in place of 14 Field Company. Another unit arrived in Italy during 
the summer of 1944, This was 301 Field Park Company (Bombay), 
and on August |1th came | Field Company (Bengal) under Major 
J. G. Wood, R.E. Both these Companies were posted to 466 Corps 


158 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Troops Engineers, a formation which also included 14 Field Company 
and 97 Field Company. 

Some very extraordinary tasks have occasionally to be undertaken 
by Sappers in the field, and as an illustration one may quote from 
the experiences of 97 Field Company as given by Major A. B. Rhodes, 
R.E., who was a subaltern with that unit in Italy. ““While my platoon 
was converting a school at Asto into a hospital’, he writes,! ‘‘the 
senior Surgeon performed an operation on a man’s stomach and 
removed a large pathological specimen which he thought would 
interest the Royal College of Surgeons in London. He turned to 
me for help. The specimen was about 18 inches by 12 inches, so the 
manufacture of a waterproof glass-topped case to hold it gave my 
carpenter quite a headache. However, he made the case and handed 
it over, but I never heard whether the specimen got safely to its 
destination”. 

The story of the achievements of the 10th Indian Divisional 
Engineers in the Italian campaign is told very fully in a volume 
written by Lieut.-Colonel Hutchinson.2 In the Foreword to that 
volume, Major-General D. W. Reid, the Divisional Commander, 
makes the following comments:— “Infantry and Artillery can on 
many occasions avoid and by-pass certain known or suspected places 
of danger. You, the Engineers, cannot. Yours is a task of service, 
one of the proudest tasks of all. You have always a shrewd idea of 
the cold-blooded hazard which you are to encounter, and it is with 
open eyes and a high sense of duty that you have faced the wicked 
and deadly artificial obstacles which the enemy has constantly laid 
in our path’. This is a fine tribute, and it might apply with equal 
force to the Engineer units of the 4th and 8th Indian Divisions. 

In May 1944, the 10th Divisional Engineers were busily engaged 
in roadmaking and bridging in the Ortona area on the east coast. 
41 Field Park Company carried out a fine piece of improvisation in 
the form of a nullah causeway called ‘“‘Rockery Ridge” which carried 
the entire maintenance traffic of the Eighth Army for many months. 
At the beginning of June, the 10th Indian Division was relieved by 
the 4th Indian Division and moved across to Venafro, near Cassino, 
where 5 Field Company replaced 14 Field Company on June 22nd. 





Notes entitled “Personal Experiences in the Indian Engineers”, by Major A. B. 
Rhodes, R.E. 


* History of the 10th Indian Divisional Engineers in Italy, by Lieut.-C 
: Colonel G. F. 
Hutchinson, p.s.0., R.E. re 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 159 


The end of the month saw the Division on the move to the neighbour- 
hood of Perugia where the Germans had established a temporary 
line of resistance across the Peninsula, based on Lake Trasimene. 
The Fifth Army was then advancing up the west coast, the main 
body of the Eighth Army was moving forward in the central Apennine 
sector, and the 5th Corps of that Army was advancing in the east 
coast sector, where it was due to be relieved by the Polish Corps. 
The 10th Division now took over from the 8th Division astride the 
valley of the River Tiber and improved the communications. Both 
the 4th and 10th Divisional Engineers worked in constant danger 
from mines. On June 27th, for instance, 61 Field Company met for 
the first time the ‘“‘Riegel’”” mine. Lieut. Fraser, R.E., managed to 
lift and dismantle one of these horrible contraptions without accident, 
but afterwards three Sappers were killed and three others wounded 
when collecting some lifted mines. So unaccountable was the behavi- 
our of these mines that orders were issued that they were never to 
be handled but merely pulled to one side and afterwards destroyed 
where they lay. The Engineer units of both Divisions made numerous 
tracks up to the forward troops, a notable example being one called 
‘“‘Jacob’s Ladder’ constructed by the 4th Divisional and 10th Corps 
Troops Engineers. This track rose 1,150 feet at an average gradient 
of 1 in 10, and when the clouds were low, it seemed indeed to lead 
to heaven. 

As a further example of the danger from mines, the experiences 
of 10 Field Company on the road to Umbertide (beyond Perugia) 
may be quoted here. This unit, working in conjunction with 61 
Field Company, was making a diversion to by-pass a demolished 
reinforced concrete bridge whose metal-work and rubble were scattered 
around. The splinters of metal made electrical detection very un- 
certain, and the rubble impeded prodding with bayonets. After a 
bulldozer had been at work for some time, there was a violent ex- 
plosion. The driver, blown into the air, landed at the feet of the 
C.R.E. and bravely rushed back at once to stop his machine which 
was thrashing around with one track gone. This accident occurred 
in the darkness preceding dawn. When daylight came and the site 
had been carefully examined, bulldozing was resumed with another 
machine; but within an hour this also was blown up, and although 
the driver again escaped damage, one Sapper was killed and six 
others wounded. Mine-lifting had become a daily feature in the life 
of the men. Every day and along every road, Sapper parties picked 
their way gingerly with detectors and prodders, first clearing the 


160 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


roadway itself and then dealing with the ground on either side. As 
a rule they followed close behind the leading infantry; but some- 
times, when the infantry were off the road and engaged in occupying 
some adjacent point of vantage, they were quite unprotected and 
consequently liable to be ambushed. Wooden ‘Schumines’ were met 
in increasing numbers. With these, as already mentioned, electrical 
apparatus was useless and too vigourous prodding was liable to cause 
a detonation. Colonel Hutchison therefore suggested that a process 
of raking might be substituted for prodding, and a light rake, with 
strong wire prongs mounted on a long bamboo handle, was produced 
in 41 Field Park Company's workshops at Umbertide, the wire 
being obtained from local vineyards. Except on very hard ground, 
these rakes proved most efficient and became quite popular with all 
ranks except the pronounced ‘die-hards’ who still pinned their faith 
on prodding. The ‘rakers’ sometimes caused considerable surprise to 
newcomers to the front. For instance, a newly arrived R.E. subaltern 
records that he was greatly intrigued one day to notice a line of 
smart bearded men, each armed with what appeared to be a garden 
rake, marching up the road, and then, at a word of command, attack- 
ing the surface with the utmost ferocity. A squad of ‘die-hards’, 
with bayonets stuck in their belts, reminded him of Captain Kidd’s 
pirates, so bloodthirsty did they look! ! 

A few other stories by young Royal Engineer officers in Italy are 
worthy of record. A Sapper subaltern, going out to meet an infantry 
patrol on a dark night, lost his way and walked straight through 
our forward defence localities. Arriving eventually at the head- 
quarters of a unit, he asked a sentry ‘“‘Are you the London Scottish?”, 
and not till then did he notice that the man wore a German helmet. 
As the unit was a Panzer Grenadier Regiment, he was very lucky 
to be able to fade away without being shot, but he managed to do 
so and found his way back to his own folk. Again, as an example 
of how far forward the Sappers sometimes had to work, there is 
the story of the Tank Troop leader who was recommended for a 
Military Cross for making his way successfully to the far end of a 
much shelled village. When he arrived there, he found a party of 
Sappers intent on brewing their tea. They had swept the road clear 
of mines some three days before! The Indian Engineers invented a 
very effective method of deceiving the enemy as to the site of a bridge 
under construction. They dug a few slit trenches on the river bank 
A a en eee ee ee te, 


1 Notes by Captain D. Gardiner, R.E., dated January 3rd, 1953. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 161 


at some distance from the site and placed in each a Sapper provided 
with a hammer and an empty tin or piece of scrap metal. These men 
hammered vigorously while the bridge was being built and thus 
distracted the enemy’s attention. It was a ruse which appealed 
greatly to their sense of humour. 

The pursuit of the German forces towards Florence continued 
steadily during the summer of 1944 though increasingly hampered 
by the demands of the invasion of Normandy and preparations 
for a landing in Southern France. Shortly after the occupa- 
tion of Rome, General Alexander was ordered to release the 
American 6th Corps of 3 divisions, a French Expeditionary Force 
of 7 divisions, and large numbers of landing craft and aeroplanes 
for the adventure into the south of France. The target date was to 
be August 15th, and more than 2,000 ships were ear-marked to 
transport the invading army. The loss of ten divisions was a serious 
blow to Alexander, and particularly at a time when the Germans 
were about to rally on their carefully prepared ‘Gothic’ Line beyond 
Florence. It is true that he was to be reinforced by some Greek, 
Italian and Brazilian formations, but these could not be expected 
to equal the American and French divisions which he had to release. 
All hope of ending the Italian campaign in 1944 then vanished. 
Our diminished forces were destined to become more and more 
‘bogged down’, in more and more mountainous country, against a 
more and more easily reinforced enemy, until the valley of the Po 
was reached. Another winter would soon be on its way, and to reach 
the River Po Alexander would first have to fight through the Apennine 
defiles, then to force the crossing of a succession of small 
rivers, and finally to traverse a flat stretch of country intersected by 
innumerable irrigation and drainage channels ideal for delaying 
tactics. Yet his sorely tried troops were not dismayed by the prospect, 
and even after the 4th Indian Division was sent to Greece towards 
the end of the year and a further four British and Canadian divisions 
were withdrawn to France or the Eastern Mediterranean in February 
1945, the cosmopolitan Fifth and Eighth Armies still waged their 
war in Italy with praiseworthy energy and valour and brought it at 
last to a successful conclusion. 

On July 21st, 1944, 4 Field Company arrived in Arezzo, only 40 
miles south-east of Florence, and four days later, every man who 
could be spared went to the neighbouring 10th Division sector to 








Notes by Captain J. D, Watson, m.B.£., R.E., dated January 6th, 1953. 


162 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


see H. M. King George VI who was touring the front. Soon after- 
wards, the 10th Division axis was switched across the Tiber towards 
the Arno Valley, and by the end of the month the general line Ancona- 
Florence-Leghorn had been reached and the River Arno crossed and 
bridged by the Fifth Army. 

The decision was now taken to move the Eighth Army back to the 
Adriatic coast and there to launch the main attack on the ‘Gothic’ 
Line which extended across the peninsula from beyond the River 
Arno to the east coast about Pesaro. The 13th Corps was to be 
transferred to the Fifth Army, which would press forward towards 
Bologna, while the Eighth Army, comprising the 5th and 10th British 
Corps, the Ist Canadian Corps and some other formations, would 
advance up the east coast. Meanwhile, preparations were made to 
thrust towards the ‘Gothic’ Line in the central or Apennine sector, 
and on August 3rd, 1944, the 4th and 10th Indian Divisions began 
Operation ‘Vandal.’ ‘“‘This’, writes Pakenham-Waish,! “involved 
the Sappers and Miners in the opening of a mule track, the construc- 
tion of a jeep track and the provision of a tank road. It is recorded 
that ‘giant boulders, crumbling surfaces, rocky ledges, patches of 
scrub and heavy forest alike succumbed to the caterpillars, picks and 
shovels and high explosives of the urgent Sappers. Neither enemy 
shell-fire nor direct attack impeded their progress. The team work 
of the engineers triumphed over every obstacle, and the bare log of 
accomplishment does less than justice to a superb achievement’. 
Six miles of jeep track were completed in 66 hours, and the tank 
track in 36 hours. As a result of the labours of the Sappers, the 
tanks reached their assembly position on the heather-studded crests 
on August 7th when a change in the general plan caused the operation 
to be called off”. This cancellation was due to orders for the with- 
drawal of the 4th Indian Division to the Adriatic sector and the 
consequent necessity of extending the 10th Indian Division over the 
whole Corps front. 

An exploit by 5 Field Company should not be missed. This was 
the gallant rescue of an Italian Countess from her booby-trapped 
castle by a platoon engaged in filling in craters in full view of the 
enemy. So impressed was the lady with the bravery and sang froid 
of the Platoon Commander that she asked him to repeat the perform- 
ance next day by rescuing her maid, and this was duly accomplished 





! History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. VIII, by Major-General R. P. 
Pakenham-Walsh, c.8., M.c. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 163 


although there were a number of Germans in the castle. History 
does not record the relative attractions of mistress and maid and 
consequently which rescue afforded the greater satisfaction. Humour 
of a rough and ready kind often helps to relieve the monotony of 
war, so here is an example. The 10th Divisional Engineers had 
almost completed a long track through the mountains except 
for a few narrow defiles, one of which, a leafy glade, was known 
as “Lover’s Lane.”’ This title was most appropriate and encouraging. 
But a little further on there was another notice. ‘“‘Virgins not checked 
beyond this point” it ran. Honi soit qui mal y pense ! 

Cheered no doubt by such crude witticisms, the 10th Indian Divi- 
sion moved slowly towards the outposts of the ‘Gothic’ Line with 
other formations on either flank, while in the west the 8th Indian 
Division made good progress northwards from Siena along heavily 
mined roads. As usual, there were occasional fatal accidents. In 
a single week, while clearing mines under fire, 69 Field Company 
lost three officers killed. Often, as many as fifteen ‘Tellermines’ were 
lifted at one spot, each ringed with intricate booby-traps. Engineer 
patrols entered Florence on August 11th, 1944. The only undamaged 
bridge was found to be the celebrated Ponte Vecchio, but the appro- 
aches to it were blocked with rubble and mines. However, by August 
14th, 7 Field Company had cleared a way through and forded the 
River Arno before handing over charge to the engineers of a British 
Division. 47 Field Park Company had already contrived to lower 
the water-level by opening some sluice gates, and thus the infantry 
were able to ford the river without much difficulty for there was no 
opposition. On the Adriatic side, the Eighth Army was now ready 
to move against the left of Field-Marshal Kesselring’s ‘Gothic’ Line. 
The Germans were well placed to offer a stubborn resistance. Forti- 
fications and mine-fields protected their lateral communications 
across the peninsula and barred entry into the narrow and winding 
valleys by which alone the Fifth and Eighth Armies could reach the 
crest of the mountains and descend into the plain of the River Po. 

The assault on the ‘Gothic’ Line was opened by General Leese’s 
Eighth Army on the Metauro River, south of Rimini, on August 
26th, 1944, Initial surprise was secured, but the fighting which 
followed was some of the bloodiest in British history. Bridging on 
an unprecedented scale was involved, and the ‘‘Ark’’, or bridging tank, 








4 The “Ark” was a turretless Churchill tank to which were attached, fore and aft, 
two American treadway tracks. ‘“Arks” could crawl over each other, if necessary, 
to make a longer or higher bridge. 


164 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


was used by our armour with great effect. General Mark 
Clark's Fifth Army then attacked south of Pisa on the west coast, 
meeting extensive bridge demolitions and long stretches of broken 
toad; but by August 29th, with the exception of a fraction in the 
west, the entire ‘Gothic’ Line had crumbled. Five days later, the 
Eighth Army was on the move, and with the crossing of the Marecchia 
River on September 21st, the plain of the Po was reached by the 
forward troops. 

The work of the Indian Engineer units during the Eighth Army’s 
advance was exceedingly heavy. Their first task was to open and 
maintain communications for the leading troops through a welter 
of demolitions and mud, and in this they showed much ingenuity 
and resource. 61 Field Company, for example, built and operated 
an aerial ropeway across a gap where its bulldozers could not provide 
a causeway. 10 Field Company developed a new type of bridge. 
This was the ‘‘Houdini’’, which could be used at night but rendered 
invisible by day. It consisted of a steel cable taken across a river, 
through a couple of snatch-blocks, and back again to some tackle 
on the near bank. Timber decking was lashed to the cables. At 
dawn, by slackening the cables, the bridge could be submerged, and 
when the shoremost decking had been removed at both ends and the 
anchorages properly camouflaged with brushwood, there was no sign 
of acrossing place. Yet, soon after dark, the bridge could be operating 
once more to full capacity. 41 Field Park Company carried the neces- 
sary cables and tackle. 

Behind the Field Companies came a host of Corps and Army 
Engineers, replacing Bailey bridges by timber or brick structures, 
often with the help of Italian labour, so that the Baileys could be 
sent forward for further use. These units also built high-level bridges 
to guard against interruption of the road communications by sudden 
floods. The road maintenance problem became almost insoluble 
when a deluge of rain began to fall in September. Continuous traffic 
crowded the narrow roads, which were mostly gravelled. The founda- 
tions became waterlogged. Torrents attacked weak points. Low- 
level bridges and culverts simply disappeared. High-level bridge 
piers led a precarious existence. Yet between November 5th and 
December 17th, the 8th Divisional Engineers, reinforced by other 
troops, opened 34 miles of road, maintained 64 miles, built 23 Bailey 
bridges (some of which had piers 70 feet high), constructed two 
folding boat bridges, replaced seven Baileys by timber structures, 
made a number of mule and jeep tracks and several aerial ropeways, 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 165 


provided water-points galore and built up dumps of stores. Their 
achievements were matched by those of the 10th Divisional Engineers. 
They could hardly have been more diverse. 

As road and bridge maintenance was a major duty of the Indian 
Engineers in Italy, especially those behind the front, it may be well 
to record briefly some of the problems it presented and how they 
were solved. 97 Field Company, under Major W. F. Eason, R.E., 
had very extensive experience in this department when serving in 
466 Corps Troops Engineers.) According to Captain D. C. Browning, 
R.E.2, the unit encountered all types of ground—plains, marshes and 
mountains—and worked in all kinds of weather. When a tar macadam 
road had to be repaired while under heavy traffic both ways—a very 
common state of affairs—the most that could be done was to throw 
tar-coated chippings into the pot-holes and trust to the traffic to roll 
them in. Non-tarred roads were more difficult to maintain. The 
first step was to get rain-water off the road as quickly as possible by 
cutting small channels in the surface. Ruts and potholes were then 
repaired and the channels filled in. In the mountains, catchwater 
drains had to be dug. Ice-bound roads in the winter brought their 
own troubles and the only solution was to have one-way traffic in 
convoys in one direction and later in the other direction. Drivers 
could then keep to the crown of the road, though this practice was 
liable to produce two deep ruts with an ice ridge between them. 
Bulldozers were very useful for removing snow. When 97 Field 
Company had to build masonry bridges or culverts on main roads 
without interrupting the flow of traffic, the usual procedure was to 
place a small Bailey bridge over the gap and build the permanent 
structure beneath it with the help of Italian labour. Materials were 
sometimes very difficult to obtain. On the plain south of Florence 
there was no stone whatever and trucks had to go 15 miles to fetch 
bricks and cement; but later, in the mountains, plenty of stone was 
available from a large quarry operated by 301 Field Park Company. 
Diversions on precipitous mountain slopes were sometimes so difficult 
that new alignments had to be blasted. On one occasion the problem 
was solved by taking the road through a convenient railway tunnel 
which 301 Field Park Company illuminated with its own electric 
lighting set. As the winter progressed, snow clearance from all main 


1466 Corps Troops Engineers was an independent Group working under 
16 A.G. R.E. and commanded by Lieut.-Colonel C. A. N. Peglar, R.E. 


2“*Road Maintenance in Italy”, by Captain D. C. Browning, R.E., appearing in 
The R.E. Journal, March 1950, pp. 61-71. 





166 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


roads above the 2,000 feet level became a priority task. This was 
done by special teams of men equipped with snow-ploughs and operat- 
ing a number of ‘snow posts’ which had Italian labourers for manual 
work. Most of the Indian Engineer units took part from time to 
time in these activities and thus helped forward the invasion of the 
Po Valley. 

Seriously depleted by the departure of the 4th Divisional Engineers 
to Greece at the end of October after 4 Field Company had bridged 
the Rubicon, the 8th and 10th Divisional Engineers laboured manfully 
through the bitter winter of 1944-45 in the mountain fastnesses of 
the northern Apennines. 5 Field Company of the 10th Division had 
distinguished itself in October by converting an old aqueduct on the 
Ronco River! into a first-class bridge while under heavy fire, and 
other units of both Divisions had shown similar bravery and ingenuity, 
but now a weary period of more or less static warfare had to be 
endured. The road maintenance work was heartbreaking. “There 
was danger and doubt in every turn of the road’’, writes Pearson.? 
“Once a bulldozer fell over the side of a cliff and turned over ten 
times before it landed: with engine and tracks undamaged’’. Many 
new jeep tracks were blasted and bulldozed, and in the 8th Divisional 
sector 47 Field Park Company pulled down a number of houses to 
supplement the supply of stone from quarries. In two months, 69 
Field Company built three large Bailey bridges, (240, 180 and 140 
feet), 7 Field Company contributed no less than five (270, 240, 210 
and two of 140 feet), and 66 Field Company built two (210 and 190 
feet). 47 Field Park Company also completed four small Baileys out 
of a total of twelve. 

On November 25th, 1944, 5 Field Company made an “Ark” 
crossing under heavy fire on the small river Montone. Another 
stream, the Lamone, was crossed on December 15th and the troops 
entered Faenza. The occupation of this town, which lies south-east 
of Bologna, opened the way for subsequent attempts to cross the 
successive barriers offered by the rivers Senio, Santerno, Sillaro, Idice 
and Reno which the Eighth Army had to traverse in order to by-pass 
the Valli di Comacchio lagoon and ‘reach Ferrara and the banks of 
the Po. Meanwhile, a general thaw in January 1945, accompanied by 
heavy rain, brought most preparations to a virtual standstill; but 








‘See the map of North-East Italy included in this chapter. 


® Brief History of the K.G.V'sQ. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.LE., August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 110. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 167 


in February, after the rain had ceased, the roads and tracks became 
usable once more. March came and the 10th Division resumed 
its share in the preparations for a great offensive. The terrain in the 
plains where it now found itself was most difficult. Every small road 
was flanked by deep irrigation ditches and crossed at short intervals 
by others of the same kind. The roads were untarred and had no 
foundations. If a vehicle slipped, it fell into a ditch and remained 
there for hours. Every bridge had been demolished. Every river 
was protected by minefields and elaborately entrenched. It was 
fortunate indeed that our troops had now been equipped with many 
new devices such as flame-throwers, the most modern artillery and 
new forms of bridges, for otherwise the casualties which they might 
have suffered in traversing this deep zone of fortification do not 
bear contemplation. 

The general offensive which carried the Allied forces through the 
‘Gothic’ Line was halted with the Eighth Army on the River Senio 
and the Fifth Army separated from Bologna only by the foothills 
of the Apennines. The Eighth Army, however, had now not only 
to circumnavigate the Valli di Comacchio on the east coast but also 
to cross the many small rivers near it. In addition, large areas had 
been flooded by the enemy by means of cutting the high river banks. 
These sheets of water extended far inland and could be traversed 
only by following two dry corridors, named the “Argenta Gap”. 
The Fifth Army was to deliver the main assault from the moun- 
tains west of Bologna and come into line with the Eighth Army 
south of the River Po. The Po having been crossed, the Eighth Army 
was to move on Padua and the Fifth Army on Verona. 

As no Indian Engineer units were now serving with the Fifth 
Army, this account is concerned mainly with the Eighth Army which 
was directed to attack north-westwards across the Senio and Santerno 
Rivers on a narrow front, the 5th Corps on the right and the Polish 
Corps on the left. The 56th British Division of the 5th Corps was 
to strike straight towards the Valli di Comacchio. The 78th British 
Division was then to pass through a bridgehead established on the 
Santerno and swing right to help the 56th Divison in forcing the 
Argenta Gap while the 2nd New Zealand Division and the Polish 
Corps made for Bologna. When the 56th and 78th Divisions had 
broken out of the Gap, they would advance to Ferrara, and the 6th 
Armoured Division, passing through, would swing left to contact 
the Fifth Army and trap all German forces south of the Po. It was 
a sound plan, but later it had to be modified in some respects owing 


168 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


to the withdrawal of certain formations from the Italian theatre. 
The Divisional Engineers, and Armoured Engineer units under 
Divisional command, were to prepare all assault crossings over 
rivers and canals including rafting, low-level Bailey bridges, “Ark” 
bridges, folding boat bridges and mobile Bailey bridges, while the 
Corps Engineers were made responsible for main communications 
and high-level bridges. 

After some preliminary operations, the Eighth Army attacked 
across the Senio River during the night of April 9th/l0th. In the 
5th Corps sector, the 8th Indian Division was on the right and the 
2nd New Zealand Division on the left. The banks of the Senio were 
30 feet above the surrounding plain and the slopes heavily fortified. 
Early on April 10th, 7 and 69 Field Companies and 564 Field Company, 
R.E., built two Class 40 Baileys across the river without much 
difficulty, but further west there was trouble in finding a site for an 
““Ark” crossing to be made by another unit, and 66 Field Company 
was therefore called upon to provide a Bailey bridge instead. The 
New Zealanders established a bridgehead very quickly and built 
six bridges for tanks. So skillful were they at this work that their 
methods for assault crossings were adopted by the Indian Engineer 
units. The New Zealand Engineers first collected their Bailey bridging 
material under cover of the near flood bank after a bridgehead had 
been secured, and then carried it over by hand. The bridge took 
the form of a 50 feet single-single low-level Bailey erected as separate 
single girders on a folding boat raft. When ready, the girders were 
lifted by man-power and the bottom pins inserted. Transoms and 
decking followed, and the completed structure was sufficiently strong 
to take Sherman tanks. The first bridges across the Senio were soon 
followed by others constructed by Corps Troops Engineers, and 
meanwhile the attacking troops surged forward to the next obstacle, 
the Santerno River, which lay three miles ahead. 

Our tanks reached the Santerno very swiftly, followed by 66 Field 
Company with bulldozers to clear the approaches and later by the 
other Companies with bridging equipment. The Santerno was even 
wider and deeper than the Senio, and the task of the 8th Divisional 
Engineers was to get the first tanks and anti-tank guns across by dawn 
on April 12th to hold a bridgehead and then to build bridges strong 
enough to carry the vehicles of the 78th Division and a Tank brigade. 
7 Field Company was to build an assault Bailey bridge for the leading 
tanks and guns, and 66 Field Company to provide the first bridge 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 169 


for wheeled traffic. Under heavy mortar and shell fire, 7 Field Com- 
pany carried out its task. 66 Field Company constructed a floating 
bridge, and thus the 78th Division and the Tank brigade were able 
to cross the river and swing northwards towards the Argenta Gap. 
After the Santerno crossing, the 8th Indian Division was withdrawn 
to a rest area and the Sapper units repaired roads between the Senio 
and Santerno and opened up routes northwards from Ravenna 
towards the Argenta Gap. 

The 13th Corps and the Polish Corps were now advancing on the 
left of the Sth Corps, but on April 13th, the 13th Corps was relieved 
by the 10th Corps and, with the 10th Indian Division, began to move 
across the rear of the Polish Corps to take over the sector of the 
2nd New Zealand Division which would then come under its com- 
mand. Every Engineer unit of the 13th Corps was to open a way 
for the advance of the New Zealanders. The attack went home with 
great power. On the !4th, the New Zealanders reached the Sillaro 
River, and six days later, the Idice. The latter was crossed quickly, 
and by April 24th, the New Zealanders were on the banks of the 
River Po some 24 hours after the 5th Army, on their left, had reached 
that river at San Benedetto, 45 miles north-west of Bologna. The 
10th Indian Division was withdrawn into Corps reserve after arriving 
on the River Reno. Al! the Engineer units of the Eighth Army 
excelled themselves in the advance from the Senio to the Po, building 
altogether more than 400 bridges and other crossings. The 56th 
and 78th Divisions were also soon on the Po having broken through 
the Argenta Gap on April [8th and 19th. On the 23rd, they had 
by-passed Ferrara which was occupied on the following day by other 
troops. The enemy was now showing signs of disorganization though 
still prepared apparently to offer some opposition to a crossing of 
the Po by the 5th Corps near the east coast. 

At this season of the year, the Po had a sluggish current running 
in a sandy bed between lofty flood banks about 400 to 1,500 feet 
apart. The 5th Corps was to attempt a crossing on a two-divisional 
front, the 56th British Division on the right and the 8th Indian Division 
on the left where a floating bridge was to be built, north of Ferrara, 
by the Corps Troops, followed by another, further to the east, when 
more equipment was available. Meanwhile, the divisions would have 
to cross by rafting. Each was allowed six rafts, some light, others 
heavy. The 8th Divisional Engineers began their ferrying operations 
north of Ferrara on the night of April 25th/26th. On the left, 7 Field 
Company built and operated a Class 9 Close Support raft from 


170 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


equipment which was quite novel to them, while on the right 66 Field 
Company operated two rafts. 69 Field Company produced a Class 
40 raft for tanks. On the 13th Corps front to the left, the 6th Armoured 
Division and the 2nd New Zealand Division also crossed the Po 
without much trouble. At all the crossing sites the infantry were 
ferried over in advance in amphibious tanks and other motorized 
craft. They rushed onwards to traverse the Bianco Canal and arrived 
on the banks of the River Adige, 15 miles away, while the Sappers 
were still rafting and bridging far behind them. The pursuit was 
developing into a rout. The end was obviously in sight. 

7 Field Company was the first unit of the 8th Divisional Engineers 
to reach the Adige. It arrived there on April 28th and immediately 
began to improvise rafts for jeeps. 66 and 69 Field Companies 
followed and built a 460 feet folding boat bridge which they called 
the “‘Roorkee Bridge’. This was on April 29th, but on the same 
day, when the Companies were due to cross to the far bank, they 
were ordered to remain where they were. There were rumours that 
a German surrender was imminent and that Mussolini had been 
executed by partisans. Padua fell on April 30th. A number of bridges 
now spanned the Adige and all organized resistance had ceased. 
The 13th Corps, headed by the New Zealanders, chased some of 
the remnants. of Kesselring’s Fourteenth German Army across the 
Piave and Isonzo Rivers and entered Trieste on May 2nd while the 
6th Armoured Division rushed northwards to prevent any escape 
into the Alps. Venice had already been occupied by the Sth Corps. 
Thus the war in Italy came to a glorious end on May 2nd, 1945, 
the day on which Berlin surrendered to the Russians and just a week 
before the final capitulation in Europe. Complete victory had been 
secured in the Italian theatre, but at what a cost in life and material! 
Could these sacrifices have been avoided by adopting a less ambitious 
policy? The verdict may be left to posterity who will be able to 
view the entire World War in better perspective. 

So many officers and other ranks of the Indian Engineers gained 
awards for bravery in the Italian field that it is impossible to record 
all their names in this narrative. The outstanding award was, of 
course, the George Cross given posthumously to Subedar Subra- 
maniam of 11 Field Park Company for his heroic act near Cassino 
in February 1944, Several British officers of the Sapper units won 
the D.S.O. and a much greater number the M.C. or the M.B.E. 
The names of many Viceroy’s Commissioned Indian Officers appeared 
in the lists of awards as recipients of the Order of British India 


Ayeay ul ASpriq Ase} Jsasuo] ay) 
‘a8piig uooyuod jaay OLET & WIM Og JAY ay) SuyuURds AUY WVYSIY ay) JO Siv0UISUq YsHiIg puL uEIpUy 


cae 
in 





ITALY, 1943 - 45 171 


(O.B.I.), Indian Order of Merit (I.0.M.) and Indian Distinguished 
Service Medal (I.D.S.M.). The 10th Divisional Engineers alone 
secured no less than 13 Military Crosses. The other ranks in all 
three Indian Divisions could show a fine array of I.D.S.Ms. and 
M.Ms. (Military Medals), and the names of those mentioned in 
despatches would fill several pages. A point which may strike a 
student of the campaign is the absence from the Honours List of 
the names of any King’s Commissioned Indian Officers (K.C.I.Os.) 
or Indian Commissioned officers (I.C.Os.) of the Engineer units. 
This is easily explained. Hardly any of these officers were present.! 
The Company Commanders and Company Officers of the units were 
almost entirely British. Their Indian counterparts could be more 
usefully employed nearer to their own country in the fight against 
Japan, but the experiences of a K.C.I.O. who was in Italy as a 
prisoner-of-war throw so much light on the Italian character that 
they should not be omitted. 

As recorded in Chapter II, Lieut. Shamsher Singh of 6! Field 
Company set out in June 1942 to do demolition work west of Mersa 
Matruh during Rommel’s breakthrough. He was not seen again, for 
he was captured and sent to Italy.2, When the Italians surrendered 
in September 1944, the Italian Commandant of the Indian P.O.W. 
Camp at Avezzano, in the Abruzzi Mountains east of Rome, told the 
prisoners that he was to hand them over to the Allies; but on Septem- 
ber 14th, after the Italian sentries had left their posts and no action 
had been taken, most of the prisoners dispersed over a countryside 
thick with Germans. As Shamsher and two other Indian officers 
had been promised a safe conduct to the British lines by an Italian 
doctor, they decided to await his appearance next morning. This 
was unfortunate because German paratroops arrived instead and the 
officers were obliged to hide for three days in the roof of a 
hospital building. One of them managed to walk out of the camp 
dressed as an Italian workman. Shamsher and the other arranged a 
rendezvous with the doctor in some woods and were just about to 
start out with an Italian guide when they heard a prolonged burst 


1 No K.C.L.Os. of the Madras, Bengal or Bombay Groups served during the war in 
Italy, though the following 1.C.Os. were present: (i) Lieut. A. L. Talwar, 301 Field 
Park Company (Bombay). (ii) Lieut. P. K. Ramakrishnan, 61 Field Company (Madras). 
Gili) Lieut. K. M. Somana, 10 Field Company (Madras). After the war, Lieut.-Colonel 
R. E. Aserappa, R.I.E., commanded the 7th Engineer Battalion in Italy from September 
1945 to February 1946. 


7 Notes by Colonel Shamsher Singh, Commandant Madras Group, Engineers, 
dated January 14th, 1953. 


172 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


of machine-gun fire. A party of V.C.Os. had tried to rush the wire 
after dark and all had been killed. Nevertheless, Shamsher and his 
companion crept out later and headed for the small village of Luco, 
north of Avezzano, where the doctor lived. Their guide had vanished 
at the sound of the firing and they soon stumbled into a Panzer 
laager, but fortunately all the Germans were asleep and after four 
hours’ marching they took cover in a haystack. At daylight they 
found they were close to the village whose inhabitants, including the 
doctor, gave them a most friendly welcome. There they stayed for 
some time, living in small stone huts among vineyards and climbing 
a near-by mountain by day to watch the British air-attacks below 
or to shelter in caves if the weather was bad. They fetched their 
food from the village—a daily dish of beans and macaroni and a 
lunch consisting of two potatoes and a slice of bread. 

From the middle of October, the Germans started to hunt the 
prisoners-of-war with troops armed with mortars and machine guns, 
though without success. On November Sth, after snow had fallen, 
the fugitives managed to find shelter in Luco in a friendly farmer’s 
house, but not for long because the man was terrified at the prospect 
of reprisals. Sure enough, a party of Germans arrived one morning 
before dawn, captured two of Shamsher’s friends and asked ‘‘Where 
is the third man?’ The farmer and his family refused to answer 
and were brutally beaten up. Shamsher was hiding under a bed. 
A German soldier removed the blankets, but when his electric torch 
went out he cleared off. The farmer's wife then reappeared, sobbing, 
and gave Shamsher some clothes in which he escaped alone into the 
hills. On December 8th, with two others, he started to try to reach 
the British front near Cassino. They ran into a cordon of Italian 
Fascists and had to turn back. At Luco once more, they were given 
shelter by a young Italian smuggler. This man was quite willing to 
take them in provided that they would agree that between his smuggling 
trips he and his wife should occupy the only double bed in the house! 
Of course, they agreed gladly, and during the long winter months 
they spent most of their time in bed while the smuggler was absent. 
Food was scarce and they were weak. On March 6th, 1945, as the 
weather had improved, they decided to start out once more. They 
climbed into the hills and immediately were engulfed in a storm. 
At 2. a.m. while sheltering in some caves, they were roughly awakened 
by a party of Germans. A Fascist had sold them for 5,000 lire apiece. 
And so, back they went to Luco and then to a P.O.W. camp after 
six months of comparative freedom in the Abruzzi Mountains. 


ITALY, 1943 - 45 173 


No doubt, many other Allied prisoners-of-war had similar ex- 
periences in Italy. They had been advised by their Governments not 
to attempt to escape after the Italian armistice but to stay in their 
camps until liberated. This proved to be most unfortunate, for the 
Germans took charge at once. Yet many officers and men were 
hidden and shielded by the Italians until the Germans were thrown 
out of the country. Shamsher Singh records that his chief problems 
were cold, lice and Germans, in that order. The Italians themselves 
seemed to be simple, honest country folk, kind and hospitable. They 
gave of their best, and the services of some of them were duly re- 
cognized after the war. The Italian doctor, for instance, was awarded 
a M.B.E. 

After the German capitulation on May 2nd, 1945, there was much 
work for the Indian Engineer units in the way of dismantling some 
bridges, completing others, building prisoner-of-war camps to hold 
thousands of the enemy, collecting stores and packing up. The 8th 
Divisional Engineers dismantled several bridges on the River Adige, 
including the ‘Roorkee’ Bridge, and 7 Field Company completed a 
510 feet high-level Bailey bridge at Badia on the same river. After- 
wards, the Division was withdrawn to a rest camp at Foligno, south 
of Perugia, whence it moved down to Taranto where 7, 66 and 69 
Field Companies and 47 Field Park Company embarked for India 
on June 20th. They had a great welcome when they reached their 
headquarters at Roorkee in July. They were followed by other units 
of the Bengal Group. | Field Company embarked at Taranto on 
July 15th, but 5 Field Company and 41 Field Park Company of the 
10th Divisional Engineers did not get away until November, as also 
the other two units of that formation, 10 and 61 Field Companies 
of the Madras Group. There was much reconstruction work to be 
done, and huge camps for prisoners-of-war were required at Rimini 
where 52 Army Troops Company was employed until it left for 
India in July. 97 Field Company (Bombay) and 14 Field Company 
(Madras) were kept in Italy until the autumn of 1945. 14 Field 
Company reached Taranto from the north in the middle of May and 
began to build P.O.W. cages for 50,000 men; but on July 18th, 
when it was actually on the quayside waiting to embark for India, 
the order were cancelled and it was sent far northwards to the region 
of Venice to build bridges, erect huts and demolish dangerous build- 
ings. 97 Field Company suffered a like disappointment, and it was 
not until October 19th that both units were able to sail from Taranto. 


174 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


By the middle of November, not a single Field unit of the Indian 
Engineers remained on Italian soil. 

At the conclusion of the campaign Field-Marshal Alexander sent 
the following message to all the Allied Engineer units in Italy, 
“Seldom have Engineers been faced with a more difficult task than 
in the Italian campaign. By surmounting every obstacle which has 
confronted you, from the beaches of Sicily across the mountains 
and rivers of Italy to the Alps, and by developing with such success 
the local production of equipment and material, you have in no small 
measure contributed to our victory. Feats of engineering without 
parallel in any other campaign have been performed. You may be 
proud of your achievements and I congratulate you on your magni- 
ficent work’. Thus the Indian Engineers, together with their British, 
American, French, Italian, Brazilian, Polish, Jewish, Greek and 
Algerian comrades, received a fitting recognition of their work in 
a long and exacting struggle. 

The story of the Indian Engineers in Africa, the Middle East, 
Italy and Greece ends with their departure from Taranto after the 
defeat of Germany in all theatres. It is a remarkable one, but a still 
greater remains to be recorded—that of the war against Japan. This 
was an ordeal much nearer the home of every Indian soldier and 
consequently of more intimate concern to the gallant Indian Army. 


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CHAPTER VII 


MALAYA, 1941 - 1942 


ARLY in 1942 the Bombay Sappers and Miners suffered the 
Epes: disaster in their long record of distinguished service, 

for when Singapore surrendered to the Japanese they lost two- 
thirds of their Regular units. At Kut-al-Amara in the First World 
War they had lost two Field Companies!, but at Singapore they 
were deprived of no fewer than four Field Companies, a Field Park 
Company and an Army Troops Company. Thereafter only by the 
most strenuous efforts could they recruit and train men to take the 
place of those who had become prisoners of war, for there were few 
old soldiers left in the headquarters at Kirkee to form a nucleus for an 
expansion which had to reach almost ten times the pre-war strength. 
Yet the seemingly impossible was accomplished, and with such speed 
that units were able to take a conspicuous part in the campaigns 
in Burma. The Madras and Bengal Sappers also suffered at Singapore 
though much more lightly. The former lost two Field Companies, 
an Army Troops Company and two Bridging Sections; the latter, a 
Field Company and a Field Park Company. The price exacted by 
a vacillating pre-war policy in Malaya was indeed a heavy one. 

A fortress incapable of all-round defence belies its title. Such 
was Singapore in 1941. As in the cases of Sebastopol in the Crimean 
War and Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War it fell to an assault 
from land. So also did Hong Kong; but Hong Kong like Gibraltar 
was at least designed by Nature for defence. Singapore, on the other 
hand, had no such advantages. Deep shelters could not be dug in 
its flat expanses of reclaimed mangrove swamp. To seaward it was 
immensely strong. Two batteries of huge 15-inch guns, and many 
others of smaller calibres, could sweep the sea approaches for miles, 
but to landward it was wide open to attack. Under the conditions 
obtaining in 1941, it could no longer be considered defensible against 
a major assault unless we held command of both the sea and air. 
It was the site of an important naval base; but the base was located 
on the northern side of Singapore Island and separated from the 
mainland only by a very narrow stretch of water. 








1 See In Kut and Captivity, by Major E. W. C. Sandes, M.c., R.E., (the present author). 
175 


176 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The Malayan Peninsula is about 450 miles in length from the 
border of Thailand (Siam) in the north to the narrow Strait of Johore 
which separates the mainland from the Island of Singapore. The 
Island itself is about 28 miles from east to west and 14 miles from 
north to south. Its only link with the mainland is the Johore Cause- 
way, a wide and massive structure, about 1,200 yards in length, 
which carries two lines of railway, a road and some large water 
mains. A range of mountains forms a backbone to most of the 
peninsula. To east and west, there are coastal plains. The eastern 
coastline has many sandy beaches suitable for landings, but the 
western littoral is composed largely of mangrove swamps. Three- 
quarters of the peninsula is covered with dense jungle—huge tropical 
trees laced with strong creepers, impenetrable bamboo thickets, 
exquisite flowers and gigantic ferns. It is all remarkably beautiful 
and all equally deadly to human life. Malaria stalks the unwary. 
The humid atmosphere saps the strength of the intruder. Wild 
animals and poisonous snakes infest the forest depths, and the per- 
petual twilight beneath the canopy of tall trees induces a feeling 
of melancholia and malaise. Hundreds of small rivers and streams 
afford means of inland travel, but otherwise the communications in 
the interior are primitive, or were so in 1939. In those days a single 
line of railway followed the west coast northwards from Singapore 
to the Thailand border beyond Alor Star, with a loop line from 
Gemas to Kota Bahru at the eastern end of the border. The loop 
line continued onwards into Thailand, rejoining the main line near 
the port of Singora (Songkhla) on the east coast. A good tarred 
road followed the west coast, but road communications on the east 
coast were often very defective or even non-existent. In many places, 
the jungle had been cleared to form rubber estates or mining areas, 
each of which had a network of small but excellent metalled roads. 
Out of a total population of 5,300,000 no less than 2,200,000 were 
Chinese. Indeed, they slightly outnumbered the Malays themselves, 
the remainder being composed of 740,000 Indians, 47,000 Europeans 
and Eurasians, 30,000 Aboriginals, 8,000 Japanese and some thousands 
of Jews, Arabs and other nationalities. The Chinese, mostly capi- 
talists and traders, were pro-British in that they hated and feared 
Japan. The Malays disliked the Chinese because the latter had 
exploited their country; their attitude to the British was therefore 
doubtful. Some of the Indians were traders, but most were coolies 
pS eg ee hr ee 


1 See the map of Malaya included in this chapter. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 177 


from the Madras area. The Europeans and Eurasians were in 
Government service or employed in mining areas, rubber estates or 
business concerns. The Japanese were mostly spies disguised as 
photographers, fisherman, traders, or what not. In Singapore itself, 
three-quarters of the population of 700,000 were Chinese. It is 
obvious that Malaya afforded ideal opportunities for ‘Fifth Column’ 
activities, a fact which the Japanese were not slow to recognise. 
They surveyed the country, and its resources and peoples, with the 
greatest care. 

In order to explain the nature of the employment of the Indian 
Sappers and Miners in the Malayan Campaign, it is necessary to 
examine the situation in the Far East after the First World War 
in which Japan had been our ally. Soon after the 1914-18 War it 
became apparent that an over-populated and ambitious Nippon 
might become inimical to our interests and that therefore we needed 
a naval base in Far Eastern waters to supplement Hong Kong. 
Singapore was selected as the site. It lay on the main shipping route 
between Europe and the Far East, and the Strait of Johore, separating 
the island from the mainland, afforded a fine natural harbour. There- 
fore it was decided in 1921 that we should establish a naval base on 
Singapore Island to counter any threat by Japan against Hong Kong, 
Malaya, British Borneo, New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand and 
perhaps Burma and India. Various schemes were considered, but 
when a Labour Government came into power in 1924 all prelimi- 
nary work was suspended though it was resumed under a Conservative 
Government at the end of the year. This break in continuity was 
not only unfortunate but expensive. The defences of Singapore 
were designed on the presumption that the security of the base would 
depend on the ability of the British Fleet to retain control of the 
sea communications leading to it. The seemingly remote possibility 
of a landward assault on the island was, of course, considered; but 
with a British Fleet in full control of the seas, Japan’s only hope of 
capturing Singapore appeared to be by a surprise landing of a small 
expedition near Mersing on the east coast of Malaya from which 
shore-based aircraft could operate. The expedition could not be 
large because the nearest Japanese base was at Formosa, 1,520 miles 
away, and the range of aircraft at that time was strictly limited. The 
defence of the entire Malayan peninsula seemed unnecessary. The 
problem was confined to the defence of Singapore Island and the 
adjacent waters, for which only a small military garrison would be 
needed. Therefore, as the Jandward side appeared to be secure, the 


178 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


naval base and other important installations on the island were 
placed on that side, contiguous to the anchorages in the Johore Strait. 
The seaward side was made impregnable by massing heavy guns 
capable of repelling any surprise attack by hostile ships which might 
evade our fleet. 

The rapid development of air power soon began to affect the 
problem and it became possible that Singapore might be exposed 
to attack by carrier-borne and shore-based aircraft operating from 
much greater distances. By 1925, the question of the best means 
of closing the ‘back door’ to the fortress had become pressing. The 
Cabinet decided that it should be closed by air, operating from 
aerodromes as near the Thailand frontier as possible. Four years 
later, following on another change of Government in England, the 
work at Singapore suffered a further interruption and was not 
resumed until April 1933, when Japan announced her withdrawal 
from the League of Nations. It was then decided that work on the 
defences should be accelerated and completed within 34 years. Colonel 
A. C. Dobson arrived as the first Chief Engineer, bringing with him 
a large staff of R.E. Officers, and the armaments and defences on 
the seaward side grew rapidly. 

The question of the best locations for additional aerodromes to 
protect Singapore from the north was already under discussion. 
At the moment, only one aerodrome was available, situated on 
Singapore Island. To obtain the greatest air-range in the direction 
of the potential enemy, Japan, it was decided that some aerodromes 
should be constructed on the east coast which had purposely been 
left without good communications in order to present an invading 
force with transport difficulties. The Army stipulated that these 
aerodromes should not be made unless they could be occupied and 
operated to full capacity by the Royal Air Force and properly defended 
by ground troops. An alternative plan for locating them on the west 
‘coast was abandoned because our aircraft would have to cross a 
range of mountains before coming into action eastwards. Army 
dispositions had to conform to Air dispositions, and the latter were 
dependent on suitable ground for aerodromes for heavy bombers. 
The only suitable areas on the east coast happened to be close to 
beaches which were, in fine weather, ideal for enemy landings, and 
accordingly the Army problem was extended from the defence of 
the naval base at Singapore to the defence of these exposed aero- 
dromes. Eventually three such aerodromes were built. They were 
completed in 1941 just in time to be a priceless gift to the Japanese. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 179 


In November 1935, Major-General W. G. S. Dobbie (late R.E.) 
was appointed G.O.C. Malaya, and two years later, Colonel (after- 
wards Lieut.-General) A. E. Percival, who was General Dobbie’s 
G.S.0O.1., prepared an appreciation, from the Japanese point of 
view, for an attack on Singapore. The situation in Europe having 
deteriorated, Percival remarked that it was unlikely that the British 
Fleet could reach Singapore within 70 days, which was then estimated 
as the time during which the garrison might be able to hold out 
unaided, and that therefore the Japanese might be able to land 
powerful forces on the east coast, seize the aerodromes on that side, 
move across the peninsula to capture Penang Island, and finally 
attempt to take Singapore. They might even try to occupy Southern 
Thailand and establish bases there. Air and ground reinforcements 
were therefore urgently needed. It will be seen that the future War- 
time Commander of the forces in Malaya was under no illusions as 
to the increasing danger of the situation. In May 1938, General 
Dobbie himself wrote that the greatest potential danger to Singapore 
was an attack from the north, and that such an attack could be 
carried out during the period of the north-east monsoon. He added 
that, contrary to previous ideas, the Malayan jungle was not impassable 
for infantry and that he was reconnoitring for further defensive 
positions across the peninsula some’ 25 miles north of Singapore 
Island. A line of concrete pill-boxes was started along the eastern 
half of this defensive zone and was being extended westwards when 
General Dobbie was succeeded in 1939 by Major-General L. V. Bond, 
(late R.E.), an ex-Bengal Sapper and Miner. The work had to be 
done mostly by contract labour so that secrecy was impossible. It is 
evident therefore that a serious attack on Singapore from the north 
was envisaged at least two years before it actually occurred even 
though, for various reasons, the measures taken to resist that attack 
were inadequate. Meanwhile, £60,000,000 had been spent on making 
Singapore the strongest naval base in the world. To seaward it 
merited that description, but only to seaward. 

As already indicated, the defence policy up to the summer of 
1939 was founded on the assumption that the arrival of the British 
fleet might be expected within 70 days of the outbreak of war against 
Japan, but the period was then extended to 180 days because of the 
critical situation in Europe. This extension immediately changed the 
defence requirements in Malaya. Given a longer respite from naval 
attack, the Japanese could afford to establish their main bases at a 
greater distance from Singapore, probably in Southern Thailand, with 


180 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


or without the consent of the Thais. It might therefore be necessary 
to hold the northern frontier of Malaya for several months against 
a powerful army, and it was estimated that, even if our Air Force 
could deal effectively with any sea-borne expeditions, we should 
require about 2} divisions, with supporting arms, to hold our own. 
The problem, in fact, had developed into a defence of the entire 
peninsula and not merely of Singapore Island and a strip of the 
adjacent mainland. Full reliance was still placed, of course, on the 
ability of the French forces in French Indo-China to prevent an 
enemy advance overland towards Thailand and Malaya. The French 
were reinforcing their garrisons and seemed to be full of fight. 

Such was the general situation shortly before war was declared’ 
on Germany on September 3rd, 1939. The garrison of Malaya then 
amounted to considerably less than the equivalent of one division, 
though afterwards it was reinforced from time to time as the political 
horizon darkened in the Far East. Malaya ranked low in order of 
priority for reinforcement because Japan was still neutral. However, 
the first nucleus of a Field Force was despatched as soon as 
possible from India. It consisted of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade 
(‘‘Emu” Brigade) under Brigadier A. C. M. Paris with some Moun- 
tain Artillery and 15 Field Company, Q.V’s O. Madras Sappers and 
Miners, the latter being commanded by Major J. F. Godwin, R.E. 
Pending the arrival of more troops, the primary duty of the 12th 
Brigade was to defend the naval base on Singapore Island. 15 Field 
Company, together with 5 Field Company (Bengal) and 22 Field 
Company (Bombay), had been selected in 1934 for ‘‘Indianization,’™) 
and all four subalterns of the unit were now Indians. They were 
Lieuts. Partap Narain, R. K. Kochhar, M. G. Bewoor and A. N. 
Kashyap. The Company disembarked at Singapore on August 8th, 
1939, and for some months was employed chiefly on improving the 
accommodation on the island and building a light railway. ‘‘On August 
10th”, writes Brigadier Partap Narain®, “I was ordered to take my 
Section to Penang. It was the only Engineer Unit in Northern Malaya 
so I spent the next few days in reconnaissances along the border. 
We reconnoitred all the roads and bridges, and particularly the 
Tailway lines, leading into Thailand. Ona peaceful Sunday, September 





1See The Indian Sappers and Miners, by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.S.0., 
M.C., p. 657, 


2“With the Madras Sappers’, by ‘Kashmiri’, appearing in The Journal of the Insti- 
tution of Military Engineers, October 1950, pp. 341-347. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 181 


3rd, as we sat in the Mess, we heard the news of the declaration of 
war against Germany. We started repairing the fixed defence lights 
and got the engines at Batu Maung working by the 13th, but other- 
wise life went on much as usual with parties, lunches and bathes on 
the beautiful beaches. On October 23rd I took the Section out to 
camp at Alor Star for a week. We lived in the drill hall of the Malaya 
Volunteers, a force composed mainly of European planters who, like 
everyone else in Malaya, took life very easily. One of our major 
tasks was to prepare the railway line from Thailand for demolition. 
All the bridges were prepared with charges in the abutments and 
steel plates on the girders for placing charges. My Section had not 
only to prepare the railway bridges for demolition but also all the 
other bridges on the routes into Malaya—a really stupendous under- 
taking as I had no other officers or N.C.Os to help me and only 
two havildars. After nearly six months in Penang we were relieved 
by another Section under Bewoor and moved to Kuala Lumpur to 
construct a brigade camp, and later, on completion of this work, 
we went back to Singapore and rejoined the Company in Tyersell 
Park Camp which housed our famous “‘Emu”’ Brigade under Brigadier 
Paris. From Singapore I went on various reconnaissances including 
those to the east coast where the Japanese finally decided to land 
in spite of the fact that it was believed at that time to be too treacher- 
ous for such operations.” 

The collapse of France in June 1940 radically altered the situation 
in the Far East. French Indo-China, under Vichy control, now no 
longer provided a buffer State north and east of Thailand. In Septem- 
ber 1940, the Vichy authorities allowed Japanese forces to occupy 
the northern portion of their territory and thus to concentrate within 
striking distance of Malaya. The Japanese were then well placed to 
launch amphibious attacks, supported by shore-based aircraft, 
across a comparatively short sea-gap. Nevertheless, Japan was still 
nominally neutral, as also was Thailand whose inhabitants, it was 
hoped, would resist a Japanese incursion if we were careful to respect 
their neutrality and keep to our side of the border. It was obvious, 
of course, that Japan intended to invade Malaya at some future 
date, and from the summer of 1940 onwards, every effort was made 
to reinforce the garrison. Two British battalions arrived in August 
from Shanghai, which had been evacuated, and in October and 
November the 6th and 8th Brigades of the 1IIth Indian Division 
(Major-General Murray-Lyon) landed from India. In February 1941 
came the first contingent of Australian troops belonging to the 8th 


182 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Australian Division (Major-General Gordon Bennett), and in March, 
the 15th Brigade of the 9th Indian Division (Major-General A. E. 
Barstow), followed in April by the 22nd Brigade. The 15th Brigade 
then joined the 6th Brigade to form the 11th Division which was 
to hold the frontier in Kedah State in the north-west while 
the 22nd Brigade, with the 8th Brigade, formed the 9th Division 
guarding the east coast. 

In May 1941, Lieut.-General Sir Lewis Heath assumed command 
of the 3rd Indian Corps in Malaya which comprised the 9th and 
11th Indian Divisions, the Singapore and Penang garrisons, and the 
Federated Malay States and Straits Settlements Volunteers. Roughly 
speaking, the two Indian divisions held the northern frontier and 
east coast and the 12th Brigade supplied the garrisons for the two 
islands. In the Malacca and Johore States, the 8th Australian Division 
blocked the road southwards to Singapore. But every division was 
under strength. Most of the men were practically untrained in jungle 
warfare, for which their equipment was also unsuitable. They were 
supported by inadequate air strength and artillery, they had hardly 
any anti-aircraft guns, and they had no tanks. This last was the fatal 
deficiency which eventually proved their undoing. Yet they did their 
utmost to prepare for the coming storm. Several anti-invasion 
defence schemes were launched in which the Engineer units took a 
prominent part. These included the preparation of defences at 
probable landing places near Kota Bahru and Mersing on the east 
coast and on Singapore Island itself, and also fortifying a ‘Jitra 
Defence Line’ in Northern Kedah, some 10 miles short of the nearest 
part of the Thailand border. 

A number of Sapper and Miner Units arrived in Malaya during 
1940 and 194} to reinforce 15 Field Company of the Madras Corps, 
which, from December 1940 onwards, was under the command of 
Major R. B. Muir, R.E. Of the Bengal Corps, 3 Field Company 
(Major A. R. Beattie, R.E.), together with 43 Field Park Company 
and 54 Field Stores Section, disembarked in November 1940. During 
1941, with various brigades, many Bombay Sapper Units made their 
appearance in Malaya. These were 17 Field Company (Major N. S. 
Bhagat, I.E.), 19 Field Company (Major M. Delmé Radcliffe, R.E.), 
22 Field Company (Major H. T. Heard, R.E.), 23 Field Company 
(Major J. E. Bate, R.E.), 42 Field Park Company (Major T. W. 
Nash, R.E.), and 45 Army Troops Company (Major R. Dinwiddie, 
R.E.). 1 Artisan Works Company (Major J. H. Heep, R.E.), also 
landed. The Madras Sapper units which arrived during 1941 were 





Jungle training in Malaya 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 183 


46 Army Troops Company (Major J. R. S. W. Elkington, R.E.) and 
6 and 14 Bridging Sections (later called Platoons). Neither of the 
Bridging Sections had their full equipment so they were employed 
mostly on defence work and ‘ferrying’ troops and stores from place 
to place. 13 Field Company (Major B. E. Whitman, R.E.), the last 
Sapper and Miner reinforcement sent to Malaya, did not reach the 
country until January 3rd, 1942. 

When war was declared against Japan, Brigadier I. Simson was 
Chief Engineer, Malaya Command, having succeeded Brigadier J. A. 
C. Pennycuick in that appointment. Colonel H. A. Urquhart was 
Deputy Chief Engineer. The Chief Engineer, 3rd Corps, was Brigadier 
K. B. S. Crawford, an ex-Bombay Sapper and Miner of Kut-al-Amara 
days who, having been a prisoner of war for 24 years with the Turks, 
was destined to spend a still longer period in Japanese prison camps. 
The 9th Divisional Engineers (C.R.E. Lieut.-Colonel T. H. Lindesay, 
R.E.) comprised 19 Field Company (8th Brigade), 22 Field Company 
(22nd Brigade) and 42 Field Park Company. The I1th Divisional 
Engineers (C.R.E. Lieut.-Colonel J. F. D. Steedman, R.E.) comprised 
3 Field Company (6th Brigade), 17 Field Company (28th Brigade), 
23 Field Company (15th Brigade) and 43 Field Park Company. As 
Corps Troops, there were 45 and 46 Army Troops Companies and 
1 Artisan Works Company. These, with the two Bridging Sections, 
complete the list of Indian Engineer units. In addition there were 
two Australian Engineer Field Companies with the 22nd and 27th 
Australian Brigades of the 8th Division and also an Australian Field 
Park Company. The Singapore Fortress Engineers, under Lieut.- 
Colonel H. M. Taylor, R.E., included 35, 36 and 41 Fortress Compa- 
nies, R.E., and there was an R.E. Works organization under Colonel 
W. H. Treays, late R.E. An Engineer Section of the Federated Malay 
States Volunteers operated as Corps Troops, and another belonging 
to the Straits Settlements Volunteers helped the Singapore Fortress 
Engineers. Altogether, there was quite an imposing array of Engineer 
talent, but it came too late to save Malaya and it arrived in driblets. 
The Chief Engineer and his Deputy were saddled with much detailed 
work in connection with accommodation and other matters on the 
lines of communication and on Singapore Island from which they 
should have been relieved by the formation of L. of C. and Base 
Areas. Yet they never ceased to press for more defences at the front 
and on the island and to endeavour to improve those already in 
existence. 


184 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Based on the idea that attack is the best method of defence, a 
scheme had been evolved to counter a possible pre-war Japanese 
move into Thailand. This was to advance to and occupy the Thai 
port of Singora on the east coast which the enemy would probably 
use for an invasion of the Kedah State preparatory to a thrust down 
the west coast towards Singapore. At Singora, in the event of war, 
we should be able to meet the enemy on the beaches and make use 
of additional aerodromes, but unfortunately our forces in the Alor 
Star district of Kedah were 30 miles from the Thailand border and 
amounted to only two weak brigades of the 11th Division. A still 
more ambitious plan to advance to the narrowest neck of Thailand— 
the Kra Isthmus, 200 miles beyond Singora and adjacent to Port 
Victoria at the southernmost tip of Burma—was also considered but 
was abandoned as impracticable. A decision was reached that 
‘‘Operation Matador’, the occupation of Singora, should be launched 
when opportunity offered, and as this scheme involved an advance 
from an inland frontier village called Kroh in order to capture a 
commanding position called ‘‘The Ledge” on the road to Patani, 
which lay far beyond the frontier, some Sapper officers disguised as 
planters or mining engineers were sent to make the necessary recon- 
naissances. As asafeguard against the failure of ‘“‘Operation Matador”, 
the construction of a defence line was begun in Kedah itself. This 
was known as the ‘“‘Jitra Line.”” Strenuous efforts were made to 
complete the undertaking in the limited time available; but labour 
was scarce, and without the necessary excavators and pumps, little 
could be accomplished. Much of the Jitra Line existed only on 
paper when the Japanese attack developed. 

Meanwhile, on the east coast of Malaya, the 9th Divisional 
Engineers were busily engaged on beach defences. Again, there 
was not sufficient time, labour or materials. At Kota Bahru, the 
8th Brigade had to defend no less than 26 miles of beach and 3 aero- 
dromes. Additional pill-boxes were built hurriedly on the beaches 
by 19 Field Company while the infantry put up defensive wiring. 
Attempts were made also to extemporise anti-boat obstacles with 
timber in the absence of tubular scaffolding, but they were not very 
successful. There was only one way in which the brigade could hope 
to defend the beaches and that was by the use of mobile columns. 
These needed good roads; but most of the road-making machinery 
and transport had been allotted for the construction of seventeen 
airfields in various parts of the country. There was no road south- 
wards from Kota Bahru. Communication was maintained along the 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 185 


railway line through Kuala Lipis and Jerantut. At Kuantan, further 
south, the problems of the 22nd Brigade and 22 Field Company 
were very similar except that communication was entirely by road as 
there was no railway connection. The river mouth at Kuantan 
presented a bottle-neck to any withdrawal as it had not been bridged. 
The construction of a floating bridge made of local boats was there- 
fore put in hand. The boats had to be towed from Singapore since 
no road transport could be obtained. Many foundered ev route, 
and those which arrived needed extensive repairs. Thus in spite of 
every effort, the Kuantan bridge could not be completed in time. 

Some of the tribulations of the Sapper Companies with the Ith 
Division in the north may be gathered from an account by Lieut.- 
Colonel J. R. S. W. Elkington, R.E., who was then in command of 
46 Army Troops Company. This unit landed at Port Swettenham, 
near Kuala Lumpur, on June 4th, 1941, and moved northwards by 
rail to Sungei Patani, some 40 miles south of Alor Star.2 It camped 
in a rubber plantation which the Madras Sappers, accustomed to 
brilliant sunshine, found most depressing. “‘Even the birds and 
monkeys fight shy of rubber plantations” writes Elkington. “They 
are no places for men to live in.” It seems that the prevailing habit 
was to locate camps on rubber estates. Good local communications 
were thus secured and also concealment from the air, but at a consi- 
derable price in comfort and happiness. Perhaps the Malayan cam- 
paign might have ended differently if some of the pre-war labour 
devoted to camp sites had been used instead on additional defence 
works. But it is easy to be wise after the event. The policy 
was laid down by Government and the Engineers had to carry it 
into effect. 

The defence area allotted to the 11th Division extended from the 
Thailand border back to the mouth of the Muda River at Sungei 
Patani and was divided into a series of demolition belts. Of these, 
46 Army Troops Company was responsible for three—Belt *‘A” on 
and immediately south of the border, Belt ‘‘B’ centred on Alor 
Star, and Belt “‘C”’ centred on Sungei Patani and the Muda River. 
It was appreciated that in the humid conditions in Malaya the water- 
proofing of demolition charges would be very important, and 46 
Company was the first unit to use a well-known rubber article, 





! Notes entitled “46 Army Troops Company in the Malayan Campaign, 1941 to 
February 1942”, by Lieut.-Colonel J. R. S. W. Elkington, R.E., dated March Sth, 1951. 


* See the map of Kedah and Perak States included in this chapter. 


186 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


obtainable from chemists’ shops, to protect its detonators and primers. 
This soon became the standard practice with all Engineer units, and 
during the months that followed, every chemist’s shop in the country 
was denuded. Malthusian principles were applied to warlike opera- 
tions, and with remarkable success. Had this not been done, hundreds 
of demolitions would have failed while our troops were withdrawing 
before the enemy. 

It soon became apparent that, if the Japanese attacked, 46 Army 
Troops Company might have to assist in the destruction of airfields. 
Some gelignite which the Royal Air Force had stored for this purpose 
had deteriorated, and the Company was detailed to remove and 
destroy it. A brown fluid was already oozing from the canisters so 
the task was highly dangerous and unpleasant, but it was performed 
without any casualties. During November 194! the tension in the 
Far East increased, and on November 30th one Section of the unit 
was sent northwards to a railway station in Belt ““A” on the frontier 
to demolish the station and a number of bridges while the remainder 
of the men worked in the Jitra position. The unit had been allotted 
its part in “Operation Matador.” It was to move to Hat Yai Railway 
Junction, south of Singora in Thailand, for road maintenance, but 
it was likely that it might have to act also as a Field Company. For 
such a role it lacked the necessary equipment. Improvisation there- 
fore became the order of the day. Bamboo was used to make 
Bangalore torpedoes and booby traps, and igniters for demolitions 
were manufactured from rifle cartridges, using a nail as a firing pin. 

A Bengal Sapper unit which did good work near the Thailand 
border before hostilities began was 3 Field Company under Major 
A. R. Beattie, R.E. With 43 Field Park Company, it had landed in 
Malaya on November Ist, 1940, and had spent nearly a year with 
the 11th Division in the Jitra region engaged on the construction of 
concrete pill-boxes and other field defences, bridging, well-sinking and 
providing booms across the mouths of rivers. Meanwhile 43 Field 
Park Company, established first at Kuala Lumpur, operated workshops 
which produced sets of shuttering for the pill-box work and 
many other useful articles. In May 1941, it moved up to Sungei 
Patani to join the 11th Division and established a forward dump 
for the supply of materials to the Jitra Line, including sets of mobile 
timber bridging to accelerate the work. The Jitra Line, however, 
already extended some 18 miles inland from the west coast 
and it could not be properly fortified and prepared for demolition 
before the storm broke. The troops had been taught to think 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 187 


‘offensively.’ They were eager to advance into Thailand and were 
confident that the position would never be used. This, no doubt, 
had some effect in slowing down the pace of construction although 
the infantry working parties and civilian labour gangs were busy from 
sunrise to sunset under very trying conditions. The truth is that 
the Jitra Line was located too far forward to stop a really serious 
invasion from the north combined with threats from the east. 

At 7.50 a.m. on December 7th, 1941, 360 Japanese planes, operating 
from carriers below the horizon, made a surprise attack on the 
American fleet and installations at Pearl Harbour in the Hawaii 
Islands of the Pacific while Japanese envoys were in peaceful dis- 
cussion with the American Government in Washington. No declara- 
tion of war preceded this unique act of treachery. The attack- 
ing planes came on in three waves directed against the American 
warships, moored closely in harbour, the troops in barracks and the 
airfields. Of eight battleships, one was wrecked, another capsized 
and three others were submerged. No less than nineteen ships were 
hit, though fortunately the aircraft carriers escaped damage as they 
happened to be at sea. Three-quarters of the aircraft at Pearl 
Harbour were destroyed on the ground, and a total of 2,800 officers 
and men were killed and 900 wounded. This dastardly act brought 
the United States automatically into the war against Japan, and with 
her, Great Britain. Italy and Germany promptly declared war against 
the United States. By a coup de main the Japanese Navy had gained 
complete command of the Far Eastern seas. In the Pacific, Guam 
and Wake Islands fell to the enemy; only Midway Island survived 
to form an American outpost. Hordes of Japanese invaded the 
Philippine Islands, north of Borneo, where the American General 
MacArthur put up a desperate defence. Hong Kong, the only re- 
maining British foothold in China was besieged. 

No Indian Sappers and Miners were in Hong Kong when it was 
attacked, but as the C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Wilson, R.E., was 
an ex-Bengal Sapper and Miner, a brief description may be given 
of the course of events. The small garrison fought with great determi- 
nation though under hopeless conditions. They could expect no 
reinforcement by land, sea or air. As the defence plans pre-supposed 
a friendly China and envisaged only a sea-borne attack, the coastal 
artillery had been sited accordingly. The garrison took up battle 
stations two days before the Japanese crossed the land frontier at 
Kowloon at dawn on December 7th, 1941. Demolition charges 
were then blown and the forward troops fell back to a defended 


188 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


line across the Kowloon isthmus, but as the line was 1! miles in 
length there were insufficient men to hold it. A further withdrawal 
to the Hong Kong peninsula was unavoidable. There, a few days 
later, the enemy succeeded in making a landing and cutting the 
defence in two. Gradually, the garrison was worn down. Under 
continuous bombardment and assault, the defenders reached a state 
of complete exhaustion and on Christmas Day they were obliged 
to lay down their arms. Thus a natural fortress which was expected 
to hold out for 6 months fell in the short space of 18 days. 

“The Japanese forces were well-trained troops who had served 
in China” writes Lieut.-Colonel Wilson.! ‘“‘They were supported by 
ample artillery and the infantry had small quick-firing guns. For 
close support they relied on mortars which had a range of about 
2,000 yards. Their artillery fire was accurate, but the shells were 
of poor quality. The infantry fought well with the bayonet. Air 
action took the form of frequent light raids with small bombs. After 
the surrender, the Japanese adopted their usual custom of giving 
complete licence to their victorious troops. There was much looting, 
rape and murder. The inhabitants were forced to pay elaborate 
signs of respect to the conquerors. The attitude towards prisoners-of- 
war was very uncertain. If you met an educated Japanese officer 
who was not responsible for you he might be quite friendly; but 
those charged with your custody were expected to treat you as some- 
thing lower than a coolie. The rank and file of the P. of W. guards 
were Formosans. Only the officers and senior N.C.Os were Japanese. 
The real power was held by the Colone!l—fat, elusive and repulsive— 
and by the N.C.Os and interpreters. The N.C.Os managed the For- 
mosans and awarded punishments for most derelictions of duty. 
They dealt with minor cases with a slap, and more serious cases 
with a regular ‘beat-up.. One got the impression that the enemy 
was desperately short of the real officer class.” There can be no 
doubt that the Japanese habitually treated the rank and file of their 
prisoners-of-war with the utmost brutality. Hundreds died during 
a cruel march from Hong Kong after the surrender, and hundreds 
more during the ensuing years of captivity. To the Japanese soldier, 
Surrender is an unspeakable degradation and he treats his captives 
accordingly. Simultaneously with the attack on Hong Kong, Japanese 
columns crossed into French Indo-China. Troops from enemy 
warships were landed near Bangkok and the Thai capital was 


1 Notes of Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Wilson, R.E., dated November 7th, 1951. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 189 


was occupied on December 8th. Within the next fortnight, the Thais 
signed a treaty of alliance with the enemy. Thus, except for such 
resistance as might be offered by three weak divisions, Malaya was 
immediately thrown wide open to invasion, not only by land, but 
by sea and air. 

On December 6th, before Pearl Harbour, our air reconnaissance 
had reported two Japanese convoys, comprising both warships and 
transports, south-east of Cape Cambodia in Indo-China, and on 
the 7th an enemy aircraft, flying very high, was detected over Alor 
Star airfield. This was probably the first hostile machine to cross 
the Thailand border. The feasibility of launching “Operation 
Matador” now receded into the dim distance as the Thais had not 
agreed to allow our troops to enter their territory unopposed. The 
uncertainty of the situation was dispelled after midnight on December 
7th/8th when the enemy landed on the beaches at Kota Bahru against 
stiff resistance, and without opposition at Singora and Patani in 
Thailand. At Kota Bahru they captured our most advanced aero- 
drome, and Singapore Island suffered its first air raids. “Operation 
Matador”’ was then cancelled and orders were issued for the occupa- 
tion of the Jitra Line. The offensive, however, was not abandoned 
tamely to the enemy. Small raids were organized to cross the Thai 
border and delay the Japanese advance. A road column from the 
6th Brigade, including two Sections of 17 Field Company, reached 
Sadao on December 8th and the Sappers prepared three bridges for 
demolition. Two of these were successfully blown before the column 
withdrew. An armoured train set out also, keeping in touch with 
the road column by wireless. With it went a Section of 3 Field 
Company under Lieut. S. V. Poyser, R.E. To guard against derailing 
and booby traps, Poyser lay on the front of the leading truck inspecting 
the line as the train proceeded and signalling back to the driver. 
After the train had travelled about ten miles beyond the border it 
came to a very large girder bridge which Posyer decided to prepare 
for demolition; but before the work had been completed to his 
satisfaction, firing was heard far in rear and the bridge had to be 
blown at once. The first attempt failed; but the next succeeded and 
the bridge was left with two halves precariously interlocked. The 
train returned safely and Poyser’s Section then rejoined 3 Field 
Company which moved at once to support the 6th Brigade in the 
western portion of the Jitra Line. 

Another raid into Thailand was carried out from Kroh by a column 
known as “Krohcol.”” 45 Army Troops Company operated with 


190 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


this column which soon met with considerable resistance from Thai 
troops and police. “The object of Krohcol was to reach a position 
called ‘The Ledge’, some 22 miles beyond the frontier’’ writes Lieut.- 
Colonel Dinwiddie who was then O.C. 45 Company.! “It was a 
place where the road from Kroh to Patani ran along a steep jungle- 
clad slope for about six miles affording a secondary route by which 
the Japanese could come in at the rear of the main British positions 
held by the 11th Indian Division in Northern Kedah. On December 
9th, slow advances were made against the Thais opposing Krohcol, 
but in the evening their resistance broke and, early on the [0th, the 
3/16th Punjab Regiment, supported by the Company, reached the 
southern extremity of ‘The Ledge’. Two miles further on, the first 
Japanese troops were encountered and the remainder of Krohcol 
were ordered to occupy a lay-back position half way between ‘The 
Ledge’ and the frontier. Severe fighting lasted until the morning of 
the 12th, and eventually, as a result of enemy infiltration in rear and 
casualties estimated at 350, the order was given to withdraw to a 
prepared position just west of Kroh. The Company had to demolish 
six bridges en route. The first, a bamboo structure, was destroyed 
with axes, crowbars and saws as there had been no time to lay 
demolition charges. Shells and bullets from a Japanese tank flew 
over the heads of the Sappers for the tank crew could not depress 
their weapons sufficiently to bear on the bridge itself. The second 
bridge failed to go up (the only failure by the unit throughout the 
campaign). This was because the guncotton primers had become 
sodden through being exposed to heavy rain for several hours. There- 
after, all primers and detonators were protected by rubber sheaths 
obtained from chemists’ shops. The other four demolitions were 
successful, and interference by Japanese tanks was thus effectively 
stopped on this route. On December 12th, Krohcol broke off contact 
with the enemy who nevertheless were quick to follow up as many of 
their troops were provided with bicycles. On the !3th, Krohcol was 
merged into the 11th Indian Division’. 

Meanwhile, the 9th Division was faring badly on the east coast. 
According to Lieut.-Colonel Muir,? heavy fighting took place against 








1 Notes by Lieut.-Colonel R. Dinwiddie, R.E., entitled “The Story of the 45th Anny 


Troops Company, Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners, in the Malayan Campaign 
1941-42", dated September 26th, 1951. 





2“Sappers in the Malayan Campaign, 8th December 1941-15th February 1942”, 


by Licut.-Colonel R. B. Muir, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, December 1950, 
Pp. 433-454. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 19] 


Japanese invasion forces supported by land-based fighter aircraft 
operating from airfields in Thailand. By the evening of December 
9th, the enemy had forced our troops away from the Kota Bahru 
aerodrome. With unimpeded landings elsewhere, the situation 
deteriorated steadily until, on December 16th, a general withdrawal 
from Kelantan State was ordered along the railway which formed 
the sole and very precarious line of communication. It was completed 
successfully during the next six days. The 9th Divisional Engineers 
carried out much demolition work in the face of the advancing enemy, 
including the destruction of the longest railway bridge in Malaya. 
19 and 22 Field Companies and 42 Field Park Company, all of the 
Bombay Corps, were responsible for most of the work, but I Artisan 
Works Company took its share. The War Diary of this unit throws 
some light on the confused, conditions under which the fighting on 
the east coast took place. ‘‘Peringat. 7th December, 0100 Ars. Sound 
of heavy shelling 20 miles to north-east. O.C. Unit advised that 
Japanese naval forces were bombarding beach north-east of Kota 
Bahru. 0500 Ars. O.C. advised that Japanese forces had landed 
and were attacking Kota Bahru aerodrome. 2100 Ars. Telephone 
orders from Brigade Major, 8th Infantry Brigade, for unit to retire 
to Milestone 19 on Kota Bahru - Kuala Krai road. No transport 
available. 814 December, 0100 hrs. Personnel commenced to march 
on foot from Peringat. Arrived Keteren 0330 hrs and embussed in 
lorries. Arrived Pulia Chondong Village at Milestone 19 . 0400 Ars. 
Peringat now in front line fighting...... 13th December. Arranged 
to work with 19 Field Company...... 16th December. Marched on 
foot to Kuala Krai for evacuation. Train departed 0930 hrs. Arrived 
Jerantut 1600 hrs. Camped in rubber. No shelter. No water. 19 
Field Company arrived.” 

The methods by which the Japanese gained their rapid successes 
in Malaya should be considered. For years they had studied jungle 
warfare, no doubt with Malaya in view, and for years they had 
practised amphibious landings in all weathers. ‘‘They wore the lightest 
of uniforms” writes Ian Morrison,! ‘‘a singlet, cotton shorts, rubber- 
soled shoes, and sometimes Malay sarongs. Two prisoners captured 
near Batu Pahat were disguised as Chinese coolies. Our men 
could never be certain that the young Malay lolling on the 
far side of the road, or the Tamil coolie just disappearing into a 
rubber plantation, was not a Japanese in disguise. Undoubtedly, 


1 Malayan Postscript, by lan Morrison, pp. 78, 79. 


192 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


there was a native element working actively with the enemy, but there 
were many more who helped us, and native co-operation with the 
Japanese in Malaya never assumed the proportions which it did, for 
example, in Burma.” The Japanese being mainly rice-eaters, were 
able to live off the country, while our soldiers were dependent on 
elaborate and diverse catering arrangements for which motor transport 
was needed. A Japanese soldier could set off alone into the jungle 
with a bottle of water and a ball of rice and subsist quite well on 
these for several days. Most of the enemy infantry were armed with 
tommy-guns or other light automatic weapons ideal for close-range 
jungle fighting. They had a plentiful supply of small hand-grenades 
and were supported by light 2-inch mortars. Mobility was secured 
by the use of bicycles, mostly commandeered from the inhabitants. 
They made full use of rivers, creeks or swamps which they navigated 
in collapsible rubber boats or native craft. Infiltration was the key- 
note of their tactics. Small groups were told to rendezvous at some 
point miles ahead in the jungle. There they would assemble and 
await their opportunity, keeping in touch with the main body by 
wireless. They might proceed to assault a small outpost frontally, 
but if they met with any considerable opposition they would always 
creep round to attack from the flank or rear. The tactics adopted 
by the Japanese in their advance down the west coast were largely 
amphibious. Launches towing barges filled with soldiers would move 
down by night, land the men and return for more. Parties so landed 
would strike deep into the jungle and lie quiet for perhaps two days 
before ambushing one of our convoys many miles behind the front. 
But the major advantage held by the Japanese was in the matter of 
tanks, of which, as already stated, we had none whatever. Our infantry 
also had very few anti-tank guns. The widely spaced trees of the 
rubber plantations offered no obstacle to the enemy’s medium tanks 
which could accordingly bypass any position astride a main road 
and attack it from the rear. 

Regarding the situation on the outbreak of hostilities, Lieut.- 
General A. E. Percival, G.O.C. Malaya Command, wrote as follows 
in 1946 after his release from captivity. ‘“‘The Navy no longer con- 
trolled the sea approaches and there was a shortage of craft for 
coastal defences. The Air Force, in place of the 566 first-line aircraft 
asked for by the Air Officer Commanding, or the 366 approved by 
the Chiefs of Staff, had a force of only 141 operationally serviceable 
machines, very few of which were of the most modern type. There 
were no modern torpedo-bombers, no dive-bombers and no transport 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 193 


aircraft. There were also comparatively few trained pilots and a 
great shortage of spare parts. As regards the Land forces, the dis- 
positions on the mainland had been designed primarily to afford 
protection to the aerodromes. Had it not been for these, better and 
more concentrated dispositions could have been adopted. As soon 
as the threat to Malaya developed in the summer of 1940, everything 
possible was done to strengthen the land defences; but time proved 
too short to put a country almost the size of England and Wales into 
a satisfactory state of defence...... I estimate that the Japanese 
employed a minimum of 150,000 men, with 300 tanks, in the 
Malayan campaign. Against this we had, on the outbreak of hosti- 
lities, the equivalent of 34 divisions with fixed and anti-aircraft 
defences but no tanks. On the British side, the total number who 
took part in the campaign was a little over 125,000, though the 
strength in Malaya at any one time was considerably less than this 
and the number included a high proportion of Command, Base and 
Line of Communication troops.” 

By the afternoon of December 11th, the Japanese were engaging 
the outposts of the Jitra Line in Kedah and had established complete 
supremacy in the air where our old Buffalo fighters were no match 
for their ‘‘Navy O” machines. The Jitra Line was at that time the 
only obstacle between the enemy in the north and the Johore State, 
450 miles to the south. The uncompleted eastern sector tailed away 
into the jungle. The western sector ran for 8 miles south of a large 
mangrove swamp, with pill-boxes and trenches sited in paddy fields 
and rubber plantations. As the enemy advanced, 3, 17, and 23 
Field Companies, 43 Field Park Company and 46 Army Troops 
Company started their demolitions. About dusk, the Jitra Line 
began to crumble. News reached 17 Field Company before dawn on 
December 12th that the demolition of a bridge some miles north of 
Alor Star had not been effected. ‘‘This demolition was considered 
important’? writes Major N. S. Bhagat,! ‘tbecause the bridge was 
immediately in front of our forward defence localities and it was 
feared that the enemy might rush tanks and carriers over it. 23 
Field Company had already tried to demolish it but had not succeeded. 
O.C. 17 Field Company then went up and reached the forward 
Section post. As our own guns were shelling the bridge, he asked 
Battalion H.Q. to have the shelling stopped to enable him to go 
forward, but the Battalion Commander advised him to wait as he 





1 War Diary, 17 Field Company, December 12th, 1941, 


194 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


felt certain the bridge was held by the enemy. Shortly afterwards his 
words were confirmed. The enemy launched an attack but were 
held up. O.C. and party returned to camp after four or five hours 
in the forward posts. O.C’s truck was riddled with bullets and had 
to be abandoned.” 

Up to 3 p.m. on December 12th, our troops continued to offer 
stiff resistance to increasing enemy pressure, but a portion of the 
Jitra Line along the Bata River was only thinly held. ‘A call for 
Sappers was made” continues Bhagat, ‘‘and ‘A’ and ‘B’ Sections 
were led straight to this sector. It was not realized till later that 
they would have to hold the line for the night. There was no food or 
water. Towards dusk, the O.C. contacted the infantry on the left 
and pointed out the extent of the position, and at about 8.0 p.m. 
fire was exchanged with the enemy”. After midnight, the enemy 
began to infiltrate on both flanks. Orders for a withdrawal had 
already been issued, and 17 Field Company leapfrogged back with 3 
Field Company, which was in position behind it. The two units then 
marched to Alor Star. This employment of Sappers as infantry 
prevented the proper demolition of the Alor Star road and railway 
bridges. The latter fell almost undamaged into enemy hands. It. 
was hoped that by running an armoured train across it a slightly 
weakened section might be made to collapse. The train was set in 
motion and the driver jumped off; but the bridge did not collapse, 
and the driverless train was found eventually some fifty miles to 
the south. 

Disaster on the sea had already been added to misfortune on land. 
The battleship H.M.S. Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser H.M.S. 
Repulse, which had reached Singapore on December 2nd, had sailed 
northwards on the 9th with escorting destroyers. As darkness fell, 
the squadron, under the command of Admiral Tom Phillips, R.N., 
was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane and shadowed by 
more planes from dawn onwards. Being without air-cover it turned 
back and headed first towards Kuantan owing to an incorrect report 
of a Japanese landing. It then steamed southwards, but at 11.0 a.m. 
on December 10th a formation of enemy bombers approached and 
scored direct hits on both capital ships. Torpedo-carrying aircraft 
followed and the Prince of Wales was hit by a torpedo. More bombers 
and torpedo-carrying aircraft appeared and attacked continuously 
until first the Repulse and then the Prince of Wales disappeared beneath 
the waves with their guns firing to the last. The destroyers picked up 
survivors and made for Singapore. Our fighters arrived on the scene 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 195. 


from a distant aerodrome too late to interfere. The loss of these 
two fine ships, combined with the crippling of the American Pacific 
Fleet, gave the enemy temporary command of the sea. Japan’s. 
long lines of sea communication were now safe. She could land 
troops wherever she wished on the Malayan coast. Singapore could 
be bombed at will by carrier-borne aircraft. Thailand became her 
ally, and waverers in Malaya began to go over to her side. 

In order to break the morale of the Malayan population and at 
the same time to secure a good harbour and suitable aerodromes for 
an advance down the west coast, the enemy launched a violent air 
attack on Penang Island and the adjacent mainland. On December 
11th, squadrons of dive-bombers wrecked the crowded native quarters 
of Georgetown on the island, killing hundreds of men, women and 
children. The population fied to the hills on the mainland. Further 
bombing followed, and within the next few days the Japanese occupied 
Penang after our small garrison had been withdrawn. No Sappers 
and Miners were present, though a Fortress Company, R.E., was 
there and demolished most of the installations before it left with the 
other troops. 

By the evening of December 12th, the Japanese were in full posses- 
sion of the Jitra Line and the 11th Division was withdrawing south- 
wards to a position in the Gurun area which had been reconnoitred 
but not yet prepared for defence. The main road between Alor 
Star and Gurun traversed a vast paddy area, and from Gurun onwards 
to the River Muda it led through rubber plantations intersected in 
all directions by small roads. 3 and 17 Field Companies had already 
lost so heavily that 45 Army Troops Company was merged into the 
11th Division to act as a Field Company. ‘From now onwards it 
was a tale of continuous retreat” writes Lieut.-Colonel Dinwiddie 
who commanded 45 Company at that time.! “There were many 
demolitions as well as the destruction of water-supplies and some- 
times of machinery in rubber factories and tin dredges. The ordinary 
rules for demolitions went by the board. There were never enough 
infantry to protect final demolitions until the last troops had passed 
through. The Sappers protected them themselves and blew on the 
order of the rearguard Commander.” 








1“The Story of the 45th Army Troops Company, Royal Bcembay Sappers and 
Miners, in the Malayan Campaign”, by Lieut.-Colonel R. Dinwiddie, R.E., dated 
September 26th, 1951. 


196 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


When the 6th Brigade of the 11th Division reached Gurun on 
‘December 14th, the men were so exhausted that little digging was 
possible. Within the next 24 hours the enemy had burst through 
and the retreat was resumed. Our rearguards did their best to check 
the flood, and 3 Field Company, in a chaos of traffic and an atmos- 
phere of overpowering uneasiness, fell back with the main body and 
blew demolitions whenever opportunity offered. The usual procedure 
was to take up a position in front of a demolition belt, and when the 
‘enemy attacked, to withdraw through the demolitions which were 
then blown to give the tired infantry time to get back to the next 
selected position. The 12th Brigade was now brought up to the front 
from the south, and with it came 15 Field Company. Its task was to 
protect the right flank of the 11th Division from encirclement by 
Japanese forces moving down from Patani on the east coast. Contact 
with the enemy was established north of Grik on the night of December 
16th/17th and during the next five days a fierce battle raged down 
the Grik road as far as its junction with the main road at Kuala 
Kangsar. Our troops counter-attacked repeatedly, and thus the 11th 
Division escaped encirclement. 15 Field Company and 46 Army 
Troops Company carried out many demolitions, and 6 Bridging 
Section did excellent work in ferrying back engineer stores and men. 
The destruction of the main road bridge over the Muda River near 
Sungei Patani fell to 46 Army Troops Company. The bridge had 
large reinforced-concrete bowstring girders, and two Sections 
worked on it for nearly three days, often under machine-gun fire 
from enemy planes. The demolition was fairly successful in the end 
although a hitch occurred when someone was found to have inadvert- 
ently connected the electric leads wrongly.! Two of the three spans 
were brought down and the back of one of them was shattered. 

The hard pressed 11th Division was soon across the Muda River. 
While 46 Army Troops Company was demolishing the concrete 
bridge, ‘‘A” Section of 17 Field Company had been trying to destroy 
a wooden bridge. This type was particularly difficult to deal with as 
the wood would not burn and the beams seemed to hang together by 
their fibres even when cut individually. Meanwhile, “C’” Section 
was sinking all boats on the river. “*B’’ Section could do little as 
33 men were missing. On December 17th, “‘A’’ Section was busy at 
Butterworth opposite Penang Island destroying cranes, petrol tanks, 


a a es 


A Short History of the @Q.V’sO. Madras Sa i i 
. A ippers and Miners during 
World War 11, 1939-1945, by Lieut-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., p. 25. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 197 


rice stores and boats, while the survivors of ‘B’ Section set fire to 
aircraft and cratered the runways of the aerodrome. ‘“‘C” Section 
sank large tugs and boats but had to leave intact a plentiful supply 
of Engineer stores. Only a few hours were available for the work 
which, according to the War Diary, could have occupied the Company 
fully for four days. Before dark, the unit concentrated in Taiping 
near Kuala Kangsar. 

The next obstacle to the enemy’s advance was the Perak River 
which flows southwards through swamps and then turns to reach the 
sea 60 miles below Taiping. On December 19th, 17 Field Company 
was at a place called Parit on this river preparing to destroy the 
important Blanjar Pontoon Bridge. This bridge was in three portions, 
a ramp on the right bank, a pontoon section in the middle, and a 
tramp on the left bank. The maximum depth of water was about 
8 feet. Major N. S. Bhagat decided to swing the floating portion 
across the river to the left or near bank before destroying it in order 
to prevent the enemy from using the grounded pontoons to effect a 
passage. By the afternoon of the 22nd, the near end had been anchored 
and cutting charges placed in position. The 28th Brigade was expected 
to cross that evening, but it did not appear as it had taken another 
route. It was learned on the 23rd that only one battalion and some 
armoured cars would cross. From morning till evening the enemy 
bombed the bridge and its approaches, hitting it in three places and 
severing all detonation circuits. Not until after dark could work be 
resumed, the first task being to make the bridge usable once more. 
This was accomplished by 10 p.m. and the waiting column began 
to cross, the last vehicles being some 6-ton armoured cars although 
the bridge was designed for only half that load. All having crossed, 
the demolition and swinging of the bridge were begun. The right 
bank portion was first destroyed; then the central floating portion 
was swung round to the near bank by releasing all anchors, the end 
arriving to within 50 yards of the bank where the pontoons grounded. 
These were promptly sunk and the superstructure smashed. All this 
was done under incessant bombing and machine-gunning from the 
air. Two other bridges over the Perak River were destroyed by 
other Sapper units. These were the ‘Iskander’ Bridge, the longest in 
Malaya, situated south of Kuala Kangsar, and an adjacent through- 
girder railway bridge. Thus the Engineer units did their best to hold 


1A detailed account appears in notes by Lieut.-Colonel N. S. Bhagat, Engineers, 
entitled “An Unusual Bridge Demolition in Malaya”, dated February 1951. 


198 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


up the rapid Japanese advance, but conventional rearguard actions 
proved of little avail against the bold outflanking and infiltration 
tactics of the enemy. 

“With our troops across the Perak River’, writes Lieut.-Colonel 
R. B. Muir,! ‘‘a determined effort to stem the invasion tide was to 
be made at Kampar, about 30 miles south of Ipoh, one of the strongest 
natural defence positions in Malaya. Only two Brigade Groups, the 
6/15th? and 28th, were available to man the position and only 48 
hours could be spent on its preparation. The Battle of Kampar 
began on December 29th when our delaying troops were forced 
back through the outposts. Two main demolition belts were organized 
around the Kampar area, and all demolitions were executed success- 
fuliy in the face of heavy enemy opposition. In the midst of the 
battle, the Japanese made an amphibious landing on January Ist, 
1942, on the west coast near the Perak estuary, and on the 2nd a 
force came down the Perak River in boats to attack Telok Anson. 
The build-up proved too strong for the opposing troops (12th Brigade) 
and endangered the security of Kampar. Accordingly, when further 
landings developed to the south and armoured thrusts made inroads 
on the main position, we were forced to evacuate Kampar on January 
3rd. On the following night the Japanese succeeded in landing near 
Kuala Selangor. The 6/15th Brigade was able to localize the effect 
of this threat up to the night of January 10th/1!th when it was obliged 
to withdraw through Kuala Lumpur”. 

Regarding the Kampar position, Major A. R. Beattie, R.E., O.C. 
3 Field Company, writes as follows3:— ‘‘The Dipang Bridge was the 
only one which crossed a small river in front of the position. It 
carried the main road from Ipoh. Behind the river were the 28th 
Brigade on the right and the 6th/15th Brigade on the left. 23 Field 
Company, in support of the 28th Brigade, had become responsible 
for the demolition of the bridge, but on December 29th the unit 
was ordered to remove the charges. This was done, though without 
taking serious note of how the charges had been laid. 3 Field 
Company, in support of the 12th Brigade which was then fighting 





1 ““Sappers in the Malayan Campaign; 8th December 1941-15th February 1942”, 


by Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Muir, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, December 1950, 
pp. 433-454. 


2The 6th and 15th Brigades had been amalgamated about December 19th owing 
to heavy casualties. 


» Notes by Major A. R. Beattie, R.E., dated June 25th, 1947, 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 199 


a rearguard action north of the bridge, had to be ready to repair 
the bridge if it was damaged by bombing. During the afternoon, it 
became apparent that a hurried withdrawal would take place, and 
Lieut. Poyser, R.E., at 12th Brigade H.Q., twice warned the Brigade 
Commander that the bridge was unprepared for demolition. A 
message sent back to 28th Brigade H.Q. failed to arrive and the 
whereabouts of 23 Field Company H.Q. was unknown. The Com- 
mander, 12th Brigade, became increasingly worried about the bridge 
as its destruction was to cover his withdrawal, and finally, at about 
5.0 p.m. he asked Poyser if 3 Field Company could prepare it for 
demolition in half an hour. A Jemadar and a Havildar of 23 Field 
Company then appeared who knew where the explosives were but 
did not know where the charges were to be fitted into position on 
the bridge. It started to rain. Infantry, carriers and armoured cars 
were pouring over the bridge in frightful confusion, making work 
very difficult. The charges could only be tied on roughly and there 
was no time for proper tamping. After about three-quarters of an 
hour the charges were ready aad the circuits wired up. The last 
infantry withdrew and the demolitions were fired. The detonators 
exploded, dislodging the charges and blowing some of them into the 
river, but they failed to ignite the primers which had got wet and 
would not explode. No rubber protectors were available. Some 
enemy tanks were 300 yards away round a bend in the road and 
there was cover for enemy infantry within 200 yards of the bridge. 
A Gurkha battalion, guarding the bridge, said they could not protect 
us by overhead fire while we were at work on it though they could 
place a couple of Sections on the bank on either side of it. A small 
quantity of explosive being still available, circuits were fitted up 
under intermittent mortar and small arms fire and three more attempts 
were made at demolition before the bridge had to be abandoned an 
hour later. [t had dropped at one end but was not a good obstacle’. 

This was one of the very few demolition failures during the retreat 
and it can hardly be said that 3 Field Company was to blame. Ex- 
plosives in large quantities, and time in which to lay them in position, 
were needed by all the Engineer units, and in the confusion of a 
rapid withdrawal a regular and sufficient issue of gelignite, gun- 
cotton, primers and detonators was often impossible. Those respon- 
sible for the supply did their best to expedite despatch to the front. 
The War Diary of 42 Field Park Company shows that on December 
Ist no less than 7,500 Ibs of gelignite and 600 electric detonators 
were sent to Jerantut by that unit for the use of 22 Field Company. 


200 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


On the east coast, patrols of the advanced 22nd Brigade, in contact 
with the enemy moving down from Kota Bahru, had been pushed 
back on December 26th into Pahang State. On the 30th, the Japanese 
were approaching the Kuantan airfield in strength, and during the 
early hours of January Ist a ferry west of Kuantan was destroyed by 
22 Field Company. A swinging boat bridge had been under con- 
struction but could not be completed because sufficient boats in 
good condition were not available. Owing to the serious reverses 
sustained by the 11th Division on the west coast, the 22nd Brigade 
was forced to abandon the Kuantan airfield during the night of 
January 3rd/4th and after very heavy fighting reached Jerantut in 
the early hours of January 7th. Its escape was due largely to the 
delaying demolitions of the Sapper units. A ‘scorched earth’ policy 
was now in full swing. It had been in operation on the west coast 
since December 20th when 3 Field Company, in the Taiping area, 
had flooded some square miles of low-lying country by breaching 
canal banks. From December 31st to January Sth, 45 Army Troops 
Company was attached to the 9th Division and helped the 22nd 
Brigade to extricate itself from the area east of the Pahang River by 
establishing a duplicate ferry near Jerantut where 54 Field Stores 
Section was at work. 

The exploits of 22 Field Company before and during the withdrawal 
from Kuantan deserve some notice. A boom had been constructed 
across the mouth of the Kuantan River and was operated by the 
Company. This was a difficult task for it had to be opened and closed 
frequently for the passage of ships. Pill-boxes had already been 
built along the beaches and in the tidal mangrove swamps flanking 
the river. These were two storeyed structures because the tide level 
varied by 20 feet. The Sappers and infantry working parties laboured 
cheerfully from sunrise to sunset, often in deep mud and bitten to 
pieces by mosquitoes. Communications were improved, large areas 
mined and many bridges and cuttings prepared for demolition. When 
the fighting started, the boom gave much trouble, for it had to be 
opened hurriedly at midnight to allow a coasting steamer to escape. 
According to an officer who was with 22 Field Company? the oil 
from some petroleum tanks which had been blown up had spread 
over the water and was giving off powerful fumes. The weight of 
the couplings which joined the two portions of the boom having 
caused the connecting link to sink about 8 feet below the surface, 


Se re ne ee 


1 Notes by Captain A. W. Haley, R.E., dated April 11th, 1951. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 201 


some Sappers had to dive into the oil-coated water to uncouple it, 
getting more and more sick with the fumes and wondering when 
the oil would catch fire. However, the boom was finally opened and 
the ship departed. The Sapper party then tackled their next task, the 
demolition of the ferry already mentioned. Throughout the day it 
was under accurate mortar fire. Towards evening, charges were 
prepared to demolish the wireless controlling it and the troops crowded 
aboard. Excitement reached a new level when it was found that the 
ferry had grounded under the abnormal load. However, it was 
rocked free and shot across to the far side. By the time all the men 
had disembarked and moved away, the charges placed in the wireless 
set had done their work and the ferry was then sunk. Meanwhile, a 
Section of 22 Field Company had been drawn into the defence of 
the airfield. This detachment suffered very severely, losing 27 men 
including the Section Commander, 2nd Lieut. J. R. Hannington, R.E., 
and an Indian officer who were over-run while still firing at the enemy. 
Further demolitions were carried out during the withdrawal from 
Kuantan. The unit then moved to Bentong, north-east of Kuala 
Lumpur. Afterwards, it concentrated on demolishing every road 
and rail bridge, and cratering the road at intervals, all the way back 
to Singapore, accomplishing nearly one hundred successful demoli- 
tions during January. Another Indian officer and some men were 
killed by mortar fire while awaiting orders to blow, and several 
parties had miraculous escapes. Infantry cover was rarely available. 
One party was actually sent back unescorted into enemy held terri- 
tory to rebuild a crossing over a river and only two men survived to tell 
the tale. In the end, after the enemy had landed north of Mersing, 
the unfortunate 22nd Brigade was completely cut off and Major- 
General Barstow, the 9th Divisional Commander, was killed; but 
22 Field Company was not involved in that catastrophe. 

3 Field Company continued to do fine work on the west coast and 
lost heavily in the process. Assisted by coolie labour, it began to 
dig and wire a position for the 11th Division at Bidor and then sent 
a Section to start work at yet another at Trolak, where the road and 
railway ran close together through a bottle-neck in dense jungle. 
Given the necessary respite, the Trolak position might have been 
strongly fortified; but there was no respite, and when the enemy 
advanced to the attack, they found only a few dozen booby-traps 
laid near the road and railway and some hastily erected wire. Behind 
the position, the country opened out into rubber and oil-palm areas 
ideal for the Japanese tanks. The 11th Division then fell back to 


202 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the Slim River. Concrete road-blocks and concertina barbed wire 
did little to delay the enemy, who, on January 7th, attacked the 
position in strength with tank support. Our demolition detachments 
were over-run and almost wiped out. They could get no orders as 
all communications had been interrupted. Some of the Japanese 
tanks were eventually stopped by a 25-pounder gun near 3 Field 
Company H.Q. about 15 miles beyond the Slim River where they 
were stalked and driven off by a party of Sappers under C.S.M. 
Topham, R.E. The Slim River Battle saw practically the end of the 
11th Indian Division as a fighting force. All its guns and most of 
its equipment were lost and hundreds of officers and men were taken 
prisoner. The enemy next advanced rapidly through the capital, 
Kuala Lumpur, towards the northern border of Johore State where 
the 8th Australian Division was preparing to give battle to save 
Singapore. On January 9th, General Wavell visited the front and 
decided that the 9th Division and the remnants of the I{th Division 
should fall back a distance of 125 miles to Singapore, covered by 
the Australians. The great exodus began on January 10th in every 
imaginable sort of vehicle. This was the beginning of the end. 

The Australians, under Major-General Gordon Bennett, fought as 
they had always fought, expecting no quarter and giving none. On 
January 15th, a few miles north of Gemas, they laid an ambush on 
a bridge and the Japanese came matching across, many of them 
wheeling bicycles. Up went the bridge, and hundreds of Japs with 
it, and the ‘Aussies’ attacked with the bayonet. Then they fell back 
south of Segamat on the railway. The brigade in question, with part 
of the 9th Division, held a line along the Muar River between Segamat 
and the sea where the newly arrived 45th Indian Brigade had recently 
met with a serious reverse. A few days of intense battle followed, 
with heavy losses on both sides. Only 800 of our men, out of 4,000 
engaged, emerged from the Muar battle. 

At about this time, the 53rd British Brigade, which had landed 
recently in Singapore, was rushed up to the front and brought into 
action while the other two brigades of the 18th British Division were 
still at sea. This attempt to relieve a critical situation failed and the 
53rd Brigade was badly mauled. 45 Army Troops Company was in 
Support and suffered accordingly. One Section, under 2nd Lieut. 
M. M. Pillai had to find its way back for four days through dense 
Jungle in order to rejoin our forces. 

The Muar River Battle saw also the virtual end of 13 Field Com- 
pany, under Major B. E. Whitman, R.E., which was attached to the 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 203 


Australians. On January 14th, the Company had successfully demo- 
lished a large bridge, but on the 15th it lost 28 officers and men in a se- 
vere action. Three days later, an enemy attack with tanks was repulsed 
by the Australians and nine tanks were destroyed, six of which were 
close to 13 Field Company; but once again heavy casualties were 
sustained and still more when enemy detachments infiltrated during 
the night of January 18th/19th. On the afternoon of the 19th, 13 
Field Company was shelled with devastating effect and 25° of the 
unit, including three officers, were killed or wounded. Every escape 
route being already blocked when the Company was ordered to 
withdraw, it became necessary to abandon all transport and proceed 
in small parties through the jungle. This was done, but not many 
managed to rejoin our retreating forces. Whitman himself was captured 
on January 28th. The casualties sustained by 13 Field Company 
were estimated at 4 officers and 60 men killed and 2 officers and 
60 men wounded. 

Many of the wounded fell into Japanese hands. Here is the story 
of Havildar John Benedict of 13 Field Company who was afterwards 
awarded the Military Medal.! He was wounded in the leg on January 
19th, and on the following day, with some of his comrades, was 
captured by the Japanese. The prisoners were placed under guard 
in a bungalow and during the evening were taken in small batches 
to the bank of a stream where their captors proceeded to behead them 
in cold blood. Benedict and another man were escorted to the stream 
by three Japs, but when they came to the place of execution, the 
Havildar knocked one of the escort aside and both prisoners dived 
into the water. Benedict himself managed to swim under water till 
he could hide under some fallen trees. There he remained concealed 
until after dark when, hearing cries for help, he swam back to rescue 
two Sappers one of whom had a sword cut which seemed to have 
half severed his head from his body. He assisted these men across, 
rendered first aid and then accompanied them in an attempt to 
rejoin our forces, but all three were recaptured a fortnight later. 
It is marvellous to record that the desperately wounded Sapper 
survived his injury and returned three years later to Bangalore, 
but unfortunately he died in January 1946, perhaps as a result of 
his experiences.2, This is no isolated example of Japanese barbarity. 


1 Jemadar Chinnadurai was awarded the Military Cross for gallantry in the same 
action. 


2A Short History of the Q.V'sO. Madras Sappers and Miners during World War 
iI, 1939-1945, by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., pp. 27, 28. 





204 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Many prisoners were murdered in similar fashion elsewhere, and 
particularly captured airmen. 

On the night of January 25th/26th, in spite of successful delaying 
tactics and demolitions, our troops were forced out of Batu Pahat 
on the west coast and Mersing on the east coast, and the enemy, 
now strongly reinforced, captured Kluang airfield, the last remaining 
air base on the mainland. We had insufficient strength to hold the 
90-mile front from coast to coast in Central Johore. Then followed the 
final withdrawal to Singapore Island. The Sappers had excelled 
themselves in hasty demolitions during the retreat from Muar and 
in the collection and repair of damaged transport, but now their 
duty lay further south. Orders to withdraw to the island were received 
on January 27th, and 15 Field Company was detailed to destroy 
the Johore Causeway after the other troops had passed over it. 
During the long retreat down Malaya, the six Sapper units operating 
with the 11th Division had accounted for 600 bridges and culverts, 
and of these, 3 Field Company had demolished 150 and 43 Field 
Park Company nearly as many. The units with the 9th Division 
had done equally well. In a campaign of consistent adversity and 
hardship, the Sappers maintained their high reputation. 

The last troops to traverse the Johore Causeway into Singapore 
Island were the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who marched 
across early on January 31st, 1942, to the accompaniment of their 
bagpipes. At about 8.0 a.m., charges placed by 15 Field Company 
were detonated, and with four tremendous explosions the long cause- 
way was cut. The water mains which carried most of Singapore’s 
supply from two large reservoirs in Johore perished with it, but 
there was, for the moment, a sufficient reserve stored in two reservoirs 
in the centre of the island. The food supply gave no anxiety. There 
was enough to last the population for six months. Shortly after the 
destruction of the causeway, General Percival issued a stirring appeal 
to the garrison. ‘Our task is to hold this fortress until help can 
come, as assuredly it will come” he wrote. ‘Our duty is clear. With 
firm resolve and fixed determination we shall win through. For 
nearly two months our troops have fought an enemy on the mainland 
who has had the advantage of great air superiority and considerable 
freedom of movement by sea. Our task has been to impose losses 
on the enemy and gain time to enable the forces of the Allies to be 
concentrated for this struggle in the Far East. Today we stand 
beleaguered in our island fortress”. The appeal, no doubt, helped to 
revive the flagging spirits of many weary soldiers, but most must 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 205 


have asked themselves the question as to whence any help could 
reach them before their strength failed. 

The truth is that the defences of Singapore Island against an attack 
from the mainland were still woefully inadequate when the Japanese 
appeared from the north. Early in January, Brigadier A. C. M. Paris 
had been appointed to organize the defences; but by that time the 
civilian labour, by means of which much of the work had to be 
executed, was beginning to vanish under increasing enemy air attack. 
An idea seems to have been held that if large defensive works were 
started on the northern coast of the island while our troops were 
locked in battle with the Japanese north of Kuala Lumpur, it would 
be bad for their morale. More probably they would have been 
buoyed up by the knowledge that they were supported by a powerful 
defensive position in rear to which they could retire, if need be, for 
reorganization before resuming the offensive. But the fact that 
Singapore was indefensible at the end of January 1942 was in no 
way the fault of the Engineer Commanders and formations. The 
policy to be followed was dictated to them. The Engineers had 
started defence preparations long before the troops withdrew across 
the Johore Causeway. Additional pill-boxes and wire, the manu- 
facture of under-water and contact electric mines, and of petrol 
drums for water-surface fires, had kept them very busy; but they were 
ordered to devote their attention first to the defence of the north-east 
coast of the island, where the naval base lay, rather than to that of 
the north-west coast which was the more probable line of enemy 
attack. Thus there were few defences to the west of the causeway, 
either in the water or on land, to stop the Japanese. 

The Singapore Island defences were organized in three areas. 
The northern coast, east of the causeway, was held by the 18th British 
Division and some remnants of the 11th Indian Division. From the 
causeway westwards and then southwards, the coast was held by the 
8th Australian Division and a newly arrived 44th Indian Brigade, 
Singapore Town and the remainder of the coast was defended by 
two Malayan Brigades, Volunteer formations and certain Fortress 
troops. The garrison totalled about 85,000 men, but many were 
allotted to administrative duties. During the first week of the invest- 
ment there was heavy artillery action by both sides. The enemy’s 
fire, however, was so intense that work on our forward defences 
could be done only at night. Officer patrols crossed the Johore 
Strait frequently under cover of darkness to obtain information 
tegarding the Japanese preparations. The Engineer units supervized 


206 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


infantry working parties, laid anti-tank minefields, placed naval 
mines across water approaches, built gun emplacements for the close 
defence of the few airfields and arranged for water-supply. The. 
Works Services in Singapore under Colonel W. H. Treays, late R.E., 
afforded the greatest assistance to the Engineer field units, and 41 
and 45 Fortress Companies, R.E., did trojan work. Treays records. 
that he received much help from the Straits Settlements Volunteers 
in demolishing buildings along the south coast to open up lines for 
machine gun fire.| The Works Services converted private houses 
into hospitals, built camps, provided water-supplies and ran a couple 
of saw mills and, later in the siege, assembled patrols for front line 
duties. 

The final Japanese offensive against Singapore Island was launched 
during the night of February 8th/9th, 1942, after a very heavy artillery 
barrage lasting several hours. The fire was concentrated on the 
north-west sector where the Australians and the 44th Brigade had 
only had time to dig the most meagre defences. Guns and mortars 
of all calibres swept the ground from the shore inland, and then 
back again to the shore. At |1 p.m. the enemy sent up a green flare 
as a signal for the assault. The night was black as pitch and our 
men were dependent on a few searchlights—some of them car head- 
lights—to see anything coming across the narrow Johore Strait. The 
searchlights were switched on, but one by one they were extinguished 
by machine-gun fire. Two enemy divisions set out from the mainland 
in successive waves of motor driven craft, each carrying about 40 men 
with their mortars and machine guns. The Australians on the shore 
took a heavy toll; yet they could not prevent large numbers of Japanese 
from obtaining a foothold while the assault craft returned to bring 
more across. The main attack developed against the 22nd Australian 
Brigade west of the Kranji creek and the Johore Causeway, the chief 
objective being the Tengah airfield which lay about four miles inland.” 
Confused fighting followed. The Australians put up a bitter resistance 
but were gradually pushed back. No less than 13,000 Japanese landed 
during the night and a further 10,000 followed. By 8.0 a.m. on the 
9th, the invading troops had captured the airfield. The same evening, 
the enemy made a second crossing just west of the causeway. Con- 
mand reserves were rushed up and some ground was regained by 4 
counter-attack, but this was only a flash in the pan and by February 





eh ee 


1 Notes by Colonel W. H. Treays, dated February 23rd, 1951. 
3 See the inset map of Singapore Island included in this chapter. 


MALAYA, 1941 - 42 207 


10th the Japanese threat had reached Bukit Timah in the centre of 
the island. The vital water reservoirs were now in imminent danger. 
Our last few aeroplanes—seven in all—had already departed to 
Sumatra. Enemy machines roamed the skies unhindered, bombing 
and machine-gunning all points of resistance. Heavy fighting raged 
throughout the 11th and 12th, and on the morning of February 
13th we evacuated Changi at the eastern tip of the island after the 
defences had been demolished. All General Percival’s troops were 
then grouped in a wide perimeter around Singapore Town. 

While the Japanese were advancing across the island to Bukit 
Timah the Engineer units had been engaged entirely on mining 
avenues of approach and destroying stores, plant and munitions, 
but from February 10th, in view of the critical situation, some of 
them assumed a new role. A composite Battalion was formed under 
the command of Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Taylor, R.E., comprising a 
Fortress Company, R.E., and three Sapper and Miner Companies 
including 45 and 46 Army Troops Companies. The R.E. Battalion 
was detailed to assist a Malayan Infantry Brigade and took up its 
position on a road outside Singapore Town. On February [3th it 
was ordered to withdraw to another position in a Chinese cemetery 
near a biscuit factory. Desperate fighting began on the 14th, and at 
2.0 p.m. on the 15th, the Battalion position was violently attacked, 
45 Army Troops Company alone sustaining 40 casualties.! Lieut. T.D. 
Hyamson, R.E., was killed, 2nd Lieut. A. Gilmour, R.E., was mortally 
wounded, and Lieut. R. M. Lindley, R.E., and Jemadar Bhaginji 
More were also wounded. A few days earlier, General ¥amashita, 
the Japanese Commander, had invited the garrison to surrender and 
had met with a curt refusal; but by the afternoon of Sunday, February 
15th, it had become obvious that capitulation was inevitable. The 
enemy now controlled the reservoirs, the only source of water-supply. 
Gun ammunition and petrol were running short and the defenders 
were completely exhausted. The surrender was authorized by Govern- 
ment and was carried into effect by General Percival at 8.0 p.m. 
Thus, at the end of one of the most tragic episodes in British history, 
70,000 soldiers passed into cruel captivity. Many were destined to 
perish miserably through starvation and disease while working like 
slaves on a railway which the Japanese were building through the 
dense jungles separating Thailand from Lower Burma, and the 


145 Army Troops Company had already lost 60 officers and men in previous actions. 


208 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


remainder will bear to their graves the mark of the hardships and 
humiliations they endured as prisoners. 

Yet a few soldiers, a very few, managed to get away from Singapore, 
and among them 2nd Lieut. M. M. Pillai of 45 Army Troops 
Company. Pillai, a Tamil from Southern India, escaped from his 
prisoner-of-war camp outside the town, and suitably disguised, mingled 
with the local population. He made his way to Penang where, claiming 
to be a merchant, he obtained a passport from Japanese Headquarters 
to leave Malaya. Though his attempts to enter China proved fruitless, 
he managed to get a visa to enter Burma from the Japanese Consul 
at Renong, a Siamese port. He made his way slowly to Prome via 
Mergui, Pegu and Rangoon. His efforts to get to Akyab did not 
succeed. He therefore worked his way up the Irrawaddy as a cook 
in a boat carrying a number of the enemy, and when they reached 
Northern Burma he took to the jungle. There he marched alone for 
three weeks, sick and starving, until finally he gained the British 
line near Fort White. For this remarkable exploit he was awarded 
the Military Cross. 

Another fortunate officer was Colonel W. H. Treays. Two days 
before the surrender, he was detailed to select a party of officers and 
men to go to Java to build camps. The last ships of any considerable 
size to leave Singapore sailed early on February 12th. These were 
the Empire Star, 11,000 tons, and an Australian vessel of about 
3,000 tons. The Empire Star carried more than 2,000 civilians, key 
officers and men, invalids and nurses, and though savagely bombed and 
hit four témes, landed her passengers safely in Sumatra and Java. 
Treays, with 22 men, left Singapore after midnight on February 
13th/14th in a small oil-tanker at the tail end of the evacuation. They 
were lucky, for very few of the smaller ships got throguh. The oil- 
tanker was bombed and sunk so they transfered to another ship which 
landed them at Tembilihan in Sumatra. Thence they moved to 
Padang and voyaged in a cruiser to the southern coast of Java. On 
February 27th they left Java in a Yangtse river-boat in a convoy 
bound for Colombo, but as the boat could not keep up with the 
other ships she was soon left far behind. Fortunately, her draught 
was very shallow, for two torpedoes from a Japanese submarine 
passed close beneath her and another ahead. So Treays and his 
party reached Ceylon and lived to fight again. 

; The effect of the loss of Singapore was world-wide. The whole 
internal defence scheme of Australia was based on this fortress and 
the presence there of a powerful Allied fleet. Singapore was the core 


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MALAYA, 1941 - 42 209 


of British power in the Far East. It was the gateway to Burma, India, 
and the Middle East. It guarded the riches of the Netherland East 
Indies. Its loss was a shattering blow to British prestige throughout 
Asia and seemed to confirm the invincibility of Japan. Yet this can 
be said of the Malayan campaign as a whole. Whatever the errors 
in advance planning, training, equipment and strategy,. those who 
actually fought in the jungles showed the greatest stubbornness and 
bravery under appalling conditions and the Engineer units rarely 
failed in their main task of delaying the enemy’s advance. 


CHAPTER VIII 


RETREAT FROM BURMA, DECEMBER 194] - MAY 1942 


LTHOUGH the Japanese must have been fully aware that the 
es of Burma should precede any attempt to invade India, 

they could hardly have hoped to launch that operation as early 
as the end of 1941. Yet their easy occupation of Thailand and their 
surprising successes in Malaya encouraged them to do so, and as a 
first step they took possession of Victoria Point at the southernmost 
tip of the Tenasserim strip, whence our small garrison had been 
withdrawn. This occured on December 14th within a week of their 
first landings in Malaya and only four days after the sinking of the 
Prince of Wales and Repulse which had given them local command 
of the seas. To ensure early success in Burma it was necessary to 
seize and occupy Rangoon. There was no rail connection between 
Burma and India, nor even a good road, and there was no railway 
between Burma and Thailand. The communications in Burma, by 
rail, river or road, ran north and south. The country was in fact an 
isolated buffer State between China and Thailand to the east and 
India to the west, but its occupation was necessary to Japan to safe- 
guard her projected conquests in the East Indies. The invasion of 
India was to follow when the means were at hand and she had secured 
safe entry to the Bay of Bengal. Therefore, her first operations 
against Burma were of a tentative nature and conducted very carefully 
in the extreme south. 

At the beginning of December 194! our forces in Burma, as in 
Malaya, were not only inadequate but totally unfitted for war 
‘against a major military Power, and in India there was not one single 
fully trained division. Burma had not been organized to face a 
massive invasion, but a decision had been reached that in such an 
event the line of the Salween River should be held at all costs... The 
operations in Malaya soon showed that Japanese mobility had been 
greatly underestimated and that therefore the enemy should be checked 
if possible in Southern Tenasserim, preferably at Tavoy which is 
more than 200 miles from the Salween estuary. The garrison of 





1 See the map of Lower Burma included in Chapter XIII. 


210 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 211 


Mergui, a further 100 miles southwards, was to be evacuated by sea 
to Rangoon. On December 11th, the Japanese opened their offensive 
by bombing Tavoy. On the 13th, they launched air attacks on Mergui 
and Victoria Point, and having occupied the latter outpost, spread 
90 miles up the coast. Rangoon was bombed by 80 Japanese aircraft 
on December 23rd. Two thousand people were killed and the rest 
stampeded to the open country. The enemy planes tried to repeat 
the assault on Christmas Day but were driven off by our meagre air 
forces and lost heavily. Responsibility for Burma had recently been 
transferred from the Far Eastern Command to that of the Commander- 
in-Chief, India (General Sir Archibald Wavell). The G.O.C., Army 
in Burma, was Lieut.-General T. J. Hutton. 

Negotiations were already in progress between General Wavell, 
the Chinese General Chiang Kai-Shek and the Americans for the 
reinforcement of Burma by Chinese troops. Chiang Kai-Shek was 
vitally interested because the ‘Burma Road’ from Chungking through 
Yunnan to Bhamo in the far north! was his sole link with the Allies 
and the only route along which he could receive Lease-Lend supplies 
from America. He had the men, but not the equipment, for modern 
warfare, and he offered no less than twelve divisions. This offer was 
declined for political reasons, but in the end it was agreed that two 
Chinese Armies, the Fifth and Sixth, should march into Burma from 
Yunnan to defend the Toungoo region if the British were forced to 
abandon Rangoon. For some reason it had been anticipated that 
the Japanese would invade Upper Burma by striking at Toungoo 
from Northern Thailand. The Chinese came in slowly like a swarm 
of locusts, living on the country as they went. They were jovial 
comrades and good fighters but no match for the highly trained 
Japanese, and they arrived too late to save Lower Burma. They 
would not submit to British control although Chiang Kai-Shek had 
agreed that the American General Joseph Stilwell, otherwise ‘Vinegar 
Joe’, should command the Chinese forces in Burma. Co-operation 
with the British was therefore exceedingly difficult, and ‘Vinegar Joe’ 
himself, though brave as a lion, was no boon companion and was 
usually to be found only in some remote northern area. 

Up to the end of 1941, the defence of the eastern frontier of Burma 
devolved mainly on the Ist Burma Division, under Major-General J. 
Bruce-Scott, strung out over a distance of 800 miles from beyond 
Mandalay southwards to Victoria Point and providing also a garrison 


1 See the map of Upper Burma included in Chapter XIII. 


242 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


for Rangoon. The division was under-strength and lacked sup- 
porting arms, anti-aircraft guns and wireless. It had little mechanical 
transport and no air cover. A reinforcement was therefore ordered 
in the shape of the 17th Indian Division, whose Commander, Major- 
General J. G. Smyth, v.c., arrived in Rangoon, ahead of his troops, 
on January 9th, 1942. Two of his brigades had been diverted to 
Malaya, and the third, the 46th Brigade under Brigadier R. Ekin, 
could not be expected before the end of the month. Smyth established 
his headquarters at Moulmein and assumed command of all the 
troops between Papun, 100 miles to the north, and Mergui, 300 miles 
to the south. These amounted to the equivalent of only two weak 
brigades. During the first half of January, Moulmein, Martaban and 
Tavoy were bombed by the Japanese and an enemy force was reported 
to be advancing westwards on Tavoy from Thailand. The 17th 
Division was therefore ordered to concentrate in Moulmein, Tavoy 
and Kawkareik, 40 miles east of Moulmein. Mergui was attacked 
by the Japanese 55th Division on January 19th and the garrison was 
withdrawn by sea after the airfield and all stores had been destroyed. 
About the same time, another enemy force crossed into Tenasserim 
from Thailand through the Kawkareik Pass to threaten Moulmein 
and Martaban at the mouth of the Salween. Tavoy was then evacuated 
and all efforts were directed towards holding the line of the Salween 
River northwards from Moulmein. 

Moulmein was to be defended by the 2nd Burma Brigade. Part 
of the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade was in Martaban across the 
Salween estuary, and the 46th Indian Infantry Brigade was assembling 
in Bilin, 60 miles further north, but without its transport. No proper 
defences existed at Moulmein, and the perimeter was far too large 
to be held by one brigade. The enemy landed and attacked on 
January 30th, and on the following day the 2nd Burma Brigade was 
ferried across to Martaban and withdrawn northwards along the 
coast through Thaton and Bilin to Kyaikto on the Sittang estuary. 
It had lost 617 men in the fighting and was badly mauled. Yet the 
17th Division was still expected to hold the Salween line for a length 
of 60 miles above Martaban and also the country between it and the 
sea. It had to cover the Bilin and Sittang rivers and in particular 
the Sittang railway bridge near Mokpalin.? Apart from ferrying, this 
Structure afforded the only means of transit across the river south 
of Toungoo, which lay nearly 110 miles upstream, and it was therefore 





* See the map of the Waw Area included in this chapter. 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 213 


a vital link with Rangoon. According to General Smyth, his forces 
were disposed so as to cover that port from a distance and thus to 
gain time for the Chinese to arrive.! The final arrangement was 
that the Salween line to Kamamaung (60 miles) should be held by 
the 16th Brigade with headquarters at Thaton. The 46th Brigade 
was to prolong the line northwards for another S0 miles to Papun, 
and in support was the 2nd Burma Brigade, shortly to be reinforced 
by the 48th Brigade of Gurkhas from India. The Japanese lost no 
time in pushing up the Salween from Moulmein. On February 9th, 
the 16th Brigade had to evacuate Martaban. On the 10th, the enemy 
crossed the river at a point east of Thaton, which was abandoned two 
days later. The 46th Brigade then withdrew to Kyaikto and the 
16th Brigade to a defensive line behind the Bilin River, 

General Smyth was not to withdraw from the Bilin line without 
permission from General Wavell who was still confident that help 
would arrive from Australia. Yet, with a threat further north against 
his left flank and possible enemy landings behind his right flank, 
Smyth realized that he could hardly hope to hold the Bilin line without 
adequate reserves. A withdrawal] to the stronger Sittang line was 
obviously unavoidable and this was approved by Wavell on February 
19th. The 48th Brigade was to cover the movement, while all the 
remaining troops, including the 46th Brigade, were to guard the 
approaches to Kyaikto. It was intended that the 17th Division should 
cross the Sittang Bridge on February 22nd; but the withdrawal to 
the bridge promised to be very slow and laborious because the 
metalled road from the south ended beyond Kyaikto and was re- 
placed by an earthen track through dense jungle. Then it was learned 
that no assistance could be expected from Australia. This matter is 
discussed fully by Sir Winston Churchill in Volume IV of The Second 
World War. The Australian Government, fearing an invasion of 
their country, had decided to refuse a request by the British Prime 
Minister that an Australian Division, returning from the Middle 
East, should: be diverted to Burma although they had been promised 
reinforcements from America. This refusal is quite understandable 
because the Australians wished not only to safeguard their country 
from the horrors of invasion but also to preserve a firm base from 


1“The Campaign in Burma”, by Brigadier J. G. Smyth, v.c., M.c,., appearing in 
The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, August 1943, pp. 188-197. This. 
article is a condensed version of another published in July 1942 in The Journal of the 
United Service Institution of India. 


214 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


which to launch a counter-offensive in the East Indies. Nevertheless, 
the refusal sealed the fate of Burma. 

It is time now to describe the part played by units of the Indian 
Engineers in these stirring events. Before the outbreak of hostilities 
the only regular Engineer field unit in Burma was | Field Company, 
Burma Sappers and Miners, with headquarters at Mandalay, but 
shortly afterwards, other units began to appear on the scene. The 
first to land in Rangoon were 50 Field Park Company (Capt. 
R. Kent, R.E.) and 60 Field Company (Major R. K. Kochhar, I.E.) 
both of which arrived during the third week of December 1941 as 
part of the 17th Divisional Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel R. S. B. 
Ward, R.E. The Malerkotla State Sapper Company (Major R. C. 
Orgill, R.E.) also arrived and was posted to the Ist Burma Divisional 
Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel D.C. T. Swan, R.E. Several weeks then 
elapsed before the next Sapper reinforcements appeared, for it was 
not until January 3!st, 1942, that 18 Artisan Works Company (Capt. 
W. Creckwell, I.E.) disembarked at Rangoon to join the 17th Divi- 
sional Engineers. 24 Field Company (Major J. McC. Smith, R.E.) 
and 56 Field Company (Major M. P. R. Sloot, R.E.) landed on 
February 6th. Thus it is clear that while the Japanese were advancing 
up Lower Tenasserim our troops had little Engineer assistance. This 
was unavoidable because the rapidity of the advance was wholly 
unexpected. 70 Field Company (Major I. H. Lyall-Grant, R.E.) did not 
arrive until March 3rd, long after the Sittang Battle had been fought. 

50 Field Park Company moved up-country and during January and 
and February arranged water-supplies and operated workshops at 
Taunggy!, east of Meiktila. Early in March it was in Toungoo, and 
not until March 24th did it enter the battle zone which had shifted 
by that time to the Irrawaddy. The Malerkotlas also went to Taunggyi 
to build bridges and improve communications for the Ist Burma 
Brigade and the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade of the Ist Burma 
Division which were defending that front. The 2nd Burma Brigade in 
Tenasserim, and the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade from Mandalay, 
joined the 46th Indian Infantry Brigade in the south before the end 
of January to complete the 17th Indian Division. The Malerkotla 
Company, ordered southwards, arrived in Kyaikto by rail on January 
29th. 24 Field Company detrained on February 7th at Hninpale, 
beyond Bilin. 60 Field Company had already moved down to Thaton, 
where the railway station had been heavily bombed and much repair 


work was needed. Then, continuing to Moulmein, it found itself in 
the thick of the fighting. 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 215 


A Section of 60 Field Company, under Capt. A. R. Jardine, R.E., 
was at work on demolitions while our troops were withdrawing 
across the Salween estuary to Martaban during the night of January 
30th/3Ist.! After finishing the demolitions, Jardine embarked his 
men on a steam launch for transit to Martaban, nearly three miles 
across the water. The Japs were getting very close, and just as the 
launch was about to leave, a party of stragglers arrived for 
embarkation. The Brigade Major of the 48th Brigade ordered 
Jardine to unload his men and defend the jetty until the 
stragglers could be evacuated: so Jardine, Jemadar Malligarjunan 
and their detachment of Madras Sappers disembarked, made a 
breastwork out of rolls of bedding, and covered the departure of the 
crowded launch. Soon afterwards, Jardine was wounded and 
Malligarjunan assumed command. He was joined by Lieut.-Colonel 
Taylor, O.C. 8th Burma Rifles, and as it was now obvious that no 
ferry boats were coming back, the whole party took refuge under 
the jetty while the enemy arrived, set up mortars on top of it, and 
opened fire towards Martaban. Darkness fell and the party still 
remained undetected. Colonel Taylor takes up the story. ‘‘A little 
later’, he writes, “I heard odd sounds coming from an adjacent 
yard and found that the Sappers had disappeared. The sounds 
persisted so I decided to investigate. Peeping round a wall, I was 
staggered to find the Sappers industriously building a petrol-barrel 
raft with their Jemadar giving instructions in loud whispers. Having 
completed the raft, they launched it; but the Jemadar, apparently 
not being satisfied, had the raft pulled ashore and taken to pieces 
to replace a leaking barrel. It was then re-launched; but still the 
Jemadar was not happy about it and had it rebuilt a second 
time. Then he smiled his satisfaction, came up to me, and saluting 
smartly said ‘Raft tayar hai Sahib’. We climbed aboard, but as we 
dared not use paddles, the Jemadar and his men stripped and gently 
slid the raft into the water and guided it to safety. By keeping calm 
and cool in the face of the enemy, and by thinking clearly and setting 
a fine example, he saved me, two other officers and all his men from 
capture’. One would imagine that Jemadar Malligarjunan would 
at least have been mentioned in despatches, but it was not so. Hardly 
any honours were bestowed on the Sappers who fought in the First 
Burma Campaign. Records are liable to be lost during a retreat 


1 A Short History of Q.V'sO. Madras Sappers and Miners during World War I1. 
1939-45, by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., pp. 29-31. 


216 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


and there are few reliable eye-witnesses. The spotlights are on the 
winning side, not the losers. 

Leaving the Martaban area, 60 Field Company demolished a 
number of road bridges near Thaton and on February Ist arrived 
by train in Kyaikto whence it moved to join the 46th Brigade at 
Hninpale. Afterwards, it prepared for demolition some bridges 
in the Bilin area until it handed over charge to 24 Field Company on 
February 7th. Then it returned to Thaton for a few days to repair 
the damage caused by persistent enemy bombing. 

Another Sapper unit which did good work in Tenasserim was 18 
Artisan Works Company? in which Lieut. L. S. Dubashi, I.E., was 
a Company Officer. ‘‘When fighting was going on at Moulmein”, 
writes Dubashi?, “‘I was ordered to embark with half the Company 
and all the kit at Calcutta on January 27th, 1942. We reached Rangoon 
on the 30th, but as the city was being bombed we did not disembark 
till the following day. On February 3rd, as no labour was available, 
we loaded our kit into railway wagons and moved by rail to Hninpale 
where we arrived on the 6th. Fighting was in progress nearby. We 
worked there in conjunction with 24 Field Company, and later with 
60 Field Company, preparing a bridge on the road to Thaton for 
demolition and operating the railway service between Thaton and 
Pegu. Fortunately, we had a British N.C.O. who was experienced 
in railway work, and with his help we managed very well. We had to 
work day and night, and one Sapper who had had no sleep for three 
days was killed while shunting was in progress. He was our first 
casualty. About February 10th, as the 17th Division was retreating, 
we moved back towards Kyaikto. Leaving Hninpale by train after 
dark on February 15th, we were joined at Kyaikto by the other half- 
Company which had come from Rangoon. We took over some 
installations from a Burma Company and began to load stores for 
despatch to Pegu. On February 20th, we moved by rail to the Sittang 
River Bridge. Almost immediately after our arrival before dawn 
on the 21st we were ordered to build a large stone jetty for a ferry 
service across the river in case the bridge had to be blown up. Some 
300 men, including Pioneers, were collected and work started at once. 
We laboured all day at this job and finished it after dark. There was 
frequent bombing to which our anti-aircraft guns replied. The early 
hours of the 22nd were spent in guiding mechanical transport along the 








* Later known as 518 Artisan Works Company, LE. 
2 Notes by Major L. S. Dubashi, Engineers 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 217 


approach to the bridge. Troops were coming over incessantly 
from the Mokpalin side. The bridge had no railings, though it was 
decked to take road vehicles, and many mules fell off into the river. 
Enemy snipers, firing from trees, caused some confusion and a tempo- 
rary withdrawal; but later we marched forward again to the bank 
where 300 native boats were moored. We had been ordered to destroy 
them so that the enemy might not use them. Only pickaxes were 
available, but under intermittent fire we sank the boats. At 1.30 p.m. 
the order came to retireso we marched about 15 miles to Waw, 
collecting 102 rifles en route and arrived there at 10.0 p.m. On the 24th 
we went by rail to Pegu, and on the 25th to Rangoon. The city had 
been evacuated and looting was going on everywhere. We operated saw- 
mills and worked on the railway, but we managed also to assemble two 
30-cwt lorries from hundreds of packages of lorries and jeeps lying on 
the wharves. We left Rangoon for Prome by train on February 28th’’. 
At the end of January, the Malerkotla Sapper Company, under 
Major R.C. Orgill, R.E., was engaged on water-supply at Kyaikto for 
the 2nd Burma Brigade which, as already related, had been withdrawn 
while the 16th and 46th Brigades tried to hold the Japanese further 
south. Early in February, the unit was erecting obstacles and repairing 
bridges near Bilin. The 17th Division was now reinforced by the 48th 
(Gurkha) Brigade from India, together with 24 Field Company, 
but it was still too weak to hold the extensive Thaton salient and by 
February 15th had retired to the Bilin River. On the 2lIst, after the 
Malerkotlas had prepared the bridges around Kyaikto for demolition, 
they blew a large road-bridge at Thebyugyaung on the Bilin road. 
By this time, the enemy had occupied a village on the coast within 
four miles of Kyaikto. There was heavy machine-gun fire during 
the night, and before dawn the enemy cheered and shouted and 
showered red tracer bullets on our men in an effort to spread panic. 
However, the 48th Brigade crossed the road-bridge at Kyaikto—a 
difficult bottle-neck—in good order and 24 Field Company prepared 
the village for demolition. The road and railway bridges were then 
blown on the order of the rear-guard commander, and Kyaikto was 
left in flames. Major Orgill, with Lieuts. Hudson and Bashir Ahmed, 
subsequently made their way back to Mokpalin with firing parties of 
the Malerkotlas. “The journey was unforgettable’, writes Major 
B. A. Khan,' “‘as we and the retiring troops of the 46th and 16th Brigades 


* Regimental History of Malerkotla Sappers and Miners, by Major B. A. Khan, 
Engineers, p. 35. 


218 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


were subjected to intermittent dive-bombing and machine-gunning 
from the air for three hours before darkness put an end to the 
activities of the day.”” Many of the enemy planes had British markings 
on wings and fuselage. Mokpalin was reached at dusk and the 
Malerkotlas crossed the Sittang Bridge to the west bank. 

Some extracts fron the Official History may help to explain the 
course of events near Mokpalin. During the night of February 2! st/22nd, 
the 17th Divisional transport began to cross the Sittang Bridge, 
but before dawn it was held up by an overturned lorry. From the 
bridge, right back to Mokpalin, the bomb-pitted road soon became 
choked with vehicles in two lines, and, to add to the congestion, 
the transport of the 16th and 46th Brigades began to arrive. Fortunately 
a Gurkha battalion of the 48th Brigade had already crossed. At 8.30 
a.m. the enemy attacked from the jungle to the north-east of the bridge 
and almost reached it before being repelled by a counter-attack. 
Brigadier N. Hugh-Jones (48th Brigade) then assumed local command 
and ordered the destruction of the 300 native boats collected near the 
right bank. Such was the situation when Brigadier J. K. Jones brought 
his 16th Brigade, and 300 survivors of Brigadier Ekin’s 46th Brigade, 
into Mokpalin after the confused fighting along the road from 
Kyaikto. At dusk on the 22nd, attacks on Mokpalin from three direc- 
tions were repelled and a perimeter defence was organized. Japanese 
machine-guns, established on the railway line, swept the whole length 
of the Sittang Bridge. The bridge presented a difficult problem. If it fell 
intact into Japanese hands, the road to Rangoon would lie open. 
If, on the other hand, it was blown up, all the troops and transport 
remaining on the left bank might be lost. Hugh-Jones therefore 
consulted General Smyth and was ordered to blow the bridge before 
daylight. Accordingly, at 5.30 a.m. on February 23rd, 1942, after 
the covering troops had been withdrawn, the bridge was destroyed. 
No avenue of retreat then remained for the thousands of men still 
waiting to cross. 

While detachments of the 16th and 46th Brigades held off repeated 
enemy assaults on Mokpalin, large numbers of men set to work to 
build bamboo or timber rafts with petrol tins or water-bottles to give 
extra flotation. Some of the slightly wounded tried to swim the river, 
but the case of the seriously wounded was almost hopeless. At 11.15 
a.m., 27 enemy bombers attacked the bridgehead and the mass of trans- 
port blocking the approaches. Gun ammunition exploded. Vehicles 
burned. The jungle blazed and casualties mounted rapidly under 
heavy mortar fire. At 2.0 p.m., Brigadier Hugh-Jones ordered a 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 219 


general withdrawal across the river. Guns, machine guns and mortars 
were rendered unserviceable. Most of the men threw their rifles into 
the Sittang. Mokpalin village was set on fire so that the smoke should 
give some concealment to the swimmers and those on rafts. The 
river was soon a mass of bobbing heads. Though sniped from the 
bank and attacked from the air, parties of men egged each other 
on to swim faster. They laughed. They made jokes about ‘the Boat 
Race’ even in the face of death. Swimmers assisted non-swimmers. 
Some swam back across nearly a mile of water to bring over more 
of the wounded. February 23rd was marked by deeds of heroism 
worthy of the highest traditions of the British and Indian Armies. 
But the 17th Division had ceased to exist, for the time being, as a 
fighting force. It could muster only 3,350 men and 149 officers 
with 1,420 rifles. General Wavell now stated that he was doubtful 
whether he could hold Burma. 

Major B. A. Khan gives a good description of the part played by 
the Malerkotla Company in the destruction of the Sittang Bridge. 
“Immediately on our arrival in the Mokpalin area’, he writes, 
“firing parties set out to destroy a dozen factories, mills, power stations 
and waterworks’ plants. The vital parts of the machinery were blasted 
and the remainder set on fire after drenching with oil. At 7.30 
p.m. on February 2Ist, the Company was given the task of 
preparing the Sittang Railway Bridge for demolition. Major Orgill 
and a party of officers and N.C.QOs. were employed on this job through- 
out most of the 22nd under continuous enemy fire. The bridge was 
the second largest in Burma, consisting of eleven spans of through- 
girder, each 150 feet long. {t had been adapted for use by mechanical 
transport by filling in sleepers in the rail gaps. The approaches were 
difficult, and the width of roadway dangerously narrow. Throughout 
the night preceding the demolition, 2nd Lieut. Macklin was loading 
charges into boxes. An enemy attack on the bridgehead took place 
but was held by the Gurkhas. The Malerkotlas then started placing 
charges on the upper and lower booms and cross-stiffeners of the 
three central spans. Major Orgill, Lieut. B. A. Khan and 2nd Lieut. 
Macklin were in charge of the three spans. Explosive stores were 
brought to the site by two parties under Capt. Corfield and Lieut. 
Hudson. Shortage of stores meant that the spans had to be dealt 
with separately and differently. Bullets hit the girders while the 
Sappers worked, but the preparations for demolition were finished 
by 3.0 p.m. Brigadier Hugh-Jones, Commander, 48th Brigade, was 
made responsible for ordering the demolition. After the bridge had 


220 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


been shelled and mortared rather accurately, orders were given to. 
withdraw from the east bank. This left only the Sapper firing party 
and a Vickers gun crew on the bridge. However, as there were still 
two brigades south of the Sittang, no orders for demolition were 
issued and about 5.0 p.m. a bridgehead was re-established on the 
east bank by the Gurkhas as it had been decided to wait and see 
whether the 16th Brigade, which was ahead of the 46th Brigade, 
could reach the bridgehead before dark: The 16th Brigade, however, 
failed to reach it. At 2.30 a.m. on the 23rd, the enemy put in a fairly 
strong attack and it was decided that the bridge could not be held 
for another hour and must be blown up. The demolition was quite 
successful although the stores provided were insufficient for the task. 
The firing party under Lieut. B. A. Khan rejoined the Company 
next morning at Abya, half-way to Waw, and on the 25th the unit 
moved to Waw where it prepared further demolitions which were 
executed by 60 Field Company. Among the troops picked up by a 
train coming from Mokpalin were Jemadar Khalil Ur Rahman and 
his firing party from the Sittang Bridge who had managed to cross 
the river on improvised rafts.” 

Lieut-Colone! Orgill writes as follows!:— “There were enough 
stores to demolish one span with instantaneous fuze, another on an 
electric circuit, and a third with lots of explosive and safety fuse 
which we hoped would go up by sympathetic detonation; but when 
the bridge was blown, the third span, though damaged, did not 
drop, although the other two spans went. Owing to shortage of 
electric cable, my exploder had to be on the bridge itself, about 
three spans back from the one electrically prepared. We thought 
that the bridge would be blown soon after the demolitions were ready, 
and at about 3.0 p.m. the troops holding the bridgehead were with- 
drawn and we prepared to fire. This, however, proved to be a false 
alarm and the bridgehead was re-occupied before dusk. On the east 
bank, a battle went on throughout the night. We had men on all 
three spans, guarding the charges. About 2.0 a.m. on the 23rd, the 
Brigade Commander asked me whether I could guarantee that the 
bridge would go up if the bridgehead was overwhelmed after day- 
light, and I replied that I could not give any such assurance though 
we should have a good try. About two hours later, the decision was 
made to withdraw and blow the bridge. The Brigade Commander 
then told me to blow, and after seeing the bridgehead troops across, 





* Notes by Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Orgill, 0.8.£., R.£., dated February 16th, 1951, 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 221 


we lit the safety fuzes and then touched off the instantaneous fuse, and 
also the electric circuit with the exploder, while the battle raged 
practically on the bridge itself.” 

Few commanders in the field have been faced with a more terrible 
problem than that which confronted Major-General Smyth in the 
early hours of February 23rd, 1942. “At 4.0 a.m.”, writes Smyth 
himself,! ‘‘the Brigadier in charge of the bridge defences reported 
that he could not guarantee to hold the bridge for more than another 
hour. I had then to decide whether or not to blow the bridge knowing 
that three-quarters of my troops were on the wrong side of it. 
However, there was no doubt as to the right course. If the enemy 
gained the bridge, not only could he push over a whole division straight 
towards Rangoon, but, with both banks of the Sittang in his posses- 
sion, the chance of getting more troops across the river was remote. 
I told the Brigadier to blow, and this was most gallantly done by 
the Sappers under close fire. The effect on the Japanese was immediate. 
Having failed in their object, they drew off. Parties of our men started 
in broad daylight to swim and float themselves over, first discarding 
their clothes and boots. On the far bank they had some distance to 
walk on stony ground, and the feet of the British soldiers were soon 
in an appalling state. The enemy, however, had had enough. His 
casualties had undoubtedly been heavy for it was estimated that 
there were 2,000 Japanese dead in the vicinity of the bridge alone.” 

Baulked at Mokpalin, the Japanese did not attempt for several 
days to cross the Sittang higher up. The Chinese approached from the 
north and it became possible to save some of the stores in Rangoon 
and to prepare for a fighting withdrawal towards Prome on the 
Irrawaddy. Early in March, Major-General Smyth handed over 
command of the 17th Indian Division to Major-General D. T. 
(‘‘Punch’’) Cowan who thereafter led the Division with great success 
during the retreat northwards and later in the defence of Imphal. 
It is interesting to note that Genera] Smyth entered Parliament after 
the war and held a prominent post in the Conservative Party under 
Mr. Winston Churchill in 1953. 

On March 4th, 1942, General Sir Harold Alexander, who had 
conducted the final evacuation from Dunkirk, arrived by air in 





1“The Campaign in Burma, 1942”, by Brig. J. G. Smyth, v.c., M.c., appearing in 
The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, August 1943, pp. 188-197. This 
is a condensed version of an article entitled “The Start of the War in Burma” by 


Brig. Smyth which appeared in The Journal of the United Service Institution of India 
in July 1942, 


222 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Calcutta to relieve Lieut.-General T. J. Hutton in command of the 
Army in Burma. There he met General Wavell and was instructed 
to hold Rangoon as long as he could as the retention of that port 
was vital to the whole situation in the Far East. Yet he must not 
risk the destruction of his Army but should withdraw if necessary 
to defend Upper Burma and particularly the large oil-fields at 
Yenangyaung and Chauk on the Irrawaddy. He should maintain 
contact with the Chinese and manoeuvre so as to cover the construc- 
tion of a line of road communication between India and Burma. 
Alexander reached Rangoon on March Sth. He found the 17th 
Division holding the area between Pegu and Hlegu, the 48th Brigade 
and the newly arrived 7th Armoured Brigade being at Pegu and the 
16th Brigade at Hlegu. Another new arrival, the 63rd Brigade, was 
in position 16 miles north of Rangoon though without its transport. 
The Ist Burma Division, having handed over the defence of the 
Southern Shan States to the Chinese Sixth Army, had the 13th 
Brigade at Mawchi, 50 miles east of Toungoo, the Ist Burma Brigade 
at Pyu, 30 miles south of Toungoo, and the 2nd Burma Brigade at 
Nyaunglebin, 50 miles north of Pegu. There was thus a dangerous 
gap of 40 miles between the two divisions. Japanese forces were 
already in Waw and close to Pegu, and others were crossing the 
Sittang at night and infiltrating through the gap north of Pegu into 
the Pegu Yomas, the hilly jungle country north-west of that place. 
Alexander at once ordered a combined offensive to close the gap 
between the divisions, but while it was in progress the enemy captured 
part of Pegu and held it firmly against all assaults. On March 6th, 
the enemy blocked the road between Pegu and Rangoon. Alexander 
then decided to abandon Rangoon. At midnight on March 6th/7th 
he ordered the destruction of the great oil refineries at Syriam, the 
final evacuation of the city by all troops, and the re-grouping of his 
Army in the Irrawaddy Valley to the north. A detachment of 60 
Field Company had been in Rangoon since March Ist trying to salvage 
as much as possible of the material lying around. The place was 
like a city of the dead. Not a soul was to be seen. An officer who 
was sent to an Ordnance dump 16 miles to the north to prepare it 
for demolition reported that explosives and ammunition were stacked 
in an area covering nearly one square mile. He tried to arrange 
transport for some of these munitions towards Tharrawaddy but 
could do little in the time available. Accordingly, everything that 
could be destroyed was destroyed. Nevertheless, the Japanese could 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 223 


have fitted out an Army Corps with the stores they secured in and 
about Rangoon. , 

General Alexander’s plan was to withdraw the 17th Division, 
under Major-General Cowan, northward by the road through Prome 
on the Irrawaddy until he could link up with the Ist Burma Division 
under Major-General Bruce-Scott which was concentrated south of 
Toungoo on the Sittang. He hoped to make a stand on the Prome- 
Toungoo line as the Chinese 55th Division was converging from the 
north on the same line. In the Rangoon area the situation was 
obviously hopeless as the enemy was already threatening the road 
to Prome and had cut the road to Toungoo. At Taukkyan, a road 
junction 21 miles north of Rangoon, the enemy established a road- 
block and held it almost long enough to capture Alexander himself. 
Then the race for Prome was resumed. 

Among the retreating troops was 70 Field Company, under Major 
1. H. Lyall-Grant, R.E. This unit had landed in Rangoon on March 
3rd and moved northwards on the 7th while the battle at Taukkyan 
was in progress. Mobility being essential, it abandoned or burnt 
most of its tents, private clothing and stores on the way to Tharra- 
waddy, retaining, however, its arms, ammunition, engineer tools and 
explosives. On March 9th, it harboured beyond Tharrawaddy, where 
the 17th Division was reorganizing, and during the next few days 
carried out many demolitions in the neighbourhood. For instance, 
on the 10th it demolished two large bridges near Okkan, south of 
Tharrawaddy. As the unit was to be lightly motorized, all non- 
essential Engineer equipment was then sent forward to Prome. On 
the 13th, it moved to Okpo, between Letpadan and Zigon, while 
detachments left behind demolished a large railway bridge near 
Tharrawaddy and another on a branch line to Henzada. The railway 
station at Okpo was then demolished. March 20th saw the unit at 
Natalin, between Zigon and Paungde, building defences and im- 
proving communications, and there it remained until it arrived in 
Prome on March 30th. There was much work to be done in and 
around Prome and little time in which to do it. Jetties were needed 
on the river bank, a new road had to be made to link with the main 
highway from Mandalay, shipping had to be sunk, and power stations 
and petrol tanks blown up. Road-blocks also were required to the 
south of Prome. In these and many other ways, 70 Field Company 
helped to check the Japanese advance. 


1 Brief History of the K.G.V’sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.LLE., August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 28. 


224 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Lyall-Grant records some interesting details about the equipment. 
and transport of his unit.1 The inadequate supply of explosives, 
secured here or there from dumps, was supplemented by judicious 
private enterprise. For instance, he acquired 600 lbs. of guncotton 
from a warehouse in Rangoon docks and discovered a store of geli- 
gnite in a cave at Prome. Commando troops gave him plastic explo- 
sives and the Chinese some gelignite. Explosives were obtained also 
from mining and commercial concerns. Each Section carried 200 Ibs. 
and the Company Headquarters, 2,000 Ibs. Yet these amounts barely 
sufficed because about 400 Ibs. were needed for every bridge demolition. 
When the supply of guncotton was exhausted, gelignite had to be 
used entirely. Few tools were required, and the only stores carried 
were explosives, spikes, dogs and binding wire. After the unit was 
motorized, each Sub-Section of 12 men travelled in a 15-cwt truck 
together with its kit and tools. Fortunately, Lyall-Grant was able to 
augment his normal transport by a 5-ton Studebaker and a 40-seater 
bus found in Rangoon and a couple of fire-engines discovered in 
Prome. These, with a 3-ton Chevrolet bestowed on him by the 
Chinese and a number of abandoned lorries and cars retrieved on 
the road, solved the problem of mobility. 

When the first Japanese patrols moved into Rangoon on March 
8th, a sorry sight must have met their eyes. The wreckage of Govern- 
ment buildings, post offices, power houses and factories strewed the 
streets. To the east, billowing clouds of smoke showed where the 
Burma Oil Company’s refineries had been destroyed. The flicker 
of flames was reflected from the clouds. But the enemy had un- 
doubtedly gained a prize of untold value from a strategical aspect. 
Alexander could now expect no reinforcements because there was 
no port where they could be landed. His aircraft had already had 
to fly up-country to hastily prepared landing grounds, and thus the 
enemy was able to add local command of the air to their supremacy 
on land and sea. On March 23rd, the Japanese occupied the Andaman 
Islands, thereby obtaining adequate cover for their sea approaches 
to Rangoon. 

In order to secure the necessary unity between the 17th Indian 
Division and the Ist Burma Division it was arranged that a Corps 
Headquarters should be set up at Prome, and on March 19th, 1942, 
Lieut.-General W.J. Slim, formerly Commander, 10th Indian Division, 
was appointed as Commander, 1st Burma Corps, otherwise known 





1 Notes by Major I. H. Lyall-Grant, R.E., dated February Ist., 1948. 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 225 


as “‘Burcorps” but shortly to be renamed the “4th Indian Corps’’. 
General ‘‘Bill’’ Slim, who has already appeared in these pages, was a 
happy choice in every respect. A fine strategist and tactician and a 
strict disciplinarian, he inspired ‘“‘ Burcorps”’ with the confidence and 
endurance necessary to conduct a fighting withdrawal under adverse 
conditions. It is not surprising that his rise was meteoric, and that 
after commanding successively the 4th Indian Corps and the 15th 
Indian Corps, he became, on October 15th, 1943, the Commander 
of the Fourteenth Army which smashed the last Japanese resistance 
in Burma. His career, after the war, was varied and notable. During 
the latter half of 1945, he was Commander-in-Chief, South East 
Asia Land Forces, and then, for two years, Commandant of the 
Imperial Defence College in England. He retired from the Army 
in May 1948 to become Deputy Chairman of the Railway Executive 
but was recalled in November to succeed Field-Marshal Viscount 
Montgomery as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Finally, in 1953, 
Field-Marshal Sir William Slim was appointed Governor-General of 
Australia. Such was the man who was destined to retrieve a lost 
Burma in the fateful years which followed the retreat from Rangoon 
so ably planned by General Alexander. 

While the 17th Division was withdrawing up the road to Prome, 
the 1st Burma Division was concentrating south of Toungoo to 
complete, with the help of the Chinese Fifth Army from the north, 
the Prome-Toungoo line of resistance. But that line could not be 
held. Japanese reinforcements were pouring into Rangoon, and on 
March 2ist disaster overtook the Allied Air Force. Reduced to two 
British fighter squadrons and a miscellaneous assortment of out-of- 
date British and American machines, it was caught on the ground at 
Magwe, far north of Prome, by a powerful Japanese air raid and was 
virtually destroyed. The few surviving R.A.F. planes flew to India: 
those of the American Volunteer Group made for bases in China. 
The enemy was then free to bomb such important centres as Mandalay, 
Thazi and Maymyo unhindered and did so with dire results. To 
relieve pressure on Toungoo by the Japanese 33rd Division, the Ist 
Burma Corps was directed to launch a local offensive southwards 
from Prome, its first objective being Paungde where our rearguard 
had been overtaken. A striking force moved out on March 28th 
but had to be diverted to counter a threat against Prome itself. An 
enemy coulmn had crossed the Irrawaddy, advanced up the west 
bank, re-crossed at Shwedaung and cut the railway line at Padigon. 


226 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Our striking force south of Shwedaung had then to fight its way back 
to Prome. 

The Japanese 55th Division, massed before Toungoo, captured that 
place from the Chinese Fifth Army on March 29th, thus securing 
access to a road into the Shan States where the Japanese 56th Division 
was already operating. This was the signal for the Nationalist 
Burmese elements to harry our retreating columns and they took 
the field under the title of the ‘‘Burma Independence Army.”” Con- 
sequent upon the loss of Toungoo and the action at Shwedaung, it 
was decided to regroup the Ist Burma Corps in the Allanmyo area, 
north of Prome, after evacuating all possible supplies from that town, 
and accordingly, when the enemy had begun to enter the place after 
dark on April Ist, our last troops withdrew, carried often on the 
tanks of the 7th Armoured Brigade. On April 2nd, the 17th Division 
marched northwards to Dayindabo and established contact with 
the Ist Burma Division coming from the east. It then passed through 
that division and reached Allanmyo on April 3rd, the day on which 
the enemy killed 2,000 people in an air raid on Mandalay. By April 
8th, the Burma Corps was holding the general line Minhla-Taungd- 
wingyi, east of the Irrawaddy and covering the important oil-fields 
at Yenangyaung. On April 12th, it repulsed an enemy assault ; but 
the Japanese were not to be denied, and moving round our left 
flank they struck straight at the oil-fields where there were no less 
than 4,000 wells.? 

The Engineer units with the Ist Burma Division had been very 
busy during March 1942. Under Lieut.-Colonel D.C. T. Swan. R.E., 
as C.R.E., they comprised 50 Field Park Company (Capt. R. Kent, 
R.E.) 56 Field Company (Major M. P. R. Sloot, R.E.) and the Maler- 
kotla Field Company (Major R. C. Orgill, R.E.). All three took part 
in active operations against the invaders, and the Malerkotlas excelled 
themselves in rafting during an offensive on the Nyaunglebin front.? 
Another Engineer unit, | Company, Burma Sappers and Miners, 
was present but had practically ceased to be of any value. While in 
Toungoo, 50 Field Park Company built bamboo bridges and ramps 
for loading trains and provided men to run power-houses, operate 
tail-yards and even to drive trains as most of the civilian railway 
employees had vanished. Leaving Toungoo on March 24th, the 

} From Pyramid to Pagoda, by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.s.0., M.c., p. 29. 


2 Regimental History of Malerkotla Sappers and Miners, by Major B. A. Khan, 
Engineers, p. 42. 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 227 


unit acted as infantry during a battle at Kyundon airfield, south of 
Meiktila, where Captain Kent was wounded by a bomb. Then it 
moved to the Irrawaddy at Allanmyo which it reached on March 
30th. 56 Field Company was also in action and suffered many 
casualties. Major M. P. R. Sloot, R.E. was mortally wounded. His 
successor, Major G. M. Eccles, R.E., was captured a few weeks 
later and finally Major P. F. Garthwaite, R.E., took command. 
This occurred on the Irrawaddy when the Burma Division was 
withdrawing northwards with the 17th Division. 

The War Diary of 60 Field Company throws some light on the 
conditions during the retreat. ‘‘Prome. 1st April. Diversion for bridge 
north of Prome all day. M.T. sent back to Allanmyo as Divisional 
Commander fears road block. 2nd April. Battle went on all night. 
After 0600 hrs., moved two miles north to Divisional Area. At 
0800 hrs., ordered to march north to crossroads. Our two bullock 
carts were very slow. Ordered to keep moving to Allanmyo. Four 
lorries gone on ahead, leaving only two. Late in the afternoon we 
got a lift on tanks about 8 miles to Divisional Camp. Allanmyo. 
3rd April. Started marching this morning to Allanmyo. Discarded 
our bullock carts. Company marched 16 miles and was then lifted 
by M.T. to a camp 5 miles north of Allanmyo. Nyaungbintha. 4th 
April. Company left by M.T. for north. Sth April. 2nd Lieut. 
Yarrow demolished a bridge, 100 yards long, 20 miles to the north. 
Taungdwingyi. 6th April. Arrived 1900 hrs. 8th April. Talk by 
General Slim, Corps Commander. He explained that we had reached 
a stage when victory hung in the balance and that it was ‘the last 
ten minutes’ that counted. Taungdwingyi was to serve as the pivot 
on which the Corps worked, so the latter had to be mobile. The 
whole 17th Division started digging in and building defence works. 
9th April. Lieut. Park started a ‘controlled’ fire of half the town. 
Fire itself took control for some time but was brought under control 
later. 10th April. Controlled firing of rest of town. 12th April. 
Eight enemy bombers over the town. Third salvo fell around our 
lines but just missed us. Slit trenches saved us from shrapnel. 19th 
April. The ‘Bangalore Tank”? was evolved. Burdiv, on our right, has 
already withdrawn from Magwe and Yenangyaung to K yaukpadaung.3 


1 Nyaungbintha is 26 miles N.N.E. of Allanmyo on the road to Taungdwingyi. 


2 A canvas tank, with 4 bib-cocks, supported by rope tied to the corners of a wooden 
framework. Carried, folded, on a lorry. When unfolded and filled on arrival, it could 
be used to replenish water-containers direct from the lorry. 


8 Kyaukpadaung is 30 miles north of Yenangyaung. 


228 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


On learning this, the Chinese on our left started to withdraw 
towards Meiktila. Thus we formed a ‘spear-head’. Hence 
the 17th Division began to withdraw. 20th April. Company started 
moving from Taungdwingyi to Natmauk, 30 miles. Arrived 1800 hrs, 
The road had been developed from a track by 24 and 70 Field Com- 
panies as we had been cut off at Magwe. Mahlaing’. 23rd April. 
Arrived midnight 22nd/23rd. Met Chinese in large numbers en route. 
They stopped our overcrowded vehicles, at the point of the bayonet, 
for lifts.”’ 

The experiences of 24 Field Company were very similar. After 
being severely bombed at Prome on April Ist, the unit was ordered 
to move to Allanmyo. It lost most of its mechanical transport in a 
road-block and then adopted pack transport. At Taungdwingyi, 
which it reached on April 8th, it prepared defences such as anti-tank 
ditches and road-blocks and also helped to wire infantry positions. 
Enemy air attacks were frequent. On April 14th it repaired the road 
to Myothit (15 miles) as an alternative route in case the Magwe— 
Yenangyaung road was cut by the enemy. Early on the [5th it started 
for Natmauk, but within a few hours it was delayed at a nullah 
called the Pinchaung, a scene of heavy fighting. The entire Company 
started at once to improvise a track over the Pinchaung and continued 
throughout the night while transport floundered across. The chaung 
was about 600 yards wide and had a bed of loose sand. The brush- 
wood track required constant renewal, but on April 18th a more 
durable track was begun. Part of this was made with 5,000 sleepers 
lifted from the railway line, and although only 80 men were available 
the track was ready for use by the 17th Division and 7th Armoured 
Brigade at dusk on the 20th. On April 23rd, the unit arrived in 
Mahlaing and reached Ondaw, west of Mandalay, on April 26th. 

Major L. S. Dubashi relates some of the experiences of 18 Artisan 
Works Company over the same period. ‘‘After a week or so at Prome, 
we moved to Allanmyo and made diversions to bridges on the road 
to Magwe in case the bridges had to be demolished. Early in April 
we went to the Yenangyaung airfield and parties of Sappers were 
trained in running the power-houses, water-supply plant, synthetic 
petrol plant and other essential services. Arrangements had been 
made to build a low wall round the installations so that the latter 
could be flooded with oil from pipes and then set on fire. A detach- 
ment at Magwe had to load coal into river steamers, day and night, 





1 Mahlaing is 20 miles north of Meiktila. 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 229 


for local labour was no longer available. As the Japanese advanced, 
our forces had to retreat from the Magwe and Yenangyaung air- 
fields, but the Magwe detachment was kept there for a time to prevent 
the enemy from crossing the river. On April 14th this detachment 
and other troops were encircled by Japanese infiltration forces, but 
with the help of tanks a road-block was removed and the detachment 
escaped in a 30-cwt lorry. Later on, there was heavy fighting and 
some of our men went astray and were reported as missing. 
Firing started during the night. A motor-cycle which we possessed 
was carried tied down on to the bumper of our lorry with some- 
body’s turban as the noise of its engine might give away the direction 
of our withdrawal. On April 16th we moved to a camp on the 
Meiktila road, and later to Meiktila itself. There we strengthened 
nine bridges. Afterwards, we moved to Sagaing, south of Mandalay, 
and a party was sent to the Myitnge River where a 100-feet railway 
bridge had to be decked. We started work at 5.0. p.m. and continued 
with only half an hour’s rest until the job was finished at 3.30 p.m. 
on the following day, and in addition we maintained a ferry service 
some miles upstream. During the last week of April, we marched to 
Shwebo, which was burning. Though it was difficult to find a way 
through the town at night, we managed to discover the road to Ye-U.”’ 

Allanmyo, and Thayetmyo across the Irrawaddy, were both eva- 
cuated by “Burcorps” on April 6th and left in flames after all possible 
stores and ammunition had been removed, and by April 8th the 
Corps was on the general line Minhla-Taungdwingyi, which, however, 
it could not hope to hold in depth. A reinforcement promised by 
the Chinese failed to arrive. The Japanese ignored the Taungdwingyi 
defences, brushed aside the right flank of the Chinese Fifth Army 
north of Toungoo and made for Yenangyaung which they began 
to attack in force on April 11th during a violent thunderstorm. 
Space does not permit a description of the confused fighting which 
ensued during the next few days except to remark that General 
Slim brought the enemy almost to a standstill. The operations are 
described in some detail by Sir Compton Mackenzie in his excellent 
history of the war entitled Eastern Epic.’ There was desperate fighting 
on two nullahs, the Yinchaung and, to the north of Yenangyaung, 
the Pinchaung where 24 Field Company laboured for so many days. 
The Ist Burma Division was cut off and in danger of annihilation, 
but it won through in the nick of time. Then followed the destruction 





1 Eastern Epic, by Compton Mackenzie, Vol. I, pp. 470-477. 


230 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


of the Yenangyaung and Chauk oilfields, a heartrending though 
unavoidable undertaking. 

The task of denying the oilfields had been entrusted to the officials 
of the Burma Oil Company who carried out their dangerous work 
with commendable thoroughness. On April 15th, a sheet of flame 
from millions of gallons of crude oil rose to the sky. Explosions rent 
the air in all directions. Dense clouds of smoke swirled over the 
forest of derricks and turned day into night, and thus the work of 
years was ruined in a few hours and some of the finest oilfields 
in the world became an abomination of desolation. On April 2\st, 
the Burma Division having been extricated, all the British and Chinese 
forces withdrew successfully north of the Pinchaung, though they 
had to abandon most of their transport. The Chinese were losing 
heart, and little reliance could be placed on them. General Alexander 
had now no option but to withdraw further northwards as quickly 
as possible and the only route was by way of Kalewa on the Chindwin 
River, up the dreaded Kabaw Valley to Tamu, and over the Naga Hills 
to Imphal in Manipur. But could he accomplish this feat before his 
troops were bogged down by the approaching monsoon? It seemed 
hardly likely. In the Shan States, the Japanese were victorious every- 
where. They had thrown the Chinese back towards the Salween and 
opened the way to Lashio which they soon occupied and thus cut the 
famous ‘Burma Road’ to China. While the British and Indian forces 
moved up the Chindwin, the Chinese withdrew to Bhamo. A wedge 
had been driven between the Allies. On April 28th, the British fought a 
brilliant action at Kyaukse, south of Mandalay, to cover the passage 
of their artillery and armour across the great Ava Bridge over the 
Irrawaddy, and then, on the 30th, blew up two spans of the bridge after 
the guns and tanks had crossed. The Chinese armies dispersed gradually 
towards Yunnan or wandered by a circuitous northern route to a 
refuge in India. The Japanese occupied Mandalay and on May 7th 
reached Myitkyina, the northern terminus of the railway. So much 
for the general course of events which must form a prelude to the 
narrative of Engineer exploits in the later stages of the campaign. 

70 Field Company, with the 48th Brigade of the 17th Division, 
arrived at Kyaukse on April 27th and proceeded to provide demolition 
parties for the two bridges at that place. The enemy had to be delayed 
at all costs so that the Ava Bridge might be used without congestion. 
Kyaukse was in flames, but its bridges were intact. Preparations to 
blow the bridges were begun on April 28th as the enemy patrols 
approached. “The battle at Kyaukse shows the difficulties besetting 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 231 


demolition parties”, writes Lyall-Grant.! “‘We had four bridges to 
demolish in less than 24 hours in addition to the railway station and other 
targets. One of these bridges, at Dwehla, was 7 miles away to the west, 
so a detachment, under an R.E. subaltern, was sent out there with a 
covering party of a few tanks commanded by another subaltern. In the 
middle of the night, while the battle for Kyaukse was at its height, I was 
informed by the Brigadier that the Dwehla Bridge had been blown 
without orders and that my R.E. subaltern had been put under arrest. 
The procedure was supposed to have been that the Tank subaltern was 
to receive from Divisional or Brigade Headquarters a wireless order to 
blow the bridge, but henow admitted that he had given the order himself. 
Consequently, I took my subaltern to the Brigadier who promptly 
cancelled the order of arrest. The withdrawal from Kyaukse started at 
5.30 p.m. on April 29th with the enemy in close contact. Just after 
6.0 p.m. the bridge on the main road south of the town was blown. 
The noise was terrific and the whole battle stopped for about two 
minutes. There was complete silence everywhere. Two of our tanks, 
which had been left deliberately on the far side, then drove round and 
entered the town by another bridge. As they came over, the crews 
shouted cheerfully ‘‘The whole Jap Army seems to be behind us” 
and promptly disappeared up the main road. The order to blow this 
bridge was then given by the Brigade Major and we began to insert 
detonators in the charges, a difficult business underneath the structure. 
However, by 6. 22 p.m. all was ready, and within another minute the 
bridge went up. The Sapper party, in a truck and a car, had then to 
drive right into the middle of the town to gain the main road, expect- 
ing every minute to meet the leading enemy infantry. They were 
lucky to get away, for the last of our own troops were already nearly 
a mile down the road.” 

24 Field Company, now under Major G. V. C. Darley, R.E., had a 
very busy time when ordered to demolish some of the most important 
bridges in Northern Burma. While the unit was resting at Ondaw on 
April 27th the order came that the Pawlaung Railway Bridge, the 
Myitnge Road and Railway Bridges and the huge Ava combined 
Road and Railway Bridge were to be destroyed. The Pawlaung 
bridge was to be blown at Darley’s discretion, the Myitnge bridges 
on the order of the Commander, 63rd Brigade, and the Ava structure 
on that of Major-General Cowan, Commander, 17th Division. At 
7.0 p.m. three Sections of Bombay Sappers left Ondaw and assembled 








1 Notes by Major I. H. Lyall-Grant, R.E., dated February Ist, 1949. 


232 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


at the northern end of the Ava Bridge to move explosives up from dumps. 
Preparations were made at noon to blow the Myitnge bridges. The 
charges were fixed after dark by Major Darley and 2nd Lieut. 
Rhodes, R.E., and both bridges were demolished at 10.30 p.m. 
The charges were fired simultaneouly with Cordex. Two spans of 
of the road bridge fell, but only one span of the railway bridge which 
was an iron structure with 180-feet girders. It is believed that the 
Japanese managed later to jack up this span and support it on a 
crib pier, but the demolition must have delayed their rail traffic for 
at least six weeks. 

After blowing up the Myitnge bridges, Major Darley went to the 
Ava Bridge to assist 2nd Lieut. Mackay, R.E., in fixing the charges. 
Work proceeded throughout the night of April 29th/30th and the 
circuit was completed before daylight. During the day, enemy planes 
dropped about 60 bombs close to the bridge but none of the 
Bombay Sappers was injured. At 10.0 p.m. on April 30th, General 
Cowan arrived and gave orders for the demolition to be prepared 
immediately, so Darley and Mackay fixed the electric detonators 
and primers and checked the circuit. Two safety fuses were also 
arranged to fire in ten minutes, and one in two minutes in case the 
bridge was rushed by the enemy. The rearguard had passed over 
the bridge some hours before, and no troops now held the southern 
bridgehead though Chinese troops and transport were still going 
across. No time was to be lost as it was reported that the Japanese 
were advancing rapidly. Therefore, the order to fire was given by 
General Cowan as soon as the bridge could be cleared. Mackay 
lighted the safety fuses and rejoined General Cowan, Lieut.-Colonel 
Ward (C.R.E.) and Major Darley in their dug-out where, at 11.21 p.m., 
he fired the charges on the electric circuit. Two spans fell with a 
resounding crash and the Ava Bridge was wrecked. 24 Field Company 
then moved to Ye-U, north-west of Shwebo, where it arrived on 
May 2nd with 70 Field Company. All packs, respirators and surplus 
stores were destroyed prior to resuming the retreat. 

Meanwhile, on the Chindwin, there had been heavy fighting at 
Monywa to the west of Mandalay. The town was held by only a small 
detachment of the Ist Burma Division. Suddenly, at 7.0 p.m. on 
April 30th, fire was opened on the place from the west bank and enemy 
troops began to cross the river further north to establish a road- 
block. The Monywa detachment was withdrawn to protect the road 
to Ye-U and two brigades of the Burma Division advanced on May 
2nd to recover Monywa. They had little success and had to be recalled. 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 233 


The Malerkotla Sappers were involved in these operations, as also 
were 50 Field Park Company and 56 Field Company of the Madras 
Corps. During the night of April 30th/31st the Malerkotlas were 
defending a sector of the river bank. Sounds of motor-boats had 
been heard, and at dawn the enemy could be seen crossing the wide 
river. The Japanese landed and opened a destructive fire from behind 
some deserted houses, and although the Malerkotlas returned the 
fire with good effect they had to withdraw after suffering a number 
of casualties. Here may be told the story of ‘Gemma’, a dog owned 
by 56 Field Company.’ As the C.R.E. and his Adjutant, with Major 
Garthwaite and a handful of men of 56 Company, were moving back 
from their headquarters in Monywa which had been over-run by 
the enemy, Japanese machine-gun bullets were throwing up spurts 
of dust in the paddy fields around. The small party found some 
cover from which fire could be returned, but not so ‘Gemma’ who 
ran around in the open, busily investigating the bullet marks. Tail 
up, frantically happy, she scampered here and there, drawing Japanese 
fire which might have been directed on the men, and she was last 
seen surrounded by a hail of bullets from a machine-gun firing from 
within fifty yards. Later in the day, some British tanks and infantry 
arrived and the Sapper party was able to return to its headquarters 
which were then burning fiercely. Garthwaite recovered what he 
could from the wreck of his office and, as an afterthought, looked 
inside an abandoned Staff car which the Japs had destroyed before 
they left. The engine had been smashed, the seat-cushions ripped up 
and the windscreen and windows broken. But there, inside, was 
‘Gemma’, looking entirely unconcerned. How she got back to the 
car from where she was last seen, more than a mile away, and how 
she had faced the Japs, only she could tell. This was not the first 
time she had been a prisoner-of-war. In the battle of the oilfields, a 
fortnight earlier, she had been in Japanese hands for no less than 
three days when the Burma Division had been cut off. On that 
occasion, she was discovered sitting calmly in the wreck of Garthwaite’s 
car. A battle had been raging over the area for more than two days, 
but except that she was rather thin and tired she seemed none the 
worse. 

The Ist Burma Division having been extricated from Monywa, 
Alexander set out by road for Kalewa on the Chindwin, for the 


1A Short History of Q.V"sO. Madras Sappers and Miners during World War I, 
1939-1945, by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, pp. 32, 33. 


234 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


enemy had closed the Irrawaddy route. Movement along the route 
from Ye-U was most difficult, yet the utmost rapidity was essential 
to win the race against both the pursuing enemy and the monsoon 
rains. The metalled road ended abruptly a few miles beyond Ye-U, 
after which a hurriedly prepared track had to carry all the traffic, 
much of which was still mechanized. The track crossed and re-crossed 
dry chaungs full of soft sand in which many vehicles foundered. 
Broken down transport littered the track, and hordes of wretched 
refugees obstructed progress. For more than 80 miles the scene was 
one of dire confusion. The troops had been on half rations for 
some time, and water could be obtained only by digging in the 
chaungs. Yet the fighting units maintained their cohesion and morale 
and plodded doggedly onwards in clouds of choking dust. The War 
Diary of 60 Field Company throws some light on the employment 
of the Engineer units. ‘“‘ Ye-U. 2nd May. Took over maintenance of 
bridge from 18 Artisan Works Company. ‘ Burdiv” having lost most 
of its M.T. and equipment is returning along the Monywa-Ye-U 
Road. Sent out our M.T. to collect stragglers of 50 Field Park and 
56 Field Companies and 123 Inland Water Transport Company. 
Picked up and fed 150 stragglers and 75 civilian refugees. 3rd May. 
Sent 3 lorries to pick up remainder of 50 and 56 Companies. Fed 
and housed them till they left next day. Firing broke out at night 
near our harbour. We stood-to. All quiet after an hour. Next 
moming we heard that the affair was caused by a Burmese who 
had objected to his wife being raped by another Burmese! 4th May. 
Company ordered to move to Pyingaing, 63 miles. Convoy very 
slow but arrived 0530 hrs. on the Sth.” 

70 Field Company, traversing the same route, was delayed repeatedly 
by ditched lorries whose drivers had fallen asleep through exhaustion. 
It was seventeen hours on the road to Pyingaing for it had to stop 
at many places to improve chaung crossings or dig for water. During 
the afternoon of May 8th, it started on an arduous night march to 
Shwegyin on the east bank of the Chindwin. Its transport negotiated 
many sandy crossings with success, but other units were less 
fortunate and the Sappers had to destroy dozens of abandoned 
vehicles. Before dawn on the 9th, the Company bivouacked two 
miles east of Shwegyin. Its vehicles were then dispersed in paddy 
fields and the unit harboured on the river bank near a jetty. The 
Chindwin was half a mile wide and flowing fast between hilly and 
forest-clad banks. On the far bank, but six miles upstream, was 
Kalewa with which communication was maintained during the day 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 235 


by five paddie-steamers. 70 Field Company began at once to build a 
proper pier and to deck boats for use as rafts. It still possessed some 
mechanical transport. In this it was more happily placed than 
some other units, for when many miles short of Shwegyin most of 
the infantry had been told that there was little hope of getting any 
of their trucks across the river and they had burned most of them 
together with their surplus kit and the bulk of their ammunition. 
They kept only what they could carry on their backs, and before 
they reached their destination they were ordered to destroy their 
last few vehicles.1 These they drove into ravines, and then, draining 
off the water and oil, ran the engines at full throttle till they seized 
up. The vehicles were finally soaked with petrol and set on fire. 
Shwegyin became a cemetery of derelict transport. It was a 
horrid sight. 

The Japanese did their utmost to prevent the crossing to Kalewa. 
After dark on May 9th, they landed a force downstream on the 
east bank, and taking a circuitous route, attacked towards the river 
on the 10th. This put a stop to all ferrying, but General Cowan 
fought back and began to march his troops upstream along a winding 
jungle track to a point immediately opposite Kalewa. All his remaining 
tanks, artillery and vehicles had to be sacrificed in the effort to escape. 
Stores were destroyed wholesale. Guns and mortars fired off their 
last ammunition. The tanks were stripped of their guns which were 
then buried as deeply as possible, after which the tanks themselves 
were set on fire. In any case, they had become almost useless as 
their tracks and engines were worn out. Eventually, our troops 
won through to the Kalewa ferry and crossed the Chindwin before 
the Japanese could interfere. With the river between them and the 
‘enemy, there was now every prospect that they would succeed in 
reaching Imphal though the way promised to be long and hard. 

According to Lyall-Grant, the men of 70 Field Company at 
Shwegyin heard some rifle fire soon after dawn on May 10th, this 
being their first intimation of the Japanese attack, but it was not 
until 4.0 p.m. that they knew that a withdrawal was being planned. 
Work was continued on the jetty until 5.30 p.m. when Lyall-Grant 
asked for permission to destroy the last of his vehicles and was told 
that he could do what he could with sledge-hammers but must not 
use explosives or fire because these might reveal to the enemy the 
imminence of a withdrawal. Sledge-hammers, however, were useless, 





1 From Pyramid to Pagoda, by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.8.0., M.c., p. 33. 


236 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


and the vehicles were therefore rendered unserviceable by seizing 
up the engines. At about 6.15 p.m., orders arrived that the Company 
was to march by the jungle path to the Kalewa ferry and the unit 
set off. Each Section carried only 3 picks, 3 shovels and their cooking 
pots and pakhals slung on bamboo poles. The Japanese were on 
some cliffs overlooking part of the route, but the ferry was reached, 
after a nightmare march, at 9.30 a.m. on May I1th and soon after- 
wards the unit crossed to the west bank and moved to a bivouac 
some 4 miles from the river. 

On May 12th, while our troops were beginning their arduous 
journey through the malarial country and over the rugged heights 
which still separated them from Imphal, the Japanese entered Kalewa. 
Fortunately, they were now too exhausted to follow up quickly. The 
end of the retreat from Burma was in sight and the enemy had been 
cheated of his prey. But we had still to traverse the unhealthy Kabaw 
Valley to reach Tamu on the Indian frontier, and then to surmount 
a range in order to arrive at Palel, whence a motor road led to Imphal. 
Every yard of the 132 miles to Palel was a purgatory to the weary 
troops. Sometimes, motor transport was available; more often it 
was not. Tens of thousands of refugees blocked the road. ‘‘Months 
latter’, writes Roy Mc.Kelvie,! “when the first British returned to 
Tamu, they found skeletons sitting, lying or propped up, just as 
they had been before dying. In the Post Office, twenty skeletons were 
around the counter and one hung round the broken telephone. It 
is not difficult to imagine the agony and desolation of the exodus 
from Burma. Disease, under-nourishment and weariness had broken 
down the will to live. The prospect of one last drag over the cold, 
rain-soaked mountains was more than they could stand. Only the 
strong survived. Yet nearly 200,000 refugees crossed from Tamu 
to Imphal, some to die of strain, others to die in hospitals so crowded 
that the staffs were incapable of handling the patients. Over ninety 
per cent of the army and civilians who tried to cope with this mass 
trek suffered from malaria.” 

The War Diary of 24 Field Company describes the difficulties and 
hardships of the move to Imphal. “Kalewa. 11th May. Company 
crossed the Chindwin by the last boat at 1300 hrs. and at 1800 hrs. 
moved to transit area at Milestone 4. Slept by roadside. Ordered to 
be ready to move at 0900 hrs. by M.T. 12th May. M.T. not available. 
Marched to Milestone 18. Troops hot and tired. M.T. to Inbaung 





* The War in Burma, by Roy Mc.Kelvie, pp. 44, 45. 





Transport on the Tamu-Palel Road 


RETREAT FROM BURMA 237 


(north of Kalemyo) not available until very late in day. Last party 
arrived in camp at 0100 hrs. Yazagyo. 13th May. At 0300 hrs, orders 
came to move. Waited for transport at 0830 hrs. None available by 
1100 hrs. Ordered to march and arrived Yazagyo 1700 hrs. Khampat 
(north of Yazagyo). 14th May. Ordered to leave by march route to 
await M.T. after 12 miles. Lifted by M.T. at 0800 hrs and arrived 
Khampat Camp 0930 hrs. Site too filthy for occupation, so O.C. 
moved camp | mile. All men marched happily.’ On May 15th, 
the unit marched 10 miles before getting a lift in some lorries to 
Tamu, where the last party came in long after dark. On the 16th, 
although the men had to march over a height of 5,000 feet to reach 
Lokchao, only one fell out through exhaustion. Motor transport was 
then promised for the 20 miles to Tengnoupal. None came, so the 
men plodded on through hilly country on May 17th and reached camp 
before dark. Here, General Slim complimented the unit on its 
marching which, he said, was the best he had yet seen. The 12 miles 
to Palel were covered on foot during the morning of May 18th, but 
that was the end of ‘foot-slogging’ as the Company was then lifted 
45 miles by motor transport to a camp site at Kanglatongbi, a few 
miles north of Imphal on the road to Kohima. The rain was streaming 
down. There were no tents, and few of the men had ground sheets. 
They bivouacked in the mud. Three tents arrived on May 2Ist. Malaria 
began to take its toll. Dysentery was always with them. Now, after 
being parched and enfeebled by heat, they were to suffer from cold 
and want. There was no air supply, and adequate rationing was 
impossible along a single road often blocked by landslides. But at 
least they were still alive and had escaped the graves in Burma, or 
the years of slavery under the brutal Japanese, which fell to the lot of 
their less fortunate comrades. 

The other Sapper units fared no better than 24 Field Company. 
70 Field Company arrived in Kanglatongbi after dark on May 
18th. In pouring rain, it was allotted an area of scrub jungle as a 
camping site. Again, there were no tents. Each man had a mosquito 
net but neither ground sheet nor blanket. “It was indeed a cold 
and miserable reception to India’’, writes Lyall-Grant. During the 
next three days, some shelters were built with tarpaulins and brush- 
wood, but it was impossible to dry any clothes, and not until May 
22nd, when the unit moved to Imphal, was there any relief or comfort. 
By that time, one man in every five was in hospital. 50 Field Park 
Company, 56 and 60 Field Companies, the Malerkotlas and 18 
Artisan Works Company had similar experiences. The same hardships 


238 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


were borne, and borne stoically, by every officer and man in 
Alexander's Army. The time had been too short for proper arrange- 
ments to be made to receive them. Worn out by their exertions and 
weakened by malaria, many succumbed in the hospitals at Imphal. 

But although the facilities for accommodating and feeding the 
Burma Army were inadequate, every effort had been made to help 
it on its tragic journey to Imphal, and in this task 59 Field Company, 
under Major J. D. H. Hibbert, R.E., played a notable part, as also 
did the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company under Major A. G. Hellicar, 
R.E., and an Excavating Company and some Pioneers. A formation 
called 114 Works Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel Pritchard, R.E., had 
been engaged for many weeks on the repair or construction of the 
road to Kalewa by way of Wangjing, Palel and Tamu. Major 
O’Callaghan, R.E., who served under Pritchard, remarks that, early 
in May 1942, refugees from Burma began to arrive in thousands— 
men, women and children, all struggling to get to safety before it 
was too late! The route was difficult and its perils many. Palel, 
and the highway to Imphal, became strewn with decomposing bodies 
which the survivors had no time nor energy to bury. Vultures might 
have helped, but there were none in that area. However, some excellent 
relief organizations were set up by Government and private com- 
munities such as the tea planters of Assam, and relief camps were 
established after a time at Palel and Wangjing as well as in Imphal. 
The death rate amongst the refugees was thus reduced, and food, 
shelter and medical aid were given. The largest camp, that at Imphal, 
was managed by an elderly English lady assisted by the wife of a 
local Superintendent of Police. 

59 Field Company had arrived in Dimapur (Manipur Road) from 
Assam on April 12th, with other troops of the 23rd Indian Division, 
and had then moved through Imphal and Tamu towards Kalewa. 
Early in May all its efforts were being concentrated on improving 
the Kalewa road for use by the retreating Burma Army. The men 
worked from dawn till dusk on road repairs and the provision of 
nullah crossings, but on May I1Ith they began to go down with 
malaria. The unit had a Section at Htinzin, north of Khampat, 
and it also maintained at Tamu a bridge built by ‘Elephant Bill’ 
(Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Williams). Later, a Section of the Tehri-Garhwal 
Company began to replace this structure with a more permanent 
one on concrete piers, but the work had to cease when the Japanese 





* Notes by Major O'Callaghan, R.E., dated February, 195]. 


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RETREAT FROM BURMA 239 


advanced. On May 17th, when the Burma Army was able to take 
over some road maintenance, 59 Field Company moved back to 
Lokchao and thence towards Palel to dig trenches and lay mines 
for a Brigade position at Shenam. The Tehri-Garhwals were there 
also. Half the men in 59 Field Company were now incapacitated 
with malaria. The steady stream of refugees interfered with their 
work. Heavy rain, early in June, caused many falls of rock and 
earth and added to their labours. By the end of that month, 59 
Field Company could muster only 64 officers and men. Those 
evacuated on account of sickness never returned, and no reinforce- 
ments were received. Other Sapper units on the Palel Road during 
May 1942 were 71 Field Company (Major T. A. C. Brownlie, I.E.) 
and 414 Bridge Construction Section (Capt. R. Blagden, R.E.). A 
Section of 71 Company reached Palel on May 7th and helped to 
bury dead refugees. During April, 414 Section had spanned the 
Lokchao River with a fine Inglis bridge, but this was dismantled in 
May and brought back to Palel where 71 Company was preparing a 
defensive position. 

The Burma Army under General Alexander ceased to exist on May 
20th, 1942. The 4th Indian Corps, under General Slim, then assumed 
control and new formations were assembled gradually in and around 
Imphal to meet the Japanese threat to India. The building up of 
this new Army must form the subject of another chapter. For the 
moment, India was saved. It remained to General Slim to consolidate 
his position, to collect sufficient forces to repel any assault, and 
finally to burst through in overwhelming strength to sweep the 
invaders from Burma. All these tasks he accomplished and thus 
established his reputation as one of the greatest commanders in the 
Second World War. 


CHAPTER IX 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM, JUNE 1942 - MARCH 1944 


ESS than half of the original 25,000 combat troops of the 

Burma Army reached Imphal in May 1942, and of these, hardly 

any were fit to fight. A grim situation confronted General 
Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, India. A few weeks earlier, he 
had informed the Secretary of State for War that if the Japanese 
pressed boldly westwards without pause, India would be in grave 
danger. The crucial months were likely to be May and June, and 
Wavell was much disturbed to find that the proposed occupation of 
Madagascar and the provisioning of Malta would cause the diversion 
of reinforcements intended for India. It was fortunate that the 
Japanese in Burma were too exhausted to press their advantage in 
the face of steadily increasing resistance in the air, and thus a 
catastrophe was avoided. But whence could reinforcements be 
obtained? India had been treated as an emergency reservoir for the 
supply of troops to many theatres. Divisions, hastily formed, had 
been rushed to Africa and the Middle East. After Germany invaded 
Russia, others had been sent to Iraq to open a line of supply through 
Persia. Rommel’s advance to El Alamein, and the German progress 
towards the Caucasus, caused fresh demands on men and material. 
The cuptoard was swept almost bare. The Eastern Army, under 
General Sir C. Broad, had to defend a frontier zone 800 miles in 
length, embracing Bengal, Arakan and Assam, an area larger than 
Great Britain. The desperately weak 4th Indian Corps, now under 
Lieut.-General N. M. S. Irwin, was responsible for the defence of 
Assam. The 15th Indian Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir N. 
Beresford-Peirse, guarded Bengal, and the greater part of the 70th 
British Division was held in reserve at Ranchi to counter any Japanese 
landing on the coast of Orissa. 

Genera! Irwin had to hold 500 miles of the Burma frontier and 
in particular to guard the Imphal Plain behind it and, further in 
rear, the village of Kohima on the main road leading back to the 
only rail-head at Dimapur (Manipur Road Station). His most 
pressing tasks were to rebuild the Dimapur-Imphal Road, 136 miles 
in length, and to make a new road from Imphal southwards at least 


240 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 24t 


as far as Tiddim, a further distance of 163 miles.! Yet it should 
not be imagined that a passive resistance was ever contemplated. 
The reconquest of Burma was being planned even while General 
Alexander was withdrawing from Rangoon in 1942, and, after he 
had reached Imphal, a plan of operations was cabled to England; 
but fate stepped in and the demands of other fronts prevented the 
launching of any large offensive. Thus a stale-mate developed on 
the Burma front during the latter half of the year and the sole event of 
much interest was the transportation by air of 13,000 Chinese troops 
over the ““Hump” Route from China to increase the Chinese strength 
in India to two divisions. But although there was little fighting, 
there was much engineering. The possibility of launching an offensive 
rested not only on the arrival of reinforcements but on the effort 
of the engineers to provide the necessary roads, airfields and other 
facilities, and thus the ‘build-up’ period in Assam from 1942 to 1944 
gave unlimited opportunities to units of the Indian Engineers to 
show the results of much intensive training. At the outset, however, 
those units which had taken part in the retreat from Rangoon were 
in a deplorable condition. For instance, when 50 Field Park Company 
was moved back to Shillong in July 1942 it could muster only 3 
British and 27 Indian ranks. Some of the remainder were on leave, 
but most were in hospital. By the middle of September, the strength 
had dwindled to | British officer, 2 V.C.Os., 5 N.C.Os. and 2 Sappers 
and no work whatever was possible other than the supervision of 
infantry working parties. 

General Wavell’s original plans for the post-monsoon period of 
1942 were for an advance by General Stilwell’s forces from Ledo 
into Upper Burma and the reoccupation of Upper Arakan by General 
Christison’s 15th Corps combined with the capture of Akyab from 
the sea. At the same time, General Scoones’ 4th Corps, advancing 
from Manipur, was to occupy Kalewa and Sittaung on the Chindwin 
and raid the enemy's lines of communication beyond that river.2 
Before November, however, these plans had to be modified and the 
operations in Arakan were restricted to an overland advance. The 
resulting campaign in that region, which will be described in the next 
chapter, was a strategical failure though it taught many useful lessons. 
We are concerned at present only with the operations in the north. 

The first Indian Engineer units to work on the Imphal-Tamu 
Road were the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company, under Maior 


“See the map of Upper Burma included in Chapter XII. 
2 See the map of the Tiddim Road, Chindwin River Area, included in this chapter. 


242 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


A.G. Hellicar, R.E., and 414 Bridge Construction Section. When the 
Tehri-Garhwals reached that line of communication in March 1942, 
the road extended only about three miles beyond Palel. ‘Later, I 
sent a Section to Tamu”, writes Hellicar,! “‘and it stayed there until 
just before the evacuation of the Burma Army in May. Another 
Section, at Lokchao, remained until after the Burma Army had 
passed through and helped to dismantle the Inglis bridge at that 
place.? This bridge had a remarkable career. It had been sent origi- 
nally from Roorkee and after being dismantled was used in our monsoon 
camp on the Imphal-Palel Road for training. Later, we rebuilt it 
at a river crossing near the camp, and thence it went to another 
crossing on the Tiddim Road. I think it was blown up when the 
Japs attacked in March 1944.” 

An Engineer formation which did good work on the Tamu Road 
in the early days was 114 Works Battalion under Lieut.-Colonel 
G. A. T. Pritchard, R.E. It was made responsible for the route 
from Imphal through Wangjing and Palel to Tamu and for an 
extension finally to Kalewa on the Chindwin. ‘‘When the road was 
started in the spring of 1942”, writes Major O’Callaghan,3 ‘“‘there 
were no Military Engineer personnel in the Imphal Plain other than 
one M.E. Company and the officers of 114 Works Battalion, but a 
passable route was completed in time to evacuate the greater part 
of the Burma Army. With the resources available in India, it was 
impossible to allot any equipment to the troops at Imphal. We 
had no defences whatever against air attack although, from May 
onwards, Japanese reconnaissance planes flew over us daily. Suddenly 
one morning, two formations of bombers appeared heading for 
Imphal. Their bombs rained down on the town and resulted in a 
heavy loss of life and the complete breakdown of all water and 
electric installations. Colonel Pritchard sent me to Imphal from 
Palel to do what I could: but without materials, tools or labour 
it was difficult to restore the water supply. I tried to discover some- 
one who could give me the lay-out of the pipe-lines and found a 
man called Gopal through whom I was able to locate a few of the 
original native staff of the Public Works Department, most of whom 
had fled. Together we repaired the main line and headworks, and 
next morning a part of Imphal had a supply. Later, we were joined 














} Notes by Major A. G. Hellicar, R.E., dated July 21st, 1953. 
* The bridge had been built in April 1942 by 414 Bridge Construction Section. 
3 Notes by Major O’Callaghan, R.E., compiled in 1950. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 243 


by a Field Company and most of the water-supply system was re- 
instated, though our work was hampered by a second air raid which 
caused even more damage than the first. Owing to the disappearance 
of the P.W.D. employees, 114 Works had to take over all their duties, 
but with the help of the Field Company the electric supply to Imphal 
was also restored quickly. During the months which followed, 
Gopal! became universally popular with soldiers and civilians alike 
and it was tragic that he should afterwards have met his end while 
trying to repair a high-tension line that was inadvertently switched 
on while he was at work.” 

A very early arrival from India was 91 Field Company (Bombay), 
under Major J. R. G. Finch, R.E., which reached Imphal on June 
9th, 1942, and began to repair roads and bridges in the Litan area 
towards Ukhrul, which lies to the north-east of the Imphal Plain. 
The unit was sadly ravaged by malaria, but in addition to its road 
work it managed to build a number of boats with the help of local 
tradesmen.! A small party under 2nd Lieut. Chambers was detailed 
to accompany some Gurkhas to Fort Hertz, the distant outpost far 
north of Myitkyina, which General Wavell wished to reoccupy in 
order to protect its landing strip and encourage the local Kachins. 
Chambers took his party to Dimapur and arrived at Dinjan aero- 
drome about June 15th. He was ordered to form a fortified base at 
Fort Hertz from which levies of Kachins could be raised to operate 
in the surrounding districts. The orders emanated from a senior 
Staff Officer stationed more than 1,000 miles away in Delhi. Chambers 
was told that he could expect to be at Fort Hertz for six months 
and that there were only two land routes between it and India, one 
leading into Tibet at 11,000 feet and the other into Assam at 14,000 
feet. He was warned that he would find no Engineer stores at the 
fort, no quinine, no clothing and no boots. It was a dreary prospect. 
The Sappers and Gurkhas were to go by air and therefore with the 
minimum of kit. They drew two months’ rations and waited at 
Dinjan for a week, mostly prostrated by malaria. Then, happily, 
a Deputy Commissioner arrived who had recently walked over the 
mountains from Fort Hertz. He told Chambers that the place had 
already been looted by 5,000 Chinese, that it was no more than a 
bamboo and mud affair surrounded by swamps, that the local Kachins 
would not fight, and that the detachment might expect to be almost 


1 The Fighting Cock (History of the 23rd Indian Division’, by Lieut.-Colonel A. J. F 
Doulton, 0.B.z., p. 34. 


244 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


obliterated by black-water fever and beri-beri unless withdrawn in 
the rains. He wound up by dubbing the whole project as ‘The 
Seven Pillars of Folly”. In this he had the keenest support from the 
Royal Air Force who stated that the landing ground at the fort 
was merely a football field bordered by jungle grass. These matters 
having been represented to the senior officer at Delhi, a welcome 
order arrived on June 30th directing the Sappers to rejoin their 
headquarters at Imphal, which they did after being held up for three 
days by a landslide. The episode furnishes a striking example of the 
evils of remote control and insufficient information. 

Another Sapper unit which was early in the field was 71 Field 
Company (Bengal) under Major F. W. Pritchard, R.E. It arrived 
in Manipur in June 1942 with the 49th Brigade to join the 23rd 
Indian Division which was guarding Imphal. Employed chiefly on 
defence works and water-supply, it also kept open the first six miles 
of the Palel-Tamu Road. In addition, it reconnoitred many hill-tracks, 
one reconnaissance extending as far down the Manipur River as 
Tonzang. The return journey through the mountainous tracts to the 
west of the river constituted the earliest reconnaissance of part of 
the route adopted later for the Imphal-Tiddim Road. A half Section 
of the Company succeeded in reaching Fort Hertz by air, complete 
with picks, shovels and tommy-guns, and set to work at once on 
improving communications. In December, when the Americans took 
charge, the detachment assisted them in cutting a track through the 
Naga Hills which was developed later into part of the famous Ledo 
Road. Two months earlier, the remainder of the unit, under Major 
T. A. C. Brownlie, I.E., had moved down the Tamu Road to the 
Shenam Saddle for road and defence work. 

After the monsoon of 1942 had ceased, 70 Field Company (Major 
I. H. Lyall-Grant, R.E.), together with 71 Field Company and the 
newly arrived 68 Field Company (Major J. R. Rawlence, R.E.), was 
employed on the Tamu Road. The casualties from malaria were 
terrible at this period. 71 Field Company, for instance, could provide 
only 30 men fit for duty. Nevertheless, it was able to begin the con- 
version of a bridle path from Tengnoupal to Mombi into a track 
passable for jeeps. The two places, though less than 30 miles apart, 
needed 50 miles of track to connect them. The route traversed steep 
hill-sides and swung crazily round rocky precipices; but after four 
or five months, jeeps were able to crawl along it. Meanwhile, on 
the main Tamu Road, the outstanding achievement was the bridging 
of the Lokchao River. Part of the old Inglis Bridge erected by 414 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 245 


Bridge Construction Section was launched on a new site. “The 
Sappers indulged in a fair imitation of ‘hunt the slipper’ over the 
Imphal Plain’’, writes Lieut.-Colonel Doulton. “Dismantled in haste 
at a time of crisis, its bits and pieces were everywhere. Eventually, 
they were collected, but their return home was not easy as the transoms 
were 17 feet long. 71 Field Company assembled the bridge at the 
gap and meditated how to hoist the finished article into position. 
The answer was to use one bulldozer as a counterweight while a 
second provided the propulsive power.™ 

By the end of November 1942, the road-makers were near Sibong, 
10 miles short of Tamu, and on December 20th, the Palel-Tamu 
Road was declared open to 3-ton lorries. 71 Field Company was 
then camped at Moreh, 4 miles short of Tamu and close to the Indo- 
Burma frontier. Reconnaissances were made along a rough track 
leading southwards along the frontier towards Witok. These were 
then extended as far as Kalewa, 100 miles down the Chindwin, and 
the track was gradually improved. In January 1943, 68 Field Company, 
which had been working on the road to Shuganu at the southern end 
of the Imphal Plain, moved to the Yu River beyond Tamu to make 
a jeep track towards Sittaung, and in the following month 71 Field 
Company moved to a village called Sunle, bulldozing the way ahead 
and maintaining the track in rear. Bridges of teak logs, cut by coolie 
tabour, were built along the route, the interstices being filled with 
gravel after the logs had been placed in position by elephants. The 
Sappers learnt to appreciate the value of these powerful animals and 
to agree with the American versifier who wrote:— “Elephants are 
useful friends, equipped with handles at both ends.’ The work had 
often to be done far in advance of infantry protection so the Sappers 
had to provide their own covering parties. 

As already stated, General Wavell had planned that during the 
winter of 1942/43 the 4th Indian Corps (17th and 23rd Divisions) 
should advance into Burma and establish itself on the Chindwin 
River between Kalewa and Sittaung. This was in order to lessen the 
enemy's resistance to Genera! Stilwell’s progress from Ledo towards 
Myitkyina and that of other Chinese forces from Yunnan. There 
were two possible routes by which the 4th Corps could reach the 
Chindwin. One was through Palel and Tamu. This was a single-way 
mountain road liable to be washed away in the rains. The distance 
from Imphal to Palel was 28 miles and Tamu lay 36 miles beyond. 





1 The Fighting Cock, by Lieut.-Colonel A. J. F. Doulton, 0.B.E., p. 42. 


246 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Thence to Sittaung on the river bank was another 25 miles or so. 
The total distance from Imphal was therefore under 90 miles by 
road. The other route lay through Bishenpur southwards to Tiddim 
(163 miles) and thence eastwards to Fort White and down into the 
Kabaw Valley at Kalemyo, a further 40 miles, making a total distance 
of over 200 miles.! This route, however, was screened by hills to the 
east until it approached Kalemyo, whereas the Tamu route was 
exposed throughout to enemy attacks from across the Chindwin. 
It was decided at first that most of the roadmaking resources should 
be devoted to the Tiddim route, but soon after the New Year the 
decision was reversed because there was not sufficient time to develop 
that route properly and because of its extraordinary engineering 
difficulties. Therefore, the main roadmaking effort was switched to 
the shorter and easier, though more exposed, Tamu route. Later, 
owing to a shortage of transport and material for road construction. 
the advance of the 4th Corps to Sittaung and Kalewa was postponed, 
and when it was discovered that the Chinese in Yunnan had no 
immediate intention of co-operating with General Stilwell, the opera- 
tions of the Corps were limited to offensive patrolling. This restriction, 
though unfortunate from a strategical point of view, was not alto- 
gather unwelcome to the hard-worked Engineer units for it gave 
them more time in which to improve the routes to the Chindwin. 
The Tiddim route was incredibly difficult. For the first forty miles 
from Imphal there was a fairly good and level road which was pass- 
able for jeeps in all weathers and for lorries except in heavy rain, 
but beyond that point there was only a track suitable perhaps for 
jeeps in good weather, though not as far as the Manipur River 
crossing at Milestone 126. After leaving the Imphal Plain the route 
crossed hills rising to 7,000 feet and traversed slopes of 70 degrees 
before plunging down 1,800 feet to the river, and some distance 
beyond the crossing it climbed rapidly for 2,000 feet to Tiddim. 
Most of the road alignment had to be hacked through dense jungle. 
Innumerable streams had to be crossed and every stream was liable 
to sudden spates, and when the monsoon came, the entire country 
was blanketed in mist and drenching rain. 

While the 4th Corps Engineers were trying to cope with the extension 
of the alternative routes to the Chindwin, other formations were 
developing the meagre line of communication far behind the Manipur 


* See the two maps of the Tiddim Road, Milestones 32 to 83, and Milestone 109 to 
Kalemyo, included in Chapter XII. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 247 


front. Assam is cut off from the rest of India by the great Brahma- 
putra River, unbridged throughout its length and with a waterlevel 
which is liable to rise 25 feet in the rains and a course which may 
change several miles either way. In 1942, the railway system east of 
the river was limited to a single metre-gauge line with very few 
resources in locomotives and rolling stock. To connect it with the 
west bank system, wagon-ferries were maintained at two places. 
There was no all-weather road up the west bank, and on the east 
bank only a narrow road extending eastwards from the ferry at 
Gauhati. Consequently, the railway deficiencies could not be relieved 
appreciably by additional road transport. Nor could river transport 
solve the problem because many steamships had been sent to Iraq. 
The transportation difficulties had a considerable effect on the military 
operations. For many months, the troops at the front had to live 
on reduced rations and therefore suffered in health and became less 
able to fight. Between October and December 1942, no fewer than 
20,000 sick had to be evacuated from the Eastern Army, quite apart 
from the 15,000 evacuated after the Burma Army reached Imphal. 
It was obviously necessary to supplement ground transportation by 
a vast system of air supply which entailed also air defence. At the 
beginning of the year, the air strength in India had been almost 
negligible and the few operational airfields that existed were situated 
near the North-West Frontier. A programme for the construction 
of 200 new airfields was therefore launched, and by the end of 
November 1942 about 150 were ready for use. There had also been a 
great increase in the number of air squadrons, and the Indian Air 
Force alone had 10 squadrons equipped with modern aircraft. Off- 
ensive operations were undertaken against the Japanese airfields and 
communications in Burma, and command of the air passed to the 
Allies. Over and over again, our supremacy in the air saved a 
critical situation. Isolated detachments were supplied. Sick and 
wounded were flown to hospital. Morale was raised. Aerial recon- 
naissance revealed the enemy’s positions, and the whole aspect of 
the fighting underwent a radical change for the better. 

The task of building airfields in Assam and Bengal for the air 
forces supporting the troops defending India from invasion, and for 
the American transport aircraft carrying supplies over the ‘““Hump”’ 
route to China, was undertaken in 1942 by the Military Engineer 
Services assisted by any Field Engineer units which happened to be 
available. This organization was replaced in the spring of 1943 by 
a General Reserve Engineer Force (G.R.E.F.) working under the 


248 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


direction of the Engineer-in-Chief, India (Lieut.-General H. E. Roome). 
Though much of the actual labour was undertaken by the Public 
Works Department, military engineer units of all kinds were also 
employed. Stone and cement were scarce, and as about 200 tons of 
stone were needed daily for each airfield under construction, dozens 
of quarries had to be opened and crushing plants installed. The 
transport of stone threw a heavy additional strain on the already 
overworked railways and river craft, and consequently the engineers 
often tried to supplement the stone supply with locally-burnt bricks. 
This, in turn, necessitated vast quantities of fuel for burning clay 
and the transport of that fuel to the site, and so the full cycle of 
obstacles was completed. The construction of an airfield is roughly 
equivalent to that of 60 miles of concrete road, a fact which gives 
some idea of the magnitude of the requirements. G.R.E.F., however, 
was not concerned solely with airfields. Its activities extended far 
and wide and included the laying of 140 miles of petrol pipe line to 
Dimapur to relieve the railway. 

Many units of the Indian Engineers helped to build airfields in 
Assam, but it must suffice here to record some of the experiences of 
362 Field Company of the Madras Corps under Major J. W. Bossard, 
R.E. When a decision was reached in March 1942 that the Ist Indian 
Chemical Warfare Group should be assembled, 362 Field Company 
was one of the units formed for that purpose, with bridging as a 
subsidiary role; and when the C.W. Group was abolished in May 
1943, the Company was posted to a Forward Airfield Construction 
Group to build an airfield at Dergaon in Assam under the auspices 
of G.R.E.F. Its journey from Deolali to Dergaon was one to be 
remembered. To begin with, owing to some miscalculation, the 
men sat for 24 hours in the train in Deolali Station, and when they 
had covered only 30 miles from Deolali, the locomative gave up 
the ghost and they had to wait a further 8 hours for a relief engine. 
Although halts of three hours for meals had been carefully arranged, 
the train invariably stopped a mile or two from the selected spots 
and remained there for a few hours. Then it would pull slowly into 
the station and the official meal halt would begin. At Calcutta, a 
reversing station, the locomotive had to be shifted to the other end 
of the train, whereupon the guard insisted that his van must go also. 
The driver did not agree, so they sat down and argued the point 
for an hour, after which the driver walked to a signal box and got a 
special shunting order. Three telegrams were received en route, each 
changing the unit’s destination, and to crown everything, some 


yardniqiq Je 9404 sa9ouIsUy AAJASay [RIIUay) Aq UOVJONAYsSUOD JapUNn yur) [CE 





THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 249 


‘sparks from the locomotive Set fire to the unit’s transport. Yet 
362 Company arrived safely on June 15th in North-East Assam and 
began to build the Dergaon airfield, 

A runway 2,600 yards long and 50 yards wide was needed and also 
5,000 feet of taxi strip and 45 hardstandings of Pressed Steel Planking 
(P.S.P.), which was here used for the first time in India.) An American 
Engineer Officer who had laid a runway at Dakar in Africa was 
brought in to advise. His men, he said, had been Pennsylvanian 
miners, whom he described as “‘Purty tough and mighty mean”, and 
he looked askance at the Madras Sappers. 362 Field Company soon 
showed what they could do and he changed his opinion At first 
there were many casualties from malaria, but these were reduced by 
rigid anti-malaria discipline. Work then proceeded very rapidly with 
the help of mechanical equipment, and some weeks before the unit 
left Dergaon in October 1943 for employment on the Tamu Road, 
the airfield was in full use by aircraft of all types. 

We revert now to the situation early in 1943 on the Manipur front 
where the greater part of the 4th Corps Engineer effort was being 
directed to the development of the Tamu Road while the 17th Divi- 
sional Engineers carried on as best they could with the longer Tiddim 
Road. The Tamu Road had to be extended not only to Sittaung on 
the Chindwin but also southwards down the malarial Kabaw Valley. 
Many streams had to be crossed, so it was fortunate that a new 
type of bridge, the Bailey, had recently arrived in India and that 
bulldozers were becoming plentiful. One of the reasons for the rapid 
extension of the Tamu Road was a feint attack on the Japanese 
forces at Kalewa which the 23rd Indian Division was to carry out in 
order to cover the advance of Brigadier Orde Wingate’s ““Chindits”’ 
(known officially as the 77th Infantry Brigade) who were to cross 
the Chindwin at points north of that place and penetrate deep into 
Burma. Although no Indian Engineer units accompanied this first 
Chindit Expedition, one or two Royal Engineer Officers were included, 
among them being Major J. M. Calvert who commanded one of 
the four columns. The force comprised some 3,000 British, Burmese 
and Gurkha troops and was designed to operate without any kind 
of land communication. Each column was entirely self-contained, with 
pack transport, machine-guns and mgrtars but no artillery, and every 
officer and man carried a 70-Ib pack holding 5 days’ rations and an 

es wala oe ce Sten yarn ee 


1“A Sapper and Miner Field Company from 1942 to 1945”, by Major J. W. Bossard, 
M.B.E., R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, June 1950, pp. 149-161. 





250 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


elaborate jungle kit. The Chindits proposed to reach and sever the 
railway line running northwards from Mandalay to the Myitkyina 
terminus, to harass the enemy in the Shwebo region, and then, if 
possible, to cut the Maymyo-Lashio branch line towards the Chinese 
frontier. Covered by the 23rd Division’s diversionary operations, 
in which 71 Field Company was concerned in the Kabaw Valley, 
Orde Wingate’s columns crossed the Chindwin in February 1943 and 
plunged into the jungle, although the scheme was nearly cancelled at the 
last moment because the Chinese forces in Yunnan had refused to 
co-operate. The Myitkyina railway was cut in many places, but the 
Lashio line could not be reached, and in June 2,000 exhausted Chindits 
trickled back to Manipur in small parties. In general it must be 
admitted that the expedition was a strategic failure for it did not 
take the enemy by surprise nor did it disorganize his offensive plans; 
but the experience gained was put to good use a year later when 
Wingate’s Long Range Penetration Group of six brigades (camou- 
flaged as the “3rd Indian Division’’) was transported into Northern 
Burma, mostly by air. One of the brigades of that force was com- 
manded by a Royal Engineer, Brigadier L. E. C. M. Perowne. 

Lieut. G. Pearson describes the work of some of the Bengal Sapper 
units in the Tamu area in 1943.1 In March, 71 Field Company and 
other Divisional Engineers provided a ferry over the Yu River at 
Minthami, south of Tamu, which was subsequently used by the 
Chindits returning from the Burma jungles. In addition, a road 
along the Indo-Burma frontier was maintained as far south as Htinzin, 
35 miles from Tamu. In the Sittaung direction there was some 
fighting against enemy patrols. Here, 68 Field Company was making 
a fair-weather road for 15-cwt. vehicles, and blasting, bulldozing and 
cutting of timber for bridges were in full swing. The blasting and 
timber-cutting parties went ahead while behind them came the bull- 
dozers clearing a track which could be widened later. Elephants 
helped to haul into position the logs needed for the timber bridges. 
Based on Moreh, 7! Field Company maintained many stretches of 
road, much of which was corduroy. Cutting and collecting wood 
was exhausting work, so the men were glad when the unit was ordered 
to make two flying ferries over the Lokchao River and to repair a 
number of timber bridges. Afterwards, the Company was employed 
in putting down shingle on the Sittaung Road and, early in June, 





1 Brief History of the K.G.V’sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.I.E., (August 
1939-July 1946), by Lieut. G. Pearson R.E., pp. 53-55. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 251 


began to open a track towards Mintha. Both 68 and 71 Companies 
then left the front, 68 Company to practice watermanship on the 
Waithou Lake near Imphal and 71 Company to undergo training at 
Wangjing in attacking bunkers with pole-charges. Meanwhile, a 
tremendous amount of work was in progress on the Dimapur-Imphal 
Road as well as on the Tamu Road. 75 Field Company, under 
Major J. S. Dhillon, 1.E.,! was engaged on the Tamu Road. Since 
November 1942, this unit had been working on communications in 
the Imphal! Plain and on the road from Imphal to Bishenpur, whence 
a track led westwards to Silchar. Shingling and metalling of the 
Tamu Road was continued steadily during the monsoon with the 
help of 2,000 coolies and the surface was thus kept suitable for motor 
traffic, the necessary road-metal being obtained from local quarries. 

The Madras Sappers were strongly represented in 1943 in the 
Tamu area. 59 Field Company (Major J. D. Hibbert, R.E.) helped 
to prepare the track to Sittaung and worked later on the Palel-Tamu 
Road, where 428 Field Company (Major Partap Narain, I.E.) was 
already engaged. 429 Field Company (Major J. H. F. H. Jolly, R.E.) 
was on the Tamu Road during the autumn, employed under G.R.E.F. 
422 Field Company (Major I. B. C. Taylor, R.E.) began to work on 
the Sittaung track in October, and 424 Field Company (Major J. E. 
Barnes, R.E.) in December. The latter unit had moved to the Tamu 
Road from the Tiddim Road in March. Several Bombay Sapper 
units were also in the Tamu region. 24 Field Company (Major G. V. C. 
Darley, R.E.) arrived there early in April 1943 and erected a triple- 
truss double-storey Bailey Bridge of 160 feet span—the first of this 
kind to be built east of Suez. In October, the unit was transferred to 
the Tiddim Road. 91 Field Company (Major J. R. G. Finch, R.E.) 
was engaged from February to April on tracks from Moreh to Mintha 
and Sunle and in May erected a Bailey Bridge of 120 feet span over 
the Lokchao River at Moreh. Then it went to Shenam. 92 Field 
Company (Major A. C. Lewis, R.E.) arrived on the Tamu-Sittaung 
track in November and worked there for several months, as also - 
did 481 Field Company (Major M. I. Pritchard, R.E.). Field Park 
Companies of all three Corps were in support, but space does not 
allow a record of their employment. Sufficient has been written to 
show the magnitude of the Engineer concentration in the Tamu 
sector of the Chindwin River front. 








1In July 1943, Major J. S. Dhillon handed over command of 75 Field Company to 
Major L. G. Kirton, R.E. 


252 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The War Diary of 59 Field Company contains a copy of the. 
instructions issued in March 1943 by the Chief Engineer, 4th Corps 
(Brigadier L. D. Grand),’ regarding the Tamu Road Project.2. The 
object was to provide a two-way all-weather road from Palel by 
November Ist. Two main factors had to be considered — malaria and 
the monsoon, which might be expected to arrive together. 
Work in malarial areas was therefore to be finished quickly and the 
troops moved to safer areas; but if possible, all work should be 
completed before the rains. The difficult nature of the country 
and the interference caused by constant traffic might make it advisable 
sometimes to cut a second one-way road rather than widen the 
existing road for two-way traffic. Every effort should be made to 
complete the Lokchao-Tamu section before the onset of the rains. 
The next in priority was the Palel-Shenam scction, since two-way 
traffic was urgently needed to Shenam. For about half the distance 
from Palel, the existing road was fairly wide and could be converted 
easily for two-way traffic. The remainder would have two one-way 
thoroughfares, as also would the section between Shenam and 
Lokchao. And finally, in order that the work should proceed quickly, 
the existing road would be closed periodically for three days and 
then opened for two days to traffic. The orders give a good idea of 
the problems confronting the 4th Corps and other Engineer units 
employed in the spring of 1943. 

Some extracts from an article by Brigadier Partap Narain will 
show the conditions under which most of the Sapper units worked.3 
The story begins in India. “In August 1942’’, he writes, “I took 
428 Field Company for a month to the newly established Jungle 
Training Camp at Shimoga. Colonel J. F. D. Steedman, then 
Commandant, had just returned from Malaya. The rain hardly 
ever stopped. There were no camp structures and we lived in tents 
and trained on the banks of a large river in spate. None of the men 
had ever lived under such conditions—dense jungle, leeches and 
over two inches of rain per day—but after the first few days of cursing, 


7 Brigadier L. D. Grand was succeeded in June 1943 by Brigadier H. Williams. 

2The Order of Battle shows that in March 1943 the following units were detailed 
to work on the Tamu Road Project. Between Milestones 29 and 42 (under C.R.E. 
4th Corps Troops) 24, 75 and 424 Field Companies and 22, 33 and 36 Artisan Works 
Pioneer Battalions. Between Milestones 42 and 71 (under C.R.E, 107 Works) 59 and 428 
Field Companies, 25 Artisan Works Company, 6 and 16 Engincer Battalions and 
17, 39, 40 and 51 Auxiliary Pioncer Battalions. Three Gurkha Battalions were attached 
to provide infantry working parties. 

3 “With the Madras Sappers”. by “Kashmiri”, appearing in The Journal of the 
Institution of Military Engineers, October 1950, pp. 341-348. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 253 


‘we settled down. After the camp, most of the men went on a month’s 
leave before proceeding to Burma on active service with barely six 
weeks’ training. The final order to move, however, did not come 
till November. Capt. D. I. Perdue was posted as my second-in- 
command, and I got Jepson, Kochhar, Pringle and Crabtree as 
Company Officers. Our vehicles had balloon tyres and we were 
really equipped for the desert. Realizing that malaria was to be 
our main enemy rather than the Japs, we began to enforce a ruthless 
anti-malaria discipline and avoided a long stay at Manipur Road. 
After a few weeks at Kanglatongbi, north of Imphal, we went forward 
to Palel for work on the Tamu Road. We came under command of 
C.R.E. 107 Works—a very nice civilian put straight into a Lieut.- 
Colonel's uniform—who took me to Tamu for a reconnaissance. I 
believe our jeep was the first to travel along the road since the retreat 
of the Burma Army in the preceding summer. The road was littered 
with skeletons and abandoned equipment. We soon moved forward 
and took over the task of opening the route from Shenam to the 
Lokchao River, a stretch of about 40 miles. Our camp was on the 
famous Khongkhang Ridge where we were to stay through the next 
monsoon. The bulldozers began to improve the road surface while 
we started a factory for the manufacture of box-frames for culverts. 
Each Section of the unit was allotted its own sector where it established 
its camp. Six months of hard work made the road passable. Detach- 
ments went forward to help the Engineer Battalion, ahead of us, in 
the more technical work and bridge construction. More Engineer 
units arrived and our task became more concentrated, though two of 
the three Sections had still to live in detached camps. In the middle 
of June, the monsoon broke. It was hell working on the road—just 
clearing mud along with Pioneer and other labour. The 23rd Division 
had to be withdrawn after the first Wingate expedition had returned, 
and we were left as a forward unit and had to act as infantry in 
addition to our normal tasks. For nearly six months we never saw 
fresh meat and the men started getting ‘browned off’ with shovelling 
mud. So much so that one day I had a heart-to-heart talk with 
Brigadier H. Williams, who was then Chief Engineer, 4th Corps, and 
asked that the unit should be employed on soldiering for a change. 
This request bore fruit and in September we got orders to move 
to Tiddim in support of the 17th Light Division.! This division had 


1 The 17th Indian Division and the 39th Indian Division (formerly the Ist Burma 
Division) were reorganized in January 1943 as Indian “Light” Divisions and their 
engineer field units became “‘Light”” Engineer Companies. 


254 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


only two brigades and had therefore been allotted only two Field 
Companies, 60 (Madras) and 70 (Bengal). Both these units were 
now being rested as they had had a tough time when they came 
out of Burma with the 17th Division in 1942, and we thus got an 
ideal opportunity of proving our worth with the famous “Black Cats”. 
We established our headquarters at Tiddim, in advance of which 
the 63rd Brigade was holding Kennedy Peak and the country right 
up to Fort White and beyond.” 

Important changes in the higher commands in India took place 
during the summer of 1943. On June 20th, General Sir Claude 
Auchinleck became Commander-in-Chief in place of General Sir 
Archibald Wavell who was appointed Viceroy. Since the outbreak 
of war, Wavell had directed some fourteen campaigns—the Western 
Desert, British Somaliland, Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, Abyssinia, 
Greece, Crete, Iraq, Syria, Persia, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, 
Burma and Arakan. The fighting forces were sorry to lose a Com- 
mander of such exceptional ability, but they had every confidence in 
Auchinleck who was a product of the Army in India and had shown 
his prowess by defeating the German and Italian attack on Egypt 
in July 1941 after he had succeeded Wavell in the chief command in 
the Middle East. Although Auchinleck was well fitted to shoulder 
the burden of the war in Burma, the struggle was soon to develop 
such proportions that it became advisable to relieve him of some 
of his responsibilities and this was secured by the creation of a separate 
South East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) which included Burma, and 
the appointment of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme 
Commander. Meanwhile, the war in Burma was controlled from Delhi 
and the ‘build-up’ in Manipur proceeded as rapidly as circumstances 
would allow. 

Although most of the Engineer formations were engaged in im- 
proving the route to the Chindwin through Tamu, General Irwin, 
the Eastern Army Commander, now decided that the Tiddim route 
should be given priority in spite of its mountainous character. He 
wished to forestall any possible enemy advance to Tiddim, and to 
secure this object he had to arrange for the provisioning of the 17th 
Division in this forward area where there was a serious shortage of 
supplies such as rice. By March 1943, the Tehri-Garhwal Field 
Company had improved the first 100 miles of the Tiddim route to 
such an extent that it could carry light motor traffic; but beyond that 
point, through the indescribably rugged country extending down to 
the Manipur River crossing at Milestone 126, there was nothing 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 255 


which could be called a road. The shortage of Engineer formations 
had to be made good by infantry labour and consequently the entire 
17th Division was thrown into the scheme known as ‘Exercise 
Navvy.” The Tehri-Garhwals had already built a great number of 
temporary wooden bridges along the route so that the roadmaking 
equipment should not be held up. These bridges were supposed to 
last only a few weeks under lorry traffic, but actually many of them 
were still standing a year later. 

The magnum opus of the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company was the 
building of the piers and abutments of a new bridge at the Manipur 
River crossing to supplement an old 300-feet suspension bridge. 
“We decided to build an abutment on a rock foundation on the 
near side’, writes Hellicar,’ ‘“‘and by using a 180-feet span, we could 
place the central pier on the far edge of the boulder-strewn river at 
low water. During the rains this pier would be in the centre of a 
roaring torrent moving at perhaps 20 miles per hour, so it was obvious 
that the foundation would have to be very deep. We used sheet-iron 
caissons for the first six feet, and then, by grubbing out boulders 
from beneath them and replacing quickly with sandbags filled with 
cement, we got down to 14 feet below bed level. The hole was filled 
with concrete, and on this base we raised a stone pier 25 feet high. 
Although we finished the piers before the road-makers reached the 
river, it was decided that it was then too late in the dry season to 
bring up a Bailey bridge and that mule and jeep transport must be 
used to supply Tiddim, so we strengthened the existing suspension 
bridge by building another around it and joining the two together, 
and we also built and operated a flying ferry to carry bulldozers 
singly or jeeps three at a time. The raft was made from local timber 
and empty oil-drums, and when fully loaded, the decking was under 
water. The piers and abutments for the Bailey bridge were finished 
about two months before we left the site in August 1943. The bridge 
itself was completed later by 60 Field Company, and I believe that 
it was opened by the Maharajah in January 1944.” 

The real effort on the Tiddim Road began early in March 1943 
when the 17th Division undertook the rapid construction of 26 miles 
of roadway from Milestone 100 down to the Manipur River crossing. 
In this “Exercise Navvy”’ every unit was allotted a stretch of alignment 
for digging and blasting and worked under Sapper supervision. The 
Engineer units were concerned mostly with bridges and culverts. 





1 Notes by Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Hellicar, R.E., dated October 2nd, 1951. 


256 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


70 Field Company built no less than 47 of these in a length of 8 miles, 
all being of timber and spike design, and 60 Field Company was 
similarly employed. Brigadier H. E. Horsfield, at that time Chief 
Engineer, Fourteenth Army, gives the following description of the 
tribulations experienced on the Tiddim Road!:— “The road was the 
main artery for the forward troops and it had always been as in- 
comprehensible and fickle as any member of the fair sex. At one 
time, mud slid over it at Milestone 42. At another time, a driver 
left his car on it overnight and in the morning found that that bit of 
road had slipped down and there was his car, still on the road, but 
30 feet below the normal level. Life was never dull on this 135-mile 
stretch when it was pouring with rain and the ditches were over- 
flowing.” 

Serving with 70 Field Company was Lieut. R. T. Urwin, R.E., 
who writes as follows?:— “Equipment was always in short supply 
and much improvisation was necessary. Our transport was often 
limited tg a jeep and about thirty mules per platoon. The Sappers 
had to be prepared to attack and defend. The terrain called for 
toughness, and the work was exhausting. I remember one section 
of the road when it was no more than a line of wooden pegs in the 
jungle. Then a mule track was cut and this was widened to take 
jeeps, and still later, 15-cwt. trucks. At this stage the Divisional 
Field Companies moved ahead and left to others the task of deve- 
loping the track into a road for 3-ton lorries. Most of the work was 
done with axe, pick and crowbar, assisted where possible by little 
15-cwt. compressor trucks. The road was cut into the mountain side, 
and every re-entrant had to have a bridge or a culvert. Local timber 
was used for the forward bridges. The road surface was always a 
problem. During the monsoon, only 4-wheel-drive vehicles could be 
sure of getting through. In the summer, the dust rose in choking 
clouds. Although there was always water in the deep valleys, the 
supply to the troops on the ridges was a difficult problem, and it was 
a familiar sight to see mule-drivers taking their animals down as 
much as 1,000 feet to bring up water.” On May Ist, 1943, the Tiddim 
Road was declared open for lorry traffic as far as the Manipur River 
crossing at Milestone 126 from Imphal, but beyond that point there 
was still only a precarious jeep track to Tiddim. A few weeks later, 


1“Engineer Operations with the Fourteenth Army in 1943-44”, by Brig. H. E. 
Horsfield, c.b.e., M.c., appearing in The R.E. Journal, December 1945, pp. 241-243. 


2 Notes by the Revd. R. T. Urwin (formerly Major R.E.) dated November 7th, 1951. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 257 


as the Japanese were reported to be moving towards Tiddim from 
Kalemyo, a party of 70 Field Company was sent forward to improve 
the track beyond Tiddim while another was detailed to attend to a 
boat bridge at the crossing as the water-level showed signs of rising. 
Sure enough, a sudden flood came down one night and the bridge 
was saved only through a rapid decision by Jemadar Dharam Singh 
to dismantle it forthwith. The river continued to rise, but on June 
12th 70 Field Company managed to build a flying ferry across the 
raging waters and thus maintained some sort of supply to the forward 
troops. 

Meanwhile, the bulk of the labour on “Exercise Navvy” had fallen 
naturally to the infantry of the 17th Division, so perhaps some of 
the experiences of the Ist Battalion, The West Yorkshire Regiment, 
will not be out of place. On March 20th, the battalion was moved 
to Milestone 108 when the road was open only as far as Milestone 
82. The track was then being widened on a steep ascent to the crest 
at Milestone 100 which was nearly 6,000 feet above sea-level. Beyond 
that point, all seemed to be virgin jungle. The completed portion 
to Milestone 82 bore little resemblance to a proper motor road. It 
was merely a rough passage, hacked through the forest, without 
any surfacing other than a coating of reddish-brown dust. The 
following description of the infantry at work comes from the pen 
of a Lance-Corporal.! ‘“‘When we moved forward, each man carried 
either a large pick, a shovel or a crowbar in addition to his normal 
equipment. The trip in jeeps to Milestone 100 was pleasant enough 
though most of us did it with one leg over the side because the sight 
of a sheer drop of 3,000 feet to left or right was not conducive to 
steady nerves. At Milestone 100 we made the acquaintance of our 
invaluable friend, the mule. The units assembled and marched to 
Milestone 108 which was to be our first bivouac area. The march 
was gruelling because it led steeply downwards the whole way and 
we could discover no track of any description. We had to cling to 
the hillside like flies. Arrived at Milestone 108, we settled in for the 
night and made ourselves as comfortable as we could with only one 
blanket and a ground shect per man. Morning dawned, and with 
it the start of many weeks of hard work. Each man had to shift 
about 60 cubic feet of earth a day and this often entailed the blasting 
of trees and boulders weighing many tons. Every officer and man, 
from the C.O. downwards, had the same task and the same rations. 





From Pyramid to Pagoda, by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.s.0., M.c., pp. 44, 45. 


258 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Each morning we had to march some three miles before we reached 
our stretch of road. The alignment seemed to twist and turn without 
apparent reason; but it was, in fact, a remarkable engineering feat, 
ably supervised by Major R. K. Kochhar, O.C. 60 Field Company, 
Indian Engineers. The road was first dug out of the mountain side 
by hand to a width of I1 feet to enable the Sappers to bring up their 
bulldozers and make it capable of taking two-way traffic.) We worked 
in shorts and boots alone, day in, day out, until 5.30 p.m., with 
short breaks for ‘elevenses’ and ‘tiffin’. At last our task was com- 
pleted, and when Major Kochhar came along the new road in a jeep 
we downed tools and gave him a right royal reception.” 

The day’s routine on “Exercise Navvy” was ordered by the sun, 
for at 6.00 a.m., as the first rays appeared over the mountains, the 
men were awakened by the unholy din of the Cicada insects in the 
trees and bushes. Arrived at the road face, everyone hacked away 
the undergrowth and shovelled the soil over the khud. It might be 
loose dust, heavy clay or shale. Rocks were blasted with gelignite 
after holes had been jumped laboriously with crowbars. Progress 
was slow at first, but when the track was a few feet in width a pneu- 
matic drill team from 60 Field Company arrived in a truck and made 
the holes more rapidly. The Sappers found willing helpers and 
advisers among the West Yorkshires, many of whom had been 
coalminers in civil life. After the end of the day’s work, the infantry 
marched back to camp for a wash and a meal, and as the light faded 
they were treated to another serenade by the indefatigable Cicadas. 
“Exercise Navvy”’ was a race against the monsoon which was expected 
to break about May 15th. The 17th Division won that race, thanks to 
the energy of the infantry and the expert supervision of the working 
parties by the Indian Engineers. 

The extension of the motor road to Tiddim itself was planned by 
the C.R.E. 17th Division but executed by civilian labour under the 
Public Works Department. Many thousands of Chin coolies were 
employed on an alignment which ran, for the most part, halfway up 
the mountain side. The scenery was indescribably beautiful. Range 
upon range of forest-clad hills stretched to the horizon. Some of 
the higher peaks, south-east of Tonzang, rose to 8,000 feet, and in 
the dim distance beyond Tiddim, Kennedy Peak soared to nearly 





1 The actual tasks were first to widen the track to 4 feet for mule traffic and then 
to 11 feet for 15-cwt. trucks. After the infantry had moved on, the bulldozers widened 
the road for two-way traffic. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 259 


9,000 feet. The final stretch of the road involved a climb of 2,000 
feet in 4 miles and had 30 hairpin bends. This was known as “The 
Chocolate Staircase’, socalled because, viewed from below, it appeared 
as a series of golden-brown steps hewn out of the purple jungle. 
The original track had been built by Chin labour in 1942 to supply 
our forward troops in the Chin Hills. Tiddim was a straggling village, 
5,600 feet above the sea and overlooking the deep gorge of the Beltang 
Lui. Beyond it, the track meandered past Kennedy Peak, Fort 
White and the old British outposts known as the ‘Bamboo Stock- 
ades’’, and passing through Kalemyo on the Myittha River, ended 
at Kalewa on the Chindwin. This was the only passable route in 
the entire region, but it traversed appallingly difficult country. Out- 
posts on adjacent ridges might be almost within shouting distance, 
and yet an attempt to move from one to the other would involve a 
descent and ascent of thousands of feet through dense jungle and 
would occupy the greater part of a day. 

In due course, the 17th Division moved forward to Tiddim and 
beyond though it could be supplied only with the greatest difficulty 
owing to the crippling of the Manipur River bridges by the spate 
in June. As already related, although preparations had been made 
by the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company to erect a Class 18 Bailey 
Bridge to meet such an eventuality, the parts could not be brought 
forward until the road from Imphal had been further improved. 
Therefore, the existing suspension bridge was strengthened for jeep 
traffic, a project which presented many transport problems because 
the cables, each weighing 1,300-Ibs, had to be carried for 126 miles 
on trains of three jeeps coupled together. However, after the suspen- 
sion bridge had been finished in August, jeep traffic poured across it 
until the end of the year. The low water-level then permitted the 
reconstruction of a floating bridge to take lorry traffic, and the Imphal 
Road having been further improved with stone secured by 442 Indian 
Quarrying Company from quarries excavated at Milestones 109 and 
127, the stores for the Bailey Bridge arrived and the structure was 
erected, 

The creation of the South East Asia Command was a very wise 
measure. The formation of this Command had been decided in 
Washington as early as May 1943 when it was agreed that it should 
include not only Burma but also Ceylon, Malaya, Sumatra, Thailand and 
French Indo-China and that Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten should 
be appointed Supreme Commander of all the Allied land, sea and 
air forces operating therein. Mountbatten arrived in Delhi on October 


260 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


7th, flew to China to contact his Amercan Deputy, General Stilwell, 
visited the headquarters at both Imphal and Chittagong, and was 
back in Delhi on October 22nd. The former Eastern Army, now 
under Lieut.-General Sir George Giffard, was split into the Eastern 
Command, India, under Lieut.-General A. G. O. M. Mayne and the 
Fourteenth Army in Burma under Lieut.-General W. J. Slim who 
assumed command on October 15th after commanding of the 15th 
Corps for four months. General Giffard became Commander, |!th 
Army Group, which comprised the Fourteenth Army, the forces in 
Ceylon and certain outlying garrisons. The Fourteenth Army, 
under General Slim, consisted of the 4th Indian Corps (Lieut.-General 
G.A.P. Scoones) based on Imphal and the 15th Indian Corps (Lieut.- 
General A. F. P. Christison) based on Chittagong. Mountbatten, being 
a sailor, planned at first to retake Burma by an amphibious operation 
using a large number of landing craft to seize the Andaman Islands 
as a prelude to an attack on Rangoon; but when, a few months 
later, most of the craft were withdrawn for operations in Europe, 
he was obliged to concentrate on a purely land attack. Undeterred 
by previous custom, he resolved to fight as hard in the monsoon as 
in dry weather and to make the fullest possible use of air supply 
to overcome the difficulties of road transport in the rainy season. 
He resolved also to select the most unhealthy areas for his operations 
because his troops were adequately safeguarded from malaria by the 
use of Mepacrine while the Japanese had no such advantage.! 

In November 1943, we were in contact with the Japanese on three 
major land fronts: in Arakan (including the Chin Hills), in the 
Manipur region of Assam, and in Northern Burma. On the Arakan 
front, the Sth and 7th Indian Divisions of the 15th Corps were in 
the process of relieving the 26th Indian Division, and the 81st West 
African Division was arriving. On the Assam front, the 4th Corps, 
now comprising the 17th, 20th and 23rd Indian Divisions, guarded 
the approaches south and east of Manipur and was preparing to 
assume the offensive. On this front also there was an independent 
brigade operating in the Lushai Hills.2 The Northern Burma front 
(known as the Northern Combat Area Command or N.C.A.C.) was 


1 Before the introduction of Mepacrine, 120 malaria cases were admitted to hospital 
for every admission on account of wounds. At the end of the war, the proportion 
had fallen to 6 to 1. 


2 432 Independent Platoon, formed from 63 Field Company in January 1942, was 
attached to this brigade until early in 1943. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 261 


held by General Stilwell’s force of two Chinese divisions based on 
Ledo, with a third division in reserve. A small garrison, mainly of 
Kachin levies, held Fort Hertz. Wingate’s ‘“‘Chindits’’ had not yet 
reappeared at the front. Expanded into six Long Range Penetration 
Brigades and camouflaged as the “Special Force’? or ‘3rd Indian 
Division”, they were undergoing further training in Central India. It 
may be interesting to note that although Wingate’s L.R.P. Force 
was now composed mainly of British troops together with some 
Gurkhas and West Africans, six “Special Sections” of the Indian 
Engineers had been formed by the Bengal Corps in August 1943 to 
accompany some Gurkha reinforcements for the force. These Sections 
moved into Assam in December, so it is possible that some of them 
accompanied Wingate into Burma in March 1944. An attempt was 
made to form two mixed British and Indian Field Companies (89 
and 90), but the system proved unsatisfactory and the units were 
re-formed with entirely British personnel. Eventually, 89 Field 
Company reverted to being an Indian Engineer unit. 

In the autumn of 1943, the Japanese had only five infantry divisions 
in Burma though a sixth was on its way. The 55th Japanese Division 
was in Arakan while the other four composed the Fifteenth Japanese 
Army, under Lieut.-General Mutagachi, with headquarters near 
Mandalay. Of this Army, the 3!st and 33rd Japanese Divisions faced 
the 4th Indian Corps along the Chindwin, the 18th Japanese Division 
opposed Stilwell in Northern Burma, and the 56th Japanese Division 
held the Chinese forces along the Yunnan border. The total enemy 
fighting strength was about 135,000 men. But already a railway link 
was being forged between Bangkok in Thailand and Moulmein in 
Tenasserim which would, when completed, greatly facilitate the 
arrival of enemy reinforcements. This was the infamous “Railroad 
of Death’’, 260 miles in length, on which thousands of British and 
Indian prisoners-of-war from Singapore perished miserably in the: 
jungles from exhaustion, starvation and disease. The line was not 
fully opened until 1945, yet even without its aid the enemy strength 
in Burma increased with considerable rapidity so that by January 
1944 it amounted to no less than 16 divisions comprising more than 
200,000 men. These were the flower of the Japanese Army—hardy, 
specially trained and incredibly fanatical. It was fortunate for India 
that she was able to reinforce her frontiers with soldiers equally 
good, and in the end even better, and by superior leadership and 
greater strength to roll back the tide of invasion. The Japanese 
planned to split open the Allied front, sealing off the two halves and 


262 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


cutting all lines of communication. Each half was then to be destroyed 
separately, after which the victorious armies of Nippon would push 
forward into Bengal and Assam through Chittagong and Dimapur. 
The conquest of Arakan was to come first, Chittagong being seized 
and the Fourteenth Army reserves attracted southwards to help the 
15th Indian Corps. Then, our northern sector having been thus 
weakened, the main thrust would be made towards Imphal and 
Dimapur, and if successful, would be followed by the severance of 
the Assam line of communication to China via the ‘‘Hump” and the 
invasion of the remainder of Assam and most of the rest of North- 
East India. The enemy still assumed that, if he out-flanked our 
forward positions by marching through dense jungle, we should 
retire to protect our Jines of communication as we had done in Malaya, 
and he counted on replenishing his supplies from captured dumps as 
he advanced. He did not realize that air supply had changed the 
whole nature of the fighting. Detachments threatened with encircle- 
ment need no longer be withdrawn. Supplied and even reinforced 
by air, they could hold their ground. This miscalculation was fatal 
to the Japanese plans, and particularly so in Arakan as we shall 
see later. 

Towards the end of 1943 the dispositions of General Scoones’ 4th 
Corps on the Manipur front were as follows. The newly arrived 
20th Indian Division, under Major-General D. D. Gracey, had its 
headquarters at Shenam on the Tamu Road and was engaged in 
patrolling across the Chindwin. The 23rd Indian Division, under 
Major-General O. L. Roberts (an ex-Bengal Sapper and Miner), was 
in the Tamu area; and the 17th Indian (Light) Division, under 
Major-General D. T. Cowan, was on the Tiddim Road with its 
headquarters about Milestone 102. Soon afterwards, the 20th Divi- 
sion relieved the 23rd Division which was withdrawn to the Imphal 
Plain. In the far north, General Stilwell’s troops had made fair 
progress along the Ledo Road. They were established at Shingbwiyang 
and had completed the road up to that point. A petrol pipe line 
was also under construction for their supply. But in the dense forests 
of the Hukawng Valley Stilwell was now meeting stiffening opposition 
and it became clear that unless the Chinese co-operated effectively 
from Yunnan there was little prospect of opening the land route to 
China in 1944 by a junction of the Ledo Road with the old Burma 
Road. Stilwell’s operations, however, are outside the scope of this 
Narrative since no units of the Indian Engineers took part in them. 

The 33rd Japanese Division, facing the 17th Indian Division in 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 263 


the Tiddim region, had launched attacks in October against Falam, 

to the south, and had pushed towards Kennedy Peak; but before 
this, 428 Field Company had received orders to move to Tiddim to 
support the Division which at the moment had only two brigades, 
the 48th and 63rd, and two Engineer units, 60 and 70 Field Companies. 
At Tiddim, 428 Field Company joined the 63rd Brigade which was 
holding Kennedy Peak and the road up to Fort White. Brigadier 
Partap Narain gives the following description of the experiences of 
the unit which he then commanded.! ‘Our first interesting job was 
to support the Gurkhas in an attack on the ‘Bashas’ (hill features) 
beyond Fort White, held by the Japanese. We spent a few days in 
planning reconnaissance routes and watersupply points and experi- 
menting with bulk charges for the demolition of bunkers. Pole 
charges and bulk charges were made up in sealed tins of sizes which 
could be carried by a man. We tried them on our own bunkers and 
they proved most effective. I detailed Kochhar’s Section to support 
the attack. Our troops surprised the Japs in their pyjamas; but 
unfortunately, just as we were going into position, our planes bombed 
us by mistake and there were a number of casualties. Young Kochhar 
was lucky enough to be pulled into a nullah by a Gurkha and thus 
escaped being written off. As soon as the monsoon was over, the 
Brigade Commander started getting worried about the water-supply 
at Kennedy Peak and the surrounding areas, and the Divisional 
Commander about the supply at Tiddim. The supply to small garri- 
sons was an easy matter; but for Tiddim, with its population of 
nearly a brigade and some Divisional troops, we had to instal a 
proper water-supply. To get sufficient water we had to go right down 
to a stream more than 2,000 feet below the town, make a bund in 
the bed and instal twelve large Waluska pumps, pumping up in 
stages. More than 4,000 yards of 4” pipe had to be laid, and to get 

the engines to the various stages we had to make a ieep track. It is® 
a great pity that the installation had later to be blown up when we 
were forced to evacuate the place.” 

The Tiddim water-supply scheme is described in detail in an article 
by Major J. V. Corbet, R.E.2. The town, perched on a lofty ridge, 
was served before the war by a small gravity system which yielded 





*“With the Madras Sappers’, by ‘Kashmiri’ (Brig. Partap Narain), appearing in 
The Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers, October 1950, pp. 341-348. 


4“Tiddim Water Supply Scheme”, by Major J. V. Corbet, R.E., appearing in The 
R.E. Journal, June 1945, pp. 79-82. 


264 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


little during the dry season. This supply was quite insufficient for 
the needs of the 17th Division and accordingly the C.R.E, (Lieut. 
Colonel R. S. B. Ward) had to produce a better system at very short 
notice. He entrusted the work to 428 Field Company. The final 
stretches of the Imphal-Tiddim Road were hurriedly made suitable 
for 15-cwt. trucks, but it was still necessary to transport the heavy 
pumping plant piece-meal. As a 50 h.p. pump could supply only 
10,000 gallons per hour at 350 feet head, pumping had to be arranged 
in stages. The idea was to have five stages, four of which would have 
two pumping sets. At each stage there would be a 10,000 gallon 
reservoir and at the top some main reservoirs to hold a total of 
50,000 gallons. Preliminary work began with marking the pipe-line 
and making a jeep track with the help of Chin labour, but the slope 
was so precipitous that the track was never really negotiable by 
wheels and visiting officers usually refused to descend to the bottom 
of the gorge. This was not surprising as the gradient on some of the 
lower hair-pin bends was ! in 2. The system subsequently needed 
some alteration, but on the whole it yielded a good supply of water 
to the troops. 414 Field Park Company, under Major R. Blagden, 
R.E., assisted 428 Field Company in some stages of the construction 
and then maintained the system until it had to be destroyed in 
March 1944. 

Some mention has already been made of the experiences of a 
Section of 428 Field Company in action beyond Fort White as related 
by Brigadier Partap Narain. 70 Field Company shared also in the 
fighting beyond Tiddim which began in August 1943. A Section of 
that unit took part in an attack on ‘Basha East’, the highest part of 
a bare ridge in jungle-covered country to the south-east of Tiddim. 
The Sapper party reached the forming-up point after a night march 
in heavy rain and darkness so complete that the men had to stick 
“phosphorescent leaves into their packs to keep contact with each 
other. Unfortunately, on this occasion they never came into action 
because the infantry attack failed. But elsewhere they had some- 
times to act as actual assault troops. The enemy’s bunkers, made 
of timber and earth, were very elaborate and had interior blast-walls 
so that a grenade thrown through a firing slit would probably fail 
to dislodge the defenders. This was where the Sapper ‘bunker- 
busting’ parties came into their own. A party usually consisted of 





1414 Field Park Company had been formed from 414 Bridge Construction Section. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 265 


an N.C.O. and 3 men, each man carrying an explosive charge of 
20-lbs. made up in tins. The N.C.O. carried the firing mechanism, 
with detonator and primer connected up. If the infantry were checked 
they called for a Sapper Assault Party of this nature and indicated 
the target. The Sappers then crawled forward, rushed up to the bunker 
and piled their charges one on top of the other, and the N.C.O. 
having fixed the firing mechanism and pulled out the pin, they dived 
for the nearest cover. But things did not always pan out so well. 
Urwin gives an instance in his account of the assault on ‘Basha 
East’. ‘‘As soon as the barrage stopped’’, he writes, ‘‘we began to 
move forward though not fast enough to satisfy the infantry Company 
Commander who started to encourage his men in no uncertain terms. 
We were only a few yards away, so'I began to add my encourage- 
ments to his. Naturally, the Sappers thought I was addressing them, 
and, with a Moslem war-cry, they began to advance much faster 
than the rest. In fact, we got well in front as the infantry had slowed 
down because the Japs were not where they had expected them to 
be. The enemy were in a strong position to one flank and firing 
Straight across the bare summit, so our troops went to ground and 
tried to adjust themselves to this new development. Suddenly, both 
sides ceased fire and we could hear the Jap commander exhorting 
his men. Having finished his speech, he shouted ‘‘Charge” in English, 
and both sides let loose at once. Neither could see the other and 
both thought the other was charging. When the firing died down, 
we found that we were in the front line with the infantry and there 
we dug in. After an hour or so, the Battalion Commander sent for 
me and said he thought there was a bunker we could deal with and 
that he would get some Gurkha scouts to pin-point the position for 
us; but when I brought up a Sapper party, both sides resumed 
firing and we had to wait. After another hour, all was silent again, 
but by this time the moonlight was so bright that the C.O. said we 
should get picked off if we attempted to deal with the bunker. Accord- 
ingly, we stayed in position on the perimeter and remained there for 
48 hours while the infantry infiltrated round behind the Japs and, 
by cutting their water-supply, forced them to withdraw. Only after 
our Company Commander had protested that if we were not going 
to be used as Sappers he would like to have us back were we allowed 
to leave our sector of the defence and rejoin the unit. Such co- 
Operation with infantry was common in the days when we held 
Tiddim.” 


266 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


A further account of Sapper activities on the Tiddim front is 
given by Brigadier Partap Narain who writes as follows:—! “In 
November 1943, after an unsuccessful attack by us, the Japs started 
attacking Fort White. A Battalion Group (of the 63rd Brigade) was 
therefore put in between Kennedy Peak and Fort White and 428 
Field Company had a Sub-Section with it for water-supply duties. 
During the night of November 13th, our position was heavily shelled 
by the enemy and was over-run at dawn next day. I went up to 
Kennedy Peak to see the stragglers coming in. There were Punjabis, 
Gunners, Signallers, Service Corps, all and sundry, returning with 
awful tales, but I could see no sign of my Sappers. In fact, there 
was no sign of them for two days and I felt sure I had lost them. 
Then suddenly they marched into camp, properly dressed and com- 
plete with arms and ammunition. They had had a hard time 
marching in and out of the Jap lines without food or water. This 
is what had happened. Naik Dorairaj Nadar, having received no 
orders to withdraw the Sub-Section, had taken up an alternative 
position from which, after reconnaissance, he returned later to his 
original post. Here he organized a meal for his men and sent out 
patrols. He held his post till 4.0 p.m. on November 14th, eight 
hours after the Battalion had been withdrawn, and only left it when 
the evening patrol reported a large concentration of the enemy. 
Then he burnt all maps and papers and withdrew the Sub-Section. 
After marching over devious routes for about 22 miles through dense 
jungle, he reported at Section H.Q. at 3.0 p.m. on the 15th. He was 
helped by Lance-Naik Pandiayan who had led the evening patrol 
on the 14th. While on this patrol, Pandiayan was captured by the 
enemy and deprived of his rifle and helmet. A Japanese officer 
threatened him with a revolver and asked him for information. This 
he refused to give, and hitting the officer with the spare barrel of 
a light machine gun, knocked the revolver out of his hand and escaped 
under heavy fire to give the alarm to his men. He reported that he 
had seen the Japs driving up and down in our abandoned jeeps and 
throwing atta about merrily. The Divisional Commander was very 
pleased and told me he had recommended both N.C.Os. for the 
Indian Distinguished Service Medal and the men for mentions’’.2 





1 “With the Madras Sappers”, by ‘Kashmiri’ (Brig. Partap Narain), appearing in 
The Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers, October 1950, pp. 341-348. 


2 The I.D.S.M. was awarded, however, only to Naik Dorairaj Nadar, and none of 
the others was mentioned in despatches. Another account of this action appears in 
the Bangalore News Letter dated December 1946. 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 267 


By the end of 1943, the Engineer ‘build-up’ in Assam and Arakan 
had assumed vast proportions and included a great number of field 
units of the Indian Engineers in addition to other Engineer formations 
of all descriptions. Among the Madras Group units were 56, 60, 62, 
362, 365, 421, 424, 428, 429, 430, 431 and 432 Field Companies and 
44, 303, 323, 326, 327 and 330 Field Park Companies, as well as 1 and 10 
Bridging Sections and 101 Railway Construction Company. The 
Bombay Group was represented by 20, 24, 28, 30, 91, 92, 98, 328, 
363, 402, 403, 48! and 483 Field Companies, several Field Park 
Companies and 9 and 889 Bridging Sections. The Bengal Group 
had 2, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75, 77, and 94 (Faridkot) Field Companies and 
322, 332 and 414 Field Park Companies. The list may be incomplete, 
but it is evident that at least 33 Field Companies of the Indian 
Engineers were present. Accordingly, it is impossible to deal with 
them individually. The experiences of a few, as given in this narrative, 
must be taken as typical of those of the remainder. Most of the 
work was hard, exacting and often monotonous, but not a minute 
was wasted and it was due in no small measure to the labours of 
the Engineers in 1943 that the Japanese onslaughts in 1944 in both 
Arakan and Manipur were defeated with great slaughter and the 
way opened for a decisive counter-offensive. 

As early as the end of January 1944, evidence had begun to accu- 
mulate of the enemy’s intention to launch a general offensive against 
the 4th Corps in Manipur. Our air reconnaissance had reported 
troop movements, road building and the construction of rafts on 
the Chindwin River. It was therefore decided that, when the attack 
came, the Corps should concentrate in the Imphal area and fight 
the decisive battle on ground of its own choosing. Imphal was the 
nodal point on which hinged the defence of Assam. With the 
Imphal Plain in their hands, the Japanese would be able to build 
forward airfields from which to attack our air bases in Assam and 
Bengal and to interrupt our land communications with General Stilwell 
and our air route to China. The enemy’s offensive was expected to 
take the form of an advance on Tiddim to cut off the 17th Division 
with the help of encircling thrusts northwards towards Imphal on 
either side of the Tiddim Road. Other enemy columns would push 
towards Imphal up the Tamu Road and towards Ukhrul, north-east 
of Imphal. Still further north, a smaller force would strike at the 
Imphal-Dimapur Road as a prelude to attacking Kohima and the 
rail-head, airfields and dumps at Manipur Road Station. The forecast 
proved remarkably accurate and was followed almost exactly by 


268 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the enemy. The dispositions of the 4th Corps were based on it. But 
General Scoones was placed in the unenviable position of having at 
first to defend long stretches of the Tiddim-[mphal Road which ran 
roughly parallel to the enemy’s front along the Chindwin. His main 
lines of communication were therefore terribly vulnerable. Still, he 
knew that a successful concentration on Imphal would lengthen the 
enemy’s line of communication, already stretched to breaking point. 
On the Manipur front, January 1944 passed quietly enough with 
constant patrolling and intensive preparation for the coming storm. 
It was far otherwise in Arakan where General Christison’s 15th Corps 
was already taking the offensive in order to disorganize the enemy's 
obvious preparations for the first phase of his invasion of India. 
The patrols in Manipur were often accompanied by parties of Indian 
Engineers, particularly those sent out from Tiddim towards Yazagyo. 
Here the jungle was so dense that the men had either to use elephant 
tracks or follow the dry beds of streams. In bivouac at night, the 
stillness was so deadly that even the sound of a falling leaf was 
startling. The enemy seemed to lurk in every shadow. Nerves were 
Strained to the limit, and never was the rising sun more welcome. 
The ‘build-up’ in Manipur had now reached such proportions that 
it was decided that Major-General Orde Wingate’s Second Chindit 
Expedition should be launched into Upper Burma to co-operate in 
the offensive which we had planned for 1944. Six Long Range 
Penetration Brigades were to be despatched, mostly by air. They 
were intended to help the advance of Stilwell’s forces down the Ledo 
Road, to reduce the opposition offered to a Chinese advance from 
Yunnan and to disorganize the enemy’s rear areas in the north. 
The movement began on February 5th, 1944, when one of the brigades 
set out on foot from Ledo. A month later, ‘‘Operation Thursday” 
was launched by flying 10,000 men and 1,000 pack animals over the 
mountains and jungles by night and setting them down far behind 
the enemy’s lines. Wingate proposed to establish strongholds deep 
in the enemy zone and thence to start large-scale operations in several 
directions. To use his own words, he would “insert himself in the 
guts of the enemy”, and go, not where the enemy was, but where 
he was not. Five brigades were set down on two clearings---‘‘Broad- 
way” and “‘Chowringhee’’-—situated about 150 miles east of the 
Chindwin in the triangle formed by Mogaung, Indaw and Bhamo. 
The first waves came in gliders, towed in pairs over an 8,000 feet 
mountain barrier; but out of 67 gliders that took the air, only 32 
landed at ‘Broadway’. Some had crashed on the way; others had 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 269 


been forced to turn back. One glider, loaded with a bulldozer, 
plunged into the surrounding wall of jungle at 60 miles an hour. 
Its wings were torn off, and when the fuselage stopped, the bulldozer 
continued to smash its way through the trees. But luckily, as the 
bulldozer left the fuselage, it had operated a hinge by which the two 
pilots’ seats could be swung upwards to give more room. Pilot and 
co-pilot were consequently thrown into the air while the bulldozer 
made its exit beneath them, and they landed back in the wrecked 
fuselage, unhurt, after the machine had left. “I planned it just that 
way” said the American pilot. 

Four hundred troops and a mass of equipment were soon delivered 
at “Broadway” though not without scores of casualties. The infantry 
fanned out and the engineers worked desperately to make an air- 
strip. This was completed in 24 hours and dozens of Dakotas landed 
with more troops of the first two brigades and heavier equipment 
and stores. The same procedure was followed at “‘Chowringhee”’, 
further south, where another brigade came in. Yet another brigade 
arrived on March 23rd on an alternative air-strip called ‘“‘Aberdeen”’. 
This was Wingate’s last exploit. Flying back to India on March 
24th, his plane crashed in the jungle and he was killed. The leadership 
of the ‘‘Chindits”’ then fell to Major-General W. D. A. Lentaigne. 
The Second “Chindit’” Expedition undoubtedly disorganized some 
of the Japanese rear communications and therefore must have affected 
the strength of the enemy’s onslaught in March, but, as already 
stated, there is no evidence that any Indian Engineers were concerned 
in it. 

The first ripples of the Japanese offensive against Imphal and 
Kohima began to lap round our forward positions on March 6th, 
1944. General Mutagachi told his Fifteenth Army that the fate of 
the Empire depended on the result and that Imphal must be taken, 
whatever the cost. The order was passed on by the Commander of 
the 33rd Japanese Division, a man of few illusions. “‘You will take 
Imphal’’, he wrote, ‘but the Division will be annihilated’. He was 
wrong in his first prognostication: right in his second. The 17th 
Indian Division was to be the chief executioner though it escaped 
disaster in the early stages only by a narrow margin. The enemy 
offensive opened on March 8th, a week earlier than had been expected. 
It took the form of two thrusts by the 33rd Japanese Division, one 
up the west bank of the Manipur River and the other northwards 
up the Kabaw Valley in the Tamu region. Early in the month it 
had been decided that, if there was a risk of the 17th Indian Division 


270 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


being cut off, it should be withdrawn at once towards Imphal; but 
General Cowan was reluctant to abandon his ground and was deter- 
mined to see his wounded, transport and stores safely on the way 
before his fighting troops withdrew. The date was left to him and 
he chose March 14th, by which time the route to Imphal had already 
been cut. In consequence, the 23rd Indian Division had to send 
two brigades down the Tiddim Road to. help the 17th Division in 
the later stages of its withdrawal, and the 4th Corps reserves were 
thus depleted. Lord Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander, then 
summoned the Sth Indian Division from Arakan by air, taking the 
responsibility himself of diverting 30 Dakotas from the ‘Hump’ 
route for that purpose. It was a bold decision though well justified 
in such an emergency. The 15th Corps could spare the troops: the 
4th Corps had not a man to spare. 

When the 17th Divisional Engineers began to withdraw with the 
other troops from the Kennedy Peak area on March 14th they left 
delayed demolitions and booby-traps all along the Tiddim Road. 
At Tiddim, they destroyed all installations and stores and set fire 
to the houses. On the 20th Division front, where the centre of the 
Japanese offensive had to be met, 309 Field Park Company and 422 
Field Company were both engaged, the latter being heavily attacked 
on several occasions while the Division was withdrawing up the 
Tamu Road to Shenam. The G.R.E.F. organization handed over 
its available field units to the Chief Engineer, 4th Corps, who thus 
gained the services of 428, 429 and 362 Field Companies. The two 
latter were sent afterwards to work on the Bishenpur-Silchar track 
where they were isolated for six weeks and were engaged in hand-to- 
hand fighting with the enemy. 424 Field Company carried out demo- 
litions on the Sittaung track as the 20th Division withdrew and then 
worked on strengthening the defences at the Shenam Saddle, where 
a determined stand was to be made. Thus the Madras Sappers took 
a prominent part in delaying the Japanese advance on Imphal in 
its early stages, as did also the units of the other two Corps which 
were in the forward areas. 

Precautionary measures had been taken to guard against a direct 
thrust at Kohima. Two battallions of the 50th Parachute Brigade 
had arrived to reinforce the few troops in the wild and mountainous 
country east of that place, and as soon as it was seen that an attack 
was probable between it and the head of the Kabaw Valley, the 
Engineers began to make a jeep track running eastwards to Jessami, 


THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 271 


then southwards towards Ukhrul, and finally south-eastwards to the 
Kabaw Valley. This track was completed in the nick of time and 
proved a most useful line of lateral communication. 

A few more personal experiences at the front may serve to round 
off this chapter on the ‘build-up’ period. Major Bossard writes as 
follows about 362 Field Company on the Tamu Road. ‘From the 
lessons learnt during a ‘flap’ in December when all civilian labour 
had been withdrawn towards Palel, a new scheme for evacuation 
had been evolved. It was in three phases, ‘‘A’’, ‘‘B” and “C”, and 
in Phase ‘‘C’’ all Engineer troops were to drop everything, wire them- 
Selves in, and prepare to stay to the last round. In February we knew 
that the enemy was concentrating and that he outnumbered us by 
about three to one. Then suddenly, on March 17th at about 11.0 a.m., 
the unit received the code-word for Phase “C”’, never having been 
given “A” or “B. The Japs had crossed the Chindwin and were 
already in Laiching, only 17 miles to the east. The scenes that followed 
were reminiscent of France in 1940, The civilian labour was just 
told to go. No transport was available. We dug in and wired our 
perimeter and took a 25 pr. battery under our wing, coming under 
command of the 80th Brigade which established itself on the next 
hill, about 600 yards away. The 32nd Brigade was forward in Tamu 
and Moreh. Two nights later, the first Jap patrol came in, about 
30 strong, and fired red tracer into the camp from a hill 900 yards 
away. The enemy tried to tear open the perimeter wire and scale a 
cliff from the road, using bamboo ladders. This was too much for 
the Sappers who opened up with everything they had. The battle 
went on through most of the night, and the Company lost two killed 
and two wounded. Then it settled down to an infantry role. By 
now, pressure was increasing all round. The Japs had cut in behind 
Nippon Hill. They were pushing up the Mombi and Sita tracks and 
were hammering at Tamu which the 32nd Brigade had begun to 
evacuate. The Company’s lines were continually peppered. When 
the 32nd Brigade began to withdraw, we were switched on to the road, 
and it was then that we lost Wright, a Platoon commander. About 
April 2nd, the 80th Brigade also began to withdraw and 362 Field 
Company pulled out and marched to Shenam.”’ 

The Revd. R. T. Urwin gives the following impressions of the 
withdrawal along the Tiddim Road when he was a subaltern with 


1A Sapper and Miner Field Company from 1942 to 1945", by Major 
J. W. Bossard, M.B.E., R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, June 1950, pp. 149-161. 


272 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


70 Field Company.’ ‘It was a sad business blowing up the road 
and the bridges that had been made with such labour. We didn’t 
really know what was happening. Nerves were taut and we had to 
grow accustomed to the idea of being surrounded. It was three 
months before we could feel that the Japs were only in front and not 
everywhere else as well. Certain things stand out in my mind. The 
slowness of the convoy as we moved away from Tiddim; a piece of 
rock falling on my tin helmet after a demolition; being badly ‘jittered’ 
by the Jap in camp at night; a reconnaissance at a ruined camp at 
Milestone 109; finding a tin of milk and drinking it straight off; 
marching a very long way one night, and finally being shelled when 
we reached the Imphal Plain.’’ A vivid word-picture, typical of the 
blurred recollections of those who have had the misfortune, like the 
author, to take part in that most exhausting of military operations, 
a long and hurried retreat before a victorious enemy. 

The defence of Imphal, which will form the subject of another 
chapter, may be said to have begun on March 12th, 1944, when the 
full weight of the Japanese offensive was developing and the enemy’s 
intentions were clear. The attacks by the 3Ist, [Sth and 33rd Japanese 
Divisions, ranged in that order from north to south, were closely 
co-ordinated and had as their primary object the capture of Imphal. 
Having already failed in Arakan, the enemy now staked all on his 
operations against the 4th Corps in Manipur. While the 33rd 
Japanese Division tried to trap and annihilate our 17th Division, 
the 31st and 15th Divisions joined in the fray to the north-east. 
Columns of the 31st Division crossed the Chindwin between Thaung- 
dut and Homalin in a thrust towards Kohima, and others, of the 
15th Division, advanced against our 20th Division which was with- 
drawing slowly along the Tamu-Palel Road. The Japanese, in their 
usual grandiloquent fashion, soon claimed to have obliterated the 
17th Division with the exception of a detachment surrounded at 
Tonzang. Their radio described the scene at Tiddim, where the 
Division was said to have made a last stand. “In that picture of 
desolation”, said the announcer, ‘one can read the panic which 
must have reigned in the hearts of the soldiers in their last moments”’. 
But there were no last moments except for those few brave soldiers 
who gave their lives to check the yellow flood. The 17th Division 
was by no means destroyed and had the satisfaction later of destroying 





1 “Recollections of the Tiddim Road”, by the Revd. R. T. Urwin, dated November 
7th, 1951. 


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THE BUILD-UP IN ASSAM 273 


their opponents. Nevertheless, the general situation on the Manipur 
front in the middle of March was undoubtedly serious. The 33rd 
Japanese Division was trying to break the hold of the 17th Division 
on the Manipur River bridge at Milestone 126. The 15th Japanese 
Division, across the Chindwin and overlooking part of the Kabaw 
Valley, was fanning out south-westwards to co-operate with the 33rd 
Division in an assault on Tamu. Further to the north, the 31st 
Japanese Division was crossing the Chindwin as a prelude to an 
advance on Kohima through Ukhrul where the 50th Parachute 
Brigade lay in wait. Five days after passing the Chindwin, many 
thousands of Japanese crossed the frontier of India and the flag of 
the Rising Sun was hoisted for the first time on Indian soil. The 
‘March on Delhi’ seemed really to have begun. The 4th Corps fought 
for time. The 20th Division retreated slowly and stubbornly along 
the Tamu Road, holding every defensible position as long as possible. 
The 17th Division withdrew rapidly, bursting all barriers and repelling 
all attempts at encirclement. The 23rd Division, in reserve, defended 
the Imphal Plain. Large reinforcements were on the way, but it 
was doubtful whether they could reach the battle zone before the 
monsoon washed away our slender line of communication with 
Assam. Every aircraft, every train and every road-vehicle was pressed 
into service, and on every road the Engineers redoubled their efforts 
to keep the traffic moving forward to the hard pressed front in 
Manipur. 


CHAPTER X 


ARAKAN, 1942 - 45 


HE First Arakan Campaign was a gamble, pure and simple. 
ims was admitted later by General Wavell, the Commander- 
in-Chief, India, who took the risk of ordering an advance from 
Chittagong to Akyab when he had no longer the necessary sea and 
air support. Chittagong, 250 miles east of Calcutta, had a good 
harbour and was connected by rail with Comilla, Dacca and the 
remainder of Assam, but southwards the railway extended no further 
than Dohazari, about 25 miles. From Dohazari to Bawli Bazar 
there was a single fair-weather road, but thence through Maungdaw 
and down the Mayu Peninsula to Foul Point facing Akyab Island 
there was nothing which deserved the name of road. In fact, it was 
hardly feasible to take Akyab by a land advance unless the resistance 
offered by the enemy was very small. The formation detailed for 
this almost impossible task was the 14th Indian Division under 
Major-General W. L. Lloyd, reinforced later by other brigades. The 
troops had been trained for the defence of India against invasion. 
Of jungle warfare they knew practically nothing, nor were they 
equipped for it. They never possessed the numerical superiority 
necéssary for the assault of skilfully entrenched positions. Success 
depended on a rapid advance; but bad weather hindered the start 
and gave the Japanese time to pour troops into Akyab and the 
adjacent country. It is not surprising, therefore, that the campaign 
resulted in a costly failure, and that although much _ experience 
was gained, an exorbitant price in life and loss of morale had to be 
paid for it. Was the venture justified? Some would say it was not. 
Yet it should be borne in mind that the acceptance of considerable 
risk was perhaps permissible in order to offset the dire political 
effects of the fall of Singapore and the retreat from Rangoon, and 
also to dispel the myth of the invincibility of the Japanese. Wars 
are rarely won by leaders who play invariably for safety, and it must 
be remembered that Wavell had already routed the Italians in North 
Africa by a very bold and even hazardous offensive. 
The coastal tract of Arakan is ideal for delaying tactics—a jungle- 
covered country with steep hills, deep ravines and, near the sea, 


274 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 275 


muddy creeks or chaungs fringed with mangrove swamps. From a 
narrow coastal strip, dotted with paddy-fields and villages, rises the 
Mayu Range, sheer, rocky and thickly wooded. Some miles to the 
east lies the wide Kalapanzin Valley, more open and cultivated, down 
which flows the river of the same name which is known in its lower 
reaches as the Mayu. Beyond this valley rises a more formidable 
range, the Arakan Yomas, anything up to 25 miles in width and 
2,000 feet in height. Like the Mayu Range, this barrier is a wilder- 
ness of jungle, intersected by ravines and with knife-edged ridges 
ideal for defensive positions. East of the Yomas, the Kaladan River 
runs southwards to debouch into the Bay of Bengal below Akyab 
Island while the Mayu River comes in north of the island. During 
the dry season, the innumerable chaungs in the valleys are passable 
anywhere for wheeled or tracked vehicles; but as soon as the monsoon 
starts, all traffic is tied to the recognized roads, if such exist. The 
valleys are dotted with hillocks covered with scrub which make 
excellent defensive positions. Three factors hamper road commu- 
nication—heavy rain, water crossings and lack of stone for road 
repairs. These were the chief natural obstacles confronting the 
Engineer units of the 14th Division in 1942. 

From the railhead at Dohazari, all traffic had to move southwards 
through Chiringa, Ramu, Taungbro and Bawli Bazar to reach the small 
port of Maungdaw opposite the southern end of the narrow Teknaf 
Peninsula.! From Maungdaw to Foul Point, the southern tip of the 
Mayu Peninsula, there was only a rough track passable for jeeps in dry 
weather but involving the crossing of many unbridged coastal chaungs. 
There was no other direct land route towards Akyab Island, the nor- 
thern shore of which was 15 miles from Foul Point. Troops and supplies 
sent by sea from Chittagong, could be disembarked at Cox’s Bazar, 
a small port near Ramu, or further down the coast at Maungdaw, 
but the latter could not be used during the monsoon. Elsewhere, 
the heavy surf prohibited a landing. When supplies had been unloaded, 
they could often be sent inland in local boats, known as sampans, 
plying along tidal chaungs, and this relieved to some extent the con- 
gestion of road traffic. The heat and dust in Arakan during April 
and May are very trying, and during the monsoon period from the 
middle of May to the end of September life becomes almost unbear- 
able. The jungle sprouts visibly in the humid atmosphere. Deluges 
of rain fill every ravine with a roaring torrent. Roads are obliterated 


1 See the map of Arakan included in this chapter. 


276 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


in mud. Mosquitos and leeches abound. In 1942-43, sickness deci- 
mated the troops. The only relief was afforded by the winter months 
from December to March when the sun shone on a wonderfully 
beautiful scene and the nights were cold. This was ideal campaigning 
weather. 

In October 1942, the i4th Indian Division moved southwards 
from Chittagong and occupied Maungdaw and Buthidaung without 
much difficulty, thereby securing temporarily a valuable line of 
transverse communication behind its front, but it soon had to with- 
draw to Bawli Bazar owing to Japanese landings on the coast. The 
Divisional Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Muirhead, R.E., 
comprised 26 and 28 Field Companies (Bombay), 73 and 74 Field 
Companies (Bengal), a Sirmur State Field Company and 305 Field 
Park Company, quite an impressive array of talent. Other Engineer 
formations followed, including the 8th and 10th Engineer Battalions, 
the 15th, 17th, 42nd and 55th Auxiliary Pioneer Battalions and 
9 and 11 Bridging Sections in addition to a Field Company and a 
Field Park Company, R.E., a Forestry Company and an Army 
Troops Company.! It is clear that the engineering difficulties in 
Arakan were fully appreciated. 

26 Field Company, under Major L. A. Thorpe, R.E., which dis- 
embarked at Cox’s Bazar on October 6th with the [23rd Brigade, 
was employed in improving the main road north and south of Ramu 
and afterwards made a track for pack transport to Bawli Bazar 
where it established a ferry across the Purma chaung. Meanwhile, 
73 Field Company, under Major C. G. Figgins, R.E., was working 
on the main road further north, converting it from a mere cart-track 
with many water gaps into a route fit for light military traffic. 
Temporary bridges were built with felled trees, and if the gaps were 
too wide for bridging, they were made fordable or provided with 
ferries of country boats. The Company was still equipped for operating 
in North Africa and had no mule transport for bringing up stores. 
Heavy rain at the beginning of November caused much disorgani- 
zation. The War Diary of 26 Field Company has the following 
entries. “‘Major Thorpe returned to the unit having had to walk 
from Cox’s Bazar to Ramu through water 3 feet deep on the main 
road and swirling across it at 4 knots. All roads quite impassable. 
Diversions have either been washed away or have sat down like hot 
blancmanges. Small bridges have mostly disappeared. All timber 


1 Notes by Brigadier R. H. Muirhead, 0.3.8., dated February ist, 1954. 





ARAKAN, 1942 - 45 277 


collected for the unit by the Forest Officer has been lost. This had 
been intended for new piers at Cox’s Bazar and had taken ten days 
to prepare.” 73 Field Company had similar tribulations, but happily 
the deluge was brief and both units soon made good the damage so 
that on November 17th the road was re-opened for traffic. 73 Field 
Company then moved to Bawli Bazar and built a 400-feet bridge 
across the Purma chaung. Here it was joined by 74 Field Company, 
under Major D. C. S. David, R.E. This unit had been properly 
trained and equipped for jungle warfare and was the first of its 
kind to reach the front. By November 20th it had completed a ‘Class 5’ 
road between Ukhia and Bawli Bazar. The Divisional Engineers 
also made a track from Bawli over the hills to Goppe Bazar on the 
Kalapanzin River, a distance of seven miles. 

When the First Arakan Campaign opened in December 1942, two 
battalions of the enemy held Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Our plan 
for the capture of Akyab envisaged an advance down the Mayu 
Peninsula by the 47th, 55th, 88th and 123rd Brigades of the 14th 
Indian Division, after which the 6th Brigade of the 2nd British 
Division would make a landing on the island. The Japanese, however, 
must have had news of our intentions, for on December 16th, just 
as our advance was beginning, they abandoned Maungdaw and 
Buthidaung and retreated southwards. The 14th Divisional Engineers, 
who had been working on the roads and mule-tracks forward of 
Bawli Bazar and Goppe Bazar, were then able to extend the tracks 
towards the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. 74 Field Company 
completed a track from Goppe Bazar through Taung Bazar to 
Buthidaung and then, with 73 Field Company, set to work on the 
Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. 26 Field Company and 28 Field 
Company (Major M. E. F. Bell, R.E.) improved the main road from 
Bawli Bazar towards Maungdaw or built jetties on the Teknaf penin- 
sula for a sea-borne entry into Maungdaw across the narrow Naf 
estuary. By December 23rd, both these Bombay Sapper units were 
in Maungdaw, building jetties for landing supplies or working on 
the road towards Buthidaung. 

The Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road, the scene of so much bitter 
fighting, deserves some description.!. For the first few miles from 
Maungdaw it traversed a coastal strip of broken and jungle-covered 
country before mounting the Mayu Range, twisting its way through 
the hills and descending to Buthidaung, 16 miles away. It was too 





1 See the map of the Maungdaw Area included in this chapter. 


278 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


narrow for two-way traffic, though the surface was roughly metalled. 
In one section it burrowed through a couple of spurs by means of 
tunnels. The west tunnel, about 300 yards in length, was roughly 
half-way between Maungdaw and Buthidaung, and a mile beyond 
it lay the east tunnel, made in two short lengths with an intervening 
gap. The road had been developed from a projected railway line, 
the tunnels having been built in 1918 by a Rangoon firm; but shortly 
afterwards a steamship company, fearing railway competition, had 
purchased the whole concern and the permanent way was then 
used asa road. The Japanese stored ammunition and supplies in the 
tunnels and surrounded them with a maze of defensive positions 
extending from the Razabil Fortress, 44 miles from Maungdaw, to 
a smaller fortress at Letwedet near Buthidaung. Razabil grew in 
time to be a veritable rabbit-warren of gun positions, bunkers, deep 
shelters and tunnels covering a very wide area, though in the early 
days of the advance southwards it was in its infancy. 

So well did our advance progress that by December 27th the 14th 
Division, moving down the coastal road and the Mayu Valley tn 
two columns, had reached Indin and almost to Rathedaung and had 
consolidated on a line 25 miles south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung 
Road. The 47th Brigade was preparing to move to Foul Point, and 
a patrol had actually reached it and could look across the straits to 
Akyab Island. The !23rd Brigade was outside Rathedaung beyond 
the Mayu estuary. But the two brigades were now 150 miles from 
the railhead at Dohazari and bad weather intervened to upset their 
supply by road. A delay of ten days ensued, and when the advance 
was resumed on January 6th, 1943, it was found that the enemy 
had fortified Donbaik, a coastal village 12 miles south of Indin, as 
well as the town of Rathedaung across the Mayu River. Nevertheless. 
with Akyab almost in his grasp, General Lloyd was prepared to 
make a desperate attempt to reach his goal before his supplies ran 
out. On January 18th, and again on the 19th, the 47th Brigade 
attacked the Donbaik position and failed. On February Ist, the 
55th Brigade failed also though supported by tanks of the 26th 
Indian Division which was now coming up. The 123rd Brigade could 
make no headway against Rathedaung and was repulsed on February 
3rd. Again, on the 17th, the 55th Brigade tried to pierce the Donbaik 
defences but without success and was then relieved by the 71st Brigade 
of the 26th Division. The enemy now had the equivalent of a 
complete division at the front and it seemed improbable that the 
Mayu Peninsula could be cleared before the onset of the monsoon 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 279 


made any attempt to land on Akyab Island very hazardous. Yet 
General Wavell directed that another assault should be made 
on Donbaik and this time in great strength and depth. The 6th 
(British) Brigade was to be brought forward from Chittagong for 
the purpose, with the 71st Brigade in support. But before the assault 
could be launched, the enemy began a counter-offensive in the Kaladan 
Valley. A brigade under a certain Colonel Tanahashi, infiltrating 
through the hills, attacked the communications of the {23rd Brigade 
facing Rathedaung. The 123rd Brigade withdrew and was relieved 
by the 55th Brigade. The latter was attacked in turn and forced to 
withdraw, but with the help of the 7Ist Brigade it succeeded in 
reaching a position covering Buthidaung. Tanahashi continued his 
offensive. He crossed the Mayu River by night, and climbing the 
Mayu Range, threatened to cut off our forces on either side of it. 
Meanwhile, on March [8th, the 6th Brigade had made the final 
assault on the Donbaik position. The initial onrush had pierced 
the Japanese defences, only to be broken up among the dozens of 
bunkers whose defenders remained in action behind the leading 
waves of our infantry. While trying to get at the enemy deep under- 
ground, our men were machine-gunned and mortared off the tops 
of the bunkers. The losses were very heavy and the remnants of the 
gallant 6th Brigade had to be withdrawn. 

By the end of the month, the 26th Indian Division, under Major- 
General C. E. N. Lomax, had taken over the greater part of the 
front. General Wavell still hoped to regain the initiative and accord- 
ingly instructions were issued that positions covering the Maungdaw- 
Buthidaung Road and the mouth of the Naf Estuary should be held 
during the monsoon while offensive action was resumed on both 
sides of the Mayu River. But the plans could not be carried out. 
The troops had already suffered 2,500 battle casualties, and malaria 
had accounted for a far greater number. ‘“‘I set a small part of the 
Army a task beyond their training and capacity,” wrote Wavell, 
“and the main responsibility for the failure is mine.’ By the middle 
of April 1943, we were back on a line covering the Maungdaw- 
Buthidaung Road. The enemy followed up and pierced the line. 
Buthidaung was then evacuated, and, on May 13th, our advanced 
base at Maungdaw was abandoned. The troops fell back slowly 
and sullenly to the positions covering Bawli Bazar whence they had 
started out so full of hope nearly six months earlier. The victorious 
Japanese consolidated for the monsoon period in the Maungdaw- 
Buthidaung area, for they also had suffered severely. Some consolation 


280 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


for our failure was derived later from captured Japanese documents 
which showed that the launching of the offensive had upset the 
enemy’s plans for an invasion of India during the winter of 1942-43, 
The Indian Engineer units involved in the First Arakan Campaign 
acquitted themselves well under great handicaps. In December, 74 
Field Company repaired a large steel bridge at Letwedet and then 
pushed a mule-track forward to Hwitze, 20 miles south of Buthidaung. 
This involved four ferries and much bridging. Then, after the 123rd 
Brigade had failed to take Rathedaung, the Company began to 
convert the track into a road for jeep traffic. On March 10th, 1943, 
when enemy forces threatened to cut off the brigade, 74 Field Company 
was ordered to complete the road so that relief battalions could 
come forward and also to defend a vital bridge to the last man. 
The Sappers were soon committed to battle as infantry. The Japanese 
had to be evicted from a knoll two miles north of Hwitze. This was 
done chiefly by the 55th Brigade on March 14th, and the 123rd 
Brigade was extricated successfully although all its animals and 
heavy equipment had to be abandoned before it could be ferried 
across to the right bank of the Mayu. 74 Field Company provided 
and operated these ferries and afterwards carried out demolitions 
behind the retreating infantry. The Japanese, under Colonel 
Tanahashi, followed across the river and over the hills beyond until, 
as already stated, they were in a position to interrupt the commu- 
nications of the brigades attacking Donbaik on the coast. 74 Field 
Company went to Maungdaw, but on March 26th it was ordered 
back to act again as infantry in checking Tanahashi. It moved as 
far southwards as Indin, where it remained until April 9th when it 
returned to Maungdaw and left soon afterwards for India. 
Meanwhile, 73 Field Company had improved the harbour facilities 
at Maungdaw and at Teknaf across the Naf estuary and had worked 
also on the coastal road south of Maungdaw. During March and 
April it made an all-weather road as far south as Indin. The 26th 
Divisional Engineers then took over all-commitments, and 73 Field 
Company, having handed over to 72 Field Company under Major 
J. W. Snape, R.E., returned to India with other units of the 14th 
Divisional Engineers. 72 Field Company settled down for the monsoon 
in the Bawli Area. There was much to learn—the need for conceal- 
ment, track discipline, absolute quiet in camp after dark and a host 
of other things—and there was also plenty of employment in support- 
ing patrols, building jetties and repairing tracks. Thirteen inches of 


ARAKAN, 1942 - 45 281 


rain fell in six days, but the men remained cheerful in spite of being 
constantly wet and often shivering with malaria. 

The Bombay Sapper units vied with their comrades of the Bengal 
Corps in road repair and bridging. Early in January 1943, 26 Field 
Company was employed near [ndin on hacking a mule-track through 
dense forest to connect the forward troops on either side of the Mayu 
Range. Four days after the abortive attack by the 47th Brigade on 
Donbaik on January 18th, when the unit was at Kodingauk midway 
between Donbaik and [ndin, the following entry appears in its War 
Diary:— “Enemy dropped a good bunch of bombs but cleared off 
in a hurry. It was disappointing not to see any of the planes shot 
down, though it was stated later that some fell on the other side of 
the hills. This has since become a regular statement as no planes 
have ever been seen to fall, for the Gunners always say that they 
fell on the other side. This may be true, but we should like to see 
them fall on our side sometimes!” At the beginning of March, the 
Company was still in Kodingauk and mention is made of the Sirmur 
Sapper Company which was then with the 71st Brigade and had been 
involved in considerable fighting in the Donbaik region. Subsequent 
entries run as follows:— ‘“‘Kodingauk. 28th March. Rush order 
received to make a pack route over the hills between I[ndin and 
Sinoh (near Kanyingyaung) as the enemy has captured the other 
end of the only other route for getting supplies to the 47th Brigade. 
Two Sections of 73 Field Company came under command. 30th 
March. Track opened and the 47th Brigade traffic poured through. 
3rd-6th April. Heavy Jap attacks and withdrawal to defensive posi- 
tions. Indin occupied by enemy. 6th Brigade withdrew and 47th 
Brigade had to fight its way through and assemble 7 miles in rear. 
Three Sections of 26 Field Company were with 47th Brigade. 18th 
April. Relieved by 72 Field Company and returned to Maungdaw. 
24th April. Company being reformed at Chittagong.” 

28 Field Company remained even later in the field. On May 3rd 
it was still in Buthidaung operating a ferry across the Kalapanzin 
River for the 55th Brigade. The town was bombed on the following 
day and the brigade was ordered to move into the hills. This move 
was completed on May 6th when 28 Field Company was the last 
unit to leave Buthidaung. While proceeding along the road to 
Maungdaw on May 7th with the 26th Brigade it lost most of its 
transport and equipment in forcing a passage through a road-block, 
but it arrived in Maungdaw on the 8th and reached Bawli Bazar 
on the {lth. There was little Sapper work during this precarious 


282 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


withdrawal. As so often when in tight corners, the Sappers fought 
as infantry. 

The state of the main line of communication during the monsoon 
may be judged from the experiences of Captain J. H. Clark, R.E,, 
who joined 28 Field Company at Bawli Bazar at the end of May 
1943. This is what he writes.! ‘The dry-weather road from Chittagong 
to Cox’s Bazar being unusable, one had to transfer to a small coastal 
vessel for the journey by sea. From Cox’s Bazar to Tumbru Ghat 
on the Naf River estuary, one could travel in a vehicle; but owing 
to the continuous repair work as the surface sank in the mud, the 
road was only open for one-way traffic at certain hours and was 
sometimes completely closed. The only materials available for road- 
making were timber and bricks, the latter being baked in kilns along- 
side the road. Gangs of coolies worked all along the route. From 
Tumbru to Bawli Bazar the road was also unusable, so a ferry service 
of steamers with barges was maintained down the Naf River and 
up the Purma Chaung. All movement from Bawli Bazar towards 
Maungdaw, or from Goppe Bazar towards Buthidaung, had to be 
made with animal transport, and the latter route was sometimes 
impassable even for mules. The 36th Brigade Group at Bawli lived 
in bashas (bamboo huts on stilts) on high ground around the flooded 
paddy-fields. Here I found 28 Field Company. Everyone and every- 
thing was permanently wet. Skin troubles were common, and malaria 
also because the first issue of Mepacrine was not made until June.” 
The building of the Arakan Road from Chittagong to Bawli was a 
remarkable engineering achievement. According to Brigadier 
Horsfield? nearly 5 miles of bridging had to be provided in a total 
length of some 200 miles, and as the country was mostly under 
water from June to December, the roadway had to be raised on an 
embankment 6 feet high and 30 feet wide. Yet the task was finished 
in six months by manual labour alone. No less than 80 million 
bricks were burnt and laid on the road in 1943, and this stupendous 
total was far exceeded in 1944 when the figure rose to 180 million. 

Generally speaking, the Arakan front remained quiet between 
June and November 1943 except for occasional patrol actions. One 
brigade of the 26th Division held a sector extending from Nhila on 
the Teknaf Peninsula eastwards to Bawli Bazar, while another, 











1 Notes by Major J. H. Clark, m.c., R.E., dated February 2nd, 1954. 


4‘*Engineer Operations with the Fourteenth Army in 1943-44", by Brigadier H.E. 
Horsfield, c.p.z., M.c., appearing in The R.E. Journal, December 1945, pp. 241-243. 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 283 


beyond the Mayu Range, held the area between Goppe Bazar and 
Taung Bazar. The headquarters of the ISth Corps, then under 
Lieut.-General W. J. Slim, were at Chittagong. A few raids were 
attempted. Early in July 1943, two companies of The Lincolnshire 
Regiment penetrated to Maungdaw and occupied it for some hours, 
and in the middle of the month a smal! detachment of The North 
Staffordshire Regiment raided the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. A 
party from 28 Field Company was concerned in this affair. The 
object was to ambush enemy transport, and if possible to secure a 
prisoner for identification. Anyone performing this rare feat was 
granted automatically a month's leave. The raid showed that our 
troops, however brave, could not cope at this period with the highly 
trained enemy, for Jungle Warfare Training Divisions were not 
formed in India until late in the year. The party supplied by 28 
Field Company comprised a British Officer, an Indian Officer and 
12 Indian other ranks. The road towards Maungdaw was so bad 
that the Sappers had to be left behind for a time to see the mules 
through while the infantry went ahead to Zeganbyin where the 
Sappers rejoined them before dawn. Unfortunately, the whole of 
July 16th was spent in Zeganbyin and enemy agents reported the 
presence of the force. After dark, the raiders struck south-eastwards 
in brilliant moonlight towards the ‘Tunnels’ area of the Maungdaw- 
Buthidaung Road. The track petered out in a chaung and the local 
guides announced that they were lost. The troops then took up a 
Position in dense jungle. At daylight, the enemy opened fire and 
the infantry attempted to withdraw to a better position. One 
of the two platoons suffered heavily in the process. The other, with 
the Sappers, got clear and climbed down into the bed of a chaung. 
There it was ambushed and after fighting hard for an hour had to 
disperse in small parties into the jungle. On July 18th and 19th the 
survivors trickled back in twos and threes to Zeganbyin, and so 
ended a disastrous venture from which much was learned, the chief 
lesson being that jungle warfare is an art in itself. 

The 26th Indian Division held the forward areas throughout the 
monsoon until it was relieved by the 7th Indian Division under Major- 
General F. W. Messervy. Opposing it were two regiments of the 55th 
Japanese Division with headquarters at Akyab. Both sides were 
exhausted and neither wished to resume the struggle in deluges of 
rain and a welter of mud. The procedure of fighting throughout 
the monsoon had not yet been adopted, and Mepacrine had not 
yet appeared to combat malaria. ‘“‘Custom and military opinion’, 


284 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


writes Earl Mountbatten, ‘regarded the south-west monsoon as a 
close season. No operations had yet been undertaken in this period 
since the Allied (and evidently the Japanese) commanders considered 
that the drain on resources would place the side which attempted 
them at a grave disadvantage when the dry season returned. | deter- 
mined that we must fight on as hard in the monsoon as in the dry 
weather and thus gain the advantage which comes to the side that 
perseveres when the other is expecting that both sides will stop.” 
It is not too much to say that this decision, promulgated soon after 
Mountbatten’s arrival in October 1943, altered the whole conception 
of the conduct of the war in Burma. 

When the 26th Indian Division was relieved on September 19th, 
1943, by the 7th Indian Division, several Field Companies of the 
Indian Engineers made their first appearance in Arakan. These were 
62 Field Company (Major H. C. Lee, R.E.), 77 Field Company 
(Major H. F. Kelly, R.E.), 421 Field Company (Major M. G. Bewoor, 
I.E.) and 331 Field Park Company (Major J. H. Moss, R.E.), 
the whole being under Lieut.-Colonel P. J. Cator, R.E. General 
Messervy was told that as soon as the 15th Corps had concentrated 
for an offensive his task would be to seize the Maungdaw-Buthidaung 
Road, cut in behind the Letwedet stronghold and occupy Buthidaung. 
The 7th Indian Division—the famous ““Golden Arrows’’—had earned 
a high reputation in North Africa though it had still to learn the 
technique of the Arakan jungles. In anticipation of the arrival of the 
5th Indian Division (the “Fighting Fifth’) under Major-General 
H. R. Briggs, Messervy began to move his 33rd Brigade into the 
Kalapanzin Valley to take over from the 26th Division in Goppe 
Bazar and Taung Bazar and to patrol eastwards. The 114th Brigade 
was to advance southwards to the line of the Ngakyedauk chaung, and 
the 89th Brigade was to move over the Ngakyedauk Pass and form 
up on the right of the 114th. These dispositions would protect the 
start of Sapper work in the Pass to convert the existing rough track 
into a road suitable for mechanical transport. The Sth Division 
arrived in due course, and General Briggs was ordered to capture 
Maungdaw and the adjacent Razabil Fortress. General Slim had 
now been appointed Commander, Fourteenth Army, and Lieut.- 
General A. P. F. Christison was in command of the 15th Corps. 
Christison proposed to seize both ends of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung 





1 Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by the Supreme Commander, South-East 
Asia, 1943-45, p. 15. 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 285 


Road, locking up the Japanese garrison in the central tunnels for 
‘subsequent destruction. The Sth Division, advancing along the 
coastal strip, was to be careful to include the western slopes and 
crest of the Mayu Range and so to maintain close contact with the 
7th Division advancing down the Kalapanzin Valley. The importance 
of the Ngakyedauk Pass route was evident. So long as the enemy 
held the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road he could switch his troops 
rapidly from one side of the range to the other, and therefore we 
should be able to do likewise. The 15th Corps, however, comprised 
not only the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions but also the 8ist West 
African Division, and, in reserve, the 25th and 26th Indian Divisions. 
The 36th British Division at Chittagong was also available for a 
sea-borne landing on Akyab Island. In the previous campaign, the 
enemy had slipped round the eastern end of our front. This was not to 
be permitted again, and consequently the West Africans were to march 
down the Kaladan Valley, far inland, in step with the progress south- 
wards of the Sth and 7th Divisions on either side of the Mayu Range. 

The improvement of the Ngakyedauk Pass track to make it fit 
for jeeps was begun in October 1943. In the First Arakan Campaign 
it had been considered waste of time to make it suitable even for 
mule traffic, but the strategical requirements had altered. A mule 
track, however, was the first requirement, and in ten days 62 and 77 
Field Companies, assisted by large gangs of coolies, cut a track 5 
miles in length through the most difficult part. The result was so 
successful that a jeep road was put in hand at once. A new alignment 
in the first two miles involved much rock blasting, but the work of 
widening, re-grading and bridging proceeded so rapidly that the 
road was finished on November 13th and two days later Admiral 
Mountbatten drove a jeep over the Pass. The jeep road was then 
widened and improved, and by the end of December the road could 
be negotiated by tanks. Meanwhile, steps were taken to ensure due 
care in driving. At the foot of the Pass on the western side was a 
sign ““A Happy Christmas to you. Peace on Earth and Goodwill 
to All Men—and 15 m.p.h. if you please.” Again, further on, 
another which read “‘A Jeep can go anywhere”, together with an 
illustration of a vehicle falling over a precipice. These examples of 
humour were matched by a notice on the main coastal road in the 
direction of the Razabil Fortress which ran ‘Stop. If you drive 
past this point you probably won’t come back. They didn’t.’”! 





1 Ball of Fire (History of the Sth Indian Division), by Antony Brett-James, p. 259. 


286 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


With the 5th Indian Division from the Middle East came 2 Field 
Company (Major A. E. Scott, R.E.), 20 Field Company (Major 
P. G. Hatch, R.E.), 74 Field Company (Major D. C. S. David, R.E.) 
and 44 Field Park Company (Major M. J. P. Keating, R.E.). While the 
7th Indian Division side-stepped to the east of the Mayu Range, 
the 123rd Brigade of the Sth Division took over the front between 
the Naf River and the crest. 74 Field Company, which was with 
this brigade, reached Bawli Bazar and began to work on the Maungdaw 
Road. Unlike the other Sapper companies, it had had previous experi- 
ence of Arakan as it had taken part in the first campaign. The 
Ngakyedauk Pass having been opened for jeep traffic, all was ready 
for the offensive by the 15th Corps. In the middle of December 
1943 the Sth Division moved southwards along the western side of 
the Mayu Range while the 7th Division, keeping in close touch, 
advanced down the Kalapanzin Valley on the eastern side. On 
January 9th, 1944, Maungdaw was occupied by the Sth Division 
which then proceeded to clear the enemy from most of the adjacent 
country although the defenders of the Razabil Fortress refused to 
budge. 74 Field Company was involved in much fighting at Razabil. 
Detachments accompanied the leading infantry, carrying Bangalore 
torpedos, pole charges, bee-hive charges and 14 |b. bulk charges to 
deal with any posts which were holding up the advance. The Sappers 
lifted mines, disarmed booby-traps and blew gaps in the enemy's 
wire provided that the infantry could get sufficiently close to the 
positions, which was not always the case. Once, when the infantry 
were held up fairly close to a bunker, a Sapper N.C.O. dashed for- 
ward alone with a pole charge and thrust it into the entrance. The 
explosion killed a number of the defenders, but still the infantry 
could not dislodge the rest. The Japanese soldier was matchless in 
his determination to fight to the last. Invariably, unless prostrated 
by wounds or disease, he died where he stood, and often by his own 
hand rather than surrender. 

By the end of January 1944, enough of Razabil had fallen 
to allow General Christison to transfer the bulk of his armour 
over the Ngakyedauk Pass to help the 7th Division in its operations 
against Buthidaung and the Letwedet strong point. Far out to the 
east, the 8ist West African Division had reached Daletme, about 
25 miles north of Paletwa in the Kaladan Valley, thus beginning to 
fulfil its role as left flank guard. Its engineers had built a fine jeep 
track, 73 miles in length, along which it was supplied from Chiringa. 
The Africans continued to move down the Kaladan through dense 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 287 


bamboo forest and, supplied chiefly by air, captured Kyauktaw. 
They were then in a position to guard effectively against any out- 
flanking attempt. In the meantime, the 7th Division, reinforced from 
the Sth Division, was approaching Buthidaung. It was unable, 
however, to turn the enemy out of the Letwedet stronghold in spite 
of determined attacks in which the Sapper companies did a lot of 
‘bunker-busting.” Thus, at the beginning of February, the situation 
was as follows. The 15th Corps was holding the Mayu Peninsula 
as far south as, but not including, the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. 
The Sth Division, mostly west of the range, was in Maungdaw and 
had possession of a small part of the Razabil Fortress, and the 7th 
Division was hammering at the outlying defences of Letwedet and 
maintaining careful contact with the Sth Division through the 
Negakyedauk Pass. Along the remainder of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung 
Road the 55th Japanese Division, with some attached troops and 
elements of a so-called ‘Indian National Army’, occupied a series 
of deeply fortified strong-points, particularly in the central ‘Tunnels’ 
area, and thus prevented us from using the road as a forward 
line of transverse communication. 

The tide now turned in favour of the enemy who proceeded to 
embark on the first phase of an invasion of India. This vast offensive 
was designed to start with the annihilation of the Sth and 7th Indian 
Divisions in Arakan and the capture of Chittagong. The 55th 
Japanese Division, under Major-General Sakurai, was reorganized 
into three Task Forces, the most important of which was “‘Tanahashi 
Force’’ under the redoubtable Colonel Tanahashi. This force, of 
two battalions, was to skirt Buthidaung by night, move up the east 
bank of the Kalapanzin River between the 7th Indian Division and 
the 81st West African Division in the Kaladan Valley, take Taung 
Bazar from the rear, and then, swinging gradually south-westwards, 
cut across the rear of the 7th Division, climb the Mayu Range and 
block the Ngakyedauk Pass, thus trapping the 7th Division on the 
eastern side of the range. Meanwhile, ‘‘Kubo Force’, of one batta- 
lion, was to follow a parallel route further northwards to Goppe Bazar 
before pushing westwards over the Goppe Pass and down the western 
slope till it cut the coastal road and thus severed the communications 
of the 5th Division. ‘Doi Force’, of two battalions, was to make a 
holding attack in the Maungdaw-Buthidaung sector in order to pin 
down our troops in that area while ‘“‘Tanahashi” and “Kubo” Forces 
prevented their withdrawal, reinforcement or inter-communication. 
General Sakurai assumed that the 7th Division would try to escape 


288 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


across the Mayu Range. It could then be cut to pieces and all three. 
Task Forces could combine to crush the Sth Division. So confident 
was he of early victory that his men were allowed to carry only 
7 days’ rations. Afterwards, they would live on captured supplies. 
The plan was bold, some might say foolhardy, for it pre-supposed 
a state of panic among our troops and it neglected altogether the 
advantages of our abundant air supply. These foolish miscalculations 
had their inevitable result. They brought defeat and destruction in 
their train. 

General Christison was not taken altogether by surprise for his 
intelligence service had given some warning of a possible Japanese 
counter-offensive and dispositions were being made to deal with 
such an eventuality though time was very short. In order to serve 
his own offensive on the eastern side of the Mayu Range, Christison 
had already prepared a forward maintenance base near the village of 
Sinzweya at the eastern foot of the Ngakyedauk Pass and about 
four miles south-west of the 7th Division Headquarters which were 
located at a village called Laungtaung. Although this administrative 
enclosure was designed primarily to support an offensive by the 7th 
Division it was organized also to resist raids, and steps were taken 
immediately to strengthen its meagre defences. The area became 
known as “The Admin. Box’’, and as such it is now famous in 
military history. At the beginning of February, the enemy had already 
begun.to infiltrate slowly up the Kalapanzin Valley from Buthidaung, 
and some of our first casualties were those sustained by 303 Field 
Park Company, under Major W. S. D. Cooper, R.E., stationed in 
the lee of a large hill (Point 315) to the north-east of the Admin. 
Box.! “On the night of February 2nd/3rd”, writes Captain Goodall," 
“the O.C. and the Field Platoon Officer went out with a small recon- 
naissance party of officers and men to plan a tank approach to 
Buthidaung. They were ambushed while returning, and Lieut.- 
Colonel P. J. Cator (C.R.E. 7th Division) and Major Cooper were 
killed and another officer wounded. This was the first sign of 
Japanese activity.” 

Soon afterwards, disaster overtook the 7th Division Headquarters. 
In the early hours of February 4th, the 114th Brigade, east of the 
Kalapanzin River, reported to Major-General F. W. Messervy that 


1 See the map of the 7th Indian Division Admin. Box., Sinzweya, included in this 
chapter. 


4 Notes by Captain S. E. M. Goodall, R.E., dated October 1953. 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 289 


many refugees and some Japanese troops had passed across the 
front and that the enemy was being engaged by administrative troops 
about five miles south-east of Taung Bazar. Further reports confirmed 
that the Japanese were closing in on Taung Bazar from several 
directions. ‘“Tanahashi’’ and “Kubo” Forces were on the move. 
Messervy at once sent his 89th Brigade into action, but Tanahashi 
could not be stopped. On the Sth, Messervy prepared to move his 
headquarters to the shelter of the Admin. Box but decided to remain 
where he was until the situation was clearer. Before dawn on 
February 6th, Tanahashi fell upon him. In waist-high mist, shouting 
“Banzai”, the enemy rushed towards the camp while their mortars 
poured in a heavy fire. The only defenders, a Signals Company and 
another of the 24th Engineer Battalion, replied as best they could 
and beat off assault after assault. But this could not continue for 
long, and before midday Messervy ordered a general withdrawal to 
the Admin. Box. The remnants of the Headquarters troops, including 
the General and his Staff, succeeded in reaching Sinzweya by wading 
in small bodies through chaungs and hacking their way through the 
enemy-infested jungle. Desultory fighting then spread over the 
countryside and casualties mounted. On February 7th, 421 Field 
Company lost its able and popular commander, Major M. G. Bewoor, 
J.E., while serving with the 114th Brigade. 

“At Sinzweya’’, writes Goodall, ‘“‘none of us knew what was 
happening till just before dawn on the 6th we heard a tremendous 
din from beyond Point 315. It was evident that the enemy were 
attacking Divisional H.Q. and we could hear their ‘“‘Banzais.”” Un- 
fortunately the order to withdraw to Sinzweya never reached the 
Engineer Battalion Company and most of the men died in their 
fox-holes. The Divisional Signals Company did not retire until two 
hours after the main H.Q. and lost more than half its strength. We 
listened to the noise and waited anxiously, for we were the next in 
line between Laungtaung and Sinzweya, with Point 315 between. 
Nothing had happened by 7.0 a.m. so the men were ordered to 
breakfast in shifts. At about 10.0 a.m., Brigadier G. C. Evans, to 
whom the command of the Sinzweya area had been delegated, came 
round and told us the plan of defence. We were to hold a portion 
of Point 315, but when the Brigadier was told our small strength 
he ordered us to withdraw about 100 yards to a nullah. Dawn on the 
7th was very welcome. Good liaison was established and the peri- 
meter of the Box was strengthened. Sapper work in the Box seemed 
to be finished apart from that of a single bulldozer which was making 


290 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


gun emplacements. Our other two bulldozers had been lost. Our 
task was merely to hold our own portion of the perimeter. On the 
evening of February 7th, the Japs opened up with mortars and 
medium machine-guns. It was a very disturbed night. If one part 
of the perimeter started firing, the fusillade spread rapidly all the 
way round. The jungle was full of weird noises. Jackals and gekkos 
added to the din and often the Japs imitated them. By dawn on 
the 8th, the expected attacks had not materialized, though at 10.0 a.m. 
there was firing within our own perimeter. It appeared that the enemy 
had infiltrated up a nullah during the night and had overrun the 
makeshift Main Dressing Station, killing most of the doctors and 
orderlies. They were also at the back of our Company position, 
hidden in thick jungle. We were moved later to the south side of 
the perimeter where we dug in. Night fell, on the 8th, with the peri- 
meter complete and it did not vary much until we were relieved. 
The noises when the Japs attacked after dark were calculated to 
try the best of nerves. Many times they shouted in English, and 
amongst the devices they used were explosive bullets which burst 
on impact with a crack that gave the effect of fire from behind.” 

Tanahashi Force cut the Ngakyedauk Pass road on February 10th 
and thus accomplished its main task. Kubo Force was not so success- 
ful. While still a mile short of Goppe Bazar it ran into an Indian 
Mule Company whose men stood their ground and fought like 
highly trained infantry. The Japanese commander, suspecting the 
presence of a larger force, swung left and by astonishing efforts 
surmounted the Mayu Range further south and descended onto the 
coastal road where he interrupted the supply of the Sth Division 
until he and his men were liquidated. Doi Force, in the Maungdaw- 
Buthidaung region, fulfilled its role but could make no headway. 
Meanwhile, the 7th Indian Division was standing firm in the Kala- 
panzin Valley, and the 26th Indian Division had already retaken 
Taung Bazar and was making steady progress southwards. 

The only Indian Engineer units in the garrison of the Administrative 
Box at Sinzweya were 62 Field Company, 303 Field Park Company 
and 17 Bridging Section. With the 33rd Brigade, a few miles to 
the south, was 77 Field Company, and with the 114th Brigade, 421 
Field Company. These units formed the 7th Divisional Engineers. 
After the death of Lieut.-Colonel Cator, they were commanded by 
Major H. C. Lee, R.E. (O.C. 62 Company) until the arrival of Lieut.- 
Colonel T. Wright, R.E., at the end of the siege. Also present in 
the Admin. Box area was a Heavy Bridging Platoon equipped with 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 291 


pontoons intended for bridging the Kalapanzin at Buthidaung during 
our projected offensive. The pontoons, on their lorries, were parked 
outside the south-eastern perimeter of the Box and, incredible as it 
may appear, they were never damaged by the enemy. It seems that 
the Japanese had strict orders not to destroy our transport because it 
was to be used later for their victorious advance on Chittagong. 
At night, some of the enemy slept in the pontoons, and parties of 
our engineers occasionally visited the pontoon park to draw tools 
and stores. Within the perimeter was a mass of other transport 
which General Messervy called his ‘*‘Ascot Car Park”, and as these 
vehicles were liable to be damaged by badly aimed shells and bombs 
intended for the troops, they were transferred piece-meal, as occasion 
offered, to the pontoon park where they would be safe from Japanese 
fire and ready for our own use when the enemy had been driven off. 
In the matter of transport the Japanese therefore gave us every 
assistance. ; 

Engineer work inside the Box was mostly of a routine nature 
though it sometimes called for considerable ingenuity. For instance, 
303 Field Park Company was required to fit our tanks with some 
form of protection against the Japanese magnetic limpet mine. By 
experimenting on a damaged British tank it was found that a limpet 
mine shattered #?” armour but could not pierce 2” plate. Accordingly, 
the thinner armour was covered with rabbit-netting raised clear of the 
surface, and in two days the Company produced adequate protection 
for two squadrons of tanks. Life was never dull in the Box. One 
morning, a gunner seated beside his 5.5” gun gave a shout of surprise 
and drew attention to an amazing sight. The bamboo jungle on the 
far slope of a ridge in front of Point 315 seemed to be moving bodily 
forward. Our guns promptly opened fire, and then it appeared that 
the bamboos were carried by a Japanese assaulting party. The 
attackers wilted and fell under the storm of steel and the attempt 
was not repeated. 

Before the Admin. Box was invested, the 9th Brigade of the 5th 
Division had been sent from the Maungdaw front over the 
Ngakyedauk Pass to reinforce the 7th Division in the operations 
against Buthidaung, and the brigade was south of Sinzweya when 
the Japanese counter-offensive was launched. This was most fortu- 
nate because three companies of The West Yorkshire Regiment 
were able to reach Sinzweya shortly before the Box was surrounded 
and thus to provide a stiffening of first-class infantry. They found 
there a medley of some 8,000 administrative troops with only a few 


292 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


regular tank, artillery and sapper units. No more than two days’ 
rations were in store, and had it not been for the 60 tons of supplies 
dropped daily by American planes the garrison would have starved. 
The Admin. Box occupied a cup-shaped area of wooded hillocks, 
dry paddy fields and chaungs, roughly a mile square and surrounded 
by higher hills covered with trees and undergrowth of incredible 
density. Nature had not designed the place for defence, yet it had 
to be defended. The Japanese seized most of the surrounding heights 
and from there plastered the confined area with shells and bombs. 
Guns of heavy calibre joined in from Buthidaung. Every movement 
by day, every glimmer of light by night, attracted fire. Enemy snipers, 
tied to trees, took a constant toll. General Messervy now sent orders 
to the 89th Brigade to reinforce the garrison, but the leading battalion 
of Gurkhas, moving towards it from the north-east, was ambushed 
and severely handled. Two companies, however, reached ‘“‘Gurkha 
Hill”, near Point 315, and the remainder of the battalion arrived 
after a company of the West Yorkshires had driven the enemy back. 
The Japanese suffered heavily in an attempt to penetrate the southern 
perimeter by marching up a dry chaung. So many were killed here 
that the chaung became known as “Blood Nullah’’,' but still the 
little yellow men continued to use this route because they had been 
ordered to do so. 

On February ilth, the enemy occupied the crest of ‘Artillery 
Hill’, just outside the southern perimeter, and were driven off by 
the West Yorkshires and some tanks. A difficult problem now arose. 
This was to evacuate our wounded which was possible only by 
carrying them through the jungle by night to the 114th Brigade 
Box to the north-east, whence they could be flown out. For this 
and other reasons it was imperative that the Ngakyedauk Pass route 
should be re-opened as quickly as possible and the task was allotted 
to the 123rd Brigade of the Sth Division operating from the coastal 
road on the other side of the range. The sounds of battle reached 
the Box daily. Two brigades of the 26th Division were moving down 
the Kalapanzin Valley while another was clearing the enemy from 
the crest of the Mayu Range and the western slopes. The situation 
of the Japanese around Sinzweya was becoming desperate, yet they 
fought on with the courage of despair. On February 15th they 
attacked an outpost on ‘“C Company Hill’’ at the exit of the Pass, 
gained a footing, and were then driven off. The first sign of relief 





1 See the map of the 7th Ind. Div. Admin Box, Sinzweya. 


ARAKAN, 1942 - 45 293. 


occurred on the 16th when the leading battalion ofthe 123rd Brigade 
marched in after ten days’ fighting in the Mayu Range. There had 
been a particularly bloody struggle for a certain Hill 1010 overlooking 
the top of the Pass. The enemy had now almost shot his bolt. His 
troops were starving. A prisoner taken later said that he and his 
comrades had lived on roots for ten days. Yet on the night of 
February 21st/22nd a party of Japanese made a desperate assault 
as a final act of ‘“‘Bushido.”’ All were killed. On the 22nd, more 
troops of the 5th Indian Division, preceded by a bulldozer of 44 
Field Park Company, debouched from the Ngakyedauk Pass 
and entered the perimeter. Supplies poured in. General Briggs 
arrived in a tank, bearing some bottles of whisky and kegs of rum, 
to congratulate General Messervy, Brigadier Evans and Brigadier 
D. Crowther of the 89th Brigade who had recently assumed charge 
of the defence. The Japanese had sustained their first major defeat. 
It had been proved to all the world that they had met their match. 
As Compton Mackenzie remarks,! the victory of the Admin. Box 
had a decisive effect on the course of human history and might be 
compared with that at Marathon where the Greeks defeated the 
Persian invaders long before the Christian era. 

Some of the Sapper units with the relieving forces had had a very 
busy time. With the 26th Division on the Goppe Pass, 72 and 73 
Field Companies had worked on a new alignment for mechanical 
transport to allow the Division to pass through. The first jeep 
surmounted the crest on February [8th and the troops then began 
to move southwards towards the Admin. Box. 2 Field Company 
was concerned chiefly with water supply as the weather was very 
dry. Meanwhile, 74 Field Company, with the Sth Division, was 
struggling with the problems of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Until February 
lith it made mule-tracks for battalions assaulting the various hill 
features overlooking the road. Then a concentrated effort began to. 
open up the Pass. Slowly but surely the infantry blasted and winkled 
the enemy from their positions so that on February 18th, 74 Company 
was able to begin work on the road itself. Clearing away obstacles, 
filling craters, cutting diversions and repairing culverts, it pushed 
forward under fire with tanks in close support, and through its 
exertions, and those of other Sapper units, the tanks of the 5th Division 
were able to link up with those of the 26th Division at Sinzweya on 
February 26th. In support of the 26th Division, 72 Field Company 





1 All Over the Place, by Compton Mackenzie, p. 143, 


294 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


had already converted the jeep track from Taung Bazar into a passable 
road. After the relief of the Admin. Box, 77 Field Company returned 
with the 33rd Brigade to the Buthidaung front, sweeping for mines 
en route. One night, a Section was building a trestle bridge over the 
Letwedet chaung while, 20 yards away, the C.R.E. and another 
officer were reconnoitring an existing iron bridge. Nearby, another 
Section was constructing tank ramps. Measuring up the iron bridge 
took some time, and just as the two officers left the bridge it blew 
up! It appears that despite the presence of the Indian Sappers and 
an infantry covering party, some Japanese Sappers had been preparing 
the bridge for demolition. The enemy certainly did not lack courage. 

After all Japanese resistance east of the Ngakyedauk Pass had 
been overcome, General Christison was able to resume his offensive 
southwards. This he did on March Sth, 1944, encouraged by the 
fact that the 36th British Division, under Major-General F. W. 
Festing, was arriving in Cox’s Bazar from Calcutta in support. His 
first objective was naturally the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. The 
mouth of the Naf River was also to be seized so that supplies could 
reach Maungdaw safely by sea. The advance made slow headway, 
for the enemy resisted strongly and the coastal road was in a shocking 
state. However, on March 11th the 7th Division was in Buthidaung 
and then proceeded to assault the hill positions to the south and 
west. On the following day, the Sth Division was in possession of 
Maungdaw and the Razabil Fortress. After a fine attack by the 
161st Brigade the enemy had vacated the Fortress, and the brigade 
then fought its way along the Buthidaung road towards the central 
‘tunnels’ sector. 

Towards the end of March, the 25th Indian Division, under Major- 
General H. L. Davies, began to arrive in replacement of the 5th 
Indian Division which was to be flown northwards to the front in 
Manipur. The 7th Indian Division followed later to Manipur, and 
with the approach of the monsoon the Second Arakan Campaign 
came gradually to an end although sporadic fighting continued around 
parts of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. The 25th Division 
comprised the SIst, 53rd and 74th Brigades, and its Divisional 
Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel I. G. Loch, R.E., included 63 Field 
Company (Major V. Panch, I.E.) 93 Field Company (Major R. B. 
Johnson, R.E.), 425 Field Company (Major P. M. Bennett, R.E.) 
and 325 Field Park Company (Major P. V. Subramanyam, I.E.). 
Unfortunately, Major Panch died in April 1944 when he was 
succeeded by Major W. G. Tollworthy, R.E. The 25th and 26th 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 295. 


Divisions now held the front in Arakan. The Engineer units of 
the 26th Division had much strenuous work and a considerable 
amount of fighting along the eastern portion of the Maungdaw- 
Buthidaung Road where the enemy still held the eastern tunnel 
and some surrounding positions. Early in April, 72 Field Company 
distinguished itself during the capture of two hill features near 
Buthidaung. Afterwards, it swept mines in that neighbourhood and 
joined in May in a final and bitter struggle around the tunnels by 
which the two divisions wrested the road from the Japanese. During 
the monsoon, Buthidaung was evacuated and attention was devoted 
chiefly to improving the port facilities at Maundgaw and making a 
new road over the Goppe Pass further north. These tasks kept the 
26th Divisional Engineers very busy. The Malerkotla Field Company 
had already done excellent work at Maungdaw in rebuilding a 225-feet 
bridge in 24 days and strengthening a steel girder bridge. 

August 1944 found the 26th Division in reserve at Cox’s Bazar, 
leaving the 25th Division to consolidate the Maungdaw-Buthidaung 
line until the offensive could be resumed after the monsoon. The 
25th Division had already seen much fighting while the last Japanese 
were being evicted during May. Major Bennett records that 425 
Field Company, operating with the 53rd Brigade at that time, was 
made responsible for a hill section of the road where the enemy 
held several key features, including a knife-edged one called Point 
551.1 This was captured and handed over to the brigade. The 
Company had to defend Brigade Headquarters, and the strain of 
working hard all day and mounting perimeter picquets at night was 
very heavy. The work consisted mainly of cutting tracks forward 
to infantry posts and usually without any infantry protection. Each 
Sapper Section therefore kept two look-out men on duty, and every 
man had his rifle and a couple of grenades close at hand. Each 
morning the infantry re-opened their particular sections of the tracks 
by patrolling in carriers, accompanied by a few Sappers to remove 
the road-mines placed overnight by enemy patrols. 425 Field Company 
had also to maintain a water-point in a gorge 800-feet deep to supply 
a battalion perched on the summit of the Mayu Range. Soon after 
Point 551 was captured, the enemy re-took the crest and held on 
to it for another month. Our infantry occupied very exposed positions 


lower down, and the Sappers had to cut mule-tracks towards them 
So a ee A eee a rn, 


7 “The History of a Wartime Field Company of the Q.V'sO. Madras Sappers and 
Miners”, by Major P. M. Bennett, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 
1949, pp. 273-290, 


296 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


under constant sniping and mortar fire. They also built a bridge 
across a chaung at the foot of the hill and erected and operated an 
aerial ropeway to facilitate the supply of stores and ammunition to 
the troops far above. Building this ropeway was a very dangerous 
proceeding, for it had to be done in full view of the enemy and the 
men at the upper terminal were exposed to mortar and machine-gun 
fire as they lashed the blocks and guys to trees. Towards the end of 
May, the enemy tried to drive our infantry off the hill, but the position 
was restored by a counter-attack and, early in June 1944, the Japanese 
withdrew from Point 551 and from the entire spine of the Mayu 
Range. 

This mention of an aerial ropeway recalls another and larger 
installation in Arakan erected in the Goppe Pass between high peaks 
and over deep ravines. The Goppe ropeway, 24 miles in length and 
operated by an engine at the summit, was built before the monsoon 
of 1944 to supplement road transport in bad weather and was the 
first to be constructed entirely by Indian Engineer units. From the 
end of August 1944 it was operated by 403 Field Park Company 
under Major W. G. Carter, R.E., and it was not dismantled until 
April 1945 when a platoon of 96 Field Company removed the cable 
and other gear. 

Throughout the 1944 monsoon, 425 Field Company remained with 
the 53rd Brigade which was deployed along the ‘Tunnels’ section of 
the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. The remainder of the 25th Division 
was installed in bamboo basha camps in the Maungdaw Plain. Two 
inches of rain fell daily for over three months, so the Sappers had 
their hands full in dealing with landslides, improving shelters and 
repairing mule tracks. The most serious problem, however, was the 
road itself where 425 Field Company was in charge of an 8-mile 
stretch. It had little soling and was surfaced only with soft local 
stone. The enemy remained passive. The fight against disease 
never ceased, and particularly against jaundice and skin complaints. 
Everyone was soaked by the unceasing downpour, but a generous 
issue of rum helped to restore flagging spirits. 

Early in September 1944 there was some fighting south of 
Maungdaw when an attempt was made to surprise the enemy before 
he had further strengthened his positions. The objective was a 
couple of positions on Hill 1433 which overlooked the plain, and a 
Section of 425 Field Company was allotted to each of the attacking 
companies of Gurkhas. The infantry broke into both positions but 
were driven out again and reformed about 70 yards down the 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 297 


hill-side. Havildar Sankaranarayana Nair, who commanded a Sapper 
Section in the first attack, was ordered forward again after dark to 
ascertain whether the Jap bunkers could be demolished with explo- 
sives. With Naik Subbiah and Sapper Ramasamy carrying made-up 
charges, he worked his way through the undergrowth and pin-pointed 
some enemy posts. The party then crawled round to a basha a few 
yards behind and, covered by the tommy guns of the other two, the 
Havildar entered it, placed his charge in the centre, piled some 
Japanese ammunition and other articles around it, lit the fuse and 
withdrew his party under point-blank fire. On the following morning, 
with one companion, he again entered the position and placed and 
lit charges in a basha and a dug-out before escaping under a shower 
of grenades. For these gallant exploits he received the Indian Distin- 
guished Service Medal and his companions the Military Medal. 

The initial attacks on Hill 1433 having failed, the Gurkhas were 
told to hold on as close as possible to the enemy and accordingly 
63 and 425 Companies had to cut tracks forward. They hacked and 
dug furiously all day in pelting rain and at night concentrated in 
‘boxes’ alongside the tracks. The nights were miserable. Each man 
had only a ground-sheet and a jersey, and when morning came the 
sole means of lighting a fire was to burn some guncotton. By the 
end of the third day the Sappers were completely exhausted, but 
fortunately by that time paths for porters were ready and blankets 
and rations arrived. Two days later it was found that the enemy 
had vanished, so their positions were occupied and the tracks extended 
along a ridge thick with Japanese corpses. It was an unpleasant 
scene, but two young Lance-Naiks of 425 Company found it inspiring. 
“Sahib”, they remarked to their O.C., ‘‘the next time our unit helps 
in an attack, we want to be in the assault parties.”’ 

At the end of September 1944, General Christison was directed 
to resume the offensive in Arakan in order to contain enemy forces 
which might otherwise interfere with the offensive by the 4th and 
33rd Corps across the Chindwin River into Centf(l Burma which 
was planned to begin in December. During October, the 26th Division 
repelled a Japanese attack on Taung Bazar. Meanwhile, the 25th 
Division drove the enemy from his remaining positions south of 
the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. The 81st West African Division, 
which had withdrawn from Paletwa for the monsoon, re-occupied 
that place and prepared to advance down both banks of the Kaladan 
River to act as a flank guard. The 82nd West African Division now 
made its first appearancein Arakan. The 15th Corps was to undertake 


298 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


a land advance down the Mayu Peninsula and the Kalapanzin. 
and Kaladan Valleys in order to clear the enemy from the whole 
of Arakan north of Akyab and then to provide troops for an amphi-. 
bious assault on Akyab Island. With these orders, Christison launched 
the Third Arakan Campaign on December 12th, 1944. The offensive 
was opened by the 25th Indian Division moving along the coastal 
area and the 8Ist West African Division down the Kaladan River, 
while the 82nd West African Division advanced down the Kalapanzin 
Valley where it had relieved the 26th Indian Division. On December 
15th, the 82nd Division captured Buthidaung while the 25th Division, 
under Major-General G. N. Wood, was pushing southwards astride 
the Mayu Range, supplied chiefly by sea. On Christmas Day, the 
51st Brigade was at Foul Point, looking across at Akyab Island, 
and the 81st West African Division had seized the ferry across the 
Kaladan at Kyauktaw. It is interesting to note that the 51st Brigade 
of the 25th Division was the first all-Indian brigade to fight in the 
front line in the Second World War. It was commanded by Brigadier 
K. S. Thimayya and its three battalions were officered solely by 
Indians. The 74th Brigade followed the SIst Brigade down the 
coast while the 53rd Brigade moved down the Kalapanzin Valley. 
The coastal advance to Foul Point encountered many natural 
obstacles though little enemy resistance. The beaches made excellent 
roads but the transport became bogged periodically at the mouths 
of muddy and unbridged chaungs and much time had to be spent 
in unloading and extricating vehicles.! The 5ist Brigade was main- 
tained by means of small steamers plying from Maungdaw, with 
sampans to land stores. On the Kalapanzin River, the maintenance 
of the 53rd Brigade was more difficult. At Buthidaung the river 
was about 200 yards wide with a rapid tidal current, and lower down, 
where known as the Mayu River, it broadened into an estuary between 
one and two miles in width. Road supply being out of the question, 
everything depended on the collection of a satisfactory fleet of river 
craft. There was-only sufficient folding boat equipment (F.B.E.) for 
a single troop of 25 pr. guns. A few locally manufactured pontoons 
were available for rafting, but unit transport consisted chiefly of 
Sampans and assault boats, some of which had outboard motors. 
425 Field Company assembled and repaired the craft, while 325 
Field Park Company provided the superstructure and anchors. 








1“Water Lines of Communication along the Arakan Coast’, by Cotonel Arjan 
Singh, appearing in The Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers, April 1950, 
pp. 123-126. 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 299 


Vehicles were discarded because land transport in future would be 
by mules or porters. After Buthidaung had been occupied by the 
West Africans, 63 and 425 Field Companies set to work to prepare 
launching sites on the Kalapanzin for the hundreds of craft expected 
by road from Maungdaw.? Buthidaung being now almost hidden in 
tall elephant grass and scrub jungle, the two companies had first to 
clear half a mile of the river bank with bulldozers before they could 
cut slipways and prepare parking areas in rear. The pontoons and 
boats soon began to arrive on lorries from Maungdaw and the work 
of repairing damaged craft was taken in hand. Outboard motors 
were fitted whenever possible. Gradually, the fleet was launched, 
loaded and despatched downstream to the forward troops, and finally 
the Sappers themselves embarked on rafts and boats and followed. 
‘“Sampans replaced jeeps’’, writes Colonel Arjan Singh, ‘‘and rafts 
replaced gun tractors and ammunition trailers. The 2-pounders, 
mounted on rafts, led the columns, with infantry moving on foot on 
either bank.” Christmas Day and Boxing Day were spent in ferrying 
the troops and guns across the Mayu River near Rathedaung, and 
on January 3rd, a platoon of 425 Company, with the leading infantry, 
reached the northern end of Akyab {sland, 50 miles by water from 
Buthidaung, shortly after the island had been captured from the sea. 
The careful training of the Indian Engineers in watermanship had 
already paid a good dividend. 

Akyab, though valuable as a port, was far more so as an air-base. 
Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese, the 11th Army Group Commander, 
had been ordered to capture both Akyab and Ramree Islands by 
seaborne landings, the primary object being to secure airfields from 
which the Fourteenth Army could be supplied during its long advance 
southwards to Rangoon. That army was already approaching 
Mandalay and its tenuous line of land communication with Imphal 
was near breaking point though supplies could be brought by air. 
At Meiktila, 80 miles beyond, it could be supplied by air from 
Chittagong, but from Meiktila to Rangoon the supply would have 
to be from airfields further south. The most important task of the 
1Sth Corps in its offensive down the Arakan Coast in 1945 was 
therefore to secure air-base after air-base and this could best be 
achieved by a series of sea-borne landings designed to force the 
Japanese either to evacuate their positions or to face encirclement 





1 “The History of a Wartime Field Company of the Q.V’s O. Madras Sappers and 
Miners”, by Major P. M. Bennett, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 
1949, pp. 273-290. 


300 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


and destruction. Fortunately, the enemy chose to evacuate Akyab, 
and when the 3rd Commando Brigade landed on the island on January 
3rd, 1945, they met no opposition. They bicycled across the island 
quite happily and were soon in Akyab Town at the southern end. 
The island was eminently suitable for development as an air-base 
and thus the uninterrupted advance of the victorious Fourteenth 
Army beyond Meiktila could be assured. 

The ‘Beach Group’ now makes its appearance in this narrative. 
Five Beach Groups had come into existence in the summer of 1943, 
shortly after an Indian Expeditionary Force was formed in India 
for amphibious operations, and each Group was then about 1,900 
strong. The first to appear was 41 Indian Beach Group, formed 
north of Bombay in July under Colonel A. W. Edwards. In October, 
the Expeditionary Force became the 33rd Indian Corps, and as such, 
moved to the Manipur front and therefore left behind it the Beach 
Groups intended for amphibious assaults. These continued their 
specialized training. In April 1944, 41 Beach Group was transferred 
across India to Cocanada on the east coast for combined training, 
and a few months later 42, 43 and 44 Beach Groups were disbanded, 
leaving only 41 and 45 Groups which were then expanded gradually 
till they each attained a strength of more than 3,000 officers and 
men. A Field Company of Indian Engineers formed part of a Beach 
Group. The five Field Companies required for the Groups needed 
elaborate training in watermanship, but the training was seriously 
interrupted in the middle of April by a demand for engineer assistance 
to cope with the widespread damage caused by a great explosion 
in the Bombay Docks. For instance, 361 Field Company, belonging 
to 43 Beach Group, was employed until September on clearing debris, 
demolishing damaged buildings and erecting temporary structures in 
Bombay, and by that time its services with a Beach Group were no 
longer needed. 

Towards the end of 1944, 41 Indian Beach Group had become a 
very complicated organization. In addition to the 14th Indian 
Engineer Battalion it included 78 Field Company of the Bengal 
Group, a Pioneer Company, an amphibious Transport Company, a 
Beach Hospital, Supply, Ordnance, Provost, Signals, R.A.F., R.E.M.E. 
and Mechanical Equipment Sections and a couple of small Naval 
Commando units. Attached to it was a Special Movement Control 
unit to supervize the landing arrangements for troops and stores 
and the discharge of ships. The Group was designed to operate in 
the following manner. It would arrive after the leading infantry had 


qvAyy je Suipuey 





ARAKAN, 1942-45 30r 


secured a foothold on the beach and would prepare for landing 
reinforcements, guns, tanks, vehicles and stores brought by the 
Navy. The best exits must be found to the nearest roads and cleared 
of mines, first for tracked vehicles ‘and then for wheeled vehicles 
using Sommerfeld track if necessary. Bulldozers would bring the track 
ashore on sledges and then go ahead to level exits to the roads. 
Wave after wave of guns and lorries would finally pour down the 
ramps of the landing craft, involving unceasing repair work to the 
exits. Such, very briefly, were the tasks of the Field Company of a 
Beach Group. If the landing were opposed the Sappers were certain 
to suffer severe casualties, and it was therefore most fortunate that 
few of the landings on the Arakan Coast had to be made under 
fire. 

78 Field Company was commanded by Major T. Beaumont, R.E., 
with Captain W. Byrde, R.E., as second-in-command and Lieuts. 
A. H. W. Sandes, R.E. (son of the author), Naresh Prasad, I.E., 
P. R. Francis, R.E., and I. A. A. Clark, R.E., as subalterns. After 
a summer spent in the sweltering heat of Cocanada, the unit was 
glad to embark at Vizagapatam on December 28th and to reach 
Chittagong on January 3rd, 1945, though all ranks were greatly 
disappointed to miss the landing on Akyab Island, the first large-scale 
amphibious operation in Burma. Beaumont had gone ahead and 
was in Akyab when the Company disembarked on January 9th. 
“The 25th Division’, he writes,! ‘““were boasting that by the time the 
Commandos landed, the Divisional troops had had tea and biscuits 
waiting for them on the beach! When I approached the mansion 
allotted to 78 Field Company I found that it had been burnt to the 
ground and there was a dead dog in the well. [ toured the looted and 
desolate town which had been abandoned by the inhabitants for at 
least two years to escape Allied bombing. In the main street the 
vegetation had grown up between the road and the buildings so 
that it seemed as if one were walking along a jungle path. As soon 
as the ships were in harbour the various units of the Beach Group 
started to disembark into landing craft, and at this point the Japs 
decided to remind us that this was not the pleasure cruise it had 
seemed. Just as the unit commanders were assembling at a cross- 
roads for orders, we heard violent machine-gunning from the harbour 
and anti-aircraft fire from the ships and airfield. We could see a 





1 Notes by Major T. Beaumont, R.E., dated January 1947, and entitled “Whom 
Woe Salute.” 


302 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


few small planes swerving and diving high up in the sky and then a 
large Dakota came in low over the trees with bits of its tail dropping 
off. Soon afterwards, Adrian Sandes came up the road from the 
beach, at the head of his platoon, with a broad grin on his face. 
It appeared that they had been disembarking down scramble-nets 
into a landing craft when suddenly a Jap ‘‘Zero”’ had dived at them 
with machine-guns blazing. Miraculously, no one was hurt. That 
evening, the enemy radio at Saigon announced that Jap aircraft had 
carried out an intrepid raid on a British Naval Force at Akyab 
and had sunk one cruiser and severely damaged another!” 

Adrian Sandes* own account of his adventure was as follows.! 
‘‘We were practically all aboard the “‘Z”’ landing craft when I saw 
an aeroplane diving straight at us. A small black object dropped 
from it and hit the water about a hundred yards tostarboard. Realis- 
ing immediately that this was a Jap air attack, the Subedar and I 
lay down on deck, vaguely aware of machine-guns firing and the 
splash of bullets around. We heard no sound of the bomb. As 
soon as the plane had gone, we got up and were astounded to see 
all the 150 men standing upright in the ‘‘Z” craft, goggling and saying 
that it had indeed been an exceptionally fine demonstration by the 
R.A.F. such as they had been accustomed to see at Cocanada! By 
dint of hard yelling, 1 got them to lie down, and soon the plane was 
back again followed by another. They concentrated on our ship 
but failed to do any damage although one bomb fell very close. 
Our anti-aircraft guns opened an ear-splitting barrage and the Spit- 
fires joined in, and we heard later that six Jap planes had been shot 
down. After this little excitement we made an uneventful trip across 
the harbour and landed on the beach to be welcomed by our O.C.” 

78 Field Company was soon installed in a camp near the derelict 
aerodrome outside the jungle-covered town. ‘Jap bunkers were every- 
where’’, continues Sandes, ‘‘and so thick was the undergrowth that 
one literally could not see them even when standing on them. Their 
average field of fire was only a few yards. The town seemed deserted, 
and we settled down in our field and built corrugated iron shelters 
and pitched tents in some aircraft dispersal bays. After Cocanada, 
Akyab was delightful. So beautiful with its fine trees, European 
houses and tarred roads, and from an engineering point of view 
quite wonderful. In the miles of derelict rice-factories one could 
find anything from furniture to water-pipes. Our jobs were chiefly 





1 Letter from Captain A. H. W. Sandes, R.E., dated May 18th, 1945, 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 303 


water-supply and road repair. The bathing was excellent-—-off vast 
sandy beaches in clear water with rolling breakers. So here we stayed 
for a month while one platoon went off to Myebon and thence to 
Kangaw with the Commandos. Akyab was coming to life before we 
left. We had cinemas and Ensa shows, and J even met a few nurses 
from a nearby hospital. Our only lack was cigarettes which were 
always scarce.” 

To avoid the delay involved in awaiting the arrival of 41 Beach 
Group, the 25th Division had improvised a Beach Battalion of its 
own for the landing at Akyab. A platoon of 63 Field Company 
was with the Commandos while the remainder of the Company, 
together with 93 Field Company, prepared embarkation points at 
Foul Point to await the return of the first flights of landing craft. 
The other platoons then embarked in support of the SIst Brigade, 
followed by the Beach Battalion, and thus 63 Company was the 
first Sapper unit to reach the island. It remained there until the 
middle of January engaged in clearing a fair-weather fighter strip 
and working on communications. 78, Field Company made exit 
roads for amphibious landing craft (Dukws), using sandwich layers 
of Sommerfeld track, coir matting, iron sheeting and logs, and 
about 200 Dukws negotiated the exits daily for more than a fort- 
night. 73 Field Company crossed from Foul Point on January 18th 
and started building huts and bashas. Akyab became a hive of 
engineering industry as other units flocked in, and so it remained 
until the end of the campaign. 

The air raid on January 9th had added to the chaos in Akyab 
harbour, but nevertheless 'a further advance down the Arakan 
coast was started on the 12th when the 3rd Commando Brigade set 
out for Myebon, 32 miles to the south-east, and after a heavy bom- 
bardment, made a successful landing. A brigade of the 25th Division 
followed, and then most of the remainder of the Division after a 
bridge-head had been consolidated. The enemy counter-attacked and 
a week of severe fighting ensued while our forces pushed northwards 
up the Myebon Peninsula.! By January 21st, 1945, this had been 
effectively secured. In the meantime, plans had been made to capture 
Ramree Island and in particular the port and airfield site of Kyaukpyu, 
at the northern tip, which lies about 45 miles south of Myebon. 
Kyaukpyu was known to have a good anchorage for ships bringing 
supplies from India, but its chief asset was that it could provide 





4 See the map of Lower Arakan included in this chapter. 


304 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


another forward air-base for the supply of the Fourteenth Army, 
In addition a naval detachment was to be landed on Cheduba Island, 
south-west of Ramree. On January 21st, a brigade of the 26th Divi- 
sion, sailing from Akyab, captured Kyaukpyu and began to clear 
Ramree Island, and five days later, Cheduba Island was taken: but 
the mopping up of the final pockets of enemy resistance on Ramree 
was not completed until February 22nd by which time most of the 
Japanese garrison had been liquidated while trying to escape to the 
mainland. 

With the Commandos in the initial landing at Myebon was a 
detachment of 41 Beach Group, under Major Norman Hunter, which 
included a platoon of 78 Field Company under Lieut. P. R. Francis, 
R.E. The Sappers helped the Commandos to consolidate and after- 
wards lifted a number of 120 lb. Japanese mines of a new type. 
They were hemispherical in shape and each had a couple of horns, 
made of lead, which projected above the sand when the mine was 
buried in a beach. Francis sent some of these mines back to Akyab, 
where Adrian Sandes spent many hours in experimenting on them. 
“There were two methods of disarming the mines’’, writes the latter. 
“The first was to remove the horns which unscrewed with a left-hand 
thread. The second was to lift a small brass plunger, thereby breaking 
an electric circuit by which the mine would be detonated if the horns 
were crushed. The plunger had a little tapped hole in the centre 
and I found that it could be raised easily by screwing into the hole 
a piece of soft copper wire which engaged the threads. Francis, I 
believe, had raised a plunger by hooking it with a piece of bent wire 
inserted through one of the horn sockets.” The experiments were 
carried out in a corner of the camp where it is said that Sandes’ 
friends seldom cared to visit him. However, all went well and a 
regular disarming drill was evolved for future use. In the middle 
of January, 63 Field Company joined the platoon of 78 Field Com- 
pany at Myebon, and 93 (Mandi) Field Company arrived at the end 
of the month. There were then sufficient engineer units for main- 
taining beach roads, establishing water-points and supplying engineer 
stores. 

On Ramree Island, one of the Sapper units with the 71st Brigade 
Assault Group of the 26th Division at Kyaukpyu was 28 Field 
Company (Bombay) under Major C. H. Cowan, R.E. This unit 
performed Beach Group duties when the landing took place and 
then accompanied the brigade southwards towards Ramree Town 
at the other end of the island, losing en route Captain F. E. Henson, 


ARAKAN, 1942 - 45 305. 


R.E., who was unfortunately killed in action on January 23rd. 
Another early arrival at Ramree was 72 Field Company (Bengal), 
under Major J. R. Macdonald, R.E., which followed the leading 
troops on “‘D” Day. Its first task was to construct fighter and Dakota 
air-strips. Usually, it was considered advisible to provide new air- 
strips rapidly rather than spend time on clearing existing aerodromes, 
but in this case the aerodrome site was tackled. Though it was 
studded with sharpened stakes and intersected by deep ditches, 
72 Field Company was not deterred. The ditches were filled in by 
bulldozers, the stakes extracted by coolies; trees were cut down, 
and bricks for metalling brought from derelict houses. Sommerfeld 
track was laid in the worst places, and in five days part of the aero- 
drome was ready for use. The final touch was a wind-sock made 
from the white-washed pagris of one of the platoons! 98 Field 
Company (Bombay), under Major L. Lubert, R.E., reached Kyaukpyu 
on January 21st, and most of 78 Field Company (Bengal), under 
Major T. Beaumont, R.E., landed on February 9th and took over 
the aerodrome which had been aptly named “Ditchfield.”” On the 
same day, the 71st Brigade entered Ramree Town. 78 Field Company 
found Ramree Island not nearly so pleasant as Akyab. The climate 
was getting steadily hotter, and blowing up endless trees was mono- 
tonous work. Yet there it had to remain for nearly three months, 
living in a small sandy area and working hard on the aerodroms 
or on roads and beaches. Another Sapper unit in Ramree was 423 
Field Company, under Major J. F. Butlin, R.E., which disembarked 
there on February I!th. It began to erect petrol storage tanks and 
a ship-to-shore pipeline, 600 yards long, for discharging tankers, a 
difficult job which was not completed until May 3rd. Other units 
in Ramree during the spring of 1945 were 93 (Mandi) Field Company, 
404 and 405 Field Companies and 326 Field Park Company. 

While Ramree Island was being cleared of the last Japanese there 
had been heavy fighting on the mainland not far from the Myebon 
Peninsula where we had been trying to cut off the escape southwards 
of enemy forces retreating before the advance of the 8Ist West 
African Division down the west bank of the Kaladan. The key 
point on the escape route was the village of Kangaw on the coastal 
road and accordingly an amphibious assault on it was planned to 
take place on January 22nd. The assault was to be made by the 
3rd Commando Brigade, supported by the 5ist Brigade under 
Brigadier K. S. Thimayya, while the other two brigades of the 25th 
Division drove northwards up the Myebon Peninsula to capture 


306 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Minbya and the 82nd West African Division’ occupied Myohaung 
on the Kaladan. Myohaung was not to be occupied until the 
enemy’s escape route had first been effectively blocked at Kangaw. 
It was anticipated that a landing near Kangaw would be heavily 
opposed. The coast was intersected with mangrove-covered chaungs, 
beyond which were paddy fields with a background of densely wooded 
hills. However, the Japanese were taken by surprise and the Com- 
mandos landed on the 22nd and secured a tiny bridgehead on the 
bank of a narrow tidal chaung about a couple of miles from the 
village. During the night of January 23rd/24th they were reinforced 
by the 51st Brigade which landed under fire and then began to fight 
its way forward towards the road through swampy country. The 
enemy had rushed up reinforcements and offered powerful resistance. 
Day by day the battle continued while the bridgehead was steadily 
enlarged. On the 28th, the enemy deluged the area with shells and 
after dark made a series of desperate counter-attacks which were 
repulsed. Two days later, our troops went over to the offensive. 
They took Kangaw and blocked the road. The Japanese made their 
final counter-attack on January 31st, directing it chiefly against a 
wooded ridge which we had occupied. A party carrying explosive 
charges on long poles rushed at our tanks, one man hurling himself 
under a Sherman and dying as he demolished it. But the 82nd Division 
was fast approaching, having occupied Myohaung on the 25th. 
Caught between the West Africans and the 25th Division, the enemy 
broke and tried to escape over the hills towards the Irrawaddy. 
They left 2,000 dead and 16 guns around Kangaw and only a few 
managed to by-pass the village. Our casualties numbered 600. Parties 
of Japanese who got away southwards made for the village of An, 
whence a track led over the Arakan Yomas to the Irrawaddy; but 
on the whole it may be said that the victory at Kangaw was complete 
and comparable with those at Sinzweya and at Kohima in the north. 

A reconnaissance party from the platoon of 78 Field Company 
under Lieut. P. R. Francis, R.E., disembarked at Kangaw with the 
leading Commandos. According to Major Beaumont, the Com- 
mandos first tried to land on the banks of the main stream and 
found that the mud was over their knees, so they then reconnoitred 
with Francis to discover a better place. They went in boats up a 
chaung so narrow that the branches of trees met overhead and, 
meeting no enemy, landed and explored inland towards the ridge 





1 The 8ist West African Division was now being withdrawn to Africa. 


ARAKAN, 1942-45 307 


already mentioned and in the direction of Kangaw Village. Then 
they returned to report, and the main body of the Commandos came 
up the chaung, disembarked and occupied the ridge. They were 
soon discovered by the enemy who opened fire with guns and mortars 
but fortunately could not see the crowded beach where the Sappers 
were hard at work. 63 Field Company arrived from Myebon and 
helped the platoon of 78 Field Company to land tanks and stores, and 
to extend the beach-head and make exits from it, a difficult task as no 
bulldozers were available. Major Norman Hunter, commanding the 
41 Beach Group detachment, was killed and Francis had to take 
charge as the next in seniority. 63 Field Company was involved in 
much heavy fighting. It provided ‘bunker-busting’ parties for the 
infantry and made jeep tracks across the paddy fields from the chaung 
to the ridge; and as it happened to be encamped there when the 
Japs made one of their fiercest assaults, it was engaged in hand-to- 
hand combat and suffered a dozen casualties. 

After Kangaw, operations were resumed to clear the enemy from 
the coast to the south in order to prevent the remnants of the 54th 
and 55th Japanese Divisions from reinforcing the enemy opposing the 
advance of the Fourteenth Army, and also to secure fair-weather 
airstrips pending the completion of all-weather airfields at Akyab 
and Kyaukpyu. A bridgehead was to be established at Taungup, 
100 miles south of Kangaw, and the track leading from Taungup 
across the hills to Prome on the Irrawaddy was to be seized. Early 
in February 1945, the 25th Division and the 82nd West African 
Division were still mopping up in the Myebon-Kangaw area, while 
the 26th Division was busy clearing Ramree Island. General Christison’s 
plan was now to complete the destruction of the 54th Japanese 
Division in the Tamandu-An area, south of Kangaw, and to block 
the escape route from Taungup to Prome. The 82nd West African 
Division was to move southwards while the 25th Division made an 
amphibious landing at Ru-ywa, west of An. When An had been 
captured, Taungup would be the next objective so that the coastal 
road would be cut behind the enemy. Everything went according 
to plan. The 53rd Brigade of the 25th Division landed at Ru-ywa 
on February 16th, taking the enemy by surprise. Indeed, it was not 
till three days later that the bridgehead was heavily attacked, and 
then unsuccessfully. The remainder of the division followed and the 
An area was cleared. This exploit may be said to mark the end of 
the Third Arakan Campaign. Thenceforward, the operations of the 
15th Corps had to be curtailed in the interests of the Fourteenth 


308 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Army, which was to have priority in air supply for its advance on 
Rangoon. 

The experiences of 425 Field Company in the landing at Ru-ywa 
are related by Major P. M. Bennett.’ The first flight of the assault, 
comprising a British battalion and a platoon of the Company, touched 
down on the beaches at 10.30 a.m. on February 16th. As each 
landing craft arrived, a few Sappers leapt ashore and began to cut a 
way through mine-fields and dense and prickly jungle for the assaulting 
infantry, and then, with Hessian or wire netting, to improve it as far 
as high-water level, 300 yards away. When the remainder of the 
Company appeared with bulldozers and other equipment, the path 
was converted into a jeep track of corduroy logs. Two days later, 
an alternative beach-head was developed for landing guns and lorries, 
after which the unit returned to the original one and began digging 
for water and making airstrips. The enemy shelled the beach-heads 
and their exits whenever a landing craft was seen approaching, but 
the Sappers suffered few casualties although the Pioneers unloading 
the craft were less fortunate. On February 26th, guns and tanks 
were landed and passed successfully over the corduroy exit road. 
Early in March, the unit moved southwards to repair a ford over- 
looked by the enemy and on March 14th embarked for Akyab ea 
route to India. The other Field Companies with the 25th Division 
were employed also at Ru-ywa, chiefly in making wells by blasting 
with explosives as there were no streams and the hot weather was 
approaching. They moved to Tamandu to prepare an area for the 
occupation of the 82nd West African Division after the 25th Division 
had gone. The last to leave was 93 Field Company (Bombay), under 
Major J. K. Wren, R.E., which sailed on March 22nd. 

After Ru-ywa, the next operation was a landing at Letpan, 36 
miles to the south, which was accomplished by the 4th Brigade of 
the 26th Division from Ramree Island on March 13th. This was the 
last of its kind in Arakan. From Letpan the brigade turned south- 
wards, and after some fierce fighting, captured Taungup on April 
14th. 72 Field Company was the only Engineer unit present. It sent 
forward a few officers and men with the fighting patrols of a recon- 
naissance formation, known as ‘‘D’ Force, which preceded the 
brigade. It was during the advance of this force that Lieut. 
C. Raymond, R.E., gained a posthumous Victoria Cross for extreme 











1“The History of a Wartime Field Company of the Q.V’sO. Madras Sappers 
and Miners”, by Major P. M. Bennett, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 
1949, pp. 273-290. 





ARAKAN, 1942-45 309 


gallantry. 72 Company moved down the coastal road to Taungup, 
making it fit for tanks, preparing air-strips, clearing mines and ferrying 
infantry across chaungs. The West Africans were approaching 
down the coast. On Apri! 28th they were in Taungup and on May 9th 
in Sandoway, and by May 13th, after they had spread further 
southwards to Gwa, the liberation of Arakan was complete. The 15th 
Corps had suffered more than 5,000 battle casualties including 1,155 
killed, but it had inflicted far heavier losses on the enemy and the 
main objectives had been achieved. 

Although Arakan had been cleared, it was doubtful whether the 
Fourteenth Army, coming down from the north, could reach Rangoon 
before its line of land communication was wrecked by the monsoon. 
On April 25th, the mechanized 4th Corps, under Lieut.-General 
F. W. Messervy of ‘Admin Box’ fame, began its final dash along the last 
144 miles to the city. Lord Mountbatten, however, had already taken 
precautions against a failure to beat the rains by preparing Operation 
“Dracula” which involved the capture of Rangoon from the sea by 
the 26th Division voyaging from Ramree Island. The monsoon might 
break at any moment and Messervy’s tanks were showing signs of 
wear, so the odds were in favour of the sea-borne expedition. Six 
convoys of troopships and a host of landing craft and mine-sweepers 
were ready to sail from Ramree under the protection of a powerful 
fleet and overwhelming air cover. Little was known of the perpetually 
shifting channels of the Rangoon River or the location of the minefields 
encumbering them, so the final ascent to the City of Golden Pagodas 
promised to be slow and laborious; but it was arranged that the 
26th Division’s attack should start with the dropping of parachutists 
on the defences at Elephant Point at the mouth of the river, followed 
by the landing of a brigade on each bank. 

Operation “Dracula” does not properly belong to the story of 
Arakan; but it would be unfair to the 26th Indian Division and 
its engineer formations to omit some mention of their crowning 
exploit which was rendered possible only by their previous victories 
on the Arakan Coast. The first ships carrying the 26th Division, 
now under Major-General H. M. Chambers, sailed from Ramree on 
April 27th, 1945, and the main convoys a few days later. The Rangoon 
estuary was reached without incident, and very early on May Ist 
the 50th Parachute Brigade of Gurkhas was dropped on the enemy 
position at Elephant Point after a heavy bombardment. The para- 
chutists soon obliterated the small garrison. On May 2nd, in pouring 
rain and through rough seas, the troops were put ashore in landing 


310 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


craft but were subsequently re-embarked and sent forward up the 
river to land again within a few miles of Rangoon, and by the evening 
of May 3rd, the brigade on the east bank was in the city. As the 
17th Indian Division, leading the 4th Corps’ advance from the north, 
was then on the Pegu Road, 32 miles away, the 26th Indian Division 
had won the race to Rangoon; but had it not been for the pressure 
exerted by the 4th Corps, the sea-borne expedition might have fared 
badly. General Chambers had expected little opposition after May 
Ist because an aircraft flying over the city early on that day had 
reported that the words ‘‘Japs Gone” were painted on the roof of 
the gaol in which our prisoners-of-war were known to be confined. 
Nevertheless, the bombing of Rangoon was continued, though great 
care was taken to avoid hitting the gaol. During the afternoon of 
May 2nd, the pilot of a Mosquito aircraft, seeing no signs of the 
enemy, decided to land on the Mingaladon airfield to the north. He 
and his navigator then walked into Rangoon, visited the gaol and 
saw the prisoners who confirmed that the Japs had gone, and finally 
they sailed down the river in a sampan and informed the vanguard 
of the assaulting troops. By May 4th, 1945, the 26th Division 
was firmly installed in Rangoon, and three days later it linked up 
with the Fourteenth Army. 

To return now to the experiences of some of the Indian Engineer 
units which sailed from Ramree for the assault. 28 and 98 Field 
Companies embarked on April 28th and both were in Rangoon by 
the evening of May 3rd after helping the other troops to land, re- 
embark and land again. Once in the city, they were faced by the 
stupendous task of rehabilitating a huge port, neglected by the 
Japanese, bombed by the R.A.F., and ravaged by looters. Their 
Field Park Company had not arrived; they had little equipment 
and no vehicles: and their C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel R. S. B. Ward, 
had been killed when his landing craft struck a mine off Elephant 
Point. Nevertheless, they set to work with a will, concentrating 
first on the Mingaladon airfield. 72 and 73 Field Companies soon 
came up the river. Other engineer units followed, and the work 
of restoring the water and electricity systems, repairing docks, wharves 
and roads, and demolishing wrecked buildings, was accelerated. The 
Sappers even operated railway trains, the first of which left the docks 
early on May 8th and reached Mingaladon safely an hour later. 

78 Field Company, now under Major W. Byrde, R.E., with Captain 
A. H.W. Sandes, R.E., as second-in-command, did not leave Ramree 
until May 4th. Once again, in common with most of 41 Beach 











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Group, it missed the initial landings, but by May 6th it was in Rangoon. 
“As we sailed up the river’, writes Sandes, “the city presented a 
picture of the most complete desolation it is possible to conceive. 
Miles of riverside wharves were deserted and lined with sunken 
boats. Some of the jetties were mere masses of wreckage and many 
of the houses just rubble. On landing, we walked straight into our 
allotted area near the Mayo Club, and you may imagine our delight 
on seeing great sheds, with roofs on, for the men and a fine house 
for our Mess. Of course, the whole place was in a disgusting state 
owing to the looters. Exploration revealed miles of dumps of every 
conceivable kind. There were vast engineering workshops and ship- 
yards, timber mills, rice mills, piles of steel joists and stacks of piping, 
but almost everything was rotten, rusty and broken. The streets 
were covered with litter and strewn with worthless Japanese currency 
notes. I have never seen so much money in my life. The cranes 
were out of order, the railways overgrown with vegetation, and the 
Stations masses of twisted metal and debris. There were no trains, 
water-supply, or electric light. Here and there lay dead bodies, and 
the stench of rotting rice was abominable. Exploring the place was 
an eerie experience. Doors hanging open, creaking in the wind: 
piles of ashes stirring in the breeze: smashed furniture lying about: 
everywhere, deserted and derelict houses. The Japs had placed 
fire-bombs in some buildings, but these had already been extinguished. 
Wherever you went you could see Jap money, abandoned motor 
cars, lorries by the hundred stripped of their parts, wrecked bull- 
dozers, rusty steel helmets. I entered the Secretariat, looking for 
mines. The Japs, in their inexplicable way, had used this beautiful 
building as a warehouse. There were great halls full of rice, rooms 
filled with broken packing cases, others piled with rotting State archives, 
and others again full of old boots. Never have I seen such confusion. 
And the smell! It made one realize, as never before, the meaning 
of so-called Japanese co-Prosperity.” 

The ‘War of the Chaungs’, a long and bloody struggle, is now 
but a memory, but it takes its place in military history as an ideal 
example of the co-operation of all arms. Transported and landed 
by the Royal and Indian Navies, and covered by the Royal, Indian 
and American Air Forces, the Army reached its zenith in jungle 
warfare. The troops in Arakan, as in the rest of Burma, turned 
initial defeat into overwhelming victory. Inexperienced at first in 
jungle warfare, they improved month by month and year by year 
till finally they could outdo the Japanese in every artifice and 


312 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


manoeuvre. They were better led, better supplied, better armed. Only 
in physical courage were the two sides evenly matched. Heat, rain, 
sickness, mountains, rivers, jungles and swamps were often greater 
obstacles to success than the enemy; but the Indian Engineers 
triumphed over all and, time and again, fought with rifle and bayonet 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL, MARCH-JULY 1944 


LITTLE over a month after the Japanese had launched their 
Pac in Arakan they proceeded to set in motion their main 

effort in Manipur on a scale three times as large. This was 
their final bid for entry into the wide plains of India, and for it they 
employed their very best troops. As described in Chapter IX, the 
Fifteenth Japanese Army under General Mutagachi crossed the 
Chindwin River at several points in the middle of March 1944 in 
an attempt to destroy the 17th Indian Division on the Tiddim Road, 
to drive back the 20th Indian Division on the Tamu Road, and to 
capture Imphal itself, which was defended by the 23rd Indian 
Division. One Japanese division was to by-pass Imphal to the 
north, strike at Kohima and occupy the rail-head beyond it at 
Dimapur (Manipur Road Station). Success in this venture would 
prevent the arrival of reinforcements for the 4th Indian Corps in 
the Imphal region. It would also halt General Stilwell’s offensive 
in Northern Burma, directed on Myitkyina, and would isolate China 
by closing the ‘‘Hump” air-supply route to that country. With the 
Assam air bases in their hands, the enemy would have taken the 
first step towards the domination of all India and final victory in 
the Far East. Thus the importance of Imphal can hardly be 
exaggerated. 

Just as the defence of the Imphal Plain may be said to have begun 
when the Japanese columns crossed the Chindwin in March 1944, 
it may be deemed to have ended when they were rolled back towards, 
or beyond, that river in the following July and August, for the 
operations immediately preceding and following a siege are part 
and parcel of it. On March 12th the 33rd Japanese Division advanced 
up the Tiddim Road against the 17th Indian Division under Major- 
General D. T. Cowan and, by a series of hooks, tried to isolate it 
in its exposed position far south of Imphal and to seize the Manipur 
River crossing at Milestone 126, where lay the most forward supply 
‘ase of several which the 4th Corps had established along the Tiddim 
Road.! Further north, the 15th Japanese Division crossed the 


1 See the map of the Tiddim Road, Milestone 109 to Kalemyo, included in Chapter 
Xi. 








313 


314 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Chindwin and fanned out south-westwards to co-operate with 
the 33rd Division in an attack on the 20th Indian Division, under 
Major-General D. D. Gracey, in the Tamu region;' and still further 
north, the 31st Japanese Division also crossed the river to advance 
through Ukhrul and Jessami towards Kohima and Dimapur.? The 
23rd Indian Division, under Major-General O. L. Roberts, an ex- 
Bengal Sapper and Miner, was in reserve in the [mphal Plain. 
Roberts had many commitments. He might be called upon at short 
notice to stop any gap in the defensive screen in any direction. He 
might have to help to extricate the 17th Division from its predica- 
ment on the Tiddim Road, or to reinforce the 20th Division on the 
Tamu Road, or to assist the 50th Parachute Brigade at Ukhrul to 
the north-east in order to interfere with the enemy thrust towards 
Kohima, or even to deal with Japanese columns attacking Imphal 
from west of the Tiddim Road after moving far round that flank. 
It was an onerous burden for the Commander of a formation which 
had been long in the area and was depleted by sickness. 

General W. J. Slim, the Fourteenth Army Commander, was very 
wise to order the concentration on Imphal of the 4th Corps under 
Lieut.-General G. A. P. Scoones in the event of a massive enemy 
offensive and thus to give battle on ground of his own choosing 
where supplies were available and aircraft could land; but the date 
of the withdrawal of the 17th Division was left to Major-General 
Cowan who did not start until March 14th when it was almost too 
late. The 33rd Japanese Division moved with great rapidity to cut 
the Tiddim Road at several places between the Manipur River 
crossing and Bishenpur, and part of Roberts’ 23rd Division had 
to come to the rescue from Imphal. Yet Cowan’s bold decision 
hindered the first onrush of the invading columns and gave us time 
to evacuate to Imphal quantities of supplies which would otherwise 
have been lost. As in Arakan, the enemy relied largely on captured 
supplies to maintain the impetus of his attack. Nevertheless, the 
retreat of the 17th Division along a road parallel to the front was 
a dangerous undertaking, and it succeeded only through the stubborn 
fighting of all units and the assistance afforded by the 23rd Division 
from Imphal in opening the way. 

The Imphal Plain lies 3,000 feet up in the heart of the Manipur 
mountains. It is formed by a widening in the course of the Manipur 








* See the map of the Tiddim Road, Chindwin River Area, included in Chapter IX. 


* See the general map of Upper Burma included in Chapter XIII. Jessami is about 
30 miles east of Kohima. 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 315 


River on its way to the Chindwin at Kalewa. This green plateau, 
largely water-logged in the monsoon, is many square miles in area 
and was recognized as the only suitable site for a large base from 
which aircraft could operate close to the front. The town itself, 
the capital of Manipur, could easily be surrounded with the necessary 
depots, dumps, hospitals, workshops and camps needed for an army. 
Yet it had some serious drawbacks. It lay many miles from the rail- 
head at Dimapur with which it was connected only by a single narrow 
hill-road often blocked by land-slides, and that road was parallel 
to the probable front of attack and therefore under constant threat. 
It is true that another line of communication existed between 
Bishenpur, south of the town, and Silchar in Assam; but this was 
merely a rough track through impossibly difficult terrain and quite 
unsuitable for heavy traffic. For offensive purposes there were two 
roads leading southwards into Burma, the Tiddim Road and the 
Tamu Road, and another north-eastwards towards Ukhrul.! The 
strategic importance of Imphal was that in our hands it could main- 
tain large forces in the Chin Hills or along the west bank of the 
Chindwin. To the Japanese it would have been a prize of untold 
value as a main base for the invasion of India. Hence the bitter 
struggle for its possession. 

With the 17th Division in its hazardous withdrawal up the Tiddim 
Road were 60 Field Company (Madras) under Major P. A. Walker, 
R.E., 70 Field Company (Bengal) under Major I. H. Lyall-Grant, 
R.E., and 414 Field Park Company (Bengal) under Major R. Blagden, 
R.E., the whole being under Lieut.-Colonel R. S. B. Ward, R.E., 
as C.R.E. Moving back from the Kennedy Peak and Tiddim areas, 
the Field Companies cratered the road and booby-trapped all possible 
diversions. Every installation of the slightest value to the enemy 
was destroyed, and Tiddim was left in flames. At Milestone 124, 
beyond the Manipur River, was the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company 
under Major K. Tylden-Pattenson, R.E. This unit had already 
placed demolition charges on the bridges across the river at Mile- 
stone 126, a sad business because one of them, a fine Bailey structure, 
had been built by the unit not long before and the men were proud 
of their work. 70 Field Company crossed the river on March 18th. 
The withdrawal had been subject to constant interruption by small 
parties of the enemy firing down from ridges or lurking in long grass 
near the road. A continuous rearguard action was fought by the 





1 See the map of Imphal included in this chapter. 


316 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


infantry among whom 70 Field Company was scattered in small. 
detachments to demolish road-blocks, make diversions and clear 
mines. During the first day the 17th Division covered 40 miles, 
every officer and man, even General Cowan himself, marching on 
foot. When the 63rd Brigade reached the Manipur River bridge on 
March 18th, it halted and established a defence “‘Box”. The 48th 
Brigade continued along the road and on March 20th arrived at 
Milestone 111, where it encountered the encircling enemy. The 
Japanese had already sent a column up the west bank of the river 
to attack a large supply base at Milestone 109 which was located 
in a depression in the hills and defended only by administrative 
troops. They descended upon it from all sides and the garrison had 
to abandon it. Further north, at Milestone 82, there was another 
large supply base. This also was threatened by the enemy who set 
up a road-block between it and Milestone 109 and caused some 
confusion within the perimeter by sending out “‘jitter’” parties every 
night. 

The 63rd Brigade had placed two companies of Gurkhas to cover 
a defile in the road where it passed over a spur before dropping 
down towards the Manipur River crossing at Milestone .126, 3,000 
feet below. Here, the Sappers laid a small minefield by collecting a 
few mines and placing them in rows in the defile. The same evening, 
the Japanese attacked with tanks whose presence had not been 
expected. On came the leading tank and entered the defile. Not a 
mine was touched until the tank reached the last row, but there it 
was blown up. A second tank came through and disintegrated also 
at the Jast row. A third followed and was destroyed before it reached 
the wreckage of its predecessors. Nevertheless, a fourth tank came 
roaring. onwards, only to perish alongside the third. Seven mines 
had accounted for all four, and the Sappers were delighted with 
their work, for these tanks might have caused great damage if they 
had got through to attack the mass of men and vehicles in the valley 
below. The episode shows the gallantry usually displayed by the 
enemy, and at the same time his stupidity and inability to alter his 
plans once they had been made. 

Some Engineer units, mostly of 465 Army Troops Engineers, 
were working at this time on the Tiddim Road near Milestone 109 
under Lieut.-Colonel A. J. R. Hill, R.E., previously O.C. 8th Engineer 
Battalion,’ who, as the senior officer in the vicinity, was ordered to 





* Lieut.-Colonel A. J. R. Hill had been appointed C.R.E., 465 Army Troops Engineers, 
on February 25th, 1944. 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 317 


undertake the defence of the Forward Supply Depot at that spot. 
The units were 24 Field Company (Bombay), 428 Field Company 
(Madras), 414 Field Park Company (Bengal) of the 17th Divisional 
Engineers, and 442 Quarrying Company. When the position became 
untenable, the troops were ordered to destroy and abandon their 
vehicles and stores and make their way back through the jungle. 
The Sapper Headquarters were almost the last to leave. Hill ordered 
his Adjutant and a few men to retire a couple of miles and await 
his arrival while he himself stayed behind with three companies of 
Jats which were to form the rearguard. The enemy followed up closely 
and eventually the Jats withdrew. The Adjutant waited at the 
rendezvous for some time, and then, assuming that Hill had gone 
back by another path, resumed his march and rejoined the nearest 
troops 25 miles in rear. There, to his surprise, he was told that 
Hill had not arrived. He waited for some days but could get no 
news of his Commanding Officer, and it was obviously impossible 
to return to the depot area to search for him. Until April I{st it 
was hoped that Hill might re-appear; but after that date he was 
shown as missing at Milestone 109 on March 18th. So perished an 
able and gallant officer. 

414 Field Park Company had a very unpleasant journey to the 
rear after the order was received to abandon the depot at Milestone 
109, for it had to help in the evacuation of a large number of wounded 
men over the roughest of jungle tracks. No less than fifty crossings 
of a stream were involved, and after nine miles of stretcher bearing 
the Sappers were so exhausted that many of them had to be sent 
to Imphal in motor transport. The remainder reached the town on 
foot, but most of their equipment had been lost. 

The serious plight of the !7th Division had been realized in 
Imphal as early as March 13th when the 37th Brigade of the 
23rd Division—the only formation available in the plain—received 
a warning order at 9.30 a.m. to go to the rescue. The next evening it 
was 82 miles down the Tiddim Road, and on the 15th it was engaged 
in a tense battle at Milestone 100, the highest point. Most of the 
49th Brigade followed from the Ukhrul area and moved to Mile- 
stone 82, while the Ist Brigade returned to Imphal from the Kabaw 
Valley to garrison the town. The 37th Brigade was ordered to prevent 
the enemy from cutting the Tiddim Road between Milestones 82 
and 100 and to contact the leading troops of the approaching 17th 
Division, while the 49th Brigade was to guard the road between 
Milestones 70 and 82. By the evening of March 17th, General Roberts 


318 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


had no less than five brigades under his command. His responsibilities 
stretched from Milestone 100 back to Imphal, where the 1st Brigade 
had concentrated with the 254th Tank Brigade, and thence to Ukhrul 
and Jessami, 40 miles further north, where the Ist Assam Rifles 
were in position to cover Kohima. As Lieut.-Colonel Doulton 
remarks,! the 23rd Division front was little short of 200 miles in 
length. Fierce battles soon raged at both extremities and at Ukhrul. 
The 50th Parachute Brigade had been sent from Kohima to fill the 
gap at Ukhrul and, with a battalion of the 49th Brigade, had taken 
up a defensive position at Sangshak, 8 miles south-west of the village. 
Such were the dispositions made to assist the withdrawal of the 17th 
Division up the Tiddim Road and to safeguard Imphal and Kohima. 
It would be incorrect to imagine that the 17th Diviston would never 
have reached Imphal without the help of the two brigades of the 
23rd Division, but it would probably have lost many guns and much 
equipment in the process. The “Battle of the Road Blocks” between 
Milestones 100 and 82, which lasted from March [5th to March 
28th when a battalion of the 37th Brigade met the forward troops 
of the 17th Division at Milestone 102, was a desperate and bloody 
affair in which the 37th Brigade acted as an anvil for the hammer 
of the 17th Division. Between them, they cut a way through all 
obstructions and so the Division was able to reach Imphal in good 
shape to play a leading part in the defence. 

The experiences of 428 Field Company (Madras) under Major 
J. V. Corbet, R.E., before and during the withdrawal up the Tiddim 
Road, afford a good example of those of some other Engineer units. 
On March 4th the Company was visited at Milestone 100 by Brigadier 
H. E. Horsfield, Chief Engineer, Fourteenth Army, and Brigadier 
H. Williams, Chief Engineer, 4th Corps,? and three days later it 
was visited again by Williams in company with Brigadier E. F. E. 
Armstrong. It was then fairly clear that great events were impending. 
On March 13th the unit was ordered to move into a “Box” at Mile- 
stone 109, and there, on the 16th, it came under artillery fire. Early 
on the 17th, the position was machine-gunned. Captain D. I. Perdue, 
R.E., was shot through the head and evacuated, and the same after- 
noon the unit was ordered to retire up the bed of a nullah. It 











1 The Fighting Cock (History of the aera Indian Division), by Lieut.-Colonel A. J. F. 
Doulton, 0.3.£., p. 80. 


? Brigadier H. Williams was C.E., 4th Corps, from June 20th, 1943, to August 24th, 
1944. On January Ist, 1948, he was appointed Engineer-in-Chief, India, with the 
temporary rank of Major-General and held that appointment until October 16th, 1955. 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL . 319 


assembled on the following day in a camp at Milestone 82, whence 
it moved on the 19th in lorries to another camp at Milestone 35 
and finally came to rest in Imphal on March 20th. But the brunt 
of the delaying operations fell naturally on the 17th Divisional 
Engineers. 60 Field Company, 70 Field Company and the Tehti- 
Garhwal Field Company were involved in almost continuous fighting 
though they found time also to accomplish most valuable engineer 
work in the way of destroying communications, bridges and dumps 
of petrol and stores, and laying mines and booby traps to hinder the 
enemy’s advance. Except for the last 40 miles to Imphal, which they 
reached early in April, they covered the entire distance on foot. 
‘‘A large road-block had been established by the enemy between 
Milestones 110 and 100”, writes Pearson.! ‘‘The 48th Brigade dis- 
tinguished itself on the night of March 23rd/24th in attacks on the 
high ground overlooking Milestone 110. Not a little of its success 
was due to 70 Field Company which continued to dig the mule path 
on which the Brigade was dependant for supplies while the battle 
raged around it. The Japanese were pinned to the ridge and the 
road was cleared to Milestone 109. 70 Field Company then salvaged 
a quantity of vehicles and stores from the old Administrative base 
before going on. Another battle was fought by the 48th Brigade on 
April Ist to break a road-block at Milestone 72. Here, 70 Field 
Company cut mule tracks for each of the assaulting battalions, 
cleared mines in front of the tanks, and by evening had started to 
remove the block. At midnight, the way was clear again. The 
Sappers had often to march and work all day, and then dig in and 
act as infantry all night.” 

Some allusion has already been made to the demolition of the 
bridges at the Manipur River crossing at Milestone 126 by the 
Tehri-Garhwal Field Company under Major K. Tylden-Pattenson, 
R.E. The charges had been placed in position on March 13th, and 
at 11.30 a.m. on March 26th the order was received to blow. The 
east abutment and central pier of the fine Bailey structure were 
completely destroyed. The bridge was cut in ten places and most of 
the panels buckled. The pier of the suspension bridge was set alight 
with petrol and oil, and the cables and pylons were cut. At noon, 
the firing parties left to prepare another bridge at Milestone 117 for 
demolition. This was blown after dark, and then another at Milestone 





* Brief History of the K.G.V’s O. Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.1.E. (August 
1939-July 1946), by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., pp. 79, 80. 


320 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


113, leaving only an old bridge to take the traffic. At midnight 
the firing parties rejoined the rest of the Company at Milestone 109 
in support of the 63rd Brigade. The old bridge at Milestone 113 
was demolished on March 27th and the road heavily mined, and on 
the following day the road and the cliff face at Milestone 111 
were dealt with and further mines laid. The Tehri-Garhwals marched 
on the 29th to Milestone 91 and afterwards to the 17th Division 
Headquarters at Milestone 82, which they helped to defend. They 
reached the ‘“‘Catfish’’ Box at Imphal on April 25th and soon after- 
wards Major J. Lindsay, R.E., took over command of the unit. 

The final stages of the withdrawal of the 17th Division to Imphal! 
began early on April 2nd, 1944, after the breaking of the road-block 
at Milestone 72 with the help of the 37th and 49th Brigades of the 
23rd Division. The 37th Brigade formed the rearguard and effectively 
checked the Japanese at Milestone 82; but during some heavy shelling 
of the area by long-range enemy guns on April 3rd it suffered a 
number of casualties, among them being Major F. W. Pritchard, R.E., 
O.C. 71 Field Company, and Captain R. A. Dedman, R.E., his 
second-in-command. Major J. S. Beddows, R.E., O.C. 91 Field 
Company, then took command temporarily until the arrival of Major 
T. W. I. Hedley, R.E., from 323 Field Park Company on April 9th 
at Imphal. 

When the 3lst Japanese Division advanced towards Kohima and 
Dimapur and blocked the Kohima Road north of Imphal, the 
importance of the only other line of communication with Assam 
was greatly enhanced. This was the Silchar track starting from 
the Tiddim Road near Bishenpur. Every effort had to be made 
to open it for motor traffic, for there was a rail-head at Silchar which 
might conceivably be used if Dimapur were lost. Accordingly, work 
was started at once on the development of the track. On Apri! 2nd, 
1944, 24 Field Company (Bombay) under Major J. F. W. Rusted, 
R.E., arrived in Bishenpur for that purpose. The track was about 
109 miles in length and wound its way through dense jungle over five 
mountain ranges. There were often a dozen hair-pin bends in a 
mile, and suspension bridges up to 400 feet in length carried the 
track over streams which became raging torrents after heavy rain. 
Extracts from the War Diary of 24 Field Company make illuminating 
reading. “9th April. Parties of Japs moving along track to destroy 
Suspension bridges at Milestones 31 and 51.1 12th April. Japs 





+ The mileages were measured from Imphal, Bishenpur being at Milestone 18. 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 321 


destroyed bridge at Milestone 51. Ordered by C.R.E. to defend bridge 
at Milestone 31. 13th Apri/. Enemy established road-block between 
Milestones 23 and 24. No communication possible with Bishenpur. 
141h-18th April. Enemy in force at Tairenpokpi (Milestone 26) 
and in contact with our forces moving up from Bishenpur. Road- 
block at Milestone 27. Enemy in village 5 miles south of bridge at 
Milestone 31. 19th April. O.C. decides to withdraw Company to 
Milestone 51 to contact 362 Field Company. 22nd-30th April. Several 
small actions against enemy and frequent patrolling. Ist-4th May. 
Enemy in strong positions across track at Milestone 27. 17th May. 
Company moved to Milestone 64 en route to Silchar. 19th May. 
Arrived Base Camp at Milestone 98. 14th June. Unit moved by rail 
from Silchar to Dimapur (Manipur Road).”’ 

The other Engineer units engaged with 24 Field Company on the 
improvement of the Silchar track were 362 and 429 Field Companies. 
The 8th Engineer Battalion was there also. 362 and 429 Field Com- 
panies arrived in Bishenpur early in May and were ordered to make 
the track passable for 15 cwt. lorries within three weeks—an obvious 
impossibility. However, all three Field Companies set to work with 
a will. 362 Field Company was employed at first at Milestone 36 
but was soon ordered to Milestone 51 as a party of Japanese was 
reported to be moving thither to blow up the 330-feet suspension 
bridge at that point. So close were the pylons of this bridge to the 
cliff face at either end that jeeps had to reverse twice in order to get 
on to the bridge, and consequently the first task of the Sappers was to 
dig into both cliffs. The Japanese were only half a mile away, and early 
next morning enemy planes dive-bombed the site. After dark, there 
was a devastating roar and the bridge collapsed, though no bomb had 
hit it. It seems that a few intrepid Japs had managed to crawl unseen 
on to it and had escaped after placing a pressure charge in position. 
One of them, indeed, was seen to jump 80 feet into the water below. 
The enemy next succeeded in cutting the track completely at Mile- 
stone 27, thus isolating all the Sapper units. These had then to be 
supplied entirely by air and to remain on half-rations until they could 
establish road communication with Silchar. 362 Field Company 
built a timber trestle bridge at Milestone 51 under observation by 
the enemy on the heights above. As soon as it had been completed, 
the Japanese attacked it but were beaten off. The Company then 
set to work to repair the suspension bridge. Much improvisation 
was needed because the necessary stores could not be obtained from 
Bishenpur. The men found an old disused suspension bridge in the 


322 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


jungle, dismantled it and spliced lengths of its cables into those of 
the wrecked structure. The damaged slings were replaced, the road- 
way repaired, and on June 10th the suspension bridge was re-opened 
to traffic. Five days later, 362 Field Company began the long march 
to Silchar where it arrived safely, though without its vehicles and 
most of its stores. Meanwhile, 429 Field Company, which had been 
working for a few days between Milestones 63 and 75, had returned 
on May 14th to help 362 Field Company at Milestone 51 before 
resuming its movement westwards. Altogether, the three Sapper 
companies were isolated on the Silchar track for no less than six 
weeks and were fortunate to reach Silchar in a fit state for further 
work. Thence they moved northwards by rail to Dimapur, where 
their services were very urgently needed. 

Fighting of vital importance had been in progress, meanwhile, 
around Kohima, south-east of Dimapur; but before dealing with the 
events in that area it may be well to turn to the central front where, 
in March 1944, the 20th Indian Division, under Major-General D. D. 
Gracey, was trying to stop the Japanese advance through Tamu and 
Palel. The Division comprised the 32nd, 80th and 100th Brigades, 
and the Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel A. R. S. Lucas, 
R.E., included 75 Field Company (Bengal), 362 and 422 Field Com- 
panies (Madras) and 309 Field Park Company (Madras). Some of 
the experiences of 362 Field Company with the 80th Brigade have 
been given already in Chapter IX and may be said to resemble 
those of the other Sapper units. Before the end of the third week in 
March, the enemy’s intentions were fully apparent. While two 
regiments of the 33rd Japanese Division harassed the 17th Indian 
Division on the Tiddim Road, the third, with medium artillery and 
light tanks in support, advanced northwards through, and to the 
west of, the Kabaw Valley. Between March 12th and 14th, the 
enemy attacked in the Htinzin and Witok areas, forcing our outposts 
to withdraw northwards, and on the 15th, enemy forces occupied 
Holkhom, 7 miles west of Htinzin.!. By March 18th, other forces, 
advancing on Tamu, were within 8 miles of their objective. After 
occupying the northern part of the Kabaw Valley around Mintha, 4 
regiment of the 1Sth Japanese Division turned south-westwards to 
co-operate with the 33rd Japanese Division in assaulting Tamu, and 
at the same time other enemy troops, pushing westwards through 
the hills from Mintha, reached Sita, 12 miles east of Palel, and 














‘See the map of the Tiddim Road, Chindwin River Area, included in Chapter IX. 





THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 323 


threatened the road to Imphal. The Ist Brigade of the 23rd Indian 
Division was now ordered to operate against any enemy forces 
attempting to infiltrate into the Imphal Plain through these hills 
and did so with good effect. 

On March 22nd, elements of the 15th and 33rd Japanese Divisions 
made an unsuccessful attack on the 20th Indian Division’s positions 
at Tamu; but meanwhile some enemy detachments had almost reached 
Sibong on the road to Palel and were reported also at Leibi further 
north. After dark on the 22nd, others were only 7 miles south-east 
of Palel itself. The Tamu-Palel Road was cut temporarily at 
Tengnoupal, and with the enemy astride the road, the maintenance 
of the troops in the Moreh region was hardly possible, so General 
Gracey was ordered to evacuate Moreh, Sibong and Khongkhang 
and to concentrate in Sita, Tengnoupal, Shenam, Chapki and Mombi 
in a wide arc covering Palel and the Tiddim Road to the west. He 
evacuated Moreh on April Ist, transferring his 32nd Brigade to the 
Imphal Plain as a reserve for the 4th Corps and preparing to hold a 
group of strong positions in the Sita-Tengnoupal-Shenam area with 
his 80th and 100th Brigades. At the end of the first week of April, 
the general situation on the Manipur front was as follows. The 17th 
Indian Division, having completed its fighting withdrawal to the 
Imphal Plain, had the 63rd Brigade at Sengmai, 12 miles north of 
Imphal, with the 48th Brigade close behind it. The 20th Indian 
Division was in battle positions centred on Shenam. The 23rd 
Indian Division held the Imphal Plain, and the newly arrived 5th 
Indian Division, of which more anon, covered the approaches from 
the northeast in the hilly country between the Ukhrul and Kohima 
Roads. The 20th Division continued to block the Japanese advance 
at the Shenam Saddle until May I1lth when Lieut.-General G. A. 
P. Scoones, the 4th Corps Commander, ordered it to change places 
with the 23rd Division which at that time was operating chiefly 
on the Ukhrul Road. Thus the task of defeating the final Japanese 
attempt to reach Imphal by the Tamu Road fell to Major-General 
O. L. Roberts. 

The evacuation of Moreh is well described by Major J. H. Clark, 
R.E., O.C. 92 Field Company. “Moreh”, he writes,! ‘tis some three 
miles north of Tamu in the Kabaw Valley where the road to Imphal 
Starts to climb into the hills. A forward base was being built there, 
and towards the end of March frantic efforts were being made to 





Notes by Major J. H. Clark, R.E., dated February 2nd, 1954. 


324 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


evacuate masses of stores of every description. Little progress, how- 
ever, was possible in the few days available for the place was under 
constant shell fire, so 92 Field Company was made responsible for 
destroying all the dumps and installations on the withdrawal of the 
32nd Brigade on April Ist. No sounds of demolition were to be 
made until 9.30 a.m., one hour after the last troops had gone, in 
order that no warning should be given to the enemy. The use of the 
normal delay fuses was forbidden because they had proved unreliable 
in that climate, so the interval of one hour was arranged for by 
joining lengths of safety fuse to the 120-feet lengths of instantaneous 
fuse. The dumps were scattered on both sides of the road through 
Moreh. The Engineer Stores Dump was a massive collection of 
timber and steel covering a wide area, so that little could be done in 
the way of ‘back-loading’ or demolition. The Petro! and Oil Dump, 
however, was divided into sixteen smaller dumps, so these were 
connected to a prima-cord ring main and the prima-cord was given 
several turns round petro] drums in each dump. The Supply Dump 
was an awkward problem. This depot was stacked with solid walls 
of tins and mountains of sacks of atta, dhal, mule fodder, etc. It was 
obvious that explosives would merely scatter the tins without breaking 
them, and accordingly Sherman tanks were used to knock down the 
walls and squash the tins and also to scatter the sacks. The whole 
area was then sprayed with petrol and oil. The Ordnance Dump 
held both clothing and ammunition. The stacks of clothing were 
connected by a prima-cord ring main, and in each stack some prima- 
cord was wound round petrol drums to set the clothing alight. This 
also was successful. The only unsatisfactory item was the destruction 
of the heavy ammunition for the guns. Every alternate shell was 
de-fused and gelignite on prima-cord inserted; but when we returned 
to Moreh a year later, we found that, although the shells had been 
scattered far and wide, a large number were still intact. We also 
destroyed three water-points by wrecking the plant. Finally, we had 
to deal with the Bailey bridge over the Lokchao River, a high-level 
structure across a deep gorge. It had been prepared for demolition, 
but on the day before the withdrawal we were ordered to leave it 
intact, so I asked the battalion holding the covering positions to 
ensure that the explosive charges were removed and dropped into 
the river below. This was done, but shortly afterwards our planes 
bombed the bridge and demolished it. I was greatly disgusted to 
learn later that it had been suggested that 92 Field Company had 
blown the bridge against orders! The withdrawal started early on 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 325 


April Ist, the last troops to leave being the 4th/10th Gurkha Rifles 
with the Sapper firing party. By that time, the exit from Moreh was 
under shell fire. We had an exciting ride back to Palel as the enemy 
had reached the road at several places and the 32nd Brigade and 
its transport suffered a number of casualties. An hour after the 
fuses had been lit, the demolitions in Moreh exploded. Two huge 
clouds of smoke mounted slowly into the air, one black, the other 
white. The former came from the Oil Dump, the latter from the 
Ordnance Dump. They were a source of great satisfaction to us, 
for we had foiled the enemy on April Fool’s Day.”’ 92 Field Company 
left Palel with the 32nd Brigade on April 5th and moved to Wangjing, 
13. miles towards Imphal. Nine days later it accompanied the 
brigade to the Bishenpur area on the Tiddim Road where on April 
18th it distinguished itself by making a track for heavy tanks to 
attack an enemy position on a hill. 

424 Field Company (Madras), under Major J. G. Mitchell, R.E., 
was another unit involved in the withdrawal from Moreh. On March 
15th, while engaged in building a bridge over the Lokchao River, 
it received a warning order to move and was detailed to defend the 
Divisional Headquarters when established at Moreh. Two days later 
a detachment was sent out to blow all demolitions along the track 
to Sittaung. Early on March 20th, when fighting had started in the 
vicinity, the Company was ordered to move in fifteen minutes. All! 
that could be done was to pile some equipment into the four jeeps 
with the unit and set out for Moreh forthwith. There it dug in along- 
side 92 Field Company and was detailed to guard the Petrol and Oil 
Dump. On the 22nd, after burying much of its remaining equipment, 
it prepared to move again at short notice. A fierce battle started 
after dark to the north-east, and another to the south, and Japanese 
artillery shelled Moreh. However, the infantry clung to their positions 
and the Sappers continued to wire the perimeters. It was not until 
March 29th that 424 Field Company quitted Moreh and withdrew toa 
position in a Supply Dump at Shenam to work on the defences of 
various dumps. On April 2nd, 94 (Faridkot) Field Company under 
Major R. M. Willis, R.E., took over this duty and 424 Field Company 
began to dig gun positions. A Company Battle Cry was evolved 
—‘Manju Eli Kollw’ meaning “Kill the Yellow Rats”. After- 
wards, the unit laboured mostly on communications until, on May 
20th, it moved to “Prawn”? Box in Imphal. 

Also at Shenam was 48! Field Company (Bombay), under Major 
M. |. Pritchard, R.E. This unit was employed during April chiefly 


326 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


in an infantry role, holding perimeter posts on the Saddle, and it 
continued to act as infantry throughout May. Some extracts from 
the War Diary in June may be given. “10th/11th June. Enemy attack 
on No. | Platoon and Company H. Q. position at Bastion Point at 
18.20 hrs. Enemy shelled position and at 20.15 hrs attacked from 
east and south-west having blown or dismantled booby-traps and 
cut perimeter wire with Bangalore torpedoes. At 00.15 hrs. on 11th, 
No. 1 Platoon withdrawn to Brigade Hill as enemy had occupied a 
large part of Platoon position. Our casualties on withdrawal were 
5 killed, 8 wounded and 8 missing. Enemy casualties, inflicted by 
the Platoon, were approximately 40 killed. Wounded unknown. 
Office, Mess and M.I. Room equipment, Platoon Store, bedding, 
cookhouse equipment, 3 Bren guns and the rifles of killed or wounded 
had to be abandoned. All three Bren gunners among the killed. 
Most of the equipment was destroyed later by shelling. Further 
casualties were suffered, as the Platoon withdrew, from enemy grenade 
discharge and mortar fire from Bastion Point. Captain A. P. Smith, 
R.E., Lieut. W. M. Colvin, R.E., Subedar Bhadra, ].A.M.C. and 
one Sapper were wounded and one Sapper killed as they were approa- 
ching No. 3 Platoon position on Brigade Hill. Major M. I. Pritchard, 
R.E., and Captain R. C. H. Greet, R.E., arrived there from “B” 
Echelon and reported to the 100th Brigade Commander. They were 
ordered to counter-attack Bastion with the remnants of No. 1 Platoon 
supported by a troop of Stuart tanks and a platoon of Frontier 
Force Rifles. Three tanks were to start at 08.45 hrs., assisted by a 
Section of F.F. Rifles, and No. 1 Platoon was to assault and mop 
up when the tanks had got into the position. The tanks were to 
advance to within 175 yards and then blast the forward bunkers 
from hull-down position; then to move forward, in line ahead, to 
a point due west of the position and 40 yards outside the perimeter 
trench; and finally, to turn into line abreast and advance on the 
position, one tank engaging either side of the perimeter trench and 
the centre tank advancing through the position to hold the reverse 
slope against any counter-attack. Personnel of No. | Platoon and 
one Section of No. 3 Platoon were divided into three parties to 
assault left, right and through the centre, but unfortunately the tanks 
approached the enemy position direct without halting to give covering 
fire from the hull-down position. The Sapper parties were therefore 
held up, but all combined to reach a point 75 yards from the trenches. 
Meanwhile, the tanks had also been held up and two had been knocked 
out. As the Sappers could not assault without tank support, Major 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 327 


Pritchard then decided to withdraw the three parties to 150 yards 
from the position. At 11.30 hrs., Bastion was again counter-attacked 
by fresh troops with tanks and this succeeded. The eight wounded 
Sappers left in the position the previous night had all been killed by 
the enemy, so the total casualties of 481 Field Company in the 
Bastion battle were 16 killed and 24 wounded. Lieut. W. M. Colvin 
later died of wounds.” 

Throughout June 1944, 481 Field Company was still employed 
largely on infantry duties at the Shenam Saddle and it was not until 
July 21st that, under Major C. H. Cowan, R.E., the unit was moved 
to a rest area. The foregoing extracts from the War Diary emphasize 
the unfortunate results of the employment of Sappers as infantry, a 
course which can only be justified in a highly critical situation. Many 
other Sapper units were so employed and acquitted themselves well 
in their unaccustomed role; but the principle remains unaltered that 
the duty of Engineer troops should be to open the way for the infantry 
assault, to clear the captured position and to facilitate the arrival 
of reinforcements, and not to attack or defend with rifle and bayonet. 

Among other Sapper units engaged in the operations on the Tamu 
Road were 402 Field Company (Bombay) under Major I. G. Maclaurin, 
R.E., and 429 Field Company (Madras) under Major J. H. F. H. 
Jolly, R.E. 402 Field Company took a conspicuous part in the 
fighting during April around ‘“‘Nippon Peak’’ at the Shenam Saddle. 
429 Field Company took up a defensive position on March 16th in 
the Sibong area and then moved northwards to defend a Supply 
Depot until the brigades of the 20th Division began to leap-frog 
back to the Shenam-Palel area in April. After being often under 
shell fire it reached Shenam on May 4th and moved to Bishenpur on 
the Tiddim Road to work on the Silchar track as already described. 

The experiences of the Bengal Sapper units on the Tamu Road 
are given by Lieut. G. Pearson.! “One night in March’’, he 
writes, “75 Field Company, under Major L. G. Kirton, R.E., dis- 
covered that it had become the garrison of Shenam and that the 
Japs were on their way via the Mombi Track. The camp was soon 
filled, however, as other troops came back from Moreh. At this 
stage, morale was excellent and everyone seemed imbued with the 
idea of becoming infantry. It was therefore with mixed feelings that 
the Company quitted Shenam for Imphal and occupied part of 


* Brief History of the K.G.V'sO. Bengal Sappers and Miners, R.LE., (August 1939- 
July 1946), by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 80. 


328 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


“Prawn” Box just outside the town.” Pearson mentions also 332 
Field Park Company which was part of the General Reserve Engineer 
Force (G.R.E.F.) engaged in making a new Tamu Road through 
to the Chindwin. This unit withdrew to Shenam when the Japanese 
flood broke through and did much valuable patrol work before 
being transferred to Imphal. 68 and 71 Field Companies also took 
part in the defence of Shenam. From the day that the 37th Brigade 
of the 23rd Division took over, the troops occupying the *‘Scraggy”, 
*‘Malta” and “Gibraltar” boxes along the road had little respite from 
shelling by day and jitter raids or assaults by nights. On one day in 
March, 250 shells fell on “‘Malta’’; and on another, 100 shells crashed 
onto “Gibraltar” in the space of an hour. The trenches were inade- 
quate and casualties heavy. It is recorded that nearly fifty casualties 
were carried out of the battle each day until 68 and 71 Field Com- 
panies revetted and improved the defences. On July 24th, when the 
tide had turned and “‘Nippon’’ fell to the Seaforth Highlanders, a 
Lance-Naik of 68 Field Company coolly reconnoitered six Jap bunkers 
on the reverse slope from a distance of 15 yards. He then placed his 
charges and blew in all six. “It was such episodes’, remarks Lieut.- 
Colonel Doulton,? “that built up the mutual respect between the 
British and Indian troops of the 23rd Division.’’ Again, on July 
26th, after an attack by a Mahratta battalion had failed, a detach- 
ment of 71 Field Company showed great gallantry. The Japs had a 
machine-gun only fifty yards away and were spraying the Sappers 
with bullets. Yet the men persisted in their efforts to form a road- 
block of tar barrels and anti-tank mines. These are but two of the 
many instances of the gallantry shown by the Sapper companies. 

The story of 422 Field Company on the Tamu Road is worthy 
of record. This unit of the Madras Sappers, under Major J. E. Ralph, 
R.E., was engaged, early in 1944, on the conversion of the jeep track 
to Sittaung into a road for heavier transport. When the enemy 
advanced in March, the unit was ordered to lay ambushes, carry 
out patrols and act generally as infantry. Accordingly, it moved 
back to the Mombi track and took up a position in some hills to- 
gether with a company of Patiala Sikhs. One day a patrol under 
Jemadar Appa Rao noticed an enemy position in the jungle. The 
Jemadar halted his men 200 yards further along the track and con- 
cealed them on both sides of it. The Japs had seen the patrol and a 
platoon of them came rushing along, shouting ‘Banzai’. Five of 


at ee ee a 





' The Fighting Cock, by Lieut.-Colonel A. J. F. Doulton, 0.B.£., p. 198. 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 329 


them were killed and a number wounded; but the remainder rallied 
and began to spray the jungle with bullets as they advanced, so Appa 
Rao withdrew his men, covered by a Bren gun. 422 Field Company 
soon moved to another position on a small hill overlooking the track. 
Other hills were occupied by our infantry and the Japs wandered 
along the valleys between them, frequently interrupting our supply 
lines. Rations and water were brought forward in jeeps and finally 
man-handled to the tops of the hills, a very exhausting process. At 
night the enemy always sent jitter parties close up to our positions 
and frequently launched small attacks. On one occasion, a Sapper 
sentry, suspecting the presence of some Japs, threw grenade after 
grenade into the jungle till he had emptied two whole boxes. He was 
lucky, for next morning his friends found sixteen bodies and took 
one wounded prisoner. During April, the enemy’s shelling increased 
in volume and his attacks became more vehement. Major Ralph 
was awarded the Military Cross, and Jemadar Appa Rao gained a 
Military Medal for gallantry in repelling an assault. The rumble 
of enemy tanks could be heard every night. It was decided that the 
Brigade should withdraw to the Shenam Saddle. This was accomplished 
successfully and all the small hills above the road were soon 
thick with troops. 422 Field Company was located on ‘“‘Water Tank 
Hill’? about half way along the defended stretch of road. The most 
advanced position in the Tamu direction was “‘Scraggy’’. Then came 
‘‘Malta’”’ and Gibraltar’, and, 2 miles behind ‘‘Scraggy’’, the lofty 
“Recce Hill’, encircled by the road and forming the heart of the 
defence. In rear were ‘““Water Tank Hill” and ‘Brigade Hill’*, with 
‘Patiala Ridge’ and ‘‘Signal Hill’? to the north and “Sapper Hill’, 
“Punjab Hill’, ‘Seaforth Hill” and ‘‘Gurkha Ridge” to the south. 
Altogether, a most elaborate lay-out. The defence of the Saddle was 
a ‘dog-fight’ from beginning to end. The roar of artillery was inces- 
sant, and little sleep was possible in the forward positions. But although, 
during May, the Japanese succeeded in occupying several of the 
more exposed Jocalities, their hopes of reaching Imphal by the Tamu 
Road were shattered before the middle of June. By that time, how- 
ever, 422 Field Company was no longer at Shenam, for itjhad left 
the Tamu Road before the end of May and was working on the 
road to Ukhrul. 

Meanwhile, the 23rd Division, based on Imphal, had been filling 
the unenviable role of the old-time maid of all work, ready to help 
anyone, anywhere, in any emergency and at short notice. The Indian 
Engineer units under Lieut.-Colonel A. G. P. Leahy, R.E., were 68 


330 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Field Company (Bengal) under Major W. F. Towell, R.E., 71 Field 
Company (Bengal) under Major F. W. Pritchard, R.E., 91 Field 
Company (Bombay) under Major J. S. Beddows, R.E., and 323 Field 
Park Company (Madras) under Major T. W. I. Hedley, R.E. 68 
Field Company had been working near Wangjing on tank crossings 
for the road to Shuganu and over the Thoubal River, and when the 
enemy began to advance, it dug in at Thoubal. 71 Field Company 
was on the Imphal-Ukhrul Road beyond Litan, 15 miles from Ukhrul, 
and proceeded with the 49th Brigade down the Tiddim Road to help 
the 17th Division. 91 Field Company, having moved from Shuganu 
to Waithou on March 3rd, began to make a defensive position at 
that spot. 323 Field Park Company, stationed in Imphal, was excep- 
tionally busy. When the men of that unit first surveyed the area 
allotted to them their hearts must have sunk for it consisted mostly 
of two hillsides so steep that they could be climbed only by clinging 
to bushes. The rest was a stretch of paddy about 30 yards wide. 
However, they did not despair and by digging night and day they 
excavated a maze of dug-outs and galleries so intricate that visitors 
often got lost in it. Indeed, it is said that one guest, who had come 
to dinner, re-appeared an hour later at another entrance bewildered, 
earthy, perspiring and very hungry. The Company had to improvise 
almost everything. Among other jobs it was ordered to produce an 
explosive charge sufficiently powerful to demolish a Japanese bunker 
yet light enough to be carried by an assault party. The bunkers were 
known to be very formidable. Usually, they were roofed with two 
layers of heavy logs covered by six feet of earth. After long experi- 
ment, a suitable charge was produced from sheet iron, old 
tins and some explosive which was supposed to be plastic but 
required much kneading to make it so. The Sappers employed on 
this job were not to be envied. They suffered severely from headaches 
as they worked like bakers day after day in an atmosphere of nitro- 
glycerine fumes. 

The Ukhrul region was the scene of heavy fighting during March 
1944 after General Roberts had been obliged to send two of his 
brigades to the Tiddim Road. The 49th Brigade left Ukhrul on 
March 16th on relief by a battalion of the 50th Parachute Brigade 
which had been summoned from Kohima with all speed. A column 
of the 31st Japanese Division was advancing rapidly on Ukhrul, 
and on March 22nd the Parachute Brigade and a Mahratta Battalion 
were surrounded at Sangshak, 8 miles to the south. The task allotted 
to this brigade was to hinder the enemy advance on Kohima from 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 33] 


Homalin on the Chindwin, but the initiative rested with the Japanese. 
The Sangshak ‘Box’ was so small that supply by air was hardly 
possible, and consequently on March 26th, the brigade was ordered 
to break out in small parties and make for Imphal. This it did, and 
the remnants reached their destination by devious ways through the 
jungle. The brigade had certainly caused the enemy considerable 
delay, but its withdrawal exposed the Imphal-Kohima Road. The 
31st Japanese Division, having occupied Ukhrul, Sangshak and 
Litan, handed them over to the 15th Japanese Division and made 
for Kohima, its main objective. Happily, no units of the 23rd Divi- 
sional Engineers were involved in the disaster at Sangshak. 

The time has now come to deal briefly with the desperate struggle 
north of Imphal while the 4th Corps was defending the southern and 
eastern approaches to the town. Early in March it had become 
obvious that the 4th Corps would need reinforcement if seriously 
attacked and that consequently another division should be transferred 
at once to the Manipur front. The choice fell on the Sth Indian 
Division, under Major-General H. R. Briggs, then in Arakan, and 
the move of this formation, mostly by air, began on March 19th 
and finished in the beginning of April. The fly-in of the Division 
was undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements of the war. 
Thousands of men, hundreds of jeeps and mules and tons of equip- 
ment were transported in a few days some 400 miles over the most 
impassable country in the world. An Indian officer and his platoon 
from Arakan found themselves, in less than 24 hours, fighting the 
Japanese north of Imphal. The 123rd Brigade led the way, being 
flown straight to Imphal. The 9th Brigade followed to Dimapur, 
and the 16Ist Brigade, the last to go, reached Kohima from Dimapur 
in the nick of time to reinforce the hard pressed garrison before all 
the exits were cut by the 3lst Japanese Division. Heavy equipment 
and supplies went by road; but if the whole Division had been sent 
by this means it would have taken at least a month to reach the 
northern front. The collection of the necessary aircraft at short 
notice was sanctioned by Lord Mountbatten on his own responsibility. 
The process of emplaning was a triumph of organization. Many 
of the mules objected most strongly to entering a plane. A British 
Sergeant at the Dohazari airfield was heard to remark to an Indian 
comrade ‘ ‘Ere, you puckero ‘is topee while 1 gurm ‘is peachee” (in- 
tended to mean “‘you hold his head while I warm his behind’’) and 
thus a particularly obstinate animal was coaxed up the gangway. 


332 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Once aboard, the mules gave little trouble and were landed in Manipur 
in fine fettle. 

The 161st Brigade joined the first arrivals of the 33rd Indian Corps 
under Lieut.-General M. Stopford at Dimapur. Most of this Corps 
had to be brought from the far side of India, and General Auchinleck, 
the Commander-in-Chief in India, had arranged to rush forward 
the Corps Headquarters, the 2nd British Division under Major- 
General J. M. L. Grover, the 26th Indian Infantry Brigade, two 
regiments of tanks and some other troops. The 2nd British Division 
started on March 24th, but its two leading battalions did not reach 
Dimapur until April 5th. Fortunately, the 7th Indian Division, under 
Major-General F. W. Messervy, was available from Arakan and 
followed the 5th Indian Division northwards by air from April 6th 
onwards. Its 33rd and 114th Brigades were allotted to the 33rd 
Corps at Dimapur while the 89th Brigade went to the 4th Corps at 
Imphal. The 33rd Corps was given three tasks—to prevent the enemy 
from entering the Brahmaputra and Surma Valleys, to keep open 
the Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal Road, and to move to the assistance 
of the 4th Corps in the region west of the Chindwin River. The 
situation, however, was daily becoming more discouraging. The 
toad to Imphal and the Silchar track had already been cut. The 4th 
Corps was, in fact, completely isolated by land. On April 4th, before 
the leading troops of the 2nd British Division could arrive, the 
Japanese opened their attack on Kohima with two regiments and 
gradually pushed back the weak garrison from the outer defences. 
The situation in the north now became critical, for the enemy was 
rapidly bringing against Kohima his entire 31st Division. The rail- 
head at Dimapur was therefore in imminent danger, and not only 
the rail-head but all our lines of communication in Assam. It was 
estimated that if the enemy maintained the speed of his advance he 
might reach Dimapur by April l1th. This would have spelt disaster 
of the first magnitude. 

Kohima was a straggling town of timber huts with corrugated 
iron roofs, perched on the highest part of a sharp ridge five thousand 
feet above the sea and surrounded by patches of cultivation on terraced 
slopes. The wooded hills around were beautiful, the climate invi- 
gorating. But by June 1944, the place was unrecognizable. It had 
become a waste of rubble, bare ridges and blasted trees, and more than 
a thousand graves dotted the slopes. Overlooking it were the remains 
of the Deputy Commissioner’s bungalow and his tennis court which 
had been a No Man’s Land. It is happy to record that the town 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL, 333 


has now been restored and that the dead are buried in a fine cemetery. 
The Reverend R. M. Bennett, who commanded the Ist Battalion of 
the Indian Engineers during the war, revisited Kohima in 1952. 
This is what he writes. “‘The hills are the same cloud-covered heights, 
the Nagas the same friendly people with the same imperishable 
smile. Their flimsy houses, destroyed by gun-fire, have been rebuilt. 
The old telegraph and electric light poles are seen here and there, 
some bent and twisted by shrapnel, others riddled with rifle fire. 
New poles have been made from the chassis of old military vehicles, 
welded together to give the necessary height, and the military-installed 
electric plant works spasmodically, as does the water-pumping plant. 
Kohima has benefited a good deal by the ‘left-overs’ of the war. 
The old military hospital is now a smart and clean civil hospital, 
staffed with Indian and Naga doctors and Naga and Khasi nurses, 
and across the valley is a bright new high-school with about 900 
Naga boys and girls in attendance.’” Thus good has come out of the 
evil which obliterated the settlement in 1944. 

Before the Japanese attack, Kohima was defended only by some 
units of the Burma and Assam Regiments and certain formations of 
administrative troops—perhaps 3,500 men in all. Dimapur was held 
only by administrative and railway troops. Covering positions at 
Jessami and other places to the east and south-east were garrisoned 
by the Assam Rifles. On these fell the first onslaught of the 31st 
Japanese Division and they were soon overwhelmed. Afterwards, 
the Japanese Commander made a mistake that probably affected the 
whole course of the war in Assam and Burma. Instead of containing 
Kohima and pushing on to seize the rail-head at Dimapur, he sat 
down to reduce the garrison of Kohima. With the rail-head in his 
hands he could have starved the 4th Corps into surrender or forced 
it to attempt to cut its way out after abandoning all the stores and 
munitions in Imphal. The leading troops of the 33rd Corps were 
still some distance away, but fortunately the Japanese General 
missed his opportunity. 

On April Sth, after the attack on Kohima had begun, the two 
leading battalions of the 2nd British Division de-trained at Dimapur. 
A battalion of the 16Ilst Brigade of the Sth Indian Division, flown 
from Arakan, reached Kohima on the 6th though too late to prevent 
the enemy from occupying the greater part of the town and its 
vicinity. The other two battalions were halted by enemy opposition 
three miles short of the place. On the 7th, the Japanese captured 
the water-supply, and on the 8th they began a general attack from 


334 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


every direction on the main position where the garrison held out 
grimly until finally driven on to “Garrison Hill’, a height which 
dominated the main road. Here our men, supplied by air, resisted 
assault after assault. Brigadier D. F. W. Warren, who commanded 
the 161st Brigade,' had decided not to attempt to put the whole 
brigade into Kohima and had established a defensive box some two 
miles away to give support by fire. It is impossible in this brief 
narrative to give a detailed account of the gallant defence. The 
names of ‘Garrison Hill’, “*Picket Hill’, “‘Hospital Ridge’, ““Summer- 
house Hill’’, “Naga Village’, ““Church Knoll”, “Kuki Picket’’, “Jail 
Hill”, ““G.P.T. Ridge” and ‘“‘Aradura Spur” are prominent in military 
history. ‘“‘Unforgettable to those who endured the siege was the 
District Commissioner, Mr. Charles Pawsey”’ writes Brett-James.? 
“He lived mostly with Colonel Richards, the garrison commander, 
in a large bunker on Summerhouse Hill and was to be seen, wandering 
through the fighting, dressed in grey flannels and an old trilby hat. 
Day by day he watched his bungalow being shelled and mined. Its 
terraced garden had been gay with flowers. His private tennis court 
became the No Man’s Land of a battle. The Royal West Kents 
held trenches along its upper edge, and before long the Japanese 
had burrowed their way into fox-holes on the lower side. Almost 
hourly, grenade and rifle. duels were fought across the width of this 
court. The position on the slopes of Summerhouse Hill was terribly 
exposed. The wounded could watch the Japanese loading shells into 
their mortars. Many died of gangrene and a few of despair. Burial 
of the dead was almost impossible, and towards the end the stench 
of the corpses became hideous.” 

The garrison was reinforced on April 18th when an Indian battalion, 
supported by tanks, cleared the road from Dimapur and entered 
the defences. ‘‘We must have presented a strange spectacle”, writes 
a survivor. ‘‘Bearded, filthy men, with glazed eyes. Wounded, with 
filthy bandages and pale, grey faces and weak but cheerful grins. 
The entire hill-side was pock-marked with trenches and the trees 
battered by shell-fire and festooned with parachutes.”’ Some desultory 
fighting took place on the 19th, but on April 20th the 6th Brigade 
of the 2nd British Division, coming down the road from Dimapur, 
broke through the last Japanese road-block west of the town and 





* In September 1944, Brigadier D. F. W. Warren succeeded Major-General H. R. 
Briggs in command of the 5th Indian Division. 


9 Ball of Fire, by Antony Brett-James, pp. 311-315, 


euUTyOY Ut Suyaliie juewdinba pue sjuawadi0juIay 





THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 335 


relieved the garrison. Nevertheless, fighting still continued at various 
points. Two brigades of the 7th Indian Division entered the fray 
and distinguished themselves on “‘Jail Hill’’, and later in capturing 
the final enemy stronghold at ‘“‘Naga Village”. During the first half 
of May, the 2nd British Division, with the 33rd and 161st Brigades 
under command and aided by tanks, proceeded steadily with the 
reduction of the outlying enemy positions. The fighting was bitter 
in the extreme and the Division lost 2,500 men. On “‘Jail Hill” there 
now stands a monument with the inscription ‘‘For your tomorrow, 
they gave their today”. It is a fitting epitaph for every soldier who 
died at Kohima. 

The 3lst Japanese Division, recoiling gradually from Kohima, 
clung stubbornly to many points along the road to Imphal, including 
a large supply depot which we had established at Kanglatongbi, 
and the 4th Corps therefore remained entirely dependent on air 
supply. Around Kohima, the Engineer units continued to make 
tracks through precipitous and jungle-covered country to enable 
our tanks to reach and demolish enemy machine-gun nests, and thus 
they saved the infantry hundreds of casualties. The 7th Indian 
Division, released from Kohima, began to carry out an outflanking 
movement to the east along the Jessami track and early in June was 
pressing on towards Ukhrul in heavy rain across mountains 4,000 feet 
high and through roaring torrents. Meanwhile, the 2nd British 
Division had begun to move down the Kohima-Imphal Road. The 
thrust by the 7th Division against the Japanese communications, and 
the operations of the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade further 
to the east, soon began to tell, and June 5th saw the 3lst Japanese 
Division retiring southwards down the road to Imphal with the 
2nd Division close behind it. The assault on Kohima had cost the 
enemy 4,000 dead, and the ‘“‘March on Dethi” had failed. But the 
progress of the 2nd Division towards Imphal was slow and laborious. 
The Japanese defended every defile, and the passage of each obstruc- 
tion on the road necessitated a small battle before the advance could 
be resumed. Thus the link-up of the 2nd Division with the 5th Division 
north of Imphal did not take place for more than a fortnight later. 

As stated in Chapter X, the Sth Divisional Engineers under Lieut.- 
Colonel E. C. R. Stileman, R.E., comprised 2 Field Company (Bengal) 
under Major A. E. Scott, R.E., 20 Field Company (Bombay) under 
Major P. G. Hatch, R.E., 74 Field Company (Bengal) under Major 
D. C. S. David, R.E., and 44 Field Park Company (Madras) under 
Major M. J. P. Keating, R.E. On arrival from Arakan, 44 Field 


336 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Park Company remained in Dimapur. 2 and 20 Field Companies 
helped the R.E. Field Companies of the 2nd British Division at 
Kohima and 74 Field Company went on to Imphal. ‘‘There were 
many new tasks for the Engineers at Kohima” writes Brigadier H. E. 
Horsfield, the Chief Engineer, Fourteenth Army.! “The hills were so 
steep that tanks could not get up them to deal with the Japanese 
resistance points, normally at the top. The Engineers were therefore 
repeatedly called upon to make tracks and haul tanks up the steep 
slopes with bulldozers and tackles. Perhaps the most famous of 
these tasks was getting a tank up “Summerhouse Hill’ as this was 
the deciding point in the battle for the Deputy Commissioner’s 
bungalow and Kohima itself. Many heroic deeds were performed 
also in blowing in Jap bunkers and clearing road-blocks during the 
advance.” It is recorded that 2 Field Company distinguished itself 
on several occasions. On April 7th, a detachment under Lieut. J. W. 
Wright, R.E., was engaged in a successful counter-attack on ‘“‘Jail 
Hill”. The Sappers demolished the walls of some buildings in which 
the Japanese were hiding and after a fierce hand-to-hand encounter 
the enemy fled. No less than 44 Japs were shot as they plunged down 
the hillside. Again, on the 9th, a small party under Lance-Naik 
Abdul Majid attacked with explosives a bakery building in the 
Forward Supply Depot in which a large number of the enemy were 
concealed. The demolition wrecked the building, killing many of 
the occupants outright. The Japanese lost 120 men in this affair and 
the Lance-Naik was awarded the Indian Distinguished Service 
Medal. A Section of 44 Field Park Company, equipped with bull- 
dozers, worked at Kohima in support of the 2nd British Divisional 
Engineers whose bulldozers had not yet arrived. This Section made 
a road up “Gun Spur” to enable our tanks to attack “Church Knoll’, 
almost the last Japanese stronghold, and the bulldozers were employed 
to tow medium tanks into positions from which they could fire on 
the enemy at close range. 

The Engineer units of the 2nd and Sth Divisions were glad indeed 
to welcome their comrades of the 7th Divisional Engineers under 
Lieut.-Colonel T. Wright, R.E., when these arrived in the Kohima 
area in May. The units were 62 Field Company (Madras) under 
Major H. C. Lee, R.E., 77 Field Company (Bengal) under Major 
R. R. L. Harradine, R.E., 421 Field Company (Madras) under Major 





‘“Engineer Operations with the Fourteenth Army, 1943-44", by Brigadier H. B- 
Horsfield, c.p.£., M.c., appearing in The R.E. Journal, December 1945, pp. 241-243. 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 337 


A. Dexson, R.E., and 331 Field Park Company (Madras) under 
Major J. H. Moss, R.E. 62 Field Company was flown straight to 
Imphal; the others operated in the Dimapur-Kohima area. A 
Section of 77 Field Company entered the Kohima perimeter with 
the 33rd Brigade and distinguished itself on May 10th in destroying 
a dominant bunker in an attack on a strong position. Together with 
2 Field Company, 77 Field Company afterwards screened the roads 
out of Kohima against enemy air-raids and lifted mines from the 
Jessami track. On May 29th, two days before the Kohima area was 
finally cleared, the unit again attacked some Japanese bunkers. On 
this occasion the Brigade Commander wrote that, in his opinion, 
troops of such calibre had every right to consider themselves among 
the finest in the world. No higher tribute to the Corps of Indian 
Engineers could be desired. 

After Kohima, some of the Sapper units followed the disheartened 
enemy down the Imphal Road, lifting mines, removing road-blocks, 
bridging streams, clearing land-slides and arranging diversions for 
the passage of transport, while others accompanied the 7th Indian 
Division towards Jessami. 421! Field Company found the Jessami 
track a sea of mud. ‘‘The break-out from Kohima was impressive’, 
writes Lieut.-Colonel Frank Owen.! ‘“‘The road to Imphal is carved 
out of a cliff and can be commanded from a hundred positions. The 
difficulty of fighting across this terrain was multiplied by the arrival 
of the monsoon. From the end of April onwards, it rained hard 
every day. For every two steps a man climbed up a hillside he slipped 
back one. The mud and the monsoon, however, increased the strain 
on the weak Japanese supply organization. The Japs still got their 
rations, but their ammunition began to run short. Not that their 
resistance failed. At Viswema, a five days’ delaying battle took place. 
At Maram, the dash of the Worcesters captured in 36 hours a Jap 
position designed to hold for ten days. Meanwhile, the 7th Division, 
having severed all enemy communications between the enemy's 
bases along the Chindwin River and his troops on the Imphal Road, 
turned westwards and rejoined the 2nd British Division. General 
Briggs’ 5th Indian Division and General Gracey’s 20th Indian Division 
were already fighting their way northward from the Imphal Plain 
to meet the relieving forces, and the enemy was now everywhere on 
the defensive. His greatly reduced forces were streaming along the 
Imphal Road, though their grip at either end of it was being broken. 





» The Campaign in Burma, by Lieut.-Colonel Frank Owen, 0.B.F., p. 106. 


338 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


What would happen next? The British leaders planned to destroy 
the crack Japanese divisions so that the reconquest of Burma might 
begin, and the annihilation operation was based upon a plan agreed 
between the 4th and 33rd Corps Commanders. Neither had over- 
looked the importance of Ukhrul, the enemy’s great mountain base, 
and already Brigadier Perowne’s 23rd L. R. P. Brigade was moving 
upon Ukhrul’s line of communication in a wide hook. At noon on 
June 22nd, the jaws of the Fourteenth Army snapped together on 
the Imphal-Kohima Road when the leading echelons of both Corps 
met at Milestone 100, a few miles north of Imphal. From there, the 
two Corps Commanders set in motion the second operation. Brigades 
of the 7th Division drove eastwards to Ukhrul while units of the 
20th Division pressed on north-eastwards along the Imphal-Ukhrul 
axis. Perowne’s columns had already closed in from the north. 
Ukhrul’s fate was sealed and it became in due course the biggest 
burial ground for Japanese in the length and breadth of Manipur.” 
The junction of the 4th and 33rd Corps north of Imphal on June 
22nd, 1944, was not effected without heavy fighting. At Kanglatongbi, 
15 miles from Imphal, there was a ‘Box’ in which, on April 7th, 
the only combatant troops happened to be two Field Companies 
of Indian Engineers and a company of Assam Rifles. The other 
occupants—some 10,000 men in all—consisted of administrative 
troops and camp followers. The enemy advanced rapidly to seize 
this depot, but in co-operation with three companies of the West 
Yorkshires from Imphal, the Sappers and Assam Rifles evacuated all 
the non-combatants and stores and made a successful withdrawal. 
Operations were soon in progress along the Iril Valley to the north- 
east where the 9th and 123rd Brigades of the 5th Division, and the 
89th Brigade of the 7th Division, fought at Nungshigum, Molvom, 
Mapao and elsewhere. 20, 62 and 422 Field Companies were con- 
cerned in these battles. On May 28th, 62 Field Company erected an 
aerial ropeway over the Imphal Ture/ (stream), and three days later, 
constructed a mule track, 4,000 yards long, to a height above Mapao. 
Next, it built a 210-feet suspension bridge over the stream before 
moving in the middle of June to the Kohima Road shortly before 
the junction of the 4th and 33rd Corps. Afterwards, it assisted the 
23rd L.R.P. Brigade. 422 Field Company provided a Double Bailey 
bridge, 160 feet in length, across the Iril River at Sawambong. This 
was a remarkable achievement as the men had had no previous 
experience of Bailey bridging; but every part of the structure was 
found to fit perfectly and it was soon in use by tanks. In the middle 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 339 


of July, the Company built a fine timber trestle bridge of 15 spans 
across the Thoubal River, and later on it bridged the flooded Iril 
River several times. When the supply of explosives was exhausted, 
the Sappers used Japanese shells for demolition work on roads. 

We must hark back now to the beginning of April 1944 to describe 
the struggle on the Tiddim Road which followed the safe arrival of 
the 17th Indian Division in Imphal. The situation at that time was 
menacing. In the north, the enemy held Kanglatongbi on the Kohima 
Road, a spur east of Molvom, some high ground towards Mapao 
and an area further to the west. North-eastwards, the enemy had 
overrun most of the Iril Valley and the country between Nungshigum 
and Ukhrul. To the south-east and south, he was established at 
Tengnoupal on the Tamu Road and at Ningthoukhong on the Tiddim 
Road and was patrolling the tracks to the west of the latter. To counter 
these threats to Imphal, the greater part of the Sth Indian Division 
was disposed north-east of the town along the Iril Valley, the 23rd 
Indian Division was on the Tiddim Road, most of the 20th Indian 
Division held the Shenam Saddle facing Tengnoupal on the Tamu 
Road, and the 17th Indian Division, based on Imphal, patrolled 
westwards and blocked the Kohima Road north of Sengmai. On 
April 17th, the 17th Division took over from the 23rd Division the 
defence of the Tiddim Road, having under command the 32nd 
Brigade of the 20th Division which was ordered to prevent the enemy 
from pushing northwards across the Silchar track. 

The 33rd Japanese Division under Major-General Tanaka—perhaps 
the best division in the Japanese Army—had followed boldly from 
Tiddim. Tanaka planned to move northwards through Tairen- 
pokpi on the Silchar track and strike at Imphal from the west. 
But to accomplish this manoeuvre safely, he had first to capture 
Bishenpur. On the 17th, one of his regiments dug in south of Tairen- 
pokpi, and a few days later another approached Buri -Bazar only 
10 miles from Imphal. By April 26th, the Japanese were around 
Bishenpur in considerable strength. They attacked strongly at Mile-~ 
stone 21 for several days but were repulsed by the 32nd Brigade and 
the road to Imphal was then re-opened for transport. Heavy fighting 
developed on May 8th at Potsangbam, south of Bishenpur, where the 
63rd Brigade held all attacks in a welter of rain and mud. However, 
by the end of the month there were definite signs that the tide was 
turning. The Japanese were short of food, although they still hoped 
apparently that starvation on the British side might yet bring them 
the prize of Imphal; but General Scoones had taken the precaution 


340 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


of evacuating more than 50,000 non-combatants from the beleaguered 
town to guard against such a catastrophe. Nevertheless, while the 
road to Kohima remained closed and all supplies had to be brought 
by air, a crisis developed in Imphal at the beginning of June. The 
4th Corps needed 16,000 tons of food, ammunition and petrol 
monthly, and during May, owing to bad weather, only 5,000 tons 
were delivered. Reserve stocks had fallen to two weeks’ supply of 
food on a reduced scale and only one week’s supply of petrol, and 
the reserve of ammunition was perilously low. And at this critical 
juncture, Mountbatten was ordered to release six Dakota squadrons 
for the invasion of Europe! He protested vigorously, and fortunately 
the order was countermanded. The Dakotas continued to operate, 
the weather improved, and so the crisis passed. 

Stiff fighting followed around Ningthoukhong on the Tiddim Road. 
Both sides used their armour and the enemy increased his artillery 
fire. Towards the end of June, when the Kohima Road had been 
opened, the 5th Division was freed for action on the Tiddim Road 
in co-operation with the 17th Division. While the latter attacked 
southwards, the Sth Division cleared the area north of the Silchar 
track. For weeks the Japanese had been feeding almost entirely on 
small quantities of rice. They were dying by hundreds from the 
ravages of beri-beri, dysentery and malaria. Every day, scores com- 
mitted suicide. In some places, the ground was carpeted with rotting 
bodies which had to be pushed into mass graves by our bulldozers. 
Yet the men of the 33rd Japanese Division continued to sit till the 
last moment in their water-logged trenches and withdrew only to 
occupy other positions in rear. No one will ever know how many 
Japanese perished in the battles of the Imphal Plain; but as a con- 
servative estimate the figure may be put at 30,000 men between the 
middle of March and the middle of June 1944 while our losses amounted 
to less than 13,000 killed, wounded and missing. About 10,000 dead 
Japanese were actually counted by the 4th Corps. 

Fighting stubbornly, the Japanese were not ejected from Ning- 
thoukhong and Kha Khunou until July 16th and then only after 
a terrific concentration of artillery fire followed by a massive infantry 
assault. Kha Khunou was utterly destroyed. Pursued now by the 
Sth Division, the enemy retreated towards the Manipur River and 
Tiddim. At first, the withdrawal was very slow. Then, repeated 
air-strikes and tank attacks had their effect and the pace increased. 
Our guns were hauled up precipitous hillsides to bear on the Japanese 
Positions, and the Sappers cut paths through the jungle. Huge craters 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 341 


in the road were encountered at awkward bends. Every bridge had 
been blown. Enormous landslides had to be cleared. In one stretch 
of six miles there were fourteen landslips. Felled trees blocked the 
road. Vehicles sank to their axles in the mud. Beyond the Manipur 
River crossing at Milestone 126 the road was hardly passable even 
for jeeps until the Sapper companies set to work on it. Their labours 
along the Tiddim Road were stupendous, and no account of the defence 
of Imphal would be complete without a proper recognition of their 
contribution towards the defeat of the enemy. 

Among the 17th Divisional Engineer units on the Tiddim Road 
was 92 Field Company (Bombay) under Major J. H. Clark, R.E., 
which had arrived at Bishenpur with the 32nd Brigade from Wangjing 
on April 18th. The brigade had been detailed to hold the approaches 
to Imphal for a time while the 17th Division withdrew to re-organize. 
A “Brigade Box’’ was therefore established on a steep jungle-covered 
hill between the enemy and the junction of the Silchar track with 
the Tiddim Road, while behind the junction was a ‘“‘Gunner Box’’. 
For two months, during which battles raged unceasingly around 
Ningthoukhong and Potsangbam, 92 Field Company held part of 
the perimeter of the Brigade Box in addition to searching for mines, 
patrolling and supporting tanks in assaults. The chief task, however, 
was to keep the communications open by minor bridging and making 
diversions where necessary. When the Japanese began to infiltrate past 
Bishenpur along a high ridge to the west, two battalions were sent 
up to a pass, where the Silchar track crossed the ridge, to occupy 
“Wireless Hill’? and ‘“‘Hampton Hill’? overlooking the pass. The 
locality between these peaks was known as ‘‘Road Head” because the 
track beyond it had been destroyed. ‘Wireless Hill’? was commanded 
by another peak to the south which was held by the enemy, and this 
area became the scene of many attacks and counter-attacks. Even- 
tually, one of the battalions called for tanks. Grant tanks had 
climbed with great difficulty to “‘Road Head’’, but there appeared to 
be no feasible route up the steep and jungle-covered sides of ‘‘Wireless 
Hill’’. Nevertheless, 92 Field Company set to work on April 18th and 
before dusk a whole troop of heavy tanks reached the summit while 
the noise of their engines was drowned by air craft flying overhead. 
The track was made as follows. From an adjacent hill, Clark chose 
the most likely spur for an alignment and then made a rapid recon- 
naissance of it with an Abney level. Next, having ascertained the 
steepest slope which the weakest tank could climb, he placed his 
men along the selected spur to demolish the jungle to a width of 


342 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


15 feet. All went well except that one stretch of 40 yards proved 
too steep and required intensive pick and shovel work by relaysof 
men so that it was late in the afternoon before the weakest tank 
could be coaxed up it. When the Japs attacked that night, they were 
blinded by the headlights of the tanks and slaughtered by machine- 
guns. They were taken completely by surprise and the battle was 
quickly over. This is quoted as one of the many instances in which 
units of the Indian Engineers helped to bring tanks into action in 
seemingly impossible positions. Improvization and more improvi- 
zation was the order of the day. There was an apt saying ‘“‘The 
difficult can be done at once: the impossible will take a little longer’. 
The Sappers set out to prove its truth. 

On the Tiddim Road, in May 1944, the 48th Brigade of the 17th 
Division was sent round behind the enemy’s positions at Potsangbam 
to make road-blocks at Milestone 33, south of Torbung, and to 
occupy some commanding features from which it could harry the 
enemy’s communications. It was then to fight its way back up the 
road to meet another brigade. 70 Field Company was engaged in 
this affair. ‘‘We were behind the Jap lines for a little over two weeks” 
writes the Revd. R. T. Urwin, then a subaltern in the Company.' 
“‘We were supplied by air, but sometimes it seemed as though most 
of our food fell among the Japs and we were left only with mule 
fodder. After the road-blocks had been held for a week and we 
had inflicted severe casualties on the enemy, we began to force our 
way back towards Imphal. It had become clear that the other brigade 
would be unable to meet us and so we withdrew towards the remainder 
of the Division, clearing the Japs out of each village as we came to 
it. On one occasion, some of our tanks were expected from the Imphal 
direction, but at dusk we were surprised to hear enemy tanks appro- 
aching from the Tiddim side. Three of them came to within 70 
yards of our position and for a time kept up a heavy fire on us. At 
dawn, however, only one withdrew as the others had been destroyed 
by the Japs after they had struck mines. The monsoon had now 
started and water was creeping into our slit trenches. We occupied 
that position for only two nights, but by the end of the second night 
the trenches were completely flooded.” 

Throughout most of June, the 17th Division held the enemy on 
the Tiddim Road and 70 Field Company had many skirmishes. On 
June 28th, the Sth Division came up to clear the enemy from the 





1 Notes of the Revd. R. T. Urwin, dated November 7th, 1951. 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 343 


Silchar track and 2 Field Company made mule tracks and swept 
mines. 70 Field Company took part in the final battles for Bishenpur 
and frequently assaulted bunkers under heavy shell fire. The battle 
for Kha Khunou was won on July [6th, leaving the place nothing 
but a wilderness of water-logged craters, shell holes and sticky mud 
with not a house nor tree standing. Afterwards, the Engineer units 
moved down the Tiddim Road as far as the fork to Moirang and 
then returned to Imphal with the 17th Division, and later to Ranchi 
in Assam, while the 5th Division took the lead. The Sth Divisional 
Engineers had a sticky job in every sense of the word. In front of 
the advancing troops were huge craters, mile upon mile of mud, 
steep ascents and descents, and the Manipur River swollen by rain 
into a roaring torrent. The enemy disputed every inch of the way. 
Narrow paths had to be cut to enable our tanks and artillery to climb 
the thickly wooded slopes so that their guns could be brought to 
bear on the Japanese positions, and, as the road became more preci- 
pitous, both tanks and artillery had to be winched up the _hill-sides. 
Already the 5th Division had to be supplied largely by air, and the 
time was not far distant when all supplies had to be sent by plane 
and dropped by parachute. The Sappers set the pace of the advance. 
Across the larger craters they built Bailey bridges. Huge landslides, 
with the consistency of porridge, blocked the road. Again and again, 
with explosives and bulldozers and followed by labour gangs with 
picks and shovels, the Sapper units remade the surface so that the 
transport could flounder ahead. After Milestone 100, the number 
of land-slides increased. At Milestone 112 a bulldozer of 2 Field 
Company began to slip down a land-slide towards a precipice below; 
but the Company officers, following it down, managed to attach a 
rope to it and make the rope fast to a tree just as the machine was 
on the point of toppling over into the abyss. 

By the end of July 1944, the Imphal Plain had been completely 
cleared and General Slim had re-grouped the formations of the 
Fourteenth Army. The 4th Corps now consisted of the 5th and 17th 
Indian Divisions, while the 33rd Corps comprised the 2nd British 
Division, the 7th, 20th and 23rd Indian Divisions, the 50th Parachute 
Brigade, 23rd L.R.P. Brigade, 254th Indian Tank Brigade and 3rd 
Commando Brigade. Under the Army Command was a Lushai 
Brigade which was doing good work around Tiddim in disorganizing 
the communications of the retreating 33rd Japanese Division. The 
4th and 33rd Corps were under orders to pursue the enemy without 
respite in two main thrusts southwards which were to unite at 


344 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Kalemyo, the 4th Corps advancing along the Tiddim Road to break 
the 33rd Japanese Division while the 33rd Corps pushed through Tamu 
and down the Kabaw Valley and drove the remnants of the [5th 
and 31st Japanese Divisions across the Chindwin. Ukhrul had fallen 
to the 7th Indian Division and the 23rd L.R.P. Brigade early in the 
month. But the plan of campaign was not merely to drive the enemy 
back across the Chindwin; he was to be followed without pause 
into the Mandalay Plain and there brought to decisive battle before 
he could reorganize. It seems that General Kimura, the Commander 
of the Fifteenth Japanese Army, still thought that fighting on a large 
scale would not be attempted in the frontier mountains during the 
rains and expected to be able to retain control of the Mandalay 
Plain until the next monsoon. Then, when the Fourteenth Army 
had wasted away sufficiently through being bogged down in the wet 
zone at the end of a 400-mile supply route, he would launch another 
massive counter-offensive, supplied from large dumps which he had 
established around Mandalay. He needed time to complete his 
strategic dispositions, but he was allowed none. His two fatal 
mistakes were to imagine that General Slim would desist from opera- 
tions during the monsoon and to underestimate the enormous advant- 
ages conferred on the Fourteenth Army by domination of the air. 

After the fall of Ukhrul, a strong Japanese force held out for a 
time on the Imphal-Ukhrul Road, but by July 14th it had been 
encircled and wiped out. While the 33rd Japanese Division retreated 
before the 4th Corps down the Tiddim Road towards the Manipur 
River crossing, the 33rd Corps made steady progress down the Tamu 
Road and a brigade of the 2nd British Division entered Tamu on 
August 2nd. The scene there was indescribable. Unburied corpses 
lay among abandoned guns, tanks and vehicles. Skeletons sat at the 
wheels of burnt-out wagons. The wounded had been left to die of 
starvation unless able to commit suicide in the usual Japanese manner. 
Tamu was a charnel house, but its possession gave us great advant- 
ages. It afforded an entrance to the Kabaw Valley and access to 
the tracks leading eastwards to Sittaung and southwards to Kalemyo. 
In fact, it opened the door to the banks of the Upper Chindwin. 

The 23rd Divisional Engineers excelled themselves in the advance 
from Shenam. For instance, on July 26th they found that 200 yards 
of the road near Lokchao had vanished down the hillside; but by 
midday on the 27th they had excavated, on the Shenam side of the 
break, a 1 in 23 incline down which vehicles were lowered by winches 
to a track leading up to the road beyond the gap. Facilis descensus 


_ Agrgchep Khat 


*Tairenpokpi © Terapu 


Sich how eer 


uF. 
we 


ohwa S\pahi o 
p POTSANGBAM 
poked roupohos 


Sadyo  KpenS B WINETHOUK HONE 


Laimanai ' Kha Xhunow 


— a Skuage 


\ 





Reproduced by permission of 
The West Yorkshire Regiment 


THE DEFENCE OF IMPHAL 345 


Averno. It was easy to go down to the muddy bottom, but there 
was no return that way. Ammunition and stores were slid down a 
chute. Petrol drums were rolled down. By dint of working night and 
day in pouring rain and a howling gale, the Sappers kept the road 
open and supplies moving forward. On July 31st, a battalion of 
Mahrattas crossed the swirling waters of the Lokchao by using as 
a footway the two remaining cables of the suspension bridge, and 
after it had gone forward to attack the enemy, 94 Field Company 
provided an aerial ropeway and then a Bailey bridge for the passage 
of the 5th Brigade to Moreh and Tamu. 

The Reverend R. M. Bennett gives a picture of the Imphal region 
as he saw it in 1951, seven years later. “Imphal itself is the same 
straggling town of many villages and is said to be the largest in 
Assam; but you would never know it because the hamlets are tucked 
away in bamboo groves as they always were. As at Dimapur, 
nature has overtaken the sites. Bamboo and jungle vine have worked 
their way through every camp site and across many of the roads. 
There is little left to indicate what was once an enormous tented 
city. As for Kanglatongbi, you would recognize it only if someone 
told you it was there. Of the camps and installations, not a vestige 
remains. The Imphal-Silchar track is no longer ‘jeepable’, though the 
Tamu-Palel Road still exists, as do the bridges we built at Lokchao 
and Tamu. The military cemetery at Kohima is the most beautiful 
I have ever seen. A whole hillside has been set aside for it and 
terraced step by step. When I was there, the slope was covered with 
poinsetta trees in full bloom and the cemetery with wild roses, 
cannas and lantana. Above the acres of British dead were still further 
acres of Indian dead, comrades in death as in war. The Imphal 
military cemetery was also beautifully kept, with cultivated flowers in 
a sea of green lawns. It is comforting to know that the resting-places 
of our dead, so far from their native lands, are so well cared for.”’ 

So, as the tide of battle ebbed away in the autumn of 1944, peace 
returned gradually to war-torn Imphal; but only gradually because 
the town remained for some months an all-important forward base 
for the vast counter-offensive into Burma. The victorious Fourteenth 
Army had yet to cross the Manipur River, the Chindwin and the 
great Irrawaddy before it could give the coup-de-grace to Japanese 
aggression, and with it went those many units of the Indian Engineers 
without whose help it could never have attained its goal. 


CHAPTER XII 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY, 


AUGUST 1944 - MARCH 1945 


Y August 1944, the end of the war in Burma was in sight. Out- 

fought, out-manoeuvred and out-numbered on land and sea and 

overwhelmed in the air, the Japanese were everywhere on the 
retreat. Their Fifteenth Army, the invaders of Manipur, was dis- 
integrating. The remnants of their 18th Division, opposed to General 
Stilwell’s  American-Chinese troops in the north, had fallen back 
towards Bhamo, and Stilwell had occupied the railway terminus at 
Myitkyina and was approaching Mogaung on the “‘Railway Corridor” 
between Myitkyina and Katha.! Further eastwards, the main Chinese 
forces had crossed the Salween River in May and were advancing 
slowly through the mountains of Yunnan towards the Burma frontier. 
On the Manipur front, the 20th Indian Division and the 23rd L.R.P. 
Brigade had recaptured Ukhrul and straddled the escape route of 
the 3ist Japanese Division. The 23rd Indian Division, and the 2nd 
British Division from Kohima, had pursued the 15th Japanese 
Division from Palel to the Chindwin. The newly arrived 11th East 
African Division was pushing down the Kabaw Valley towards 
Kalewa and eastwards towards Sittaung, and the 17th Indian Division 
was forcing the redoubtable 33rd Japanese Division to withdraw step 
by step down the Tiddim Road where the last Japanese crossed the 
Indo-Burma frontier at Milestone 75 on August 25th.2  Reinforce- 
ments of men and material were now reaching the Fourteenth Army 
in considerable numbers. On the other hand, General Kimura, the 
Japanese Commander-in-Chief, had been informed by Tokyo that 
he could expect no outside help. His position was almost desperate. 
Strafed from the air, harried on the ground, reduced by starvation 
and disease and with casualties mounting daily, the Japanese armies 
faced annihilation. Beri-beri, malaria and dysentery were rampant 
among them. Our doctors reported the discovery of groups of dead, 


———— — —- * 
ae $$$ — 


' See the map of Upper Burma included in Chapter XIII. 


# See the maps of the Tiddim Road, Chindwin River Area, in Chapter IX, and the 
Tiddim Road. Milestones 32 to 83, in this chapter. 


346 


JHE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 347 


each man with a little bag of rice which he could not digest. Many 
of the living were too weak to carry out the normal Japanese practice 
of killing their seriously wounded or sick comrades, and few of the 
latter were strong enough to commit suicide. The country reeked with 
the stench of decomposing bodies. Hundreds polluted the streams 
and rivers. And so, through a welter of rain, mud and filth, the 
liberation of Burma was begun. 

The assistance afforded by Stilwell in the far north was a notable 
feature in the general scheme, and Stilwell himself a notable character. 
Early in August 1944, during the operations following the capture 
of Myitkyina and Mogaung, the 36th British Division had been 
sent to reinforce him in an advance southwards down the 
“Railway Corridor’ from Mogaung to open the line for traffic. 
When Major-General F. W. Festing, the Divisional Commander, 
contacted Stilwell he found him pondering over some maps in a 
tent. The British General saluted smartly and said “‘Festing reporting 
for duty, Sir’. The American, without looking up, replied “Take 
Taungui”’. So Festing saluted again, turned about, marched out and 
in due course took Taungui, a small railway station on the line 
leading southwards to Hopin. Such was Stilwell. Few could have 
co-operated with him so well as Festing who was a man of deeds 
rather than words. It may be added that the Indian Engineers who 
came under Festing’s command at a later date had the greatest 
confidence in his ability and showed it by their achievements. 

The 4th Corps having been withdrawn to India at the end of July 
1944 for rest and training, the conduct of the general offensive from 
Manipur devolved on the 33rd Corps under Lieut.-General Sir 
Montagu Stopford whose instructions were to pursue the enemy 
along the Tamu and Tiddim Roads, to occupy Sittaung in order to 
deny him the use of the Chindwin River, and to capture Kalewa 
and establish a bridgehead over the Chindwin at that place. Through- 
out September and October, the 11th East African Division made 
steady progress in appalling weather down the Kabaw Valley where 
every chaung had overflowed and inundated large areas. This ‘Valley 
of Death’’ was rampant with malaria and scrub typhus, a disease 
about which little was known at that time, but casualties were 
reduced by spraying the road and camp sites with D.D.T. Behind 
the advancing infantry, the road was made passable for wheeled 
traffic by the unceasing labours of many Engineer formations. On 
September 4th, a brigade occupied Sittaung and established a small 
bridgehead across the Chindwin, and on October 4th the main body 


348 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


captured Yazagyo, half-way down the valley,! and secured several 
tracks leading eastwards to the river. The rain ceased after the middle 
of October, and the [1th East African Division occupied Kalemyo 
on November 15th. That it was able to do so was due in no small 
measure to the labours of a gradually expanding Engineer organization 
called 145 D.C.E. Works (Indian), under Lieut.-Colonel P. O. G. 
Wakeham, R.E., which comprised at the outset three Field Companies 
of Indian Engineers, an Indian Engineer Battalion and some Indian 
Pioneer Companies. 

The story of the Tamu-Kalewa Road is told by Brigadier Wakeham 
in The R.E. Journal.2, In mid-October the single fair-weather track 
south of Tamu was a morass, and the East Africans had to be supplied 
by air. As the monsoon ceased, another fair-weather road was cut 
through the jungle at the rate of four miles a day to carry the sup- 
porting 2nd British Division. This rapidly became the sole line of 
communication for the Fourteenth Army and was used by about 
3,000 vehicles daily. The construction of an all-weather road was 
begun later. The northern section from Tamu to the neighbourhood 
of Kalemyo led down the Kabaw Valley for 76 miles through heavy 
teak forest and dense undergrowth, finishing with tall bamboo. 
Then came the final section eastwards to Kalewa through the rugged 
Myittha Gorge. Work was started in the Kabaw Valley in December 
but was postponed in the Myittha Gorge until April 1945 to permit 
the quarrying and transportation of 75,000 tons of stone required 
for surfacing this 18-mile stretch of mountain road. The new line of 
communication was finished in June 1945 and was undoubtedly 
one of the most remarkable engineering achievements of the war in 
Burma. The field units of the Indian Engineers, though not employed 
on the road during the later stages, had the satisfaction of having 
Started the great project. 

The most spectacular and important employment of the Indian 
Engineer units during the advance into Central Burma was the 
ferrying or bridging of rivers, often in the face of enemy opposition. 
These waterways were the greatest natural obstacles which they 
encountered although the lack of roads presented them also with 
unending problems. Mines and booby-traps had to be cleared, 
airstrips were required to keep pace with the advance; but nothing 





* See the map of Central Burma included in this chapter. 


2“The Tamu-Kalewa Road”, by Brigadier P.O. G. Wakeham, o.B.£., appearing 
in The R.E. Journal, September 1946, pp. 161-188. 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 349 


could exceed in urgency the provision of means for crossing the 
Manipur tributary of the Chindwin, the Chindwin and other tribu- 
taries of the Irrawaddy, and finally the great river itself at several 
places. Here the Sappers filled their true role, and here they showed 
the results of months of careful training in watermanship and dis- 
played those qualities of cool courage under fire for which they were 
and are renowned. It is proposed, therefore, to concentrate chiefly 
on the river crossings during the offensive. 

While the East Africans were progressing down the Kabaw Valley, 
the Sth Indian Division was making a parallel advance southwards 
down the Tiddim Road. By the end of August 1944, it appeared 
likely that the 33rd Japanese Division, opposing the 16lst Brigade, 
would withdraw across the Manipur River at Milestone 126 which 
the brigade might hope to reach in the middle of September. Major- 
General G. C. Evans, the Divisional Commander, had foreseen that 
the flooded river would be a serious obstacle and had therefore 
decided to turn the enemy’s flank in order to avoid an opposed 
crossing. With this end in view he sent the 123rd Brigade back to 
Imphal by motor transport and thence down the east bank to 
Shuganu, whence the brigade marched through mountainous country 
to some heights beyond the Manipur River crossing and thus caused 
the enemy rearguards to withdraw without serious fighting. The 
Sth Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel E. C. R. Stileman, 
R.E., comprised 2, 20 and 74 Field Companies and 44 Field Park 
Company, and it fell to 74 Field Company to supply the Engineer 
element with the detached 123rd Brigade. The Sappers cut mule 
tracks, bridged streams, and helped the infantry to establish and 
hold a road-block on the Tiddim Road some distance beyond the 
river crossing. 2 Field Company, under Major C. W. Williams, 
R.E., was then called upon to span the raging torrent at Milestone 
126 with ferries or bridges to transport the 161st and 48th Brigades 
to the far bank. The first infantry patrols arrived at the site on 
September 14th. The river was 110 yards wide and running at 12 
feet per second with a deafening roar. It seemed that no boat could 
attempt to cross without being smashed to pieces on the jagged rocks 
around which the seething waters swirled. A British officer and 
eleven men tried to cross by boat on September !6th and failed. 
Then 2 Field Company attempted to provide an aerial ropeway and 
this also met with no success. A Sapper set out to swim the river. 
He was swept away and would have been drowned had it not been 
for the gallantry of Jemadar Jahan Dad who jumped in and hauled 


350 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


him to the bank and thus earned the George Medal. Some time 
afterwards, a line was thrown across by attaching it to a 3-inch 
mortar shell. This was hauled in by a few men who had reached 
the far bank in a folding boat. A single cable and a double cable 
followed, and finally a 3-inch wire hawser which had been discovered 
on the spot. On September 19th, a folding boat ferry was installed 
by 2 Field Company, and then another by 20 Field Company under 
Major P. G. Hatch, R.E., and thereafter the ferries averaged ten to 
twelve crossings per hour. On the 20th, 2 Field Company took over 
both ferries. The men had an unenviable task. The river was still 
rising and the current had increased to 17 feet per second. The wire 
hawsers could hardly stand the strain. In one boat, the bollards to 
which the traveller leads were made fast were torn completely out, 
leaving gaping holes in the side through which the water poured. 
A boat capsized and five men were drowned. Five more were drowned 
later. By this time, however, the folding boats were being replaced 
by rafts capable of carrying 9 tons. On September 21st, the river 
rose another 3 feet, but ferrying by raft was now well established 
and a few days afterwards some rafts were coupled together to give 
sufficient deck space for mules, guns and vehicles. Later still, three 
rafts were fastened together and carried four medium tanks across 
in an hour. Ferrying continued at night in the glare of the headlamps 
of a number of vehicles, and by October 4th not only had the 16lst 
Brigade and a number of tanks been carried across but also two 
field hospitals and a mass of equipment of all kinds. The 48th Brigade 
followed. As Antony Brett-James remarks, the 5th Division could 
not have crossed the Manipur River without the rapid work, ingenuity 
and untiring energies of 2 and 20 Field Companies. The Bengal 
Sappers of 2 Field Company and the Bombay Sappers of 20 Field 
Company vied with each other in this notable feat of engineering. 
Major-General Evans having been stricken with scrub typhus on 
September 23rd, the Sth Division was now commanded by Major- 
General D. F. W. Warren. Supplied by air, it made good progress 
along the road to Tiddim. 74 Field Company spanned the raging 
Beltang Lui with a cable-way and then built a Bailey bridge. In an 
attack up the famous “Chocolate Staircase”, a mass of hairpin bends, 
the unit was with the leading troops, clearing the road of mines, 
and when Tiddim was captured on October 18th it began to restore 
the damaged water-supply system. 2 Field Company arrived on the 
Bes am Se ee es Se ee ee I ee ee 


1 Ball of Fire, by Antony Brett-James, p. 370. 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 351 


26th and both units set to work on the repair of the road to Kennedy 
Peak and Fort White.! The enemy positions at ‘Vital Corner’ 
were captured on November 2nd, and those on Kennedy Peak 
(8,871 feet) on November 4th. Meanwhile, the independent 
Lushai Brigade was harassing the enemy south of Fort White. On 
November 13th, the leading troops met those of the 11th East 
African Division at Kalemyo. The task of the Sth Division had been 
completed. It was flown out of Burma for a rest and with it went 
its Engineer units. The main body of the 33rd Corps, led by the 
East Africans, then pushed eastwards through the narrow defile of 
the Myittha River and reached its confluence with the Chindwin at 
Kalewa on December 2nd. 

A new formation had recently appeared at the front. This was 
the 19th Indian Division, under Major-General T. W. Rees, consisting 
of the 62nd, 64th and 98th Brigades. The 4th Corps, under Lieut.- 
General Sir Geoffrey Scoones, had returned from India at the end of 
October and had re-opened its headquarters near Imphal with the 
19th Indian Division and 268th Indian Infantry Brigade under 
command. The 19th Division was to lead the way across the Chind- 
win. Its Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel F. M. Hill, 
R.E., comprised 29 Field Company (Bombay), 64 and 65 Field 
Companies (Madras) and 327 Field Park Company (Madras). The 
Division moved to Tamu and, early in November 1944, set out 
along the track to Sittaung on the Chindwin, all three Field Com- 
panies being employed on road repair and bridging. 65 Field Company 
reached Sittaung on November 13th and began to build bamboo 
rafts for jeeps, and folding-boat rafts for men and animals, while a 
3-inch rope was being put across the river. The 62nd Brigade had 
been detailed to push forward beyond the Chindwin towards Pinlebu 
and at 7.30 a.m. on November 18th it began to cross in two folding- 
boat rafts. Much trouble was experienced with the 9.8 and 22 h.p. 
outboard motors and it was difficult to get the mules aboard; but 
during the day, 65 Field Company managed to carry 170 mules 
across on rafts while the remainder swam. Two platoons went ahead 
with the 62nd Brigade, and the third, gathering experience, rafted 
700 men, 350 mules and 20 jeeps and trailers to the far bank on the 
19th. Two days later, 64 Field Company took over the rafting. The 
motors still gave trouble and the Sappers often had to row the rafts. 


1See the map of the Tiddim Road, Milestone 109 to Kalemyo, appearing in this 
chapter. 


352 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The 62nd Brigade having passed through, it was decided to divert 
the remainder of the 19th Division northwards and accordingly 
64 Field Company joined 29 Field Company at Nanthanyit, upstream 
of Thaungdut. 29 Field Company took the 64th Brigade across at 
this point on December 10th, and on the 11th, 64 Field Company 
began crossing the 98th Brigade and its transport, an operation 
which lasted a week. A Ramped Cargo Lighter (R.C.L.) proved a 
most useful addition to the rafts. This peculiar craft was made of 
wood. It was 52 feet long and drew only 24 feet of water when loaded 
with 25 tons of stores. Power was supplied by two 85 h.p. engines. 
Its components had been transported by road from Dimapur and 
assembled on the banks of the Yu River, south of Tamu, where it 
was launched with the aid of elephants. Thence it had been floated 
down to the Chindwin. It was obvious that the Chindwin would 
become increasingly important as a line of communication south- 
wards, and therefore an Inland Water Transport Service was organized 
and a site for building craft of various sorts was selected at Kalewa. 
Here, in addition to R.C.Ls., steel Unicraft barges and tugs, wooden 
Higgins barges and Eastern Army Boats were produced. The latter 
were pontoon-shaped and 40 feet long, and three of them, formed 
into a raft and decked with Pierced Steel Planking (P.S.P.), could 
carry a load of 30 tons. Hundreds of boats were built during the 
winter of 1944-45 by 536 Artisan Works Company, assisted by 
Forestry Companies, a Workshop Company and native tradesmen. 
The story of the development of the Chindwin fleet is told by Lieut.- 
Colonel D. C. Merry, R.E., in The R.E. Journal.! The fleet served 
to relieve the traffic on the many miles of track which the Indian 
Engineers had to maintain, and its work was therefore of the greatest 
assistance during the advance of the Fourteenth Army. It may be 
interesting to remark that two gunboats, mounting Bofors and 
Oerlikon guns, were eventually built and launched on the Chindwin. 
They were probably the first warships ever constructed by the Army 
for the Royal or Royal Indian Navies. 

Although the ferrying of the 19th Division across the Chindwin 
was a fine achievement, the outstanding exploit on that river was 
the construction of a floating bridge at Kalewa by the 33rd Corps 
Troops Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel F. Seymour-Williams, R.E. 
The units employed on the work were 67, 76 and 361 Field Companies 





*“Development of 1.W.T. on the River Chindwin, 1945”, by Lieut.-Cotonel D. c. 
Merry, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 1947, pp. 235-240. 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 353 


(Bengal), 322 Field Park Company (Bengal), two Bridging Companies 
and some other technical formations. The water-way at Kalewa 
was more than 1,000 feet in width, and equipment was scarce because 
it had to be transported along 310 miles of difficult road from the 
rail-head at Dimapur. The longest floating bridge that had till then 
been built in any theatre of the war was needed to reach the far 
bank. This had been foreseen as early as October when Seymour- 
Williams had begun his planning while at Imphal.! At that time a 
site could be selected only by examining a few inferior aerial photo- 
graphs taken when the river had been in flood in August. These 
showed a 30-feet bank on the near shore and a stretch of soft sand, 
500 yards wide, on the far shore, beyond which there was a road on 
a high embankment. As there was no space for building rafts on the 
near shore, a site for this purpose was chosen 800 yards up the 
Myittha confluent. The 11th East African Division was given some 
folding boats with which to carry out the first assault crossing. 
Unquestionably, the most difficult phase of the scheme was to 
transport the available bridging material from Dimapur to Indainggale, 
a village near Indainggyi a few miles north of Kalemyo. Thence it 
had to be carried a further 21 miles by road to reach the selected 
site at Kalewa. This narrow thoroughfare, cut into the cliffs of the 
Myittha Gorge and damaged by previous heavy traffic, required the 
building of 9 Bailey bridges and 22 timber bridges before it could be 
used with even moderate safety. All the equipment and the Engineer 
troops were marshalled at Indainggale on December Ist, and the 
first Field Company moved off on the 4th. Progress was slow because 
the East Africans had been given priority of traffic. On December 
Sth, Seymour-Williams reconnoitred the Kalewa site under enemy 
artillery fire and designed his bridge which was to have 22 floating 
bays, mostly 42 feet long, in addition to landing bays and ramps. 
The overall length amounted to 1,153 feet. Work was begun early 
on December 6th, and on the morning of the 9th the first floating 
bays were ferried down from the Myittha to the Chindwin and taken 
across to the far bank. Both landing bays were completed the same 
evening. The approach road across the 500 yards width of sand 
on the far bank was covered with sandwich layers of coir matting 
and Sommerfeld track. It was finished by mid-day on the 10th 
while the last floating bay was being rafted into the bridge. Three 





1 “Rridging the Chindwin at Kalewa, December 1944"’, by Colonel F. Seymour- 
Williams, D.s.o., 0.8.£., appearing in The R.E. Journal, June 1946, pp. 139-142. 


354 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


hours later, ‘Grub Bridge’, as it was called, was opened to traffic 
and Lieut.-Colonel Seymour-Williams and Major-General C. C. 
Fowkes, the 11th East African Divisional Commander, drove across 
in a jeep, the first to cross since 1942. ‘“‘Grub” Bridge remained in use 
until replaced a few months later by the “Falls Bridge’, two miles 
further upstream, which had to span no less than 2,000 feet of the 
river when in flood and to allow for a rise of 40 feet in the water- 
level. 

An amusing incident during the Chindwin crossing is described by 
Lieut.-Colonel N. B. Grant, R.E. A 3-ton lorry had broken down, 
bringing a convoy of 100 lorries to a standstill, so a Sapper party 
was sent forward to help. Suddenly, a British officer appeared and 
ordered the Sappers to throw the offending vehicle into the river. 
The driver objected violently and wanted to know how he was going 
to explain the loss of his lorry to his Commanding Officer. Where- 
upon the officer gave the man a note for his O.C. and told him not 
to worry. The note read ‘‘With the compliments of General Slim’’. 

Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Clayton, R.E., who was acting at the time as 
C.R.E. 33rd Corps Troops Engineers, records that there were only 
four spare pontoons when the far bank was reached, and that had 
the bridge (a Class 30) been damaged by floating mines it could 
only have been re-assembled as a Class 18 structure and the traffic 
would consequently have been much restricted.!. A cable boom was 
therefore provided upstream and Bofors guns were mounted to 
destroy mines. Happily, no mines were released by the enemy, 
though floating logs of heavy teak caused some anxiety. A solitary 
enemy bomb damaged two pontoons, but these were quickly replaced. 
The bulldozer drivers of 322 Field Park Company worked conti- 
nuously for 54 hours on the east bank approaches. “Grub” Bridge, 
however, would have been next to useless had it not been for the 
numerous bridges built in the Myittha Gorge. ‘I have particularly 
in mind a Bailey Bridge opened on Christmas Day” writes Clayton. 
This was built round a cliff a few miles south of “Grub” Bridge by 67 
Field Company and had to be launched uphill and into space. It 
was lowered on to a pier built out from the sheer face of the cliff 
and was then cut in the middle and the interval filled with concrete. 
It was not only bent in the middle but rose to an apex on the middle 
pier. The bridge had to be constructed beneath an existing Japanese 
wooden walk-way around the cliff face. This ‘Christmas Bridge” 





—_ 





’ Notes by Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Clayton, R.E., dated June 1953. 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 355 


was probably the most vital one on the line of communication, for 
there was no alternative route except through virgin jungle.” 

An exploit by a platoon of 361 Field Company during the advance 
down the Kabaw and Chindwin valleys in December 1944 should not 
be overlooked. Twelve jeeps with trailers had to be delivered at a 
place on the Chindwin River about 30 miles north of Kalewa, and 
enemy opposition might be expected e route. The only method was 
to raft the jeeps downstream from Tamu, and this was difficult 
because suitable material was scarce. Accordingly it was decided to 
wrap each jeep and trailer in a huge tarpaulin and strap these water- 
tight packages together to form rafts. Each raft was then fitted with 
an outboard motor, and under the command of Lieut. J. A. Palfrey, 
R.E., the expedition set out downstream. It must have been a curious 
sight. Many of the tarpaulins were torn on rocks and the rafts had 
to be beached for repairs; but no jeeps or trailers were lost, the enemy 
did not interfere, and the whole consignment was delivered safely. 
For this remarkable feat, Palfrey was awarded the Military Cross. 

The mastery which the Allies achieved on the Chindwin is shown 
by the manner in which 75 Field Company joined the 4th Corps at 
Kalewa. The unit travelled 139 miles down the river in 8 days ina 
convoy of rafts bringing ferrying equipment which had been used 
at Tonhe. On five folding-boat rafts and a Japanese boat, each 
fitted with an outboard motor and towing a raft made of bamboo, 
were piled masses of bridging stores, Sommerfeld track and petrol 
containers. A motor boat accompanied the flotilla which passed 
Sittaung and Mawlaik and negotiated successfully the whirlpools 
above Kalewa, where it arrived on January 4th, 1945, and moored 
near the ‘‘Grub’’ Bridge. 

By November 1944, many changes had taken place in the higher 
commands in Burma. The American General Stilwell (nicknamed 
“Vinegar Joe’’) being unable to collaborate with the Chinese General 
Chiang Kai Shek, had been recalled to Washington and replaced by 
Lieut.-General D. I. Sultan. Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese had 
arrived to relieve General Sir George Giffard in supreme command 
of the land forces in Burma which comprised General Slim’s 
Fourteenth Army on the Chindwin front, Lieut.-General Sultan’s 
American-Chinese command on the Ledo Road and about Myitkyina, 
and Lieut.-General Christison’s 15th Indian Corps in Arakan. Slim’s 
Corps Commanders were Lieut.-General M. M. Stopford (33rd 
Corps) and Lieut.-General G. A. P. Scoones (4th Corps), but on 
December 8th, Lieut.-General F. W. Messervy, previously commanding 


356 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the 7th Indian Division, took over the command of the 4th Corps 
from General Scoones. 

Lord Mountbatten’s plans for the reconquest of Burma envisaged 
the completion of the Ledo Road, the protection of the “Hump” 
air-route to China, the capture of Mandalay, the destruction of the 
Japanese forces in Central Burma, the clearance of the whole of 
of Arakan, and finally the occupation of Rangoon. Of these, the 
most important was the destruction of the Japanese forces in Central 
Burma, and next, the capture of Mandalay. Both tasks were assigned 
to the Fourteenth Army. After the bulk of the I1th East African 
and 20th Indian Divisions had been ferried across the Chindwin in 
the Mawlaik region, the 2nd British Division crossed at Kalewa 
while the 5th Indian Division was flown out of Burma for a well- 
earned rest. The 19th Indian Division, having crossed the Chindwin, 
then pushed eastwards from Sittaung towards Pinlebu so as to link 
up with the 2nd British Division at Shwebo. General Slim had now 
at his disposal the 2nd British and the Sth, 7th, 17th, 19th and 20th 
Indian Divisions, in addition to two tank brigades and two indepen- 
dent infantry brigades, and he was supported by a very powerful air 
force. He decided to fight the main Japanese concentrations in the 
Shwebo Plain, north of the loop of the Irrawaddy which runs from 
east to west between Mandalay and Pakokku. Therefore, the Four- 
teenth Army was ordered to mass with all speed in the Shwebo 
Plain. On December 8th, the 4th Corps headquarters were moved 
from Imphal to Tamu, and on the Corps front, which lay north of 
that of the 33rd Corps, the 19th Indian Division and the 268th Indian 
Infantry Brigade proceeded to thrust eastwards, according to plan, 
over exceptionally difficult and almost trackless country. On December 
16th, the 19th Division took Pinlebu and Banmauk and made contact 
at Indaw with the 36th British Division of General Sultan’s N.C.A.C. 
Group. It occupied Wuntho on the 19th, Kawlin on the 20th and 
Kokoggon on the 23rd. It seems that the Japanese Commander, 
Lieut.-General Kimura, had ordered his 31st Division to hold the 
Shwebo Plain long enough to enable the remainder of his Fifteenth 
Army to cross the Irrawaddy, after which it would establish itself 
south-west of Mandalay. However, as soon as these intentions 
became apparent, General Slim changed his plans and decided to 
cross the Irrawaddy, even if opposed strongly, and to fight the 
decisive battles on the further side, before the end of February, in 
the plains around Mandalay and the low hills around Meiktila; and 
since he did not possess enough equipment to make a single crossing 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 357 


in overwhelming strength against heavy opposition, he proposed to 
deceive the enemy by crossing, or feinting at crossing, at several 
places. He would first cross in considerable strength north of 
Mandalay in order to entice the enemy in that direction, and would 
then make his main crossings south of the enemy forces guarding 
the Irrawaddy below Mandalay. 

The most ambitious crossing was to be made by the 4th Corps 
after it had been switched with the utmost speed and secrecy from 
the left or northern flank of the Fourteenth Army to the right 
or southern flank. Thus, instead of pushing eastwards from Kalewa, 
this Corps would turn southwards down the Gangaw Valley, moving 
across the rear of the 33rd Corps and seizing a bridge-head over 
the Irrawaddy near Pakokku. Then, with mechanized, armoured 
and partly air-borne forces, it would strike south-eastwards at 
Meiktila and Thazi. These places were key points on the enemy’s 
communications by road and rail from Mandalay to the south. 
They had five good airfields and their capture would isolate most of 
the Japanese forces in Central Burma. Afterwards, when the enemy 
had been defeated, the Fourteenth Army would make a lightning 
thrust to Rangoon. It was hoped that, as the Mandalay battle 
developed, the Japanese defenders of Meiktila might be drawn away 
in that direction and thus simplify the task of the 4th Corps. This 
seemed probable because the 33rd Corps was to secure a bridgehead 
across the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay before the 4th Corps attacked 
Meiktila. General Slim’s chief difficulty was to deploy two complete 
Corps along a single axis of advance—the Imphal-Tamu-Kalewa 
Road—and to disguise adequately his intention to move against 
Meiktila. From Tamu to Pakokku the 4th Corps had to cover 238 
miles of rough road, two feet deep in dust and liable to become 
impassable if rain fell. The distance from rail-head at Dimapur 
to Meiktila was no less than 573 miles. Fortunately, it was possible 
to supplement road and air transport by water transport on the 
Chindwin between Kalewa and Myingyan, a distance of 200 miles. 
From Myingyan to Meiktila, a further 55 miles, there was an all- 
weather road and a railway. The plan evolved by the Fourteenth 
Army Commander met with the success it deserved. The enemy was 
completely deceived and a mortal blow was struck. Everything. 
depended, however, on the ability of the Engineers to get the troops 
rapidly to the banks of the Irrawaddy at several places, and having 
got them there, to ferry them across. 


358 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Let us examine first the operations upstream of Mandalay. As 
early as August 1944, two brigades of the 36th British Division, 
under Major-General F. W. Festing, had begun to march down the 
“Railway Corridor” from Mogaung to Naba Junction, near Katha, 
on the western flank of General Stilwell’s forces to which they were 
attached. On December |6th, as already stated, they made contact 
with the leading troops of the 19th Indian Division coming from 
the west, and shortly afterwards, another brigade arrived from the 
north to complete the establishment at Katha. The 36th Divisional 
Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel P. A. Easton, R.E., comprised 236 
Field Company, R.E., 30 Field Company (Bombay), 324 Field Park 
Company (Bombay) and the 15th Indian Engineer Battalion. These 
units were joined, early in January 1945, by 58 Field Company 
(Madras).! Owing to the state of the Ledo Road, unit transport was 
severely restricted. A Field Company had to be content with a 
single jeep and a trailer, and as all Engineer equipment came by air 
from a dump 190 miles away in Assam, it also was very scarce. 
Personal equipment consisted of what each man could carry on his 
back. The troops marched along earthen tracks which often became 
watercourses under heavy rain. The only method of road repair 
was to make a rough corduroy surface with small logs and brush- 
wood and hope for the best. It was fortunate that some transportation 
could be organized along the single line of metre-gauge railway 
from Myitkyina through Mogaung to Naba Junction, a distance of 
140 miles. A short branch line Jed from Naba to the Irrawaddy at 
Katha while the main line continued southwards through Indaw, 
Wuntho and Shwebo and across the Irrawaddy to Mandalay.? 

The railway between Myitkyina and Katha had been badly damaged 
by our air forces and by the retreating enemy. All the larger bridges 
were down, and long stretches of the track had been torn up. Nothing 
heavier than a fish-plate could be flown in for repair work; yet the 
Sapper units managed to restore the track and build 28 timber bridges, 
and the line was re-opened for traffic in the middle of December. 
The lack of locomotives was met by the employment of jeeps fitted 
with flanged railway wheels. A normal jeep-train consisted of two 
10-ton box-cars coupled to a jeep, the car-load being limited to 





i “Improvisation in North Burma”, by Lieut.-Colonel P. A. Easton, 0.B.E., R.E., 
appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 1948, pp. 210-216. 


® See the map of Central Burma included in this chapter and also the map of Upper 
Burma in Chapter XIII. 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 359 


7 tons. These jeep-trains were not easy to drive. Starting was 
accomplished by engaging low gear, stamping on the throttle and 
letting in the clutch with a bang.! This made the wheels spin madly 
but usually resulted in starting the train. If not, the train had to be 
pushed by gangs of sweating men until it began to move. Stopping 
was even more difficult. The jeep’s brakes being far too weak for 
the job, the train had to be allowed to roll to a standstill against the 
jeep’s engine compression, a process which normally required 500 
yards. It can be imagined, therefore, that a speed limit of 25 m.p.h. 
was most necessary and that driving a jeep-train was very exhausting. 
Later, two locomotives were built by the R.E.M.E. from salvaged 
wagons, British engines and Japanese gear-boxes. These contraptions 
could haul ten loaded wagons, and if going downhill with a following 
wind, could attain a speed of 40 m.p.h. provided the driver was 
sufficiently daring; but in the early days in the ‘Railway Corridor’, 
the jeep ruled the roost. 

The 36th British Division, having cleared the ‘‘Corridor’’ and 
reached Katha on December I|1th, 1944, was ordered to cross the 
Irrawaddy and advance south-eastwards through Mongmit towards 
the old Burma Road in order to threaten Maymyo and Mandalay. 
The Division was split temporarily into two brigade groups. The 
29th Brigade moved downstream and crossed at Tigyaing, some 
30 miles below Katha, while the 72nd Brigade, followed by the 26th 
Brigade, crossed at Katha itself and advanced through forest country 
into the Shan States in the loop of the Shweli River. Both prongs 
made rapid progress against slight opposition. The crossings of the 
Irrawaddy were accomplished easily with the help of rafts made from 
discarded Japanese pontoons or country boats. The Division also 
had a number of American “‘Ranger’’ boats. Both rafts and boats 
were fitted with outboard motors. The crossing of mules was a 
difficult matter, but some were persuaded to swim by dangling from 
the stern of a Ranger boat a tempting nose-bag full of corn. 

The main Japanese stand against the 36th Division was made at 
Myitson on the Shweli River, 30 miles beyond the Irrawaddy and 
about half-way between Katha and Shwebo. This occurred on 
February Ist. The Indian Engineer unit chiefly concerned was 
58 Field Company, under Major H. R. Gregson, R.E., which was 
attached to the 26th Brigade. Forty Ranger boats having been 


1 “Jeep Railway in Burma”, by Lieut.-Colonel P. A. Easton, 0.B.£., R.E., appearing 
in The R.E. Journal, December 1946, pp. 329-332. 


360 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


allotted to the leading battalion, the Sappers inflated them and took 
them to the point of embarkation. Each boat had to carry five 
infantrymen, with their arms and equipment, and three Sappers for 
paddling. The first wave set out at mid-day, and with it went Lieut. 
M. R. Rajwade, I.E. The boats came under fire when half-way 
across and an unsuccessful attempt was made to recall them. The 
crossing was therefore continued, though under increasingly heavy 
fire, until nearly half the battalion was committed. Men and boats 
were now being hit repeatedly. Many boats, out of control, drifted 
downstream with their loads of dead and wounded. Some grounded 
on sandbanks where the last of the wounded met their fate. 
Meanwhile, those of the infantry who had succeeded in landing 
were engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the Japanese in Myitson 
Village. Lieut. Rajwade remained all day, and during the following 
night, in the small bridgehead, collecting the survivors of 58 Field 
Company and arranging for the return of undamaged boats when 
this should become possible. Most of the boats, however, had been 
lost and ammunition was running low. Consequently, at 5.30 a.m. 
on February 2nd, it was decided to evacuate the bridgehead under 
cover of the morning mist and a smoke screen. Rajwade was one 
of the last to return. This he accomplished by swimming the wide 
river. He was rightly awarded the Military Cross, and several of his 
men received Military Medals. The following extract from The 
Historical Records of The Buffs, 1919-1948, regarding the first attempt 
to cross the Shweli River is worthy of note. “For the armed soldier, 
who has a chance to retaliate, the crossing of the river under such 
conditions was, to say the least of it, an extremely unpleasant 
experience; but for the Indian crews it was a cold-blooded task of 
sitting to be shot at, paddling, pushing and shoving off sandbanks, 
without the opportunity to shoot back. The conduct of these Madras 
Sappers was magnificent, and the survivors returned unflinchingly to 
make a second or even a third journey.” 58 Field Company lost 9 
men killed, 16 wounded and 13 missing, believed killed. The opera- 
tion had been a failure, though redeemed by the heroism shown by 
all ranks. But the 36th Division was not to be denied, and a week 
later, a bridgehead was established successfully further downstream 
where 58 Field Company started a ferry service on February 10th. 
30 Field Company (Bombay), under Major D. S. Wilson, R.E., was 
also present and ferried 2,000 men and 50 tons of stores and vehicles 
across in a single day. 58 Field Company was transferred to the 
further bank on February 15th. On March Ist, the Division resumed 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 361 


its advance towards Maymyo, and by April 10th, 58 Field Company 
was installed in that picturesque little hill station. 

Although the 36th Division’s task was important in the general 
scheme, the spearhead of the advance into Central Burma was un- 
doubtedly the 19th Indian Division, under Major-General T. W. Rees, 
which we left on the far bank of the Chindwin after the crossings 
at Sittaung and Nanthanyit in mid-December. The role of the 19th 
Division was to cross the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay in order 
to draw on itself Japanese pressure which might otherwise be employed 
against us in a more vital area—an unenviable task as anyone will 
admit. The Division was to operate in the region south of the 36th 
Division which was coming down from the north to replace the with- 
drawing contingents of the Second Chindit Expedition. An Indian 
Sapper detachment had done fine work for the Chindits during the 
summer of 1944 on the great Indawgyi Lake to the west of Mogaung. 
It was concerned chiefly with building and operating a fleet of most 
peculiar craft to further the evacuation of sick and wounded by 
flying boats. The “Indawgyi Grand Fleet’’ boasted three squadrons, 
each of three “‘Dreadnoughts.*” These were large bamboo rafts 
composed of rubber Ranger boats encased in enormous tarpaulins 
and powered by 22 h.p. outboard motors at the stern. The Ranger 
boats were delivered by air, and each ‘“‘Dreadnought” could carry 
6 mules, 35 men and a couple of jeeps. 

On the 33rd Corps front, at the beginning of January 1945, the 
19th Indian and 2nd British Divisions were racing towards Shwebo. 
The contest was won by the former which entered Shwebo on 
January 7th, one day ahead of its rival. The 2nd Division had 
crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa in the wake of the 11th East African 
Division, now resting in Assam. The rapid advance of the 19th 
Division was secured largely by the labours of its Engineer units. 
By December 20th, 29 Field Company had opened 76 miles of road 
to Pinbon, while 64 Field Company repaired bridges in rear. 64 
Field Company then moved southwards to Pinlebu on the Mu River 
and built an “Elephant Bridge” (a causeway of logs) over a chaung. 
Christmas Day found the unit working on a Dakota airstrip at 
Kawlin, south of Wuntho. The main axis of the advance on Shwebo 
lay almost parallel to the Irrawaddy, and 64 Field Company was 
soon employed on building airstrips behind the leading brigades at 


1 “Tndawgyi’, by Major K. M. Robertson, R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, 
September 1948, pp. 217-230. 


362 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Tantabin, using the bulldozers of 327 Field Park Company. And 
here a story may be inserted of a derelict steam-roller discovered, 
lying on its side, between Pyingaing and Ye-u on the way to Shwebo. 
One of the Field Companies had two 4th Grade Engine Drivers 
who were left behind to get the roller upright and bring it to Ye-u 
where there was difficult bridging to be done. Three weeks later, 
the roller came puffing slowly in. When asked why they were so 
late, the drivers said that they had righted the roller and started it 
working in a few days but had been obliged to fire the boiler with 
brushwood gathered from the local jungle and for the first part of 
the trip they could not maintain sufficient steam pressure to move 
more than twenty yards at a time! Later, however, they had found 
some cut logs and were able to proceed at a steady speed of one 
mile an hour, which they thought was very creditable under the 
circumstances. Such persistance deserved its reward, and both men 
were immediately up-graded. 

During the passage of the 33rd Corps across the dry belt of Central 
Burma, the Engineer units were often faced with problems of water- 
supply and an Army Order was published calling for any men who 
had had experience as water-diviners. The order caused some amuse- 
ment, but several amateur “‘dowsers’’ came forward and sometimes 
gave useful help. For instance, a Field Engineer at 33rd Corps 
Headquarters, who said that he was a ‘“‘dowser’’, advised the sinking 
of a Norton tube well at a certain spot in a dry chaung where a number 
of Sappers had already dug unsuccessfully, and within an hour the 
well yielded a plentiful supply of pure water. Against this happy 
result may be set the fact that Australian ‘“‘dowsers’ operating in 
the Sinai Desert during the First World War rarely found any sub- 
terranean supply. Was the success in Burma therefore merely a 
matter of chance, or did the Field Engineer possess a sixth sense? 
Who can say? In any case, fresh water was most welcome in Central 
Burma for many of the streams were useless for drinking purposes 
as the liquid was impregnated with purgative salts. 

The Corps of Engineers had also to deal frequently with bomb 
disposal. A slab of guncotton detonated against the side of the bomb 
was the normal method of destruction. Between Shwebo and 
Sagaing there were a number of 500 Ib. bombs buried in the slopes 
of road embankments. In a fox-hole close to each bomb squatted a 
Jap suicide-man whose job it was to detonate the bomb with a stone 
when a vehicle passed overhead. Fortunately, the presence of these 
bombs was usually detected before the transport came along and 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 363 


the Japanese suiciders were shot before they could blow up the 
vehicles and themselves. 

The Divisional Engineers had often to prepare airstrips, though 
the greater part of such work was undertaken by 459 Forward Air- 
field Engineers which included the 21st Engineer Battalion and some 
Field Companies. As soon as a new airstrip was required, one or 
more Companies of the Engineer Battalion marked it out, preferably 
in open paddy fields, and then set to work to Jevel the strip and clear 
away all obstructions with the help of native labour. The surface 
was disturbed as little as possible, and frequently the only levelling 
needed was the removal of the small earthen embankments marking 
the boundaries of fields. A strip 375 yards long and 30 yards wide 
could sometimes be made ready for use by light aircraft in a single day. 
On the other hand, a Dakota airstrip, 1,200 yards long and 50 yards 
wide, might require six days’ work. After the landing ground had 
been levelled, the sides of the run-way were marked with wicker 
frames covered with parachute cloth, and a large white reversible 
‘“‘T’* was placed in position to serve as a landing guide. These and 
other elaborations might occupy a week or more; but the pilots 
often did not wait for the finished article and as many as 300 landings 
and take-offs might be expected in 24 hours as soon as a light airstrip 
was usable with moderate safety. As the 33rd Corps progressed 
towards the Irrawaddy, more and more supplies were sent by air 
until finally it may be said that the very existence of the troops, 
let alone the success of the offensive, depended on air supply. 

In the advance across Central Burma the Fourteenth Army had to 
adapt itself to a war of mobility in open country. Here, the tank 
came into its own. The 19th Division covered 140 miles in 28 days, 
and having taken Shwebo, pushed forward to cross the Irrawaddy. 
A diversionary crossing by the 98th Brigade, with 65 Field Company 
attached, was planned at Thabeikkyin, a few miles north-east of 
Shwebo, and assault boats and country craft for rafting were assembled 
there. A successful crossing was then made in spite of considerable 
shelling and bombing, and the 98th Brigade was installed in a small 
bridgehead on the east bank. The main crossing took place at 
Kyaukmyaung, east of Shwebo. Nobody was allowed down to the 
beach in daylight. During the night of January 15th/!6th, with the 
help of 29 and 64 Field Companies, a battalion was paddled across, 
and after dark on the 17th, and again on the 18th, reinforcements 
and animals were ferried over on folding-boat rafts. An early recon- 
naissance at Yedaw, above Kyaukmyaung, had proved very difficult 


364 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


owing to lack of boats. Only four were available at the moment, and 
these were leaking badly. An officer of 64 Field Company writes:— 
“T remember that night quite well. It seemed much too light and the 
river had a horrible shimmering sheen. Two men went across first 
to reconnoitre and came back to report that there were Japs on the 
opposite bank. Two more boats were then sent and nothing more 
was heard for some time. Then, firing broke out immediately opposite 
to us and the attempt to cross there was postponed. The two boats 
returned about four hours later with exciting stories of Jap bunker 
positions. Three nights afterwards, everything was ready. Two 
Field Companies and the Assault Platoon of a Bridging Company 
were available. Another crossing site was selected above Yedaw. No 
one had ever seen this site by daylight, and after dark the boats 
were carried there for two miles by parties of Gurkhas. The first 
man tocross was an Infantry officer and I wasto follow in another boat, 
each of us with two men. We were to flash a light back to say that 
all was clear and then the leading wave of the assault would come 
over. I remember feeling very frightened as I stepped into the three- 
men boat with two Sappers, but we reached the other side, 700 
yards away, safely. About 9.0 p.m. the first wave crossed and we 
soon had a Company with us on the far bank. The second wave 
was half-way across when a light machine-gun and some rifles opened 
on them. However, firing soon stopped and by 7.0 a.m., before 
dawn, the whole battalion was across and the boats hidden.” By 
a miracle, the enemy had been taken by surprise. Another battalion 
crossed during the following night and the bridgehead was made 
secure. 

On January 19th, the first daylight crossing of the 19th Division 
took place, and with it went a platoon of 29 Field Company. After 
that, with the help of an increasing number of floating boats fitted 
with outboard motors, there was little difficulty and the crossing of 
more troops and stores proceeded steadily day by day. 429 Field 
Company (Madras), under Major G. W. Pinto, I.E., arrived from 
the 268th Brigade to assist in the ferrying. On the 24th, the bridge- 
head was moved down to Singu and then at last the enemy realized 
the position and bombarded the bridgehead with 70 guns. But he 
was too late. Ferrying by raft went on without intermission. On 
February 6th, 29 Field Company took across 8 Lee tanks and on the 
following day 16 Stuart tanks, and by February 16th, when it handed 
over the rafting to 431 Field Company of 459 Forward Airfield 
Engineers, the crossing of the 19th Indian Division at Singu may be 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 365 


said to have been completed. About ten days later, the Division 
broke out of the bridgehead in a triumphant progress southwards 
towards Mandalay. Major-General Rees had acted with great 
boldness and had accepted considerable risks; but he had succeeded 
in attracting enemy forces away from the region west of Mandalay 
where the main battles were to be fought. 

Meanwhile, moving simultaneously across the Central Burma 
plains to the south of the line of advance of the 19th Indian Division, 
was the 2nd British Division which had relieved the 11th East African 
Division at Kalewa and had received orders to make for Ye-u. By 
January 9th, the Division was in Shwebo and then advanced towards 
the Irrawaddy south of Mandalay. It reached the river at Nzagun, 
about 10 miles east of the 20th Indian Division, and on February 
23rd began its attempt to cross in the face of fierce opposition. The 
leading waves of men had their boats sunk under them, but others 
established a footing on the far bank, and after 72 hours of sustained 
effort, Major-General C. G. G. Nicholson had 6,000 men and 200 
vehicles across the river. Thence the Division advanced towards 
Ava Fort, downstream of Mandalay, and captured it on March 
17th before swinging south-westwards to clear the country in the 
direction of Myingyan and Meiktila. The operations of the 2nd 
British Division, however, do not really concern this narrative as no 
units of the Indian Engineers were present. 

Parallel to the line taken by the 2nd British Division, and still 
further to the south, moved the 20th Indian Division under 
Major-General D. D. Gracey. The Divisional Engineers, under 
Lieut.-Colonel A. R. S. Lucas, R.E., comprised 92 Field Company 
(Bombay), 422 Field Company (Madras), 481 Field Company 
(Bombay) and 309 Field Park Company (Madras). The 32nd Brigade 
had begun to cross the Chindwin by ferry at Mawlaik early in 
December 1944 in order to contact the 2nd British Division south- 
east of Kalewa and capture Budalin. The remainder of the 20th 
Division followed the 2nd Division across the ‘‘Grub”’ Bridge at Kalewa 
and met the 32nd Brigade at Budalin, which was taken on January 
10th after three weeks of bitter fighting. The Division then split 
into three brigade columns, the 32nd Brigade taking Monywa on 
January 22nd while the 100th Brigade occupied Myinmu and the 
80th Brigade cleared the area around the confluence of the Chindwin 
and Irrawaddy. The whole Division then concentrated for a crossing 
of the Irrawaddy at Myinmu, a few miles downstream of the crossing 
point allotted to the 2nd British Division. 


366 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Major J. H. Clark, R.E., gives the following account of the experj- 
ences of 92 Field Company with the 32nd Brigade.' ‘November saw 
the Brigade setting out on a pack basis into the hills south of Imphal 
along the Mombi track. We debouched into the Kabaw Valley and 
proceeded south-eastwards to Mawlaik which had recently been 
cleared of the enemy by the East Africans. On December Ist I 
reconnoitred for a crossing of the Chindwin. We had only thirteen 
outboard motors in our equipment, but a dozen Ranger boats were 
soon dropped to us by parachute. Downstream of Mawlaik, the 
river ran in several channels, so a site was selected upstream of the 
place where the river was 600 yards wide and clear of sandbanks. 
The current ran at 5 knots. The Brigade Group normally comprised 
about 5,000 men with 1,500 animals and 30 tons of stores, but it 
was now increased by the arrival of an additional battalion of 
Gurkhas. Two rafts were improvised with empty oil-drums and palm 
trees, each with several motors attached. Other motors were fixed 
to native craft, and a workshop was started to keep the motors 
repaired. On December 2nd, the Ist Northants established a bridge- 
head and pushed out patrols, and by December 4th the whole batta- 
lion was across and on its way into the hills to the east. The remainder 
of the Brigade was across by December 7th, and 92 Field Company 
followed on the 8th. To get the mules across, each animal was led 
to the rear of a Ranger boat containing two Sappers and eight 
infantrymen. Its load and harness had already been dumped on a 
raft. The inflated boat was then paddled out from the bank at a 
steeply sloping place until the mule’s head could be hauled up on 
to the rear bulwark and held there securely so that it could breathe 
freely. The swimming of the mule helped the boat forward, though 
some skill was needed to steer the animal in the right direction. 
After we had put the 32nd Brigade across, the Company marched 
up the bed of a chaung for a week. The country was very dry and 
arid and there was much difficulty with water supply. We debouched 
into the plains near Budalin, captured the place and moved on to 
take Alon and Monywa and force a crossing of the Irrawaddy. The 
32nd Brigade Group had marched 230 miles in 6 weeks on a pack 
basis from Imphal to Budalin where it met its transport which had 
‘come down the Chindwin on rafts. 

Meanwhile, 422 Field Company, under Major R. T. Gerrard, R.E., 
and 481 Field Company, under Major M. I. Pritchard, R.E., had 
ee es ae a 


* Notes by Major J. H. Clark, R.E., dated February 2nd, 1954. 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 367 


been assisting the main body of the 20th Division at the Kalewa 
crossing. Previously, 422 Company had been employed on the 
Kabaw Valley road and cutting a track through virgin jungle towards 
Mawlaik. While one of the platoons was bridging a chaung, the 
famous “Elephant Bill’? (Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Williams) arrived and 
provided six elephants to speed up the work.’ The bridge, which 
was 180 feet in length, soon took shape. A Danaram saw was used 
for felling trees and cutting the timber into lengths, while the elephants 
pulled the logs to the water’s edge and placed the road-bearers neatly 
in their correct places. 

422 Field Company built rafts at Kalewa and loaded them with 
stores to be taken downstream to Maukkadaw, three days’ journey. 
The first fleet of five rafts started at the end of December with a 
flag, consisting of a Sapper’s pair of pants, waving proudly in the 
breeze from the top of a boat-hook erected as a mast on the leading 
craft. As the fleet neared Maukkadaw in a fast current, the com- 
mander saw an officer waving frantically on the bank, so he pulled 
in to the shore to get berthing instructions. He was annoyed to find, 
however, that the officer, who was a keen fisherman, merely wished 
to warn the fleet to keep clear of his lines! For the next six weeks, 
the Company continued river transport and ferrying work at Mauk- 
kadaw and then moved to Alon, where it arrived on January 21st 
while the battle for Monywa was raging four miles away. Great 
was its disappointment when told that the arrangements for crossing 
the Irrawaddy would devolve on the other two Field Companies of 
the 20th Division. 422 Field Company was detailed to make airstrips 
and send out “‘bunker-busting” parties with the infantry and tanks. 
During one of these expeditions it lost Lieut. E. J. Wright, R.E., 
who was mortally wounded in a gallant attack on February [2th. 
The infantry had been unable to subdue the enemy snipers and 
consequently the Sappers could not get on to the bunker which was 
being attacked. Wright then seized a bee-hive charge and rushed 
forward alone. He reached the top, but as he was placing the charge, 
a sniper shot him through the head and he died a few hours later in 
hospital. Both 92 and 481 Field Companies had been engaged since 
December in ferrying at Maukkadaw after their stores and jeeps had 
come down by river from Kalewa, and they were very busy also with 
training and with preparations for the great task which lay ahead. 


1 History of 422 Q.V'sO. Madras Indian Field Company, R.1.E., by Major D. W. 
McGrath, R.E. Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Williams is the author of Elephant Bill (1950) 
and Bandoola (1953). 





368 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The crossing of the Irrawaddy at Myinmu by the 20th Indian Division 
was a fine achievement. In order to distract attention from the main 
bridgehead, the 32nd Brigade made a subsidiary crossing near Myaung, 
a few miles to the west. 92 Field Company was responsible for the 
ferrying which had been rehearsed at Monywa on the Chindwin. 
On February 9th, Major Clark reconnoitred the near bank after 
dark. It was high and covered with elephant grass, but there were 
good lines of approach along some dry watercourses. On the 10th 
the approaches were prepared for vehicle traffic, and on the I1th 
the floating equipment and stores were moved up to the assault 
area after dark. As most of the available boats were required for 
the main crossing at Myinmu, 92 Company improvised a raft to 
carry mules, anti-tank guns, jeeps and signal cable. The raft had 
five piers, each of two Jap timber pontoons found at Monywa, with 
old rails as road-bearers and a decking of planks. At 7.0 p.m. on 
February 12th, the available equipment was launched and building 
started. The light equipment consisted of three tows, each of a Jap 
steel boat with two 22 h.p. motors attached to the stern, behind which 
were towed ten Ranger or Assault boats in two files. Each of the 
tugs was manned by five Sappers. Soon after 11.0 p.m. the first 
flight crossed almost unopposed, and by dawn on the 13th, the 
greater part of the Ist Northants were on the far bank despite consi- 
derable trouble with the motors. Then the enemy began to re-act 
with artillery fire and it was arranged that a smoke-screen should be 
laid down before dawn. The first flight by daylight started well, but 
the engines failed in mid-stream and the boats began to drift down 
the river helpless. The smoke cleared quickly and left them in 
full view of the enemy. Lieut. H. R. Balston, R.E., immediately 
volunteered to take another tow across to rescue them; but by the 
time he reached them, they were under heavy fire and he was shot 
through the arm and one of his engines was put out of action. He 
continued, however, to the far bank where the men took cover 
while a mortar detachment tried to silence the enemy’s fire. The 
battle continued throughout the day, but after dark the isolated 
troops were able to move upstream into the main bridgehead. Four 
more flights came across in boats and the raft made several trips. 
By the morning of February 14th, the Northants and a wing of another 
battalion were across, and also guns, jeeps, mules and stores; and 
on the following night, while a violent battle raged on the far bank, 
two rafts and three tows of boats were in constant use. One of the 


Appemesiy ay) ssoioe ysodsuvay pur snowse surds94 





THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 369 


tows unfortunately came right into the battle and was sunk. Attempts 
to ferry by daylight were then abandoned, though night ferrying 
continued, On the 16th, the beaches were under accurate shell fire 
all day, and another big battle commenced on the far bank. Rafting 
ceased altogether and the Sappers manned the perimeter on the near 
bank. February 17th was spent by them in repairing damaged boats. 
On the 18th, however, rafting was resumed by daylight and was 
continued during the 19th in spite of shell fire which caused a number 
of casualties. Among these was Major J. H. Clark who was wounded 
in the leg and evacuated. Crossings continued on a decreasing scale 
until February 27th when the entire 32nd Brigade was able to leave 
the bridgehead for the advance towards Kyaukse, south of Mandalay. 

481 Field Company (Bombay) was the Engineer unit chiefly respon- 
sible for ferrying the bulk of the 20th Division across the Irrawaddy 
during the main crossing at Myinmu. Due, probably, to the diversion 
afforded by the 32nd Brigade, this operation was very successful, 
though made under considerable difficulties. The date of the crossing 
had been fixed for the night of February 12th/I3th. 422 Field Com- 
pany, under Major D. W. McGrath, R.E., worked on the approaches 
through long elephant grass and laid tapes to the beaches. The 
bulldozer drivers of 309 Field Park Company assisted by making 
ramps down to the beaches. 481 Field Company then began the 
ferrying using Ranger boats at first and, later on, rafts of folding 
boats for the infantry and others of country boats for the jeeps and 
stores. The crossing continued steadily during the 13th and 14th 
while the small bridgehead was gradually expanded. 422 Field 
Company went over to lay Sommerfeld track across the wide belt 
of sand on the far shore. The 100th Brigade was holding on grimly 
in the bridgehead though losing rather heavily from shelling and 
bombing. Slowly but steadily the bridgehead was expanded, and 
with this expansion the Sappers of 422 Field Company were called 
upon to make many tracks through elephant grass to the forward 
positions. Snipers lurked in the grass, and direction could be main- 
tained only by compass bearings. Bulldozers were useless for making 
these tracks because they would raise dust and bring down enemy 
artillery fire. Consequently, the grass was cut by hand and laid 
flat on the dusty surface. After 481 Field Company had ferried 
across some Stuart tanks, the expansion of the Myinmu bridgehead 
was accelerated. Neighbouring villages were cleared of the enemy; 
and on February 27th, when the main bridgehead was 8 miles long 
and 24 miles deep, the 80th Brigade broke out and made for Kyaukse 


370 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


in company with the 32nd Brigade from Myaung. On March 2nd, 
the 20th Division established contact with the 2nd British Division 
on its left and thereafter advanced rapidly, mopping up Japanese 
remnants and playing havoc with the enemy’s lines of communication. 
Myotha was taken on March 12th; Wundwin and its large dumps 
on the 21st. Two days later, a brigade turned northwards and 
destroyed a large Japanese force at Kume, thus cutting the main 
enemy escape route from Mandalay to the south. On March 30th, 
the other two brigades took Kyaukse after a week of severe fighting. 
The road and railway line of communication from Mandalay to 
Rangoon was thus severed at yet another point. The 20th Divisional 
Engineers were fortunate to share in these victorious operations 
towards which they had contributed much in blood and sweat. 

The time has now arrived to deal with the most important and 
decisive operations undertaken during the invasion of Central Burma. 
These were to be carried out by the 4th Indian Corps under Lieut.- 
General F. W. Messervy. At the outset the Corps comprised the 
7th and 17th Indian Divisions and the 255th Tank Brigade. With 
the 7th Division, under Major-General G. C. Evans, were 62 Field 
Company (Madras), 77 Field Company (Bengal), 421 Field 
Company (Madras), and 331 Field Park Company (Madras), 
the C.R.E. being Lieut.-Colonel T. Wright, R.E. With the 17th 
Division, under Major-General D. T. Cowan, were 60 Field Company 
(Madras), 70 Field Company (Bengal), the Tehri-Garhwal Field 
Company and 414 Field Park Company (Bengal), and the C.R.E. 
was Lieut.-Colonel T. H. F. Foulkes, R.E. 36 Field Squadron 
(Madras) was attached to the 255th Tank Brigade. The role assigned 
to the 4th Corps was to make a surprise crossing of the Irrawaddy 
and to strike directly at the nodal point of the Japanese road, rail 
and air communications and supply organization at Meiktila in rear 
of their forces guarding Mandalay or opposing the 2nd, 19th, 20th 
and 36th Divisions. The enemy would thus be caught between the 
anvil of the 4th Corps and the hammer of the 33rd Corps descending 
from the north. The plan was daring because, as already explained, 
it involved the secret transfer of the 4th Corps across the rear of the 
33rd Corps. Elaborate deception was necessary and wireless silence. 
The movement of the 4th Corps was headed by the 28th East African 
Brigade, which did not belong to the 11th East African Division. 
By employing this brigade south of Mandalay it was hoped to deceive 
the enemy into believing that he was still fighting the 33rd Corps 
and that the 4th Corps was still operating in the north. The fact 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 371 


also that the 19th Division, formerly with the 4th Corps, was now 
pushing towards the Irrawaddy well to the north of Mandalay, 
might help to confirm this belief. Parachutists were dropped across 
the Irrawaddy where no offensive was intended, and many such 
areas were also bombed. Yet had it not been for the Chindwin 
River line of supply it is doubtful whether the transfer of the 4th 
Corps across the rear of the 33rd Corps would have been feasible in 
spite of the benefits of air supply, nor its rapid advance to the 
Irrawaddy. The 4th Corps was to cross the river at Nyaungu, near 
the ancient city of Pagan, while feints were made at Pakokku upstream 
and Chauk downstream. There was to be no preliminary bombard- 
ment nor air-strike. Surprise was the essence of the whole under- 
taking. The 7th Indian Division would cross first. Then, two 
mechanized brigades of the 17th Division would follow and rush 
upon Meiktila where the Sth Division, coming mostly by air from 
Imphal, would take a hand.} 

At the end of January 1945, the 4th Corps was moving down the 
Gangaw Valley faced with the problem of traversing a narrow hill- 
road into the Irrawaddy Valley. From Kalemyo to Pakokku, some 
230 miles, the road was quite unsuitable for the passage of scores 
of tanks and hundreds of bridging lorries, and for the first 140 miles 
to Tilin it was deep in dust. In the hill section from Tilin to Pauk, 
the gradients were severe and the corners designed only for jeeps. 
Any bridging lorries which broke down had to be pushed over the 
side or halted for several days at a passing place. The traffic was 
so dense that the Sappers working on the road had often to be 
supplied with rations by air because they could not fetch them them- 
selves. The units available for the work were the 7th Divisional 
Engineers, 4th Corps Troops Engineers (2 Faridkot, 75 and 424 
Field Companies and 305 Field Park Company), 36 Field Squadron, 
the 12th Engineer Battalion and an East African Field Company. 
This was a strong cadre, yet it was insufficient to bring the road up 
to the necessary standard when little assistance could be given by 
other arms. The problems of the advance to the Irrawaddy were 
greater than those of the actual crossing because the current at 
Nyaungu was sluggish, and the river, though wide, could be crossed 
easily by loaded rafts without fear of grounding. The allotment of 


1The Sth Indian Division was commanded by Major-General D. F. W. Warren 
until February 11th, 1945, when he was killed in a plane accident. He was succeeded 
by Major-General E. C. Mansergh. 


372 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Engineer duties was that the 7th Divisional Engineers, with 36 Field 
Squadron and the East African unit, made the road passable for 
3-ton lorries, while behind them came the Corps Engineers and the 
Engineer Battalion improving it so as to take tank-transporters and 
repairing or by-passing any weak bridges. Although the crossing 
site had its advantages, it was by no means ideal. On the near side 
there was a stretch of soft sand, 600 yards wide, ending with a 
vertical drop of 4 feet to the water-level. On the far side there was 
a slope of hard clay with deep water close in shore, but beyond the 
slope was a vertical rise of considerable height. These conditions 
applied only to a length of about half a mile along the banks, beyond 
which the river ran in many channels with intervening sandbanks. 
Landing stages and equipment had therefore to be concentrated in 
a small area and offered a perfect target for air attack.! 

Several airstrips were needed urgently down the Gangaw Valley 
for the maintenance of the 4th Corps. One was completed at Kan 
during the first half of January and another at Tilin. On February 
Ist, an air-head was started at Sinthe, a-few miles below Pauk on the 
Yaw tributary, and the Forward Airfield Engineers built a strip there 
in four days. Others followed quickly. The completion of the Sinthe 
air-head was vital to the success of the whole operation and into it 
was flown the Sommerfeld track and additional folding boat equip- 
ment needed for the crossing as well as supplies and ammunition. 
Within a few days, 500 tons of stores were being delivered in 24 hours. 
An advanced airstrip was provided on February !6th at Myitche to 
complete the chain of air supply.2 Our mastery of the air prevented 
any serious interference with these activities. 

Major D. De Souza describes some of the experiences of 421 
Field Company of the 7th Divisional Engineers during the approach 
to the Irrawaddy. ‘Six days before D-Day”, he writes, ‘“‘motors 
and serviceable boats were loaded onto very ancient bridging lorries. 
The convoy was large and heavy and it had 140 miles to cover. It 
set off with a Sapper escort and fervent prayers for its safe arrival. 
The journey was to take several days along a narrow and tortuous 
road and the traffic already moving forward was prodigious. Two 
days later, the Field Companies were briefed as to their tasks and a 
composite Assault Company was formed from all Engineer units. 


'“The Crossing of the Irrawaddy by 4 Corps, February 1945”, by Colonel 
A. Murray, appearing in The R.E. Journal, March 1947, pp. 19-28. 


* “Engineer Aspect of 4 Corps Operations, Imphal to Rangoon”, by Major W. W- 
Boggs, R.E. Pp Bi » OY J 





ys ee 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 373 


The Companies then moved forward to the assembly area. The 
Divisional Engineer convoy arrived there in fine style but found it 
only partially cleared of Japs, so a new area was allotted and the 
Engineer units assembled there. Equipment was off-loaded, checked, 
repaired and loaded again. After dark, two days before D-Day, the 
enormous convoy moved forward again along a narrow, sandy 
track to the forward assembly area near the beaches. It was a 
sleepless night for everyone. The sand did its evil job only too well 
and some of the heavy lorries failed to arrive before dawn. They 
remained camouflaged throughout the day, ready to move to the 
beaches the next night. The final briefings and study of air photos 
were carried out by the Assault Company, and reconnaissances of 
the beaches and approach roads were made.” 

The responsibility for the Engineer arrangements for the actual 
crossing of the 7th Indian Division at Nyaungu on February 14th, 
1945, devolved on Lieut.-Colonel T. Wright as C.R.E. Topographi- 
cally, Nyaungu was an unlikely crossing place, and it was therefore 
only weakly held by the enemy although the approaches were under 
close observation from cliffs beyond it. It appears that the Japanese 
imagined that only one division was advancing down the Gangaw 
Valley and that it would exploit southwards towards the Chauk and 
Yenangyaung oilfields instead of crossing the river. This belief was 
fostered by the despatch of the East African Brigade to Pauk and 
onwards to a point opposite Chauk, and from the heavy resistance 
offered by the enemy in this region it is evident that he swallowed 
the bait. The Irrawaddy crossing was to be made in three stages. 
First, the capture of Pakokku and the concentration of the 4th Corps 
in the crossing area. Next, the establishment of a bridgehead on the 
far bank; and finally, the massing of the Corps on that bank. The 
crossing would be followed by a lightning thrust to the Meiktila- 
Thazi area with the help of air-borne reinforcements and supplies 
and all available armour. The enemy forces in Central Burma could 
then be destroyed between the 4th and 33rd Corps. The 7th Division 
was to establish a bridgehead through which the 17th Division and 
armoured forces would pour for the advance on Meiktila. The 5th 
*Division, previously held in reserve, would be brought forward 
rapidly to help in the capture of Meiktila. 

By the evening of February 13th, Lieut.-Colonel Wright had 
succeeded in concentrating his Engineer units and equipment as 
close to the selected beaches as he was allowed to go. There were 
three beaches. ‘‘A’’ Beach opposite Nyaungu with a watergap of 1,200 


374 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


yards; ‘“B” Beach, further upstream, with a gap of 1.800 yards; 
and “C” Beach, still further upstream, where the width was 3,700 
yards owing to a wide area of sand in the middle. The approach to 
the river at ‘‘B’’ was fairly good, but at ““C” there was 500 yards of 
sand on which no preparatory work could be done until the far bank 
was cleared of the enemy. Although ‘“‘A” Beach was the most attrac- 
tive since it had the shortest water-gap, it was decided that it should 
not be used for the initial crossing. The choice fell on ‘“C’’ where 
a company of infantry was to be paddled across by night in assault 
boats. Once established, it was to be followed, under cover of dark- 
ness, by two more companies carried in folding or assault boats 
equipped with outboard motors. These craft would make for a 
point on the far side opposite ““B’’ Beach and then return to that 
beach to pick up the rest of the battalion. 

The Sapper companies had a prodigious task during the night to 
coax the bridging lorries along the 14 miles of track leading towards 
the river. It took five hours of unremitting toil. At one moment, 
Wright almost despaired of reaching the bank before daybreak. And 
this was by no means the end of the story, for as he approached the 
bank he was confronted with a final obstacle of more than a quarter 
of a mile of the softest sand in Asia, across which the assault craft 
had to be man-handled to the launching points at **C’’ Beach because 
no preparatory work had been permitted. ‘‘The Engineers of both 
the 7th and 17th Divisions combined to support the 7th Division in 
the initial task of crossing the river” writes Pearson.! ‘‘Work on the 
approaches had not been heavy although the sandy soil was soon 
cut up by the bridging lorries. On February 13th, 77 Field Company 
started work on ‘“‘C”’ Beach, assembling folding and assault boats, 
while 70 Field Company improved the route to ‘‘B’’ and ‘‘C’”’ Beaches 
with bamboo matting and timber. The lorries were strung out along 
the narrow Kanhla-Myitche road, slowly bringing their loads to 
““C” Beach which the last vehicle reached at 1.0 a.m. on February 
14th.” 

The first assault troops—a Company of South Lancashires— 
embarked in folding boats at ““C’’ Beach and were paddled by Sapper 
crews across the dark waters under a moonless sky. They landeé 
unobserved and took up a position to cover the arrival of reinforce- 
ments. The next flight, of two more Companies, followed in assault 
boats fitted with outboard motors, while our planes roared overhead 


eee eh Sie ae ae te ee ee, Come ee 
* Brief History of the K.G.V’s Own Bengal Sappers and Miners Group, R.LE, 
(August 1939 - July 1946), by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., p. 123. 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 375 


to drown the noise of the engines. Dawn, however, was already 
breaking and the boats were still 200 yards from the far bank when 
they were revealed to the enemy in the pearly light stealing across 
the water. There had been some delay because many of the outboard 
motors had refused to start and others had failed in mid-stream. 
Japanese machine-gunners opened fire from caves in the face of the 
cliffs and the men in the boats suffered a number of casualties. Several 
boats were sunk and all on board killed, wounded or drowned. A 
few crippled boats managed to struggle slowly back to their starting 
point, where the wounded were landed and the engines re-fuelled for 
a second attempt. This was made, a few hours later, by the 4/15th 
Punjabis. The enemy was now fully aware that a major crossing 
was intended. With maddening sluggishness the boats nosed their 
way forward. It was a long trip—4,300 yards in all owing to the 
diagonal nature of the crossing from ‘‘C”’ Beach to a point downstream 
on the opposite bank. The enemy’s fire increased in volume and 
intensity from both front and flank. Two boats grounded on a 
sandbank near the far shore, but the infantry waded to the bank. 
Other boats arrived and soon the men were swarming up the cliffs 
to join the South Lancashires holding out bravely in their small 
position. More and more boats followed, all heavily laden with 
assault troops, until boats were going both ways in continuous streams. 
By nightfall, three battalions had crossed and the rafting of vehicles 
and ammunition was in hand. Then came the tanks. 36 Field 
Squadron had built three Class 40 Bailey rafts, and with these the 
unit ferried across six Sherman tanks of the 255th Tank Brigade. 
Smaller rafts and landing stages were now being built at ‘“‘B’’ Beach, 
but a landing stage on the far shore was not ready when the 
Shermans appeared there. Nothing daunted, the drivers drove the 
tanks straight off the rafts on to the bank to save time, fortunately 
without damage to the rafts or themselves, and within the next few 
minutes the tanks roared into action. 

A few extracts from the War Diary of 62 Field Company, under 
Major R. S. A. Pryde, R.E., may be quoted to show the strenuous 
nature of the work on D-Day. ‘Lieut. S. E. M. Goodall, R.E., and 
one Sapper were in the first wave which came under heavy fire. It 
succeeded, though with severe casualties. 62 Company was delayed 
until the Punjab Battalion was across. Major Pryde and Lieut. W. 
Milton, R.E., accompanied the Punjabis to reconnoitre the far beach. 
On arrival there at 11.00 hrs, the Company began to build landing 
stages for rafts, search for mines and make exit roads. By evening 


376 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


everything was well organized, and men, stores, tanks and transport 
were pouring across and being cleared quickly. The gallantry shown 
by our two representatives in the assault wave makes thrilling reading. 
Lieut. Goodall piloted his boat towards the shore under a hail of 
fire which followed him as he tried frantically to dodge it. A burst 
caught his boat, killing all but three of his sixteen passengers, smashing 
his left arm and wrecking the engine. He tried to paddle the boat to 
the shore but could not manage it, so the few survivors left the boat 
and began to swim back a mile to their own shore. How Goodall 
did so with a stump of a left arm and weak from loss of blood is 
beyond comprehension. The Sapper with him had been wounded in 
the head and had not sufficient strength to continue after swimming 
about a hundred yards, so he turned back towards the enemy shore 
and made for a boat that was drifting downstream with its driver 
dead and the others dead or wounded. He boarded the boat and, 
though close to the enemy positions, tried for half an hour to start 
the engine. In the end, he succeeded, and, four miles down the river, 
brought his boat and the dead and wounded to the near shore. His 
action was described by the Commanding Officer of a British Battalion 
who witnessed it as one of the bravest he had ever seen.” 

On February 15th (D+1 Day) the splutter and roar of engines 
started again at daylight. Heavy rafts with more Sherman tanks 
crossed safely,,and a steady stream of smaller rafts brought men, 
ammunition and mules from “‘B’”’ Beach which was now coming into 
use. Meanwhile, some of the Sapper units were hard at work on the 
approach roads to ‘‘A”’ Beach which was to operate when the enemy 
had been driven from the vicinity. The Nyaungu bridgehead was 
already securely held, thanks to the gallantry of the assault troops 
and the feints at crossing which had been made at Pakokku on 
February 13th by the 7th Division and at Chauk by the 28th East 
African Brigade. A reconnaissance of the river banks on the 15th 
confirmed the plan to conduct further crossings at “‘A’”’ Beach and 
to transfer all equipment gradually downstream to that point. Early 
on the 16th, the C.A.G.R.E. assumed responsibility for the crossings 
at “A” Beach, having under his command the 7th Divisional 
Engineers (62, 77 and 421 Field Companies and 331 Field Park 
Company), 60 and 70 Field Companies of the 17th Divisional 
Engineers, the 4th Corps Troops Engineers (2 Faridkot, 75 and 
424 Field Companies and -305 Field Park Company), 36 Field 
Squadron, and 854 Bridging Company of Army Troops Engineers. 
These units were joined later by the 12th Engineer Battalion and a 


VIVA, 0} VuRAPE ay) BuluNp EMAIS Je UOKIE UT Sdoo’y URIpUT 





THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 377 


Mechanical Equipment Platoon. All were not present on February 
15th but the cadre was soon completed. 

February 16th and 17th were somewhat disappointing days at 
“A” Beach. Sommerfeld track for the approaches should have 
arrived on D-Day, but although Dakotas and Commandos landed 
continuously on the forward airstrips, no track appeared for some 
time, and when eventually it began to arrive it was found to be 
deficient in pickets and other stores required for laying it. Infantry 
working parties scoured the adjacent villages for materials while 
bulldozers and teams of men hauled the bridging vehicles across the 
sand to the water’s edge. By nightfall on the 18th, there were sufficient 
landing stages and rafts at ‘‘A’ Beach for ferrying to begin on the 
following day with the help of the rafts previously operating from 
‘“B’’ and “C”’ Beaches. A supply of Sommerfeld track had come 
also and was being laid on the approach roads. Some impatience 
had been shown because of the delays which had occurred, although 
these could not be attributed to any lack of energy or foresight on 
the part of the Engineer units. This was nothing new, and to illustrate 
the point one may quote a story related by Major-General E. H. W. 
Cobb who was then B.G.S. 4th Corps.! Cobb writes that before the 
Corps reached the Irrawaddy there was a shortage of Bailey bridging 
and perforated steel planking for rafting and approaches, and that 
Lieut.-General F. W. Messervy, the Corps Commander, was conti- 
nually asking Brigadier W. W. Boggs, his Chief Engineer, when it 
was going to arrive. At last, to Boggs’ delight, news came that plenti- 
ful supplies were on the way by air, so he went to the airfield to 
watch the unloading of fifty Dakotas. The doors were opened and 
unloading began. Alas, there was no Engineer equipment whatever! 
Nothing was visible except hundreds of drums of crude oil which 
had been substituted at the last moment in order to lay the dust 
on airstrips. ‘“‘Useful, no doubt, to pour on troubled waters” 
remarked the disconsolate Boggs as he pictured his next interview 
with the impatient Corps Commander! 

However, the delays and difficulties of the first few days at Nyaungu 
were soon over, and while the Sapper units were there, more than 








1 Notes by Major-General E. H. W. Cobb, c.8., C.B.E., dated February 20th, 1954. 
Brigadier Cobb was B.G.S. 4th Corps from December 1944 to November 1945, Aftere 
wards, he commanded the 33rd Brigade of the 7th Indian Division in Bangkok and 
Malaya until December 1946. As a junior officer he had served for many years with 


the Bengal Sappers and Miners. 


378 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


20,000 vehicles were ferried across. Night work was abandoned, but 
a 12-hour day was the rule, and woe betide those responsible if the 
first flight of rafts had not set out by 6.15 a.m. Eight landing stages 
were in use on each bank, and 1,000 vehicles often made the trip 
in a single day. And what vehicles they were! As a truck or lorry 
broke down it was converted into a trailer to be towed behind a 
stronger specimen. There were literally hundreds of such lame ducks 
to fill most of the limited deck space on the rafts. The competition 
among the Sapper units engaged in ferrying soon became terrific. 
Each raft flew its Company ‘‘House Flag’, and each Company 
established its ‘Shipping Office’ on the beach. Notices appeared 
such as “Don’t waste time. Travel by the Red Line’, or “Quickest 
and safest by the Blue Line’. Another notice extolled the virtues 
of “The Irrawaddy Steamship and Transport Company”, and a 
large board, labelled ‘“‘Form at a Glance’’, showed the progress day 
by day in what was known as “‘The Irrawaddy Regatta’. The scene 
resembled Margate on a Bank Holiday, but with this difference that 
work and not pleasure filled every hour. During the month that 
followed D-Day, the entire 4th Corps was ferried across the Irrawaddy 
—three divisions, the Corps troops, and all their transport and sup- 
plies. It is said that the record number of crossings in a single day 
was held by 62 Field Company; but if so, the other units could not 
have been far behind. 

Once across the Irrawaddy, the nature of the engineer problems 
changed. The 4th Corps was now in a dry belt and the roads were 
good. Sufficient water could be secured by digging in the beds of 
chaungs, though the issue had to be carefully supervized. The chaungs 
themselves were crossed on causeways made with brushwood and 
toddy palms because Sommerfeld track was scarce owing to lack of 
transport. There were few enemy obstacles. The Japanese seemed to 
rely chiefly on buried bombs and shells, which were easily detected 
and disarmed. Thus the leading troops of the victorious 4th Corps 
rushed almost unhindered towards Meiktila, led by the mechanized 
48th and 63rd Brigades of the 17th Division and the 255th Tank 
Brigade. These brigades were ordered to capture Taungtha and 
Mahlaing, seize an airstrip north-west of Meiktila for the fly-in of 
the 99th Brigade, isolate, and if possible capture, Meiktila, and finally 
occupy Thazi beyond it. On February 24th, they took Taungtha, 
and on the following day, Mahlaing, and on the 26th they seized an 
airstrip at Thabutkon, 15 miles north-west of Meiktila where the 
99th Brigade began to arrive by air on the 27th. The main body of 


THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 379 


the 4th Corps was then driving on towards Meiktila where some of 
the most important Japanese airfields in Burma were situated. If 
these were lost, the whole structure of the enemy’s defence of Central 
Burma would probably collapse. 

About 13,000 Japanese soldiers had been hurriedly assembled in 
and about Meiktila, of whom 4,000 were inside the town. The appro- 
aches to it from the west and south were very difficult, being narrowed 
by large lakes which, with numerous irrigation channels, hampered 
the use of tanks. Nevertheless, at dawn on February 28th, 1945, 
the assault on Meiktila was begun from all points of the compass, 
and by nightfall, after very heavy fighting, the town was surrounded. 
Three days of hand-to-hand combat ensued, the Japanese fighting 
to the death in the narrow streets and alleys; but by March 4th, 
the greater part of the town, and the main airfield on its eastern side, 
were in our hands. A few days later, when the battle was over, 2,000 
enemy dead were counted. Only 47 prisoners were taken, most of 
them wounded. A story about General Slim, who was present at 
Meiktila, may be included here. The General was most particular 
about wireless security, and so, when calling up a certain battalion 
during the attack, he began by saying ‘‘Hullo, hullo! This is Number 
Nine, the very big Number Nine’’. The C.O. was mistified, so Slim 
continued ‘Hullo, hullo! This is Bill, the Thin Man, speaking”. To 
the horror of those around him, the irate C.O. shouted back “‘And 
who the Hell is the Thin Man?’ No one was more amused than the 
Army Commander himself, for he had the keenest sense of humour. 

The enemy reacted strongly to the loss of Meiktila. A Japanese 
division advanced from the north and north-west and a regiment 
moved up from the south, while all available artillery was massed in 
the area. The enemy re-occupied Taungtha, thus blocking the arrival 
of 5,000 vehicles, and fought hard also to regain control of the main 
airfield at Meiktila. General Slim’s nearest reserve was the Sth 
Indian Division, far away in Assam, and so the 9th Brigade was 
ordered forthwith to Meiktila. It came by air from Palel and landed 
between March 15th and 18th in time to resist a strong enemy counter- 
attack. The struggle at Meiktila did not end until March 28th when 
the last Japanese were killed or driven off. As General Slim once 
remarked, they were indeed ‘tthe most formidable fighting insects on 
earth”. The loss of Meiktila was a devastating blow to General 
Kimura. He had diverted troops too late to save the situation and 
in so doing had laid open to the 19th Indian Division the road to 
Mandalay. 


380 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Engineer duties at Meiktila were prosaic though useful. The Field 
Companies were involved occasionally in street fighting, but normally 
they were employed on defence work, lifting mines, providing water 
supplies and sending out parties with mobile columns. Work on the 
defences included the improvement of communications, minor 
bridging, the construction of command posts and shelters, and the 
provision of protection for guns. They levelled many enemy bunkers 
and buried the enemy dead with their bulldozers. Last, but not 
least, they completed four additional airstrips, and when the infantry 
were called away they took their share in manning the perimeters of 
the various ‘Boxes’. : 

The capture of Mandalay followed close on the heels of the first 
entry into Meiktila. It was the privilege of the 19th Indian Division, 
which we left on the far side of the Irrawaddy after the crossing at 
Singu in January 1945. On February 26th, the Division began to 
push southwards, demoralising the enemy by the speed of its advance 
which was made with powerful air support. By March Sth, a bridge- 
head had been established over the Magyi Chaung, the last natural 
barrier before Mandalay. Japanese positions about Madaya were 
assaulted and captured, and on March 9th the forward elements 
entered Mandalay City. Siege was laid immediately to Mandalay 
Hill, a rocky eminence, about 800 feet high and covered with pagodas 
and temples, which dominates the north-east sector of the city. 
South-west of the hill lay Fort Dufferin. This was a large area enclosed 
by solid masonry walls 20 feet high, backed by 60 feet of earth and 
encircled by a moat about 70 yards wide. Mandalay Hill was captured 
on March 11th after severe fighting. The city was then cleared, 
and three days later, Fort Dufferin was invested. On the 16th, several 
air attacks were made on the massive walls with little effect. Medium 
artillery also failed to breach them. However, another air-strike 
having made a small opening, an infantry assault was attempted by 
night. It was repulsed, and three more assaults on March 18th met 
with a similar fate. An attempt to cross the moat early on March 
19th failed because the water was choked with weeds. Later that day, 
three planes carrying 2,000 Ib. bombs managed to blow a 15-feet 
hole in the wall by using a special technique. The bombs were released 
at a low level, ricochetted off the water, and exploded against the 
masonry. At last, on March 20th, our assault troops forced an 
entry, only to find that the bulk of the defenders had vanished. A 
few suicide squads remained, but these were gradually eliminated. On 
March 21st, 1945, Mandalay was Officially declared to be clear of 


ShOL “HINT YOuRpy ‘Avjepuryy ye uLayng y40.4 Jo Sayed ay) Surusdo Auedwoy ppiy so 


PCLT TEE LE AI ALR TT ERE SATE IIT LT PE 





THE ADVANCE TO MEIKTILA AND MANDALAY 381 


the enemy. The 19th (‘‘Dagger’’) Division had delivered the coup 
de grace to Japanese prestige in Burma. The ancient Burmese capital 
had fallen. The battle of annihilation in the Mandalay Plain was 
in its closing stages, and the 33rd Corps was driving the remnants of 
three enemy divisions eastwards into the Shan States or south- 
wards down the Rangoon road. 

The 19th Divisional Engineers did trojan work in the advance to 
Mandalay and the siege operations which followed. At the Magyi 
Chaung, 64 and 65 Field Companies laid a corduroy road and 
bridged a deep channel to maintain the speed of the advance. North 
of Madaya, a platoon of 29 Field Company branched off eastwards 
with the 62nd Brigade to occupy the hill-station of Maymyo while 
another accompanied the 98th Brigade in the main advance. This 
platoon sent a party forward to reconnoitre Fort Dufferin. The men 
cut through barbed wire fences and crawled through long grass 
between the moat and the wall and afterwards returned to make a 
second reconnaissance to ascertain, if possible, the actual thickness 
of the wall, but heavy fire necessitated their withdrawal. On March 
10th, when 64 Field Company had reached the outskirts of the city, 
a demolition party was sent to the top of Mandalay Hill to assist in 
its capture. They used bee-hive charges to blast holes through the 
concrete roofs of strong-points so that the infantry could finish off 
the enemy inside with grenades. The fight for Mandalay Hill was a 
bloody one and 64 Field Company took part in several assaults. 

During the eight-day siege of Fort Dufferin, most of the Engineer 
work was done at night. 29 Field Company moved into the city 
to build a light airstrip on the Race Course. 327 Field Park Company, 
with the help of 29 and 64 Field Companies, prepared scaling ladders 
in case the walls had to be surmounted in the old-fashioned style. 65 
Field Company was as usual well to the fore, and on March 18th 
a small detachment from the unit carried out a daring reconnaissance. 
On the northern side of Fort Dufferin there was a sewerage tunnel 
which ran under the moat and the wall and emerged among some 
trees inside the enclosure. Captain R. W. T. Britten, R.E., and 
Subedar Pappala Yakub went forward to find out whether troops 
could enter the Fort through this tunnel. They waded through two 
feet of filth, dragging behind them a tracing tape as a communication 
cord with their men outside, and actually penetrated into the Fort, 
but it was decided that the sewer was not suitable for assaulting 
infantry and the project was abandoned. Britten was awarded the 
Military Cross and Yakub the M.B.E. 


382 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


When news was received at 1.0 p.m. on March 20th that the 
Japanese had gone, the Sappers cleared the rubble away from the 
gates of battered Fort Dufferin, and their C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel 
F. M. Hill, made a triumphant entry in his jeep, the first vehicle to 
arrive. The troops streamed in amid general rejoicings, and the 
Sappers built a platform of Bailey bridging equipment with a silver- 
painted telegraph pole as a flagstaff for the hoisting of the Union 
Jack by General Slim. Then they set to work to repair railway lines, 
clear away debris and lift enemy mines. Mandalay was a sorry 
sight—a travesty of the picturesque city of King Thebaw’s day—and 
the Field Companies were glad to leave it in rotation for a short 
rest at Maymyo. Before transfer to Meiktila, 327 Field Park Company 
had the satisfaction of bringing in the first railway train since the 
evacuation in 1942. The locomotive, though riddled with bullet 
holes, had been successfully repaired and drew the train in fine style. 

The flag was now about to fall for the race to Rangoon. It was 
realized fully that this was a gamble, and that if the fates were against 
us and we could not reach the city before the monsoon burst in full 
force, we might have to withdraw towards Imphal and throw away 
much if not all that had been won. But every officer and man in the 
Fourteenth Army was determined that the gamble should succeed 
and was ready to put his last ounce into the effort to clear Burma of 
the Japanese. Never was morale higher than in the spring of 1945 
on the banks of the mighty Irrawaddy. 


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Reproduced by permission of 


CHAPTER XIII 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA, 
APRIL 1945 - OCTOBER 1947 


ARLY in 1945, the Fourteenth Army began to re-group for 
Bie thrust to Rangoon. It seemed, at that period, that even 

if the adventure were completely successful it would be necessary 
afterwards to clear the country by a long process of annihilation 
because the Japanese would never surrender. There remained the 
possibility that their Government might be forced to sue for peace 
and consequently order its armies in Burma to cease hostilities. At 
the moment, this appeared improbable, though it was actually brought 
about later by the use of the atom bomb which was approved at the 
Potsdam Conference in Berlin on July 24th. The secret of this new 
weapon, however, was closely guarded, and the commanders in the 
field were unaware of the Potsdam decision. Rangoon was their 
immediate goal, and they had to reach it before the monsoon wrecked 
their communications. The laborious process of clearing the country 
would follow, as it did in the South African War. 

General Slim had planned originally to send the 4th Corps, under 
Lieut.-General Messervy, down the Irrawaddy, and the 33rd Corps, 
under Lieut.-General Stopford, down the Mandalay-Rangoon road; 
but as a swift advance down the road would cut off large enemy 
forces in the Pegu Yomas and prevent their escape eastwards towards 
the Sittang, he decided instead to send the largely mechanized and 
mobile 4th Corps down the road and the adjacent railway and to 
despatch the 33rd Corps down the Irrawaddy. The 4th Corps was 
in a better position than the 33rd Corps for a rapid advance on 
Rangoon as it was concentrated in the Meiktila area, some 50 miles 
south of its rival. The new plan involved a complicated manoeuvre 
since the bulk of the 33rd Corps, consisting of the 2nd British Division, 
20th Indian Division and 268th Indian Infantry Brigade, would have 
to move from north-east to south-west across the lines of commu- 
nication of the 4th Corps which comprised the 5th and 17th Indian 
Divisions and the 255th Tank Brigade. After arriving in the Irrawaddy 
Valley, the 33rd Corps would be reinforced by the 7th Indian Division 
which had previously belonged to the 4th Corps. During the 


383 


384 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


regrouping stage, the 4th Corps would occupy Pyawbwe, 25 miles 
south-east of Meiktila, and use it as a springboard for a further 
advance when ready, while behind it the 19th Indian Division (now 
under Army Command) cleared the country between Mandalay, 
Thazi and Chauk.' 

Undoubtedly the most spectacular feature of the last phase of the 
war in Burma was the advance of the 4th Corps on Rangoon, so it 
is proposed to deal now with that operation and the experiences of 
the Indian Engineers engaged in it. The advance began on March 
30th, 1945, when the 17th Division moved southwards from Meiktila 
to threaten Pyawbwe from the north and west while the 255th Tank 
Brigade dealt a decisive blow from the south-west. Fierce opposition 
was encountered. Almost every village was defended by suicide 
squads. Yindaw was found to be so strongly held that the 17th 
Division was ordered to by-pass it and leave its clearance to the 
5th Division which was following on its heels. Yindaw resisted for 
three days and was not taken until the garrison had been wiped 
out. Pyawbwe fell to the 17th Division on April 10th, and the way 
then lay open for a thrust towards Pyinmana and Toungoo. The 
latter was particularly important because it had airfields which 
could be used not only to support a further advance on Pegu but to 
provide air cover for the sea-borne attack on Rangoon from Arakan 
by the 26th Indian Division. The 17th Division had done very well 
while in the lead. In a fortnight it had killed 2,900 Japanese and 
captured or destroyed 44 guns, 6 tanks and 70 vehicles. The Tank 
Brigade had also taken a heavy toll of the enemy. 

The Sth Division now took over the lead, and preceded by an 
armoured column, two mechanized brigades passed through the 17th 
Division. By the evening of April 10th, the armour was beyond 
Yamethin. The infantry and transport, following more slowly, were 
held up temporarily by enemy forces which had returned to Yamethin 
under cover of darkness; but these Japanese were liquidated after 
a couple of days’ fighting and the advance was resumed. Shwemyo, 
30 miles beyond Yamethin, fell to the 5th Division on April 16th. 
The armoured column, and a mechanized infantry brigade which 
followed it, were checked for a time at the Shwemyo Bluff, a ridge 
dominating the main road and railway for several miles. However, 
another mechanized brigade arrived on the scene, and by outflanking 





' See the maps of Upper and Lower Burma included in this chapter. 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 385 


the defenders, forced their withdrawal on April 18th. The Division 
then advanced towards Pyinmana,! which the armoured column 
reached on the 19th. By-passing the town, the Division seized the 
important airfield at Lewe and prepared it to receive light planes 
and gliders. Pyinmana having been captured on April 2Ist, the troops 
pressed on towards Toungoo which was already under heavy air 
attack. This town was valuable strategically not only as a forward 
air base but because a road ran eastwards from it to the Salween 
River near Mawchi along which the enemy might escape into Northern 
Thailand. On April 22nd, the armoured column, closely followed by 
a brigade of the 5th Division, swept into the place. It took the enemy 
so completely by surprise that a Japanese traffic policeman, on point 
duty, signalled to the tanks to stop. Those were the last signals he 
ever made. By April 24th, Toungoo had been cleared and from one 
of its three airfields our fighters were able to cover Rangoon, 160 
miles away to the south. Meanwhile, the armoured column and the 
leading infantry brigade had gone far ahead towards Pyu which 
they captured on the 25th in spite of a serious check at the Pyu 
Chaung where, as related later, a bridge had been destroyed. The 
17th Division now passed through the Sth Division to resume the 
lead in the thrust towards Pegu. 

During the three weeks which had elapsed since General Messervy’s. 
4th Corps had burst out of Meiktila it had advanced 170 miles and 
killed 4,800 Japanese. Its progress had been so rapid that at times 
the Forward Airfield Engineers had been unable to keep pace with 
it. In order, therefore, to ensure the least possible delay in making 
or repairing airstrips, a reconnaissance party of engineers travelled 
with the armoured spearhead. The Field Companies of Indian 
Engineers followed as closely as they could and managed to open 
no less than 9 airstrips in 11 days over a distance of 200 miles. The 
Japanese were rushed off their feet and were rapidly losing heart. 
General Kimura, recognizing that the situation in Southern Burma 
was hopeless and that his last chance of saving Rangoon had gone, 
ordered the evacuation of the city and transferred his headquarters 
to Moulmein on the Tenasserim Coast. He had lost effective control 
of his armies and had few reserves. Yet he was still determined to 
fight for Pegu which controlled the road and rail route to Moulmein, 


1 Pyinmana is a railway junction, north of Toungoo, from which a branch line runs. 
to Taungdwingyi and Chauk. 


386 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


and therefore he scraped the bottom of the pot to find men to hold 
that town and garrison Moulmein. 

The 17th Division, preceded by an armoured column of the 255th 
Tank Brigade, left Pyu on April 25th for the final dash towards Pegu 
and Rangoon. It was fitting that this Division should have the honour 
of leading the victorious 4th Corps during the last stage of the advance 
because it had borne the burden of the dogged retreat in 1942 and 
had since established an unrivalled reputation in bitter fighting on 
the Tiddim Road. The axis of the 4th Corps’ final advance to the 
south has been described as “‘the longest and narrowest salient known 
in warfare’, for it was seldom wider than 200 yards on either side 
of the road and railway. Our tank crews, racing down the road 
could see Japanese infantry trudging along parallel to them in the 
hills to right and left. These men belonged to a Japanese division 
moving southwards from the Shan States. Stragglers were picked up 
by the 19th Division in the Toungoo region or fell victims to Karen 
guerillas hiding in the jungles. Many were killed by detachments of 
the “Burma National Army’’, 7,000 strong, under Major-General 
Aung San, which had come over to our side when an Allied victory 
seemed assured.! 

The distance by road from Pyu to Rangoon is only about 140 
miles, so there still seemed to be a chance that the 17th Division and 
255th Tank Brigade, followed by the Sth Division, could reach the 
city before the 26th Division arrived by sea from its advanced base 
on Ramree Island. The leading troops of the 4th Corps were now 
on reduced rations. Food supplies had to be sacrificed to meet the 
voracious demands of the armoured vehicles for petrol and oil. Yet 
there were no complaints. ‘Sorry you ’ve got to do all this on half 
rations’’ remarked General Slim to some toiling and sweating Gunners. 
‘‘Never mind, Sir’’, they replied. ‘Give us quarter rations and enough 
ammunition and we ’ll get you to Rangoon’”’. While the 19th Division 
in rear was pushing slowly eastwards from Toungoo up the Mawchi 
Road, the 17th Division arrived on April 26th in Daik-u, within 
85 miles of Rangoon, and was held up for a time near the Moyingyi 


' The Burma National Army had various names at different times. Early in 1942, 
when fighting for the Japanese, it was known as the “Burma Independence Army”. 
in August 1942 it became the “Burma Defence Army”. In March 1945 it was re- 


named the “Burma National Army”; and finally, in July 1945, it was called the 
‘Patriotic Burmese Forces”. 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 387 


Reservoir by suicide squads, mines and swamps.! Nevertheless, 
advanced elements of the 255th Tank Brigade penetrated into the 
outskirts of Pegu early on April 28th while others struck south- 
eastwards to cut the escape route towards Waw and the Sittang.? On 
the same day, the 17th Division recovered 400 British, Indian and 
American prisoners-of-war who had marched from the Rangoon 
Gaol. Then the monsoon descended in full force. All the airstrips 
were put out of action. Tanks and vehicles could not leave the main 
roads, and the Pegu River rose in flood and barred all forward 
movement. There were three bridges over the river, a main road 
bridge in Pegu itself, a railway bridge about a mile to the north, and 
three miles further upstream, a second railway bridge. All were held 
by the enemy and prepared for demolition. On April 30th, despite 
fierce resistance, a brigade and some armour gained a foothold in 
part of Pegu on the east bank and another brigade crossed under 
fire over the remains of the northernmost bridge after the enemy 
had demolished most of it. One brigade was then left in Pegu while 
the other two and the armour set out on May 2nd for Rangoon; 
but when still 32 miles short of their goal they received news that 
the city had already been occupied from the sea. Thus the Fourteenth 
Army was beaten on the post. It was a bitter disappointment to all 
ranks though they had the satisfaction of knowing that without their 
great efforts, and the support given by their planes, the 26th Division 
could not have taken Rangoon with so little loss. That the 4th 
Corps so nearly won the race was due in no small measure to the 
energy and enterprise of its commander, Lieut.-General F. W. 
Messervy, who had led the “Gazelle Force’ of armoured cars 
successfully in the operations against the Italians in the Sudan and 
Eritrea in 1940-41 and also the famous 7th Armoured Division 
(“The Desert Rats”) in the struggle against the Germans in the 
Western Desert in 1942.3 

This brief account of the operations of the 4th Corps as a whole 
may be supplemented by some details of the achievements of the 
Engineer formations, under Brigadier W. W. Boggs, which enabled 
the advance to proceed with such astonishing speed. In a rapid 
offensive of this description the problem of moving the Engineer 


1 See the map of the Toungoo-Rangoon Area included in this chapter. 
1 See the map of the Waw Area included in Chapter VIII. 
3 See Chapters II and IV. 


388 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


units forward from job to job is most intricate. Some detachments 
of the 4th Corps Engineers were still only 50 miles south of Yamethin 
when the armour reached Pegu. About 1,900 tons of Bailey bridge 
material were used during the advance. The Engineer units with the 
leading Division had to get it forward by hook or crook, so they 
were given a Bailey Platoon from a Bridge Company to help them. 
The Engineers with the supporting Division, though expected to 
bridge gaps as rapidly as possible or to improve bridges already 
made, had no such expert assistance. With the leading Division were 
also the Forward Airfield Engineers and a Mechanical Equipment 
Company. The Japanese airfields were vital objectives, and the For- 
ward Airfield Engineers were usually flown in to develop an airfield 
directly it had been taken. Behind them and the 4th Corps Engineer 
units came the Army Engineer formations to build large bridges, 
repair the railway and improve and maintain the line of communi- 
cation. At the outset, when the 17th Division was in the lead, the 
most urgent work, with the exception of airstrip construction, devolved 
naturally on the !7th Divisional Engineer units under Lieut.-Colonel 
T. H. F. Foulkes, R.E. These comprised 60 Field Company (Madras) 
under Major P. A. Walker, R.E., 70 Field Company (Bengal) under 
Major W. A. Livings, R.E., the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company under 
Major T. D. Badhani, I.E., and 414 Field Park Company (Bengal) 
under Major I. R. Ireland, R.E. Most of the work consisted of rapid 
Bailey bridging, at first over dry chaungs and then, as soon as the 
rains had begun, over flooded chaungs. The units were involved 
in occasional skirmishes with the enemy. Between Meiktila and 
Pyawbwe, 70 Field Company accounted for a number of 
Japanese, particularly in bayonet attack ahead of 414 Field Park 
Company’s bulldozers which were making a diversion. Near Pyawbwe, 
the Company eliminated a party of Japanese snipers, bringing the 
total bag to 30 killed. Experiments were made with a jeep train at 
Pyawbwe, and the railway line to Yamethin was repaired when clear 
of the enemy. 60 Field Company had some fighting after it 
left Meiktila on April 4th with the 63rd Brigade. It gave close support 
to the infantry and tanks and destroyed many enemy dumps. In 
the assault on Pyawbwe on April 10th, it was in the forefront of the 
ras and assisted the infantry in clearing the village on the following 

ay. 

After the 5th Division had assumed the lead at Pyawbwe, the 5th 
Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Orgill, R.E., moved 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 389 


up in support. The units concerned were 2 Field Company (Bengal) 
under Major C. W. Williams, R.E., 20 Field Company (Bombay) 
under Major J. D. Holland, R.E., 74 Field Company (Bengal) under 
Major D. Brunt, R.E., and 44 Field Park Company (Madras) under 
Major H. F. Thompson, R.E. At the Shwemyo Bluff, 74 Field 
Company helped the leading brigade to clear the enemy position 
while 2 Field Company crossed the Sinthe Chaung and went forward 
to make a diversion to by-pass Pyinmana. Bulldozers and motor 
graders were used to provide a route across paddy fields and sandy 
ground, and the Company joined the infantry in a battle against 
snipers hidden in fox-holes and trees. Williams was somewhat shaken 
when the bodies of two snipers, shot down from trees, landed within 
a few yards of him! Further crossings of the Sinthe Chaung were 
made under heavy shell fire. At one time the shells were dropping 
all round the Sappers as they laboured on a tank crossing. Following 
closely behind the leading tanks, the Sth Divisional Engineers also 
provided numerous crossings over smaller chaungs by bridging or by 
laying Army track, and by April 22nd most of them were well beyond 
Pyinmana. The 17th Divisional Engineers came hard on their heels. 
Major T. D. Badhani, O.C. Tehri-Garhwal Field Company, records 
that two diversions were made near the Shweymyo Bluff, two more 
at Pyinmana and another at the Yonbin Chaung near the Lewe 
Airfield.1. Occasional showers of rain had begun to fall and the diver- 
sions were deteriorating rapidly. The greater part of the 99th Brigade 
was carried in huge transporters which could not negotiate the curves 
and gradients which had sufficed for the Sth Division’s traffic under 
better conditions, and the bridges could not take such heavy loads. 
These were some of the problems encountered by the 17th Divisional 
Engineers while following the rapidly moving 5th Divisional Engineers 
towards Toungoo. 

At Pyinmana, as a very large bridge had been demolished by the 
enemy, the 4th Corps had to cross by fords or temporary bridges. 
The repair of this bridge was undertaken later by 362 Field Company 
(Madras) of the Command Army Group Engineers (C.A.G.E.). The 
trusses which were still standing were blown up and the pieces dragged 
away by recovery vehicles. Bailey crib piers were then built on the 
existing foundations, and over these was launched a continuous 
Triple-Single Bailey structure to take Class 40 loads. This bridge is 


“Engineer Operations of the 17th Indian Division, February-June 1945,” by 
Major T. D. Badhani, R.I.E. 


390 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


said to have been the first of its kind in Burma. It was a good example 
of Sapper ingenuity. 

Although the Field Companies of the 4th Corps Troops Engineers 
had to work desperately hard to maintain the impetus of the advance, 
the most exciting experiences fell naturally to 36 Field Squadron 
(Madras), under Major W. B. J. Armstrong, R.E., which operated 
with the spearhead provided by the 255th Tank Brigade. On April 
11th, the unit was in Pyawbwe, and a week later, after Yamethin and 
Tatkon had been captured, it reached a village called Kanhla, about 
40 miles south of Yamethin, where a bridge over a deep chaung had 
been demolished and was well covered by enemy fire. The chaung 
made an effective anti-tank obstacle and the advance was halted. 
Lieut. D. A. Orr, R.E., then went forward in a Scissors Bridge tank 
and superintended the laying of a bridge across the 30-feet gap under 
heavy rifle and mortar fire. It was laid straight and evenly although 
it was impossible for anyone to direct the operation from outside. 
The fighting tanks crossed quickly, and under cover of their fire, 
the infantry followed to clear the far bank. The scissors bridge was 
then adapted for jeep traffic, and vehicles of all sorts began to use it. 
Some of the drivers did not like the height above the water and had 
to be guided very carefully across. The main body of the Brigade 
being now well beyond the chaung, Lieut. G. C. Hodgson, R.E., 
reconnoitred the banks to find a place where a bulldozer could be 
got across. He discovered a suitable spot, but while returning to 
report, his jeep ran over a mine. Fortunately, it was exploded by a 
rear wheel, and Hodgson and the driver escaped injury though covered 
with picric acid and dust. The last vehicle crossed before dusk. A 
Valentine tank was then brought forward to lift the bridge; but 
just as the lifting gear was being adjusted, a party of Japs came down 
the chaung and attacked the infantry covering detachment, so the 
work had to cease while the tank withdrew into the perimeter defences. 
More Japs appeared and a brisk exchange of fire lasted throughout 
the night. The next morning, however, the enemy had gone and 
‘“B” Troop of 36 Field Squadron was able to go out and remove the 
bridge. 

After the Sth Division had passed Pyinmana, the Forward Air- 
field Engineers developed the Lewe airfield with the utmost energy 
while the Divisional Engineers passed on towards Toungoo with the 
brigades to which they were attached. Ahead of them, as usual, was 
the 255th Tank Brigade which captured an airstrip at Toungoo on 
April 22nd. Two days later, 2, 20 and 74 Field Companies were in 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 391 


the town. They were followed by the Airfield Engineers who included 
the 23rd Engineer Battalion under Lieut.-Colonel E. E. N. Sandeman, 
R.E., and 81 Field Company (Bengal) under Major R. S. O. Carter, 
R.E. These formations then began to repair the main all-weather 
airfield. Dozens of bomb-craters had to be filled in and acres of 
Bithess laid on the runways. The 17th Divisional Engineer companies 
next came through to resume the lead, but always ahead was the 
255th Tank Brigade with 36 Field Squadron. Major W. B. J. Arm- 
strong relates an amusing incident which occured in a village near 
Toungoo. “The place had just been cleared of Japs’, he writes,! 
“and “B’’ Troop was hard at work lifting some aerial bombs, fitted 
with contact fuses, which had been set in the ground as anti-tank 
mines. The bombs having been lifted, the fuses were removed and 
the bombs stacked at the side of the road. A Naik found one fuse 
which defied his efforts, so he decided, as time was short, to drop 
the bomb down a near-by well. A violent explosion followed. Water 
shot up a hundred feet into the air, flooding three Sherman tanks 
through their open turrets. The Naik himself was lucky to escape 
with a wetting and a clout on the head from a stone.” 

The speed of the advance was increasing in spite of numerous 
obstacles. At Pyu, for instance, a formidable chaung barred the way. 
It was held strongly by the enemy, but the near bank was cleared on 
April 24th and a small bridgehead established. The chaung was 
90 feet wide and very deep, and as the bridge across it had been 
demolished, the progress of the 17th Division, now in the lead, was 
checked temporarily while a Bailey bridge was being built. It was 
estimated that this bridge could not be ready before dawn on the 
26th, and the 255th Tank Brigade Commander told Major Armstrong 
that he, at any rate, could not afford to waste a day and that 36 
Field Squadron must therefore improvise a crossing for his tanks 
and transport. Armstrong reconnoitred on the evening of the 24th 
and found a spot on the far bank where some 15 feet remained of a 
Japanese trestle bridge. About 30 feet from the near bank, though a 
little off the centre line of the demolished bridge, was a submerged 
sandbank, and Armstrong promised the Brigadier that a crossing 
would be provided there by 10.0 a.m. the next day. Materials were 
collected, but enemy interference prevented a start until 8.0 a.m. 
The operation began with building a wooden platform on the sand- 
bank to just above water level. A Valentine Scissors Bridge was 


1 Notes by Major W. B. J. Armstrong, R.E., dated May 3rd, 1951. 


392 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


then laid from the near bank to the platform and a second Scissors 
Bridge brought forward. With great difficulty, this was laid in pro- 
longation of the remains of the Jap timber bridge, the deck of which 
was less than five feet above water. A very hump-backed structure 
resulted, but light vehicles were able to begin crossing only five 
minutes after the stipulated time. Each was guided across at snail’s 
pace by men stationed at intervals, and lame ducks were hauled 
over by a winch. Then came the 3-ton lorries. These almost caused 
the collapse of the old timber bridge, but it was held together some- 
how by lashings, nails and spikes. By nightfall, 500 vehicles had 
negotiated the crossing and the Brigade had moved ten miles to 
the south. The last vehicle crossed after dawn on April 26th. 36 
Field Squadron then removed the Scissors Bridge and rejoined the 
Brigade in a lightning thrust of 40 miles. Such ‘Heath Robinson’ 
structures had to be improvised by many Engineer units. No obstacle 
could be allowed to hinder the advance. Factors of safety lost their 
meaning. Every reasonable risk was taken. This was no time for 
text-book methods. 

Behind the Divisional Engineer units, the 4th Corps Troops 
Engineers, Army Troops Engineers and Forward Airfield Engineers 
flooded into and through Toungoo. It was a mighty influx. The 
War Diaries of April 1945 indicate the presence of 362, 364 and 365 
Field Companies and 327 Field Park Company of the Madras Group, 
75, 80 and 81 Field Companies of the Bengal Group, and 29, 363 
and 402 Field Companies and 305 Field Park Company of the Bombay 
Group. There were also many technical Engineer units. The scale 
on which the communications were being developed will therefore 
be appreciated. At the Pyu Chaung, for instance, 65 and 424 Field 
Companies (Madras) were building a Bailey bridge on April 30th. 
The centre span of a Warren girder bridge had collapsed after heavy 
rain and the resulting traffic block extended for two miles. Yet the 
gap was spanned successfully by a Double-Single Bailey after 30 
hours’ continuous work and the stream of lorries was released to 
pour southwards towards Nyaunglebin and Pegu. 

Stiff battles were fought at Pyinbongyi and Payagale where the 
main road and railway skirted the western boundary of the Moyingyi 
Reservoir north of Pegu. A Japanese Engineer Battalion had been at 
work on demolitions, booby traps and minefields. The booby traps 
were strewn everywhere, though they caused few casualties unless 
operated on the spot by suicide men. On April 27th, at Pyinbongyi, 
36 Field Squadron encountered for the first time some lone Japs 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 393 


concealed alongside the main road and carrying ““Lunge’’ mines. 
These weapons consisted of a bee-hive charge on a long bamboo 
pole which could be jabbed at a passing tank, demolishing it and, of 
course, killing the operator. Most of these suicidal Japs, however. 
were discovered and shot before they could do any damage. The 
armoured attack at Pyinbongyi went in at 10.0 a.m., and Lieut. S. T. 
Cooper, R.E., was called forward to remove a vehicle placed as a 
road-block at a demolished bridge. With him in a jeep was Sergeant 
Pimm of the Bridging Troop, and behind them a small detachment 
of 36 Field Squadron in a 15-cwt. truck. A Sherman Tank bulldozer, 
going into action for the first time, brought up the rear. As there 
was much sniping near the bridge, Cooper halted the tank bulldozer 
on the road and took his two vehicles off it to some cover afforded by 
the embankment. He decided that, if the blocking vehicle were pushed 
aside, a Scissors Bridge could be used, so he sent Sergeant Pimm 
back to fetch one while he led the Sherman bulldozer forward. He 
got to within ten yards of the bridge. Then there was a terrific 
explosion and he disappeared. The tank toppled over, with the 
bulldozer blade and a sprocket and two bogie wheels smashed, and 
the sergeant in charge of it jumped out and rushed back to get an 
ambulance. Armstrong and Pimm came forward alongside the road, 
but as they approached there were four more explosions and the tank 
sergeant was blown to pieces before their eyes. Armstrong then 
went on alone. He decided that some electrically detonated aerial 
bombs must have been buried near the bridge. The road was already 
badly cratered and more explosions might be expected unless the 
concealed Japs operating the mines could be eliminated. Accordingly,. 
a battalion of Gurkhas was sent through Pyinbongyi on either side 
of the road, accompanied by detachments of 36 Field Squadron. 
These troops dealt with the enemy snipers around the bridge and 
discovered and killed the occupants of a fox-hole from which the 
mines had been detonated. Afterwards, Armstrong and other officers 
searched in vain for Cooper’s body though they found the remains 
of the tank sergeant about 30 yards off the road. 

An unfortunate accident occured during the attack on Payagale 
on April 28th. A Section of ‘‘A” Troop, 36 Field Squadron, was 
sweeping the road for mines under the direction of Major Armstrong 
and the Troop Commander, Jemadar Kader Khan. A Naik and a 
Sapper, moving along 30 yards west of the road, found a Jap hiding 
in a fox-hole and attacked him with their rifle-butts. The Jemadar, 
seeing this, rushed across, picked up a Lunge mine lying near the 


394 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


fox-hole, and thrust at the Jap with the pole. The mine immediately 
exploded, killing the Jap, the Naik and the Sapper and seriously 
wounding the Jemadar. Armstrong had shouted a warning but it 
was not heard in time. Though himself wounded by a piece of metal, 
he was able to walk to an ambulance, with the Jemadar on a stretcher 
alongside. Further casualties were suffered a few days later. Two 
Sappers were busily examining an obvious booby-trap when a Jap, 
hidden in a fox-hole in some near-by bushes, pulled a string laid 
through loose earth to a switch at the trap. Both Sappers were killed 
and the Jap immediately shot. Such incidents were by no means 
uncommon and show the desperate nature of the enemy. A wounded 
Jap was very dangerous. He might, and probably would, try to kill 
those who sought to help him. Only the dead could do no harm. 

At Pegu, when within 50 miles of Rangoon, the 4th Corps Engineers 
met their first serious check. On April 29th, four days before a 
brigade of the 26th Indian Division occupied part of Rangoon, 
units of the 17th Indian Division were in the outskirts of Pegu, and 
part of the 48th Brigade, together with 70 Field Company, forded 
the river to enter the eastern portion before floods prevented an easy 
passage. As already explained, there were three bridges across the 
Pegu River—a main road bridge in the town, a railway bridge up- 
stream of it, and another railway bridge on a diversion some miles 
beyond. The general attack on Pegu began on April 30th. 60 Field 
Company provided detachments to lift mines while the 63rd Brigade 
cleared part of the town. The road was dotted with small mounds. 
These concealed dummy mines intended to delay our mine-sweepers. 
The Tehri-Garhwal Field Company was detailed to repair the road 
bridge which, like the other bridges, had already been demolished by 
the enemy. Major T. D. Badhani states that the 100-feet centre span 
of this three-span steel girder structure had been cut at one end and 
that it was difficult to find sufficient space to launch a Bailey span bet- 
ween the trusses. The decking of the other spans was weak, and as the 
enemy still held the far bank, stores could not be transported to that 
side. The project was therefore shelved, and instead it was proposed 
to convert the most distant railway bridge for road traffic. This was 
a low-level timber pile affair of seven bays which afforded the quickest 
means of crossing, although the approach road was very long and 
liable to give trouble under heavy rain. The bridge was repaired and 
altered by the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company, and the approach road, 
through paddy fields, improved by 60 Field Company, so that a consi- 
derable number of troops and some tanks were able to cross after 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 395 


dark on May 2nd. Then the monsoon started in earnest. 60 Field 
Company was flooded out and the road became impassable. Attention 
was transferred, therefore, to the steel road bridge in the town where 
it was hoped that a Bailey span might be built to replace the fallen 
span. This scheme, however, was shelved in favour of providing a 
floating Bailey bridge near at hand although the banks were steep 
and the equipment hardly suitable. At noon on May 3rd, 60 Field 
Company and the Tehri-Garhwals started work, and at 9.30 a.m. 
on the 4th the 63rd Brigade began to cross. Then the water level 
rose 15 feet. At dawn on May Sth it was found that another span 
of the adjacent steel bridge had fallen and that the flood, helped by 
an accumulation of debris, had washed away the floating bridge, 
parts of which could be seen resting on the far bank some hundreds 
of yards downstream. 74 Field Company, now in charge of the bridge, 
began to make preparations for ferrying with motor boats. The 
river was still rising and the situation seemed almost hopeless. How- 
ever, by the morning of May 6th the water had subsided six feet and 
ferrying was started. On the 7th, 60 Field Company began to assist 
74 Field Company in the erection of a high-level Bailey bridge to 
span a wide gap in the steel railway bridge a mile upstream. The 
remainder of this bridge was decked for road traffic and the rails 
removed from the approach embankments so that vehicles could 
reach the bridge. Thus the obstacle of the Pegu River was surmounted 
at last. The final rehabilitation of the communications fell to the 
Corps and Army Engineers, but it is evident that the struggle for 
Pegu was more a fight against the monsoon than against the enemy. 
Meanwhile, two brigades of the 17th Division had resumed the 
advance on Rangoon, only to be held up at the Lagunbyin Chaung 
at Milestone 324 just short of Hlegu. Here, a 135-feet brick-arched 
bridge with high embanked approaches had been demolished. Very 
little Bailey equipment was available, and more could not be expected 
at the moment because it had to be brought by air and most of the 
airfields were flooded. The only solution was to build embanked 
approaches at the narrowest site so that 110 feet of Bailey would 
suffice. Bulldozers were employed on the earth work, but they sank 
or overturned continually in the mud. Nevertheless, the Sappers 
persisted in their efforts, and within 48 hours 70 Field Company 
launched a Bailey bridge across which some infantry and armour 
passed on to Hlegu. The Tehri-Garhwal Field Company afterwards 
replaced this bridge by a heavier type. At Hlegu itself, the 17th 
Division was faced with another obstacle. Two spans of a road 


396 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


bridge, destroyed by our planes in 1942, had been replaced by the. 
Japs with timber trestles and these in turn had been burnt down. 
Bailey equipment was now beginning to arrive again in moderate 
quantities, so 70 Field Company soon had the bridge in usable 
condition. Yet the delays at Lagunbyin and Hlegu dashed all hopes 
that the 17th Division could beat the 26th Division in the race to 
Rangoon, and nothing could be gained by advancing further. 

Some of the airfields in rear were in a sorry state. Their condition 
may be judged by what happened at Payagyi where there was an 
airstrip on rough paddy fields. A Commando plane, slightly damaged 
in a collision, lay there while the rain poured down in an unceasing 
deluge. An American Colonel came along and, ploughing through 
the swamp, found a stretch of fairly dry surface only 700 feet in 
length. ‘‘Guess we “ll snap her off’’, said he, and ordered the plane 
to be dragged into position by a bulldozer. In he got, and after a 
run of 699 feet, pulled up the wheels and rose into the clouds. Though 
greatly impressed by his daring, the Sappers exchanged rather sour 
looks for they had been told that they must always provide a 2,000- 
yard runway for a Commando and had tried to do so at the expense 
of much toil and sweat. But then, everyone is not sucha care-free 
and dare-devil flyer as that American. 

In all, during the 4th Corps’ advance to Pegu and Hlegu, 25 Bailey 
bridges were built, of which eight were multi-span. Five double-strip 
and seven single-strip airfields were made or repaired, and 1,900 tons 
of Bailey equipment were flown in. All this was accomplished in 
little over a month while the men were on reduced rations. It may be 
interesting, at this point, to record the overall Engineer achievement 
during the entire campaign ending in the capture of Rangoon. Lord 
Mountbatten states that some 2,400 miles of all-weather road were 
built—a distance as far as from Lisbon to Leningrad.! No less than 
95 all-weather airfields and 312 fair-weather airstrips were constructed, 
involving 180 miles of paved runway in addition to aprons, hard 
standings and taxi tracks of equivalent area. These would be equal 
to a two-way road from Paris to Moscow. American Engineers laid 
2,800 miles of oil pipe line, and Indian Engineers a further 900 miles. 
During the battles around Mandalay and Meiktila, 20,000 tons of 
Engineer stores were flown in. And as to the labour employed, 
75,000 British, Indian, American, African and Cingalese Engineers 


» Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South- 
East Asia, 1943-1945, pp, 252-53. 





THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 397 


were continuously at work, together with 200,000 unskilled labourers. 
These statistics afford some idea of the vast demands of the final 
campaign in Burma. 

A brief allusion has already been made to the Allied prisoners-of- 
war recovered near Pegu by the 17th Division. These men had been 
confined in the Rangoon Gaol, some of them since 1942, and among 
them were several of the Indian Engineers. Those who were fit 
enough had been forced by the Japanese to march northwards towards 
Pegu with a view to evacuating them across the Sittang and down 
the coast to Moulmein. But after news had arrived that the 4th 
Corps had taken Payagyi, the Jap escorts decamped and the prisoners 
were left to make contact with our forces as best they could. They 
proceeded in small parties, often hiding in Burmese villages to escape ~ 
roving bands of Japanese. On arrival, they presented a pitiful spectacle. 
Some were barefooted, and their feet were cut and bleeding after a 
50-mile march. They were bearded and emaciated, and many were 
almost naked, but their joy when they met their comrades was 
unbounded. They found it difficult to stop talking, even to eat, and 
afterwards they went on talking till they dropped asleep from sheer 
exhaustion. 

The time has now come to describe as briefly as possible the advance 
of the 33rd Corps under Lieut.-General Stopford down the Irrawaddy 
while the 4th Corps was thrusting straight at Rangoon. During the 
first week of April 1945, the 268th Indian Infantry Brigade and a 
brigade of the 2nd British Division moved south-westwards from 
Myingyan, north of Meiktila, and entered the 33rd Corps area on 
the Irrawaddy, clearing the country as they went. Little opposition 
was met until the troops reached Mount Popa, an extinct volcano, 
on which the enemy was strongly entrenched.! Here the Japanese 
held out until April 20th, after which the British brigade was with- 
drawn and eventually joined the remainder of the 2nd British Division 
in India. The 7th Indian Division, now in the 33rd Corps, had mean- 
while been making steady progress down both banks of the Irrawaddy, 
encountering little resistance on the west bank but stiffer opposition 
on the east bank, especially at Kyaukpadaung, the railhead of the 
branch line from Pyinmana. Kyaukpadaung was captured on April 
12th and the advance resumed towards Yenangyaung, a most impor- 
tant oil centre. By April 21st, Yenangyaung was encircled, and in 
spite of fierce resistance, it was taken on the following day. While 


' See the map of Central Burma appearing in Chapter XII. 


398 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


these operations were in progress, the 20th Indian Division had not 
been idle. Two mechanized brigades had begun to push south- 
westwards towards Taungdwingyi in order to reach the Irrawaddy 
below Yenangyaung. Taungdwingyi was an important road centre 
on the Japanese escape route eastwards across the Pegu Yomas. 
The garrison was taken by surprise, and the town was occupied 
without much difficulty on April 13th. The 20th Division then swung 
westwards to the Irrawaddy, capturing Magwe and Myingun on 
April 19th. It was now well placed to cut off some enemy formations 
on the east bank which were being driven southwards by the 7th 
Division. These Japanese managed to cross to the west bank, followed 
by a brigade of the 7th Division, and for the rest of the month they 
were driven further and further south down that bank. A brigade of 
the 20th Division was brought forward and directed straight on 
Allanmyo while another moved along the river bank. Allanmyo fell 
on April 28th and Prome on May 2nd. Prome was important because 
of its port facilities and also because it lay on the only escape route 
for the enemy forces isolated in Arakan. Having taken Prome, the 
20th Division advanced down the main road towards Rangoon after 
detaching a brigade to follow the river bank and seize any crossing 
places. Columns were sent westwards along the Taungup Road to 
meet patrols of the 82nd West African Division coming from Arakan. 
The task of eliminating a final pocket of resistance established on the 
east bank of the Irrawaddy a few miles north of Prome was allotted 
to the 7th Division and 268th Brigade. This proved most difficult 
and was not completed until early in June when the 7th Division 
assumed control of the Prome-Shwedaung sector while the 20th 
Division was located further south in the Shwedaung-Hmawbi 
sector.! But several weeks earlier the campaign on the Irrawaddy 
had come virtually to an end, for on May 20th a brigade of the 20th 
Division had met another of the 26th Division coming up the main 
road 60 miles from Rangoon. 

Most of the Engineer work during the advance of the 33rd Corps 
down the Irrawaddy fell naturally on the 7th and 20th Divisional 
Engineers. The latter, under Lieut.-Colonel A. R. S. Lucas, R.E., 
comprised 92 and 481 Field Companies (Bombay) and 422 Field 
Company and 309 Field Park Company (Madras). The experiences 
of 422 Field Company, under Major L. S. Henderson, R.E., 
are described in Major D. W. McGrath’s history of that unit, 





* See the map of the Toungoo-Rangoon Area included in this chapter. 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 399 


some extracts from which will show the general nature of the work, 
not only of that particular Company, but of others also. ‘“‘We were 
to branch westwards from Meiktila into the oilfields districts’, 
writes McGrath, ‘‘and then southwards down the road to Prome. 
The C.R.E. converted his Sappers into an “‘R.E. Group’’. One Field 
Company was with the leading Brigade while the other two followed 
to tackle the bigger jobs. The leading Company was expected only 
to do the roughest jobs to get the Brigade forward. Accordingly, 
on April 14th, 422 Company (less No. 3 Platoon) moved to Meiktila 
to the concentration of the R.E. Group. The town was absolutely 
devastated, though the airfields were in good working order. Every- 
thing was very bare and dry and our camp was situated among 
large rocks which radiated heat. We were employed well in front of 
our infantry on making dry chaungs traversable for the whole Divi- 
sion on the road to Kyaukpadaung. One of 481 Company’s jeeps 
blew up on a mine, but we did not even smell a Jap. The 32nd 
Brigade resumed its advance and we followed closely behind, branching 
off the main road towards Natmauk which was captured without a 
fight as the enemy was concentrating around Mount Popa. The 
Brigade then went on towards Taungdwingyi while we remained at 
Natmauk. Here, No. 3 Platoon arrived with the 80th Brigade which 
had been following the 32nd Brigade. The 80th Brigade was to 
go to Magwe, 30 miles away on the river bank. There were many 
bad chaungs on the road, but Nos. | and 2 Platoons made them 
traversable to within eight miles of Magwe by using Sommerfeld 
track, brushwood and stones. The Yin Chaung, which kept on 
cropping up, was our greatest bugbear. The country was covered 
with stunted jungle, the heat was terrific, and there was practically 
no water. No. 3 Platoon, with the 80th Brigade, then passed through 
to clear mines in front of the tanks!, and Magwe was taken without 
much opposition. Meanwhile, back at Natmauk, the other Platoons 
were repairing the road to Taungdwingyi which had been captured 
by the 32nd Brigade. Once again, the biggest obstacle was the sandy 
Yin Chaung, here more than half a mile wide. All available Sommer- 
feld track was soon used up, and for the rest of the distance we laid 
thousands of bricks and many layers of brushwood. At last we 
moved forward to Taungdwingyi. The Japs had not realised that 


1 The tanks were those of the 254th Tank Brigade to which was attached 401 Field 
Squadron (Bombay) under Major P. G. Burrell, R.E. 401 Field Squadron reached 
the Yin Chaung on April 24th. On May [1th it was in Taungdwingyi, on May 12th 
in Allanmyo, and on the 15th in Tharrawaddy. 


400 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


our troops had taken the place, and an enemy convoy, coming down 
the road with its lights blazing, had been promptly wiped out.” 

“While Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons restored the water-supply in 
Taungdwingyi’, continues McGrath, ‘“‘No. 3 Platoon was having a 
rough time at Magwe. A road on the opposite bank, leading to 
Thayetmyo, was still in enemy hands and our guns opened fire on 
vehicles moving along it. The Japs replied with such effect that 
Magwe was known thereafter as the “Shelling Camp”. 422 Company 
now prepared to advance again down the main road minus No. 3 
Platoon which was given the unenviable job of footslogging with 
the 80th Brigade along jungle tracks to Allanmyo. All stores and 
equipment were carried in bullock carts. The rest of the unit moved 
to Nyaungbintha, half-way between Taungdwingyi and Allanmyo, 
and No. 2 Platoon pushed on to repair a girder bridge while 481 
Field Company, under Major M. I. Pritchard, R.E., made a diversion. 
Nearing Allanmyo we could see that the battle for the town was still 
in progress. Each side held half of it. Fighting was fierce all 
night and the 32nd Brigade was heavily engaged, but by morning 
we had captured the place. The 100th Brigade now took over the 
lead, and on April 28th 422 Company camped with it at the Bwetgyi 
Chaung. As usual, the Japs had destroyed the bridge, so our tanks 
had to cross elsewhere. The Jap gunners made life very difficult for 
us until our infantry got among them. Materials for a tank crossing 
were found in the masses of logs which had collected upstream of 
the wrecked bridge, and Nos. | and 2 Platoons rapidly made a winding 
Staircase down and up the steep banks and filled in depressions in 
the bed of the chaung with stones. It was an alarming sight to see 
our tanks going down the staircase, for in two places they had to 
be swivelled round on one track and eased gently down a slope of 
1 in 2. The 100th Brigade was moving on towards Prome and we 
spent another day at the Bwetgyi Chaung maintaining a crossing for 
‘soft’ vehicles made by 481 Company. Rain fell heavily, and winching 
the vehicles up the slopes was a slow business. Meanwhile, we heard 
that the 80th Brigade’s bullock-cart convoy had arrived in Allanmyo. 
No. 3 Platoon had marched 70 miles, covering 17 miles on the first 
day. Foraging had to be done all the way to keep the bullocks fed. 
It had been a most gruelling journey as the Sappers had not only to 
march the whole distance and assist at crossings when necessary 
but also to provide water at every camp.” 

On May Ist, 422 Field Company (less No. 3 Platoon) moved to 
the Nawin Chaung, four miles from Prome. The monsoon was 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 401 


now imminent and the 20th Division had been ordered to cover 
13 miles a day. The chaung was under enemy fire as the unit settled 
in. Some tanks managed to cross by a ford and it was hoped that 
others would be able to follow before the flood came down. The 
Sappers set to work after dark on building a 200-feet folding boat 
bridge and a Bailey raft and landing stages, but at dawn the monsoon 
arrived. The water rose at the rate of a foot every 20 minutes. A 
bridge built further downstream by 481 Field Company was washed 
away though 422 Company’s bridge still held. Next day, the rain 
ceased temporarily and the water level began to fall. Some tanks 
were winched across the ford by bulldozers, but the medium artillery 
failed to make the passage. The approaches had now become absolute 
quagmires. Splashing through inches of mud, 422 Field Company 
laid 300 yards of Sommerfeld track on one side while 92 Field 
Company, under Major J. B. Irving, R.E., surfaced the other side 
with any materials it could find. Late that night, the Sappers were 
told that the medium artillery must be got across at all costs for a 
final attack on Prome. There was nothing for it but to risk taking 
the 5.5 inch guns over the floating bridge. Swearing gunners were 
ordered to unload all ammunition and kit from their ‘quads’. It was 
decided that these should cross first, one at a time, and anchor well up 
the far bank. The guns could then be winched over while the gunners 
held up the spades and guided the wheels. No. 2 Platoon got four 
quads and their guns across during the night, though it was a most 
laborious process. Many times the guns had to be hauled back 
and another attempt made. The boats almost foundered under the 
excessive load, while the Sappers baled for dear life. Fortunately, the 
water level continued to fall, and when daylight came the remainder 
of the medium artillery could use the ford. On May Sth, after the 
occupation of Prome, 422 Field Company began to build a Bailey 
bridge while 92 and 481 Field Companies pushed on. This bridge, 
220 feet in length, was opened to traffic on May 12th, the day on 
which 422 Company captured a Sergeant-Major of the Japanese 
Sappers dressed as a Burman. On the 13th, the Company moved 
through Prome to bridge the Inma Chaung, 153 miles from Rangoon, 
and finished the work in five days. The forward elements of the 20th 
Division were now beyond Tharrawaddy, 80 miles from Rangoon, 
and had contacted the 26th Division coming up from the south, so 
422 Company moved to Tharrawaddy, building two more bridges 
on the way, and on May 25th took up monsoon quarters with the 
80th Brigade at Hmawbi, within 30 miles of Rangoon. 


402 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


During the Irrawaddy advance, the 7th Division had co-operated 
fully with the 20th Division, its first objective being Kyaukpadaung 
which fell on April 12th. The 7th Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.- 
Colonel T. Wright, R.E., comprised 77 Field Company (Bengal) 
and 62 and 421 Field Companies and 331 Field Park Company 
(Madras). 77 Field Company, under Major T. G. Jamieson, R.E., 
swept up mines at Kyaukpadaung and took part later in an attack 
on Chauk, an important oil centre on the river bank. Here, the 
Sappers used bee-hive charges to help the Gurkhas in dealing with 
enemy snipers concealed on cliff-tops. The next place to fall to the 
7th Division was Singu, a few miles upstream. The Japanese counter- 
attacked but were repulsed. Some 48 miles south of Chauk lay 
Yenangyaung, the chief town of the oilfields area and a primary 
objective of the Division. After its capture on April 22nd, 77 Field 
Company collected stores for an assault crossing of the Irrawaddy 
at Kyaukye, just north of the town, and with 60 Field Company, 
completed the ferrying of the 89th Brigade on the 27th. 421 Field 
Company had already ferried the 114th Brigade to the west bank 
from Magwe to Minbu. The 89th Brigade was ordered to cut off 
the Japs driven southwards by the 114th Brigade, but most of these 
escaped the net, and in the middle of May 421 Field Company 
ferried the 114th back to Magwe to resume the advance to Allanmyo. 
62 Field Company, with the 89th Brigade on the west bank, then 
joined in the pursuit southwards along hilly jungle paths, which had 
to be adapted to carry mechanical transport, until finally the enemy 
was cornered some 30 miles north-west of Thayetmyo. 77 Field 
Company, after operating the ferry at Magwe for a time, built a 
floating bridge over the Yin Chaung and, late in May, a 270-feet 
Bailey bridge across another chaung further down the road. By the 
end of the month, both 77 and 421 Field Companies were in or near 
Prome. 331 Field Park Company arrived there early in June, but 
62 Field Company did not reach the place until June 20th as it was 
kept at Allanmyo for ferrying work. There was much to be done in 
Prome in the way of general rehabilitation and repair of war damage, 
and 77 Field Company established a ferry to bring some West African 
troops across from the Taungup Road. Warlike operations on the 
Irrawaddy were now practically at an end, and late in June all the 
7th Divisional Engineers moved down the Rangoon Road through 


Hmawbi to the Pegu area where the Japanese were making their 
final stand. 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 403 


A remarkable feat of navigation was performed by the 33rd Corps 
Troops Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel T. G. Morton, R.E., in 
support of the advance down the Irrawaddy. This was the transport 
downstream of masses of equipment and material lying on the banks 
of the river in the Mandalay region. The units involved were 67, 76 
and 361 Field Companies and 322 Field Park Company, all of the 
Bengal Corps. Early in April 1945, 76 Field Company had begun 
to collect equipment near Mandalay, and on the 15th, in a convoy 
of rafts known as the “Red Fleet’, the unit sailed for Nyaungu 
where arrangements were to be made to continue the voyage to 
Chauk and Yenangyaung when possible. At Nyaungu, 361 Field 
Company was waiting with further equipment and materials, and 
on April 21st it set out in a convoy called the ‘‘White Fleet’. Some 
of the first rafts of this fleet to reach Chauk were sent on at once to 
help in ferrying the brigade of the 7th Division which crossed the 
Irrawaddy at Kyaukye, after which they proceeded downstream to 
Yenangyaung and Magwe. 76 Company’s “Red Fleet”’ followed the 
“White Fleet”. Below Chauk, which both fleets left early in May, 
the river was very treacherous and navigation extremely difficult. The 
flotillas of rafts, each towed by a Dukw, could barely negotiate the 
narrow channels. No time could be lost because Bailey equipment 
was urgently needed at the front, and by May 4th most of the 
flotillas had reached Magwe. Here they were unloaded and were joined 
later by further flotillas brought downstream by 67 Field Company. 
All three Companies then set to work on bridging chaungs on the 
road to Prome and improving the line of communication. The 33rd 
Corps would have been sadly handicapped without the good offices 
of Colonel Morton’s Red and White Fleets and the Engineer units 
which manned them. 

Soon after the occupation of Rangoon, the 26th Indian Division 
received orders to return to India where the whole of Lieut.-General 
Christison’s 15th Indian Corps was to concentrate for the projected 
invasion of Malaya known as Operation “Zipper”. At the same 
time, sufficient troops were withdrawn from the Irrawaddy Valley 
to provide a new formation, the 34th Indian Corps, under the 
command of Lieut.-General O. L. Roberts, an ex-Bengal Sapper and 
Miner who had till then commanded the 23rd Indian Division. The 
15th and 34th Corps made up a re-grouped Fourteenth Army with 
its headquarters in India, and the command was allotted to General 
Sir Miles Dempsey who had led the Second Army in the invasion 


404 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


of Germany. In Burma, consequently, there remained only the 
4th and 33rd Indian Corps. These were formed into a new Twelth 
Army under Lieut.-General Sir Montagu Stopford, previously com- 
manding the 33rd Indian Corps which had been disbanded officially 
on May 28th, 1945. General Sir William Slim, the former Fourteenth 
Army Commander, became Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land 
Forces, South-East Asia, in place of General Sir Oliver Leese, and 
controlled both the Twelth and Fourteenth Armies. Lieut.-General 
Stopford established his Twelth Army headquarters in Rangoon. He 
had under his command the 4th Indian Corps (Sth, 17th and 19th 
Divisions and 255th Tank Brigade), the 7th and 20th Divisions and 
268th Infantry Brigade, and a brigade of the 2nd British Division. 
He also controlled the 82nd West African Division in Arakan, the 
22nd East African Brigade and the Burma National Army. His 
task was to destroy the remnants of the Japanese forces in Burma 
and re-occupy the southern coastal province of Tenasserim. The 
Twelth Army, over 300,000 strong, was disposed mostly along the 
Toungoo-Pegu-Rangoon Road, the largest concentration being in 
the bend of the Sittang River east of Pegu. The Japanese had little 
chance against such massive strength and they knew it. 

Since it was impossible at first to supply the 4th Corps in the 
Rangoon area adequately either by sea or air, supplies had to be 
carried for a time along the land route from the north which was in 
an appalling condition owing to heavy and continuous rain. The 
solution of the problem lay in re-opening the port of Rangoon as 
soon as possible for large ships and building up an air-base in Southern 
Burma. The Engineers therefore set about the primary task of re- 
storing the badly damaged port facilities, providing railway sidings 
and airstrips, erecting store-houses, workshops and camps and 
ensuring proper water and electricity supplies. By May 12th, several 
berths had been opened for unloading troops, transport and stores 
from ships, and by the middle of June no less than 3,000 tons of 
stores were being discharged daily. An enormous programme of 
airfield construction was initiated at Mingaladon, north of the city, 
not only to assist the Twelth Army in Burma but also to provide a 
main air-base for the invasion of Malaya. In the meantime it was 
necessary to exploit to the full any advantages which the possession 
of Rangoon might afford in driving the last Japanese out of the 
country. The Japanese armies, or what remained of them, were now 
grouped in four isolated areas. Remnants of the Fifteenth and 
Thirty-third Armies were in the Shan Hills, between the Mandalay- 


dnoqieyy uoosuRY 49A0 JasuNg 





THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 405 


Rangoon Road and the Thailand border, covering the escape routes 
eastwards from Meiktila through Taunggyi and from Toungoo 
through Mawchi. In the south, at the mouth of the Sittang River 
and along the Tenasserim Coast between Mokpalin and Moulmein, 
was the remainder of the Thirty-third Japanese Army. This was the 
vital area since General Kimura intended to concentrate his dis- 
organized forces in Tenasserim. Elements of the Twenty-eighth 
Japanese Army were scattered among the Pegu Yomas between the 
Sittang and the Irrawaddy. And lastly, in the Arakan Yomas to the 
west of the Irrawaddy, further elements of the same Army were 
trying to cross the river to join their comrades in the Pegu Yomas 
and combine with them in a desperate attempt to hack a way through 
the Twelth Army’s cordon along the Mandalay-Rangoon Road. 

To deal with this situation, the 4th Corps was ordered to cross 
the Sittang and, if possible, capture Mokpalinand Kyaikto. It was also 
to destroy any enemy forces attempting to cross the river further 
north and to capture Thandaung, 29 miles north-east of Toungoo, 
which dominated the Mawchi Road. The 19th Division, less one 
brigade, was deployed along the Mandalay-Rangoon Road from 
Toungoo southwards to Pyu and was to operate along the Mawchi 
Road. The detached brigade would advance along the Kalaw Road 
further north, in the direction of Taunggyi. As there was no serviceable 
bridge at Pegu owing to the torrential rains, the 17th Division was 
moved to the north of that town to a sector extending from Pyu 
southwards to Pyinbongyi, its main task being to prevent any Japanese 
breakout from the Pegu Yomas. The 5th Division was posted south 
of Pyinbongyi and was to cross the Sittang to secure Kyaikto if the 
crossing could be made without incurring casualties. Logistics, 
however, caused the abandonment of this scheme in favour of a 
policy of holding the Pegu-Payagyi area strongly in order to prevent a 
break-out. Thus the general dispositions from north to south along 
the Mandalay-Pegu Road were the 19th Division, 17th Division and 
5th Division in that order. During June, these regular forces began 
to get an increasing amount of assistance from contingents of the 
Burma National Army which were becoming skilled in guerilla 
tactics. 

The opening of the ‘‘Battle of the Break-out’’ was not long delayed. 
The Twenty-eighth Japanese Army, mostly in the Pegu Yomas, was 
still a fighting force in spite of exhaustion, sickness and lack of equip- 
ment and supplies, and towards the end of June it became obvious 
that an enemy attempt to cross the main road was imminent at 


406 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


various points along a front of 150 miles between Toungoo in the 
north and Nyaunglebin in the south. The 7th Division was then 
brought across from the Irrawaddy Valley to the Pegu area to replace 
the Sth Division which was being withdrawn to train for the invasion 
of Malaya, and the dispositions from north to south became as 
follows. A brigade of the 19th Division guarded the main road in 
Pyinmana district, north of Toungoo; another operated along the 
Mawchi Road, east of Toungoo; while the third held the line south- 
wards as far as Pyu. In the centre, the 17th Division was deployed 
between Pyu and Payagyi, and in the south the 7th Division was in 
contact with the enemy at the mouth of the Sittang River. The 
Thirty-third Japanese Army counter-attacked violently in the latter 
region, and early in July the 18th Japanese Division succeeded in 
recapturing Nyaungkashe. There was bitter fighting also against the 
53rd Japanese Division at Myitkyo, a few miles to the north, where 
the enemy was attempting to reach the line of the Pegu-Sittang Canal. 
These counter attacks weakened gradually, and the “Battle of the 
Break-out” ended, late in July, with a general withdrawal of the 
enemy across the Sittang. Little activity was reported in the central 
and northern sectors, held by the 17th and 19th Divisions, except 
on the Mawchi Road and at points on the main road where bands of 
Japanese had tried to penetrate the cordon. The defeat in the southern 
sector was disastrous to the enemy, and the Sittang was thick with 
Japanese corpses. After August 4th, fighting died down everywhere. 
It is estimated that during the preceding fortnight the enemy lost 
more than 6,000 killed, half of whom had been shot by guerillas. 
Only 740 Japanese surrendered. The losses of the entire 4th Corps 
over the same period amounted to only 95 killed and 322 wounded, 
a small price to pay for the final liberation of Burma from the 
Japanese yoke. 

The part played by the Sth Indian Division in the Sittang Delta 
before its withdrawal at the end of June should not be overlooked, 
nor the support given by its Engineer units, 2, 20 and 74 Field 
Companies and 44 Field Park Company. The Sth Divisional Engineers 
had concentrated at Pegu early in May to open and maintain the 
difficult line of communication between Waw and the Sittang for 
the projected advance towards Mokpalin. The routes available were 
the Pegu-Sittang Canal, the badly damaged railway, and a sandy 
track alognside it. Jeep trains could operate as far as the Abya 
Chaung, 4 miles beyond Waw, where ferrying was necessary as the 
bridge had been destroyed; but 74 Field Company, assisted by @ 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 407 


platoon of 60 Field Company, soon built a 130-feet Bailey across 
the gap. 2 Field Company went forward to operate a service of 
rafts and Dukws on the canal while 20 Field Company replaced a 
broken span of the railway bridge in Pegu and prepared the bridge to 
take road traffic. 

Engineer units of the 7th Indian Division, 4th Corps Troops and 
Army Troops carried on the work in the Pegu region begun by the 
5th Divisional Engineers. Rafts transported stores along the Pegu- 
Sittang Canal, rail traffic was increased, and 421 Field Company 
replaced a floating bridge across the canal at Waw by a high-level 
170-feet Bailey structure. In Pegu itself, the most conspicuous achieve- 
ment was the construction of a 320-feet suspension bridge across the 
river. This was begun in the middle of August and was completed 
by 424 Field Company early in September when it was opened by 
General Messervy and became known as the ‘‘Messervy Bridge’. It 
was erected without a hitch although the units concerned had had no 
previous experience with this type. 62 Field Company operated a 
jeep train service between Pegu and Nyaungkashe and a Dukw 
service on the canal. These are a few only of the multifarious duties 
performed by the Engineer units around Pegu. Airfield construction 
or repair was in hand not only at Pegu but at several places between 
it and Rangoon, notably at Mingaladon, north of Rangoon, and at 
Zayatkwin near Intagaw. Another large airfield was located at 
Wanetchaung on the Rangoon-Prome Road. 363 and 402 Field 
Companies worked for several months at Zayatkwin as part of the 
Forward Airfield Engineers. Small groups of the enemy were often 
encountered even after the end of the war. For instance, at the 
Pabst airfield near Hmawbi, 300 Japanese, ensconced in a near-by 
quarry, refused to believe that hostilities had ceased and continued 
to raid the airfield by night until they had been obliterated to a man. 

During the last phase of the war, very active Engineer operations 
were undertaken at the northern end of the Sittang line by the 19th 
Divisional Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel A. G. P. Leahy, R.E. The 
units were 29 Field Company (Bombay) under Major A. K. Dowse, 
R.E., 64 and 65 Field Companies (Madras) under Majors C. Hewson 
and R. W. T. Britten, R.E., and 327 Field Park Company (Madras) 
under Major D. W. C. McCarthy, R.E. The Field Companies were 
busily employed on the roads leading eastwards from Thazi and 
Toungoo along which the enemy hoped to escape. On the Thazi- 
Kalaw-Taunggyi-Hopong Road, 64 Field Company, assisted by two 
companies of the 15th Engineer Battalion, worked with the 64th 


408 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Brigade after being recalled from Lewe; and at Pyinyaung, between 
May 10th and 18th, it built two Bailey bridges and put another across 
the Myittha Chaung. Next, it advanced up the road and built another 
Bailey at the foot of a difficult stretch known as the ‘‘Kalaw Staircase” 
The tanks came forward and the Sappers cleared the road of mines 
ahead of them. Often they found themselves cut off in the confusion 
of a small battle and suffered several casualties. They bridged many 
gaps and blasted a diversion for a new alignment at one place, using 
Japanese aircraft bombs lifted from the road. In a single length of 
two miles of road, 67 mines and 18 aircraft bombs were removed 
and seven road-blocks cleared. Soon after the Company had reached 
Kalaw it was ordered southwards to Toungoo to help 29 and 65 
Field Companies in a bloody advance along the Mawchi Road, but 
tefore leaving the Kalaw Road it got the Thazi-Kalaw Branch railway 
line into working order for a distance of ten miles from Thazi through 
level country. The damage in the hilly section beyond that point 
was too severe to tackle, and the gradients too steep for jeep trains. 
As will be recorded later, Engineer operations to extend the Kalaw 
Road through Loilem and across the Salween River towards Kentung 
and the border of French Indo-China were resumed at the end of 
June 1945, but meanwhile all activities had to be transferred to the 
Mawchi Road where most of the 19th Divisional Engineers were 
already hard at work. 

The Mawchi Road, running eastwards from Toungoo, was narrow, 
winding and only lightly metalled. It crossed and re-crossed dozens 
of ravines through hilly and jungle-covered country. There was no 
air supply, and because of the atrocious weather, very little air 
support, and the enemy contested every yard of the advance. After 
Toungoo had been cleared during the latter half of April, the 19th 
Division had been ordered to open the road as far as Milestone 13, 
where a branch took off north-eastwards to Thandaung. The 
Japanese had destroyed all means of transit across the Sittang at 
Toungoo and held strong positions astride the road on the far side. 
Consequently, the first task of the 19th Divisional Engineers was to 
restore communication across the river. The main road bridge had 
consisted originally of six 106-feet spans, four of which had been 
destroyed by Allied bombing. The Japanese had built a timber pile 
bridge, 650 feet long, close to it, and when this was threatened, had 
demolished a length of 60 feet in the centre. 29 Field Company, 
using trestles, spanned the gap very quickly and re-opened the bridge 
for light traffic. This structure, known as the ‘“‘Ramshackle Bridge” 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 409 


was used in the Mawchi Road operations until the beginning 
of June when some Bailey equipment arrived for the repair of the 
main bridge. The latter was restored by Army Engineer units and 
opened to traffic on June 3rd, exactly three days before the ‘‘Ram- 
shackle Bridge’’ was washed away. 

But long before this mishap, the 19th Divisional Engineers had had 
to tackle another problem. A squadron of Sherman tanks was 
expected to arrive on May 8th, and in the absence of sufficient Bailey 
equipment for ordinary rafting, a means had to be devised to get 
the tanks across the river. It was decided, accordingly, to make a 
tarpaulin raft with Bailey framework. Two huge tarpaulins, with a 
layer of bitumenized Hessian between them, formed the skin of this 
extraordinary craft, and pieces of Bailey equipment provided a 
floor and sides around which the tarpaulins were wrapped. The 
tanks were ready to cross on May Ith and 65 Field Company put 
a wire rope across the river to enable the improvised raft to operate, 
but fortunately it was decided to experiment first with a bulldozer. 
The raft began to leak, though the bulldozer made the passage, 
and just as the Sappers were beginning to scratch their heads a 
consignment of Bailey put in an appearance. “H.M.S. Tarpaulin”’ 
was therefore paid off and a Class 40 Bailey raft was soon ferrying 
the tanks across the wide Sittang. The attempt at improvization 
had failed, but it was a very laudable effort. 

65 Field Company had a hard time on the Mawchi Road where 
it began by building two Bailey bridges and a diversion at Milestone 3. 
A platoon working at Milestone 6 on May 12th suffered several 
casualties while clearing road-blocks under close fire. The tanks pressed 
forward too rapidly and the Sappers had to make a corduroy road to 
extricate them from thick mud. Another platoon, arriving to relieve 
the first, blew up a number of road-blocks of felled trees by using 
flexible canvas Bangalore Torpedoes. On May 18th so many mines 
were found that a small party of Sappers had to move ahead of the 
tanks. Captain K. Mason, R.E., with a couple of men, dashed 
along, removing the fuses from the shells used as mines, while close 
in rear of the tanks came mine-detecting parties to sweep the verges 
of the road. Mason was with some infantry on the following day 
when they were ambushed at Milestone 10, but he managed to crawl 
back safely to call up the armoured cars. For this and other 
exploits he was awarded the Military Cross. On the 24th, when the 
98th Brigade took over from the 62nd Brigade, Mason’s platoon was 
relieved by one of 29 Field Company, and soon afterwards another 


410 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


platoon of 65 Field Company came forward to help the Bombay 
Sappers in dealing with two huge craters. The Bombay men filled in 
one crater with the assistance of a bulldozer while the Madrassis. 
bridged the other with a 30-feet Bailey. At Milestone 134 a platoon 
of 65 Field Company had to build an 80-feet Bailey bridge. Here 
the road was so narrow and the turning of vehicles so difficult that 
bridging lorries were obliged to reverse for nearly three miles to reach 
the site; and when they eventually arrived there with their radiators. 
boiling, they found a launching space so restricted that an armoured 
car had to be used as a mobile counterweight. All this took place 
under the close fire of Japanese snipers hidden in the undergrowth. 
It can truly be said that the Mawchi operations were no picnic. 

The road junction at Milestone 13 having been captured on May 
28th it was decided to advance another ten miles to the Thaukygat 
Chaung although the road was becoming still narrower and the 
jungle still more dense. No less than 24 Class 40 bridges, averaging 
50 feet in span, were needed in this stretch to avoid diversions. The 
Japs looked on from the heights around, and when bridging was 
well under way, plastered the Sappers with salvos of shells before 
moving their guns rapidly to another position. Deep anti-tank 
ditches were often encountered. These were spanned temporarily 
with Scissors bridges until they could be filled in. Every road-block 
was covered by fire from Japanese bunkers; but casualties were 
reduced by supporting the infantry closely with concentrated fire 
from the tanks. An infantry platoon usually preceded the leading 
tank, keeping on the higher side of the road so that the tank could 
sweep the lower side with fire. Between them, a small party of 
Sappers moved along in two groups inspecting the road for mines 
and lifting any which were discovered. An instance is recorded when 
a tank actually straddled a Sapper engaged in mine-lifting in order to 
protect him from enemy fire! The Field Companies took the lead 
in turn during this slow and arduous advance, while behind them, 
in Toungoo, 80 Field Company (Bengal) and 364 Field Company 
(Madras) built a fine bridge over the Sittang. This was a 450-feet 
Class 12 Double-Single Bailey. The work started on May 25th with 
the demolition of the piers of the old steel bridge, and the structure 
was opened to traffic on June 3rd. 

After Milestone 23 had been reached there was a lull in the Mawchi 
Road operations because it was considered that the Mandalay- 
Rangoon line of communication had already been safeguarded 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 411 


sufficiently from enemy interference. Engineer work, however, 
continued steadily, and in the middle of June, 65 Field Company 
was ordered to build a pack suspension bridge over the Thaukygat 
Chaung so that a battalion could be maintained on the far side. The 
gorge was deep, the river rapid, and the site exposed to enemy 
shelling. A flying ferry was established first, then an aerial ropeway, 
and finally, on July Ist, work was started on a 260-feet suspension 
bridge with a long approach of timber trestles on the near bank. 
This impressive bridge was completed on July 16th. Three weeks 
later, the enemy withdrew and the advance was resumed. A serious 
obstacle was encountered at the Paletwa Bridge over the Thaukygat 
Chaung near Milestone 26. This bridge had had three long girder 
spans on masonry piers, but only the piers remained. Beyond it, 
the road which mounted steeply in a series of zigzags to reach the 
Mawchi plateau had been breached in 24 places. Covered by some 
infantry, 65 Field Company began to build a 200-feet Bailey bridge 
on the piers of the demolished bridge while 29 Field Company went 
forward to repair the damaged road. The new Paletwa Bridge was 
opened on August 10th, and five days later both Companies had 
cleared the route to Mawchi. News arrived on the same day that 
Japan had surrendered. The announcement was received with much 
satisfaction; but the War Diary of 29 Field Company runs ‘“‘Though 
itis V. J. Day, the unit is still on this bloody road and it is still raining.” 
One can sympathize with the writer, buried in the Burma jungles 
so far from the scenes of enthusiasm which marked the event elsewhere. 

There had already been a Victory Parade in Rangoon on June 
11th in which the Indian Engineers were represented by small contin- 
gents from a number of units; but V. J. Day was a much greater 
occasion and was celebrated in proper style. The city was taking 
on a new look. Docks, wharves, buildings of all sorts, electric instal- 
lations and airfields were being repaired; and last, but not least, the 
main water-supply. In this, 72 Field Company was intimately con- 
cerned. The great pipes which brought water from the Gyobyu 
reservoirs, 45 miles away to the north, had been shattered by bombing 
and 72 Company had to restore the supply. Each section of pipe 
was 25 feet long, 5 feet in diameter, and weighed 5 tons, so it may be 
imagined that much ingenuity was needed and a liberal use of bull- 
dozers. Yet the damaged sections were replaced ina fortnight and pure 
water was delivered once more to all parts of the city. 1f Rangoon 
presented a busy scene, Mingaladon presented an even busier one. 


412 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


A host of engineer, pioneer and coolie labour was at work restoring 
and expanding the pre-war airfield, and when the 23rd Engineer 
Battalion arrived in August the total number of Engineer and Pioneer 
troops engaged at Mingaladon rose to 8,000. 

Meanwhile, in the Sittang bend and further north, the 7th Divisional 
Engineers were competing doggedly with the monsoon. Units near 
the river were often isolated by floods. Maps were reduced to pulp. 
Patrols went out in boats. Supplies ran short. British formations 
were being depleted by the repatriation of many men under the 
“Python” scheme and this threw an additional strain on all units, 
British and Indian. The climax of the ‘“‘Battle of the Break-out” 
came on July 26th, by which time thousands of Japanese had been 
killed and only 1,200 had managed to escape across the Sittang. 
The Sapper companies of the 7th and 17th Divisions worked hard 
and fought hard. Their employment was very varied. In the Pyu 
area, for instance, 60 Field Company maintained roads, made air- 
strips, provided a ferry service across the Sittang, operated a jeep 
railway, arranged for water-supply and worked on perimeter defences 
around which Japanese jitter parties roamed at night; and when 
the unit moved southwards to the Waw front early in August, it had to 
repair the lock gates at the northern end of the Pegu-Sittang Canal. 

The end of the war in Burma on August 15th, 1945, followed 
closely on the dropping of atomic bombs by American planes on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. The Japanese Government 
immediately asked for terms, and on August 14th, accepted uncondi- 
tional surrender. On August 20th, General Stopford ordered General 
Kimura, the Japanese commander in Burma, to cease hostilities 
forthwith and make arrangements for the surrender of all his troops. 
Kimura issued the necessary orders; but many of his formations were 
out of touch with him and some refused to believe their instructions. 
Thus sporadic fighting continued till the end of the month and 
particularly in the Mawchi, Shwegyin and Waw regions. Then, at 
last, peace and quiet returned to the devastated and water-logged 
countryside. The “Sons of Heaven” surrendered piece-meal to the 
nearest British or Indian troops and proved to be quite ordinary 
mortals and remarkably docile prisoners-of-war; but the process 
took some time and it was not until September 13th that Major- 
General Ichida, representing General Kimura, made a formal surrender 
of all the Japanese in Burma. The surrender was accepted by 
Brigadier E. F. E. Armstrong, B. G. S. Twelth Army, acting on 
behalf of General Stopford. “Effie’ Armstrong was a Royal 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 413 


Engineer who had served for several years with the Bengal Sappers 
and Miners.? 

While the mass surrender was in progress, the 17th Division was 
facing the Japanese in the Mokpalin sector, having replaced the 7th 
Division at the mouth of the Sittang. The Divisional Engineers 
under Lieut.-Colonel T. H. F. Foulkes, R.E., comprised 60 and 70 
Field Companies, the Tehri-Garhwal Field Company and 414 Field 
Park Company. In an interesting article in The R.E. Journal Foulkes 
has recorded his impressions of the Japanese in defeat and some of 
the experiences of his units in the re-occupation of Tenasserim. 
“TI had sometimes flown over the Japanese positions on the railway 
and in the wooded hills beyond the Sittang”’, he writes,? “‘but I had 
never been able to detect a vestige of enemy life. Now that the war 
was over, there was a sudden change. The Japs emerged from the 
earth and vegetation by hundreds; stumpy little officers strutting 
about with big boots and dangling swords, mounted men slouching 
on shaggy ponies, and marching troops bent double under mountains 
of awkward kit. For the first few days they were inclined to crouch 
and run for cover when my little Auster plane zoomed down at them, 
though some were impudent enough to laugh and wave. From now 
on, they were at our disposal for work. Divisional H.Q., and a 
large part of the Division, were to move from Pegu to Moulmein, 
and as the seaward approaches to that port were still blocked by 
our mines, we were forced to follow the difficult route by road, rail, 
canal and ferry through Waw, Kyaikto and Martaban to take the 
surrender of some 8,000 enemy troops between Mokpalin in the north 
and Victoria Point, 500 miles further south. As most of the country 
was still under water it was decided that I and Major R. B. Kean, 
Brigade Major, 63rd Brigade, should cross the Sittang with an armed 
Japanese escort to explore the ground. We therefore approached the 
river bank in a crazy old jeep on rail-wheels, taking with us R.E. 
Graham, a subaltern of 60 Field Company, who was to start work 
on the far bank. We also took a Royal Signals officer and a former 
Jemadar of the Burma Sappers and Miners, hailing from a village 
near Pegu, who knew every inch of the ground. Standing on the 
high bank, upstream of the ruined bridge, we watched our Japanese 


1See The Indian Sappers and Miners, by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.S8.0., 
M.C., pp. 637, 640, 


2 Extracts from “‘A ‘Close-up’ of the Japanese Soldier”, by Lieut.-Colonel T. H. F. 
Foulkes, 0.B.£., R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 1950, pp. 293-307. 


414 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


guide push off from some derelict jetties on the other side in a canoe: 
paddled by two soldiers and cross the 600 yards of brown and swirling. 
water. On stepping ashore he introduced himself in good English 
as Captain Aoki. He was about half the size of my husky companions 
and looked like a child dressed up. We were soon crossing the water 
towards a very peculiar reception committee among whom was an 
elderly gentleman in the garb of a Second-Lieutenant who seemed 
well educated and spoke quite good American. All the Jap officers 
were dressed in khaki tunics and breeches, mackintoshes, boots and 
leather gaiters. Their soft, peaked, khaki caps had the usual cloth 
star sewn on in front. For badges of rank they wore little red and 
gold tabs sewn to chest or collar, with stars according to seniority. 
They had not yet been relieved of their swords. An armed escort of 
a dozen soldiers was drawn up in two ranks on the jetty. They were 
dressed much the same as the officers but wore khaki shirts instead 
of tunics, puttees instead of gaiters, and inferior canvas shoes. They 
were armed with a very long bayonet and a long and clumsy rifle, 
with which they presented arms in British fashion. Of all shapes and 
sizes, they looked a villainous crew, ranging from the short, sturdy 
type with spherical head and ruddy cheeks, to the lanky, yellow and 
cadaverous, and they were badly shaven and dirtier than they need 
have been. In the course of a long walk in heavy rain we examined 
the bomb-churned water-front, the sad remains of the railway station, 
the ruins of Sittang Village and the small Pagoda Hill which commands 
the great railway bridge. It was from this hill that the Japanese, four 
years before, had opened small arms’ fire on the bridge after working 
round the flank of the 17th Division, and it was this bridge which 
had been blown up before a large part of the Division had got across.} 
On the hill were small parties of Japs quartered in shelters and ruined 
huts. Most of these men saluted smartly as we passed. In accordance 
with Allied orders, the “Rising Sun” flag was nowhere to be seen. 
Before we re-crossed the river, a table was set up at which we sat 
and made notes while the Japs stood by. The unexpected offer of a 
plate of sweet cakes was rather too fraternal for my liking; but while 
I hesitated, the elderly Second-Lieutenant exclaimed with a laugh 
“It’s all right. They ‘re not poisoned.” In the end we ate some of 
the cakes and felt none the worse, and the Japs saluted very keenly, 
with many a courteous bow and smile, as we boarded our launch.” 





1 See Chapter VIII. 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 415 


A few days later, with Captain G. N. F. James, R.E., of 60 Field 
‘Company, and a Japanese interpreter, Foulkes explored southwards 
by road for about eighty miles to Martaban, gathering on the way 
his first impressions of the more senior Japanese officers. With their 
well-made uniforms, keen and determined expressions and smart 
bearing, they seemed a race apart from the ordinary regimental officer. 
They commanded regiments or higher formations and were obviously 
picked men who had been well trained in Staff duties. The rank and 
file seemed to be on very easy terms with the local Burmese with 
whom they fraternized freely in the streets and bazaars. Much had 
been forgotten or forgiven. As the British Officers went further 
south beyond Kyaikto they overtook columns of tattered, weary 
and heavily laden troops on their way to their appointed concentration 
areas. Martaban had been wrecked by Allied bombing. Only the 
solid brick pagodas remained standing. A timber jetty, however, was 
still in existence, so Foulkes ordered the local Japanese Engineer 
regiment to repair it while he and his following returned in torrential 
rain to Mokpalin. As soon as the Divisional Engineers had patched 
up the Sittang Railway and the Pegu Canal, the 17th Division began 
to cross the river near the wrecked bridge in landing craft; but before 
the transport could reach Kyaikto, a two-mile stretch of sodden 
causeway had to be reinforced with stone. The Japanese engineers co- 
operated by starting at the southern end to meet the Indian engineers 
in the middle. They showed the utmost zeal, hoping no doubt to 
propitiate their late enemies. The next obstacles were at the Bilin 
River where both the road and railway bridges had been demolished 
by the 17th Division during the retreat in 1942. The flooded river 
was 700 feet wide, and here the Japanese displayed their remarkable 
ability in pile-driving which they had practised throughout the war 
because of their lack of standard bridging equipment. They quickly 
built a couple of long piers, and with aid of a Bailey raft, the troops 
and transport were carried across and began to move on towards Thaton 
and Martaban. The Japs seemed almost tireless in spite of the humid 
atmosphere. They sang and joked as they worked almost naked in 
the turgid river. Some months later, a 660-feet high-level Bailey 
bridge on pile piers was built at Bilin. The Jap prisoners were very 
keen on the success of this project and quickly learnt to use Bailey 
equipment. When the approach roads were nearing completion, a 
shaven-headed interpreter, translating for the Japanese Engineer 
Captain, bowed, sucked his teeth in the prescribed Japanese manner 
of showing respect and humility, and delivered himself as follows:— 


416 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


“This officer has been in charge of many roads in Japan, but of 
course he has had little experience of tropical conditions. Please 
excuse him if he suggests that you should use a little more bitumen.” 
Surely the acme of politeness and subservience, and typical of the 
attitude of the Japanese in defeat. 

In due course, the 17th Division moved across the Salween Estuary 
from Martaban to Moulmein in an extraordinary assortment of old 
motor craft, manned by Japanese but flying little Union Jacks. At 
Moulmein, there was the same co-operation. Arms had been stacked, 
ready for surrender; roads were sign-posted in English, and buildings 
labelled. Japanese carpenters set to work to build boats in work- 
shops established by 414 Field Park Company. Almost every Japanese 
soldier bowed or saluted, even when carrying a considerable load, 
for if he failed to do so he knew he would be hit or kicked by his 
own officers. One of Foulkes’ first actions on reaching Moulmein 
was to call for a report from the Japanese Railway Regiment which 
had ill-treated our men so abominably on the new railway between 
Moulmein and Thailand and was now operating what remained of 
it under the orders of some of the ex-prisoners. It is said that this 
244 miles of line cost the lives of 11,000 Allied soldiers and nearly 
100,000 civilian labourers. The largest work undertaken by the 17th 
Divisional Engineers in Tenasserim was the construction of a coastal 
road from Moulmein to Ye, 60 miles to the south, whence a road 
extended a further 100 miles to Tavoy. Moulmein and Ye had been 
connected by rail, but all the bridges were down. The Tehri-Garhwa! 
Field Company built the new road with the aid of 5,000 Japanese 
prisoners under a Major-General and finished it in four months 
although no bulldozers were available. The Major-General, a trim 
little man in a white cotton shirt, always bowed solemnly on arrival 
or departure. The Japanese have a motto ‘“‘Death is lighter than a 
feather, but Duty is heavier than a mountain’. Their Emperor 
wished them to co-operate with their late enemies and therefore 
they did so without question. Yet some of these enthusiastic workers 
had probably been responsible for nameless atrocities during the 
war. It had been expected that the Japanese prisoners would soon 
be evacuated from Tenasserim; but this did not happen, and accord- 
ingly, early in 1946, the problem of providing monsoon accommo- 
dation for them had to be considered. Foulkes sent for the senior 
Japanese Engineer officer and ordered him to produce a standard 
design for a bamboo hut, thatched with leaves, to be built by his 
men. An excellent design was soon submitted, but tools for cutting 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 417 


bamboos were woefully deficient. Thereupon, the Japanese manu- 
factured the necessary cutting implements from the springs of derelict 
vehicles rotting in a local dump and built the huts at express speed. 

The 17th Division was withdrawn gradually from Tenasserim to 
Meiktila until only the 48th Brigade remained. 60 and 70 Field 
Companies were ferrying on the Bilin River in September 1945 with 
a Japanese Engineer Regiment under command, after which 60 
Company moved forward to Thaton to make an airstrip and was 
still there, at the end of the year, collecting timber for the Bilin 
bridge described by Foulkes. The exodus of the 17th Divisional 
Engineers began in the spring of 1946, 414 Field Park Company 
left Moulmein for Meiktila in the middle of March and the Tehri- 
Garhwal Field Company and 60 Field Company followed in April, 
the former proceeding direct to Maymyo and the latter by gradual 
stages to Meiktila where 70 Field Company, the last to leave Tenas- 
serim, arrived on August 20th. The change of scene and climate was 
very enjoyable. The Sapper camp was on the shore of a large lake 
and the bathing excellent. Training, and more training, became the 
order of the day and the time passed quickly. But a sad disappoint- 
ment was in store for all ranks. This was the announcement of the 
approaching amalgamation of the 17th Division with the 19th Division 
by which the former would lose its separate identity as the veteran 
formation of the Burma War. 

A post-war engineer operation of considerable importance had 
meanwhile been carried out by the 19th Divisional Engineers under 
Lieut.-Colonel A. G. P. Leahy, R.E., assisted for a time by two 
Companies of the 3rd Engineer Battalion and a Bridging Platoon of 
Bombay Sappers. The Thazi-Hopong Road, already mentioned, was 
to be extended towards and beyond the Salween River in the direction 
of French Indo-China. On September 7th, 1945, 65 Field Company 
arrived in Taunggyi, and later, 140 miles further east, established a 
ferry at Kunhing on the Nampong River where 64 Field Company 
afterwards built a pile bridge. Ahead lay the mighty Salween, flowing 
at eight knots and with a stupendous rise and fall. 65 Field Company 
reached the river after a 32-mile march and provided a flying ferry 
of folding boats which 64 Field Company converted into a raft 
ferry. The advance was halted for a time, but early in January 1946, 
65 Field Company, now under Major R. C. Gabriel, R.E., was detailed 
to carry out bridging on the road to Kentung, far beyond the Salween. 
A small party of Japanese Engineer prisoners arrived in February 
and became known as No. 4(J) Platoon. A Bailey bridge was first 


418 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


erected near Loilem while equipment was being sent forward for 
another at Tongta, 88 miles beyond the Salween. Meanwhile, Gabriel 
went ahead in a jeep to reconnoitre the entire route to Kentung, 
passing through wild and mountainous country along a very narrow 
road. Kentung seemed to be a prosperous town, untouched by the 
war. Its large bazaars were thronged with Thais and Chinese from 
the border only 60 miles away. The Tongta Bridge was launched on 
March 12th and was followed by others along the roads leading 
northwards towards Hsipaw and Lashio. On April 12th, a large 
bridge was opened to traffic at Namsang, near Loilem. Here, the 
inhabitants celebrated the arrival of the rains by holding their annual 
“‘Water Festival’, and Gabriel had to run the gauntlet of laughing 
people armed with buckets and stirrup-pumps. With all the necessary 
bridges built, 65 Field Company handed over charge to the Public 
Works Department and moved to Meiktila and subsequently to 
Rangoon, where the 19th Divisional Engineers embarked for India 
at the beginning of June. 

The bridging in 1946 of the Myitnge tributary of the Irrawaddy, 
a few miles below Mandalay, was one of the last, and perhaps the 
most outstanding, achievement of the Indian Engineers before most 
of the units were withdrawn from Burma. The road and railway 
to Rangoon crossed the tributary by two separate bridges about 
200 feet apart, both of which had been destroyed. The road bridge 
had been a continuous lattice girder affair supported on concrete- 
filled steel columns. The railway bridge had had six spans of Warren 
trusses resting on brick piers. The remains of the girders and trusses 
lay in tangled masses in the river bed, but a prodigious Bailey bridge, 
erected in May and June 1945 by 428 Field Company on the piers of 
the railway bridge, had served to carry both rail and road traffic 
across the Myitnge though forming a considerable bottle-neck. The 
problem was how to reinstate full pre-war road and rail traffic without 
interfering with the existing traffic. Lieut.-Colonel J. J. D. Groves, 
R.E., C.R.E. 4th Corps Troops Engineers, was detailed to carry out 
the work, the units available being 75 Field Company (Bengal), 
2 Faridkot Field Company, 305 Field Park Company (Bombay), a 
Railway Bridging Company, a Plant Troop and a Battalion of 
Japanese Engineers.! It was decided to build a diversion railway 
bridge, served by a loop line, about 14 miles upstream of the existing 











* “The Myitnge Project, 1946”, by Lieut.-Colonel J. J. D. Groves, m.c., R.E., 
appearing in The R.E. Journal, September 1954, pp. 214-228. 


THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 419 


Bailey structure and to provide a Bailey pontoon bridge for road 
traffic close upstream of the remains of the old road bridge. When 
these had been completed, the existing Bailey bridge would be removed 
and the abutments and piers rebuilt to carry new Warren girders. 
The Field Companies tackled the pontoon bridge, and although the 
length was 567 feet, they finished their task on January 13th. Mean- 
while the Railway Bridging Company was at work on the diversion 
railway bridge of 40-feet Bailey spans on timber pile piers, and this was 
completed on February 20th. It was then possible to transfer attention 
to the main undertaking of dismantling and remodelling the original 
rail and road bridge. This was begun at once, the Sapper units 
operating in rotation with Japanese companies; but it was a slow 
process because the piers required much repair and alteration and 
new abutments had to be built. In June the river began to rise at 
the rate of two feet a day. Work on the piers and abutments became 
increasingly difficult and three officers laboured for several days in 
improvised gas-mask diving-suits in water more than 20 feet deep. 
By July 6th, however, the Bailey structure had been removed, the 
piers repaired and the abutments rebuilt, and all was ready for the 
erection by civilian engineers of new Warren girders which had already 
arrived from India. 

All Indian Engineer units, whether in Burma or elsewhere, were 
proud to receive, in February 1946, the notification that the services 
of their Corps had been recognised by the bestowal of the title 
“Royal”. The “Corps of Indian Engineers’? thus became the ‘Corps 
of Royal Indian Engineers”. The news was received at each Group 
Headquarters in India with a signal from General Sir Claude 
Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief, which ran as _ follows:— 
“Very pleased to be able to tell you that His Majesty the King 
Emperor has approved the conferment of the title “‘Royal’” on the 
Corps of Indian Engineers. Please convey to all ranks my heartiest 
congratulations on this recognition of their magnificent record in the 
late war and in the many wars and campaigns before it.” 

By the middle of 1946, there were few Indian Engineer units left 
in Burma. Most had gone to Malaya, Java or Sumatra. Others had 
returned to India for disbandment. Those still available had lost 
many of their most experienced officers, N.C.Os. and men under the 
repatriation scheme. The effects of repatriation may be judged by 
the rapid changes in command experienced by 29 Field Company 
while at Meiktila. In March 1946, the unit was commanded by 
Major J. Lindsay, R.E.; in May by Major A. D. Arden, R.E.; from 


420 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the middle of July by Major P. J. Papworth, R.E.; and from the middle 
of September by Major R. D. Mitchell, R.E. All these officers held 
Regular Army Emergency Commissions and became due for release 
in rapid succession. Early in 1947, the process of reduction had run 
its course and it was decided that three regular post-war Field 
Companies of the Indian Engineers should be selected to form part 
of a proposed garrison of Burma. The choice fell on 7 Field Company 
(Bengal), 19 Field Company (Bombay) and 64 Field Company 
(Madras). These units landed in Rangoon at the beginning of March 
1947. They carried out routine duties in various parts of the country, 
but occasionally their work was far from normal]. For example, 
while 19 Field Company was at Mingaladon in July, Major-General 
Aung San, late commander of the Burma National Army, was 
assassinated by a man called U Saw, and the Rangoon Police suspected 
that certain incriminating articles had been thrown into the Victoria 
Lake in front of U Saw’s house. Major A. B. Rhodes, R.E., O.C. 
19 Field Company, was then asked to get volunteers to dive into the 
ake to try to find the articles.1 Eight good Mahratta swimmers 
volunteered and soon brought up various items including parts of a 
Sten gun. So important were the articles recovered by Lance-Naik 
Balkrishna Korde and Sapper Bhimrao Khape that these two soldiers 
were required to return to Burma in February 1948 to give evidence 
at the trial of U Saw. They were perhaps the last Indian Engineers 
to serve in Burma, for 7, 19 and 64 Field Companies had been recalled 
to India in October 1947. 

The connection of the Indian Engineers with Burma had persisted 
at intervals ever since the Ist Battalion of the Madras Pioneers, the 
forerunners of the Madras Sappers and Miners, disembarked at 
Rangoon in May 1824 with the expedition under Major-General Sir 
Archibald Campbell which advanced up the Irrawaddy to the ancient 
capital at Ava in the First Burma War. A battalion of Bengal Pioneers 
fought in Arakan in 1825 as part of an ill-fated expedition from 
Assam led by Brigadier-General J. W. Morrison. Four companies 
of Madras Sappers and Miners were engaged in the Second Burma 
War in 1852-53 and remained in the country until 1856. Another 
three companies, together with two of the Bengal Corps and one of 
the Bombay Corps, shared in the Third Burma War which began in 
1885; and thereafter one or more units of the Madras Sappers were 
always stationed in Burma in addition to a Burma Sapper Company 





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THE RECONQUEST AND RESTORATION OF LOWER BURMA 421 


raised in 1887. Thus it may be said that the connection of the Indian 
Engineers with Burma lasted for more than 120 years. After the 
Third Burma War, the Corps was saddled with the entire responsi- 
bility for all engineer work until the Public Works Department took 
charge, and it had to bear the same burden, for a time, after the 
Second World War. The modern Republic of Burma, therefore, 
owes it a debt of gratitude; and although the Indian Engineers may 
be seen no more in the northern mountains, the dusty central plains, 
the fertile regions of the south and the jungles of Arakan, they can 
rest on the laurels so hardly won between 1942 and 1945 against the 
pick of the Japanese Army. 


CHAPTER XIV 


POST-WAR OPERATIONS IN MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES 


AND THE FAR EAST 


IKE a giant finger pointing southwards from Lower Burma lies 
Lite Malay Peninsula, the narrow northern part belonging to 
Thailand and the wider southern part forming the Federated 
Malay States with Singapore at the tip. Extending eastwards from 
Malaya is the world’s largest archipelago providing, as it were, a Series 
of stepping stones between Asia and Australia. The Indonesian Archi- 
pelago dominates all the gateways between the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans, but by far the most important maritime passage is the Malacca 
Strait separating Malaya from Sumatra. The string of islands form- 
ing the southern curve of the archipelago—Sumatra, Java and many 
others—ends at Timor which faces Australia across the Timor Sea. 
Further north, in a parallel line, lie Borneo, Celebes and New Guinea 
and clusters of smaller islands, and at the northern apex of the triangle, 
the Philippines, which face French Indo-China. 
After the destruction of the American fleet at Pearl Harbour, the 
Indonesian Archipelago became a happy hunting ground for the 
predatory Japanese. It afforded them an almost limitless supply 
of rubber, oil, minerals and produce of all sorts which they needed 
for their attempt at world domination, and had it not been for the 
atom bomb, who knows how long they might not have been able to 
cling to their ill-gotten possessions. In the autumn of 1945, however, 
they had to hand over all they had won by an act of treachery un- 
matched in history. They left Malaya and the archipelago in a sorry 
State. The industries were wrecked, the rubber plantations dying 
through neglect, and the inhabitants seething with discontent at 
facing what they considered to be a mere change of masters. It was 
into this scene of material and political turmoil that the British and 
Indian forces were launched after the reconquest of Burma. Victory 
was already theirs, but the aftermath promised them no easy passage. 
Operations “Zipper” and “‘Mailfist’’, the plans for the invasion of 
the mainland of Malaya and the island of Singapore, were prepared 





+ See the map of South-East Asia included in this chapter. 


422 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 423 


while Japan was still a belligerent. The problems were unique. ‘I 
always feel’’, writes a Staff Officer of the Sth Indian Division,} “that to 
give people in Europe an idea of the difficulty of mounting the Malayan 
invasion one must quote a parallel. Imagine that a number of troops 
for the invasion of France are in action in Italy two months before 
“D” Day. Their commanders and staff are summoned to Moscow 
for planning their part in the invasion. The troops receive new 
equipment from America and reinforcements from Egypt. The 
invasion is embarked at points ranging from Marseilles and Gibraltar 
to Glasgow, and the whole force is to rendezvous off a spot on the 
Malayan coast some days later.’’ The writer was evidently a humorist, 
but his description is worth quoting. The conditions under which 
the invasion was to take place changed daily, almost hourly, and it 
is greatly to the credit of the planners that there was so little 
confusion and delay. 

The Fourteenth Army, now under General Sir Miles Dempsey, 
bore the responsibility for the operations. A bridge-head was to 
be formed in the heart of the Malay Peninsula between Singapore 
and the main enemy forces, which were believed to be in the north. 
Field-Marshal Terauchi, the Supreme Japanese Commander, had 
anticipated an Allied advance southwards from Burma down the 
narrow Kra Isthmus, though he had taken the precaution of rein- 
forcing his garrison on Singapore Island. The initial sea-borne assault 
on Malaya was to be delivered by the 34th Indian Corps under 
Lieut.-General O. L. Roberts. Two infantry divisions and a brigade 
would carry out the first landings, followed by three more divisions 
and a parachute brigade. Two further divisions would be held in 
reserve for subsequent operations as necessary. A Japanese counter- 
attack was expected from the north. When this had been defeated 
and the position consolidated, a thrust would be made southwards 
to Singapore. These plans, however, had to suffer considerable modi- 
fication. Man-power was being affected by the extensive repatri- 
ation of British ranks under the ‘Python’ Scheme. Orders were 
received to undertake the responsibility for large areas in the East 
Indies previously under American control, and American air and 
sea support was withdrawn. Then came the dropping of the atom 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th and the 
surrender of Japan a few days later. No opposition was expected 
thereafter in landing on the Malayan coast, but it was decided 


! Ball of Fire, by Antony Brett-James, p. 425. 


424 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


nevertheless that the disembarkation of the 34th Corps should proceed 
more or less according to plan. The 15th Corps, on the other hand, 
would be sent direct to Singapore to occupy that island, and Johore 
State on the adjacent mainland, until it proceeded further overseas. 

The plan for the 34th Corps, whose Chief Engineer was Brigadier 
E. C. R. Stileman, involved two assault landings which, owing to lack 
of sufficient naval craft, would have to be separated by an interval 
of three days. On “‘D” Day, fixed as September 9th, 1945, the 25th 
Indian Division, under Major-General G. N. Wood, with 46 Beach 
Group under command, was to land at Morib, 20 miles south of 
Port Swettenham.! Simultaneously, the 27th Brigade of Major- 
General D. C. Hawthorn’s 23rd Indian Division would disembark 
at two places further south. On “D+3” Day, the Ist and 49th 
Brigades of the 23rd Division, with the 3rd Commando Brigade and 
41 Beach Group, were to land south of Port Dickson to capture the 
important communications centre of Seremban. The 5th Indian 
Division, under Major General E.C. Mansergh, was to follow up at 
Morib, helped by part of 45 Beach Group. The objectives for the ““D” 
Day assault were Port Swettenham, an airfield at Kelanang near Morib, 
and a crossing of the coastal road over the Sepang River some 10 
miles north of Port Dickson. It was hoped that the seizing of this 
crossing by the 37th Brigade would lead to the occupation of Port 
Dickson by ‘‘D+3”’ Day. All the assaulting formations belonged to 
the Indian Army because the only British Division available for the 
Far East, the 2nd Division, was already committed to sending brigades 
to Hongkong and Japan while the third brigade was to remain in 
India. 

Towards the end of August 1945, a great armada began to sail 
from Bombay, Madras, Cochin, Vizagapatam and Rangoon packed 
with troops who had undergone months of intensive training in pre- 
paration for an opposed landing. For most units, the voyage was 
a pleasant change from the commotion of the last days ashore. 
Captain A. H. W. Sandes, R.E., of 78 Field Company (Bengal) in 
41 Beach Group, writes as follows:—‘We left our camp at Bhiwandi 
outside Bombay on August 30th but did not arrive at the Victoria 
Docks till sunset, having taken sixteen hours to travel forty miles. 
There we staggered up the gangway of S.S. Arawa laden like pack- 
horses with equipment and clothing. We remained in dock until 
September 2nd, loading thousands of bottles of soda-water and 


: * See the map of Malaya included in Chapter VII and the map entitled “Landings 
in Malaya, Sept. 1945” included in this chapter. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 425 


‘detachments of late arrivals, and in the afternoon, amidst general 
rejoicing, pulled out into the harbour and were able to take stock of 
the rest of the convoy. Many ships had already gone, but a lot still 
remained. We sailed that night, and morning found us out of sight of 
land, steaming southwards over a placid sea. After the first day or 
two, life settled down to a daily routine of meals, talk, reading, boat 
drill and sleep. We sailed in undreampt of comfort because there 
was no black-out. The myriad lights of the convoy looked lovely 
at night. After about four days we turned east, and so knew that we 
were south of Ceylon. Then on and on, in perfect formation, until 
we sighted on the southern horizon some dim hills which we guessed 
were Sabang, at the northern tip of Sumatra. We overhauled another 
vast convoy of more than forty ships, and on the following day, 
passed a lone rock said to be off Penang. We still didn’t know defi- 
nitely that there would be no opposition to a landing, so we were all 
‘“‘briefed”’ and ready to fight. On the night of September 10th we 
passed another convoy and moved in single line ahead to get through 
some minefields. The morning of the 11th was wet and misty, but 
soon we could see the coast and anchored some ten miles offshore. 
There was much argument as to where we were, but it finally proved to 
be Port Swettenham, though the inevitable ‘man who had lived there’ 
swore that it was Port Dickson. Masses of ships were anchored for 
miles along the coast. We lay there all day, ready to disembark, 
but sailed again during the night and arrived off Port Dickson next 
morning. Seen from the sea, the place was not impressive except for 
its green foliage and the blue hills behind in the distance. It lay at 
the northern end of a long bay, at the southern end of which was a high 
hill called Cape Rachado, crowned by a lighthouse. Rain fell heavily 
for a couple of hours while we waited, piled with equipment, for a 
landing craft to take us ashore, but about noon an L.C.I. came along- 
side. We boarded it, and the ship’s officers entertained some of us 
to sherry, the first we had tasted for years! As we neared the shore 
we could see a white sandy beach running up to palm trees and thick 
vegetation. It did not look very tropical, however, as there were many 
other trees resembling Scotch firs. A few white houses with red-tiled 
roofs showed here and there, and on an islet near the shore stood a 
little temple. Port Dickson reminded us of Akyab, though it was much 
nicer. Most of the roads were tarred and in good repair, and almost 
every house had piped water and electricity. The buildings seemed 
quite palatial, with marble floors, electric fans and all modern conven-. 
iences, and appeared to have suffered little from Japanese neglect. 


426 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The gardens would have been lovely had they not turned to jungle. The- 
heat during the day was stifling, though the nights were cool, and the 
people seemed pleased to see us. Along the coastal road outside the 
town the contrasts in foliage were vivid. On one side, rubber plant- 
ations which had been allowed to grow untended and looked exactly 
like English birch woods. On the other side, mangrove swamps and 
palms. Rubber seemed to cover most of the countryside. The young 
trees were only about thirty feet high, with slender trunks quite bare 
for the first ten feet. Above that height were branches bearing dark 
green, oval-shaped, leaves which let little light through to the ground, 
Hence a rubber plantation resembled a vast colonnade of slim pillars 
under a roof of leaves stretching away into the distance. Apart from 
rubber, there were palms, giant bamboos, mangrove, eucalyptus and 
many other types of trees and bushes.” 

Most officers who were not in the first flights of the landings in 
Malaya must have gathered similar impressions of the country and 
had similar experiences, but those who led the way on September 
9th and 12th under war conditions, though not under fire, found the 
problems of rapid disembarkation more formidable. For a distance 
of 200 miles between Port Swettenham and Singapore, the west coast 
of Malaya had only two beaches, about a couple of miles apart, 
which might perhaps be used for landing large bodies of troops 
and transport, and both were in the shallow bay between Port Dickson 
and Cape Rachado. Mangrove swamps fringed the remainder of 
the coast. The two beaches south of Port Dickson had been selected 
by aerial photography and were called ‘“‘Dog’’ and ‘“‘Charlie’’. The 
former was to be used for landing stores on ““D+3’ Day (September 
12th) and the latter for landing vehicles. Both showed sand of an 
alluring smoothness, though their attractions proved later to be 
very deceptive. No good word can be said for two other beaches north 
of Port Dickson on which the actual ‘‘D” Day landings on September 
9th were to take place. These also had been selected through air 
reconnaissance. They were called ‘‘How” and “Item” and earmarked 
for the landing of the 37th Brigade. “How” was no more than a 
flat shelf of mud, half a mile wide, backed by mangrove trees and 
impossible for vehicles or stores. “Item” looked a little more inviting 
but flattered only to deceive. 

General Roberts’ plan envisaged the early capture of Port 
Swettenham, away to the north, and the development of airfields 
there and at Kelanang, and consequently, apart from the operation 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 427 


by the 37th Brigade, the main “D” Day assaults had to be made as 
close to Port Swettenham as possible. The only moderately suitable 
stretch of coast-line appeared to be a length of seven miles extending 
southwards from Morib, some distance south of Port Swettenham. 
Here, two beaches ‘‘Love”’ and “‘King’’, were chosen as they seemed 
to have sandy surfaces. They had, but only as a veneer. The plan for 
the main landing near Morib on September 9th, 1945, was as follows. 
The 53rd Brigade of the 25th Division would assault on the right 
over ‘“‘King”’ beach while the greater part of the Slst Brigade assaulted 
on the left over “Love” beach. A force of all arms called ‘‘Langat- 
force’’, detached from the 51st Brigade, would push inland in amphi- 
bious craft to seize crossing places over the Langat River where the 
25th Divisional Engineers would establish ferries. The Dukws of 
this force were not to go beyond the river; but actually, two 
of them, loaded with engineer siores, finished up in Kuala Lumpur 
and can be said to have unofficially ‘liberated’ that city’. The first 
waves of the brigades and their Beach Groups landed on ‘“‘D’’ Day 
without opposition, the only hindrance being an enormous traffic 
block caused by the arrival of a senior Japanese Officer who wished to 
discuss terms of surrender. Support by the Sth Indian Division being 
clearly unnecessary, that formation did not disembark but conti- 
nued its voyage southwards towards Singapore. ‘‘Love’’ beach soon re- 
vealed its true nature. It was found to have only a skin of sand, four 
inches thick,-over a mass of soft mud. A beach roadway for vehicles 
was obviously needed, but a senior Naval Officer insisted that all 
vehicles should be disembarked forthwith and these immediately 
sank over their axles in the mud. Two Dukws and three bulldozers, 
sent to the rescue, were also bogged down. Soon the lower part of 
the beach was impassable even for a jeep. Sufficient pre-fabricated 
roadway sheets (known as “‘Muckamuck’’)? were not available to cover 
all soft patches, and in less than an hour there was a welter of fifty-two 
vehicles stuck in the mud up to their frames and doomed to be swamped 
by the in-coming tide. However, most of these unfortunates were 
recovered and repaired later, and the landings near Morib and further 
south proceeded day after day with remarkable steadiness until a 





1“Indian Beach Groups in the Landings in Malaya’, by Colonels D. W. Price, C.B.E. 
and J.R.H. Robertson, appearing in The R.E. Journal, Dec. 1947, pp. 288-305. 


2 “Muckamuck” consisted of bamboo panels sandwiched between coir matting 
and steel mesh which formed the road surface. 


428 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


total of 42,651 men and nearly 4,000 vehicles had been put ashore. 
It was a fine achievement by the Royal Navy, the Beach Groups and 
the Field Companies of the Indian Engineers. 

The units of the 25th Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel 
H. R. Greenwood, R.E., which took part in the Morib landings were 
63 Field Company (Madras) under Major G. A. P. N. Barlow, R.E., 
93 Field Company (Bombay) under Major I. D. Usher, R.E., 425 
Field Company (Madras) under Major J. W. L. Row, R.E., and 325 
Field Park Company (Madras) under Major J. B. Hooper, R.E. The 
original landings were consolidated by the arrival of the 23rd Division. 
The convoys carrying the latter anchored off Port Swettenham on 
September 11th, and early on the 12th, moved southwards to a new 
anchorage off the Port Dickson beaches. The 23rd Divisional Engi- 
neers, under Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Holloway, R.E., comprised 68 and 
71 Field Companies (Bengal) under Majors R. Allen and R. N. B. 
Holmes, R.E., 91 Field Company (Bombay) under Major J. S. 
Beddows, R.E., and 323 Field Park Company (Madras) under Major 
T. W. I. Headley, R.E. Landing craft of all sorts were soon discharg- 
ing men and vehicles along beach roadways of Sommerfeld track to 
exits connected by further roads to the main coastal route. The 
development of such exits, and the preparation and repair of routes 
inland, were the main tasks of both the 23rd and 25th Divisional 
Engineers. The traffic was heavy and unceasing, and mud was cons- 
tantly oozing up through the sandy surface. Major N. H. Bower, 
R.E., who commanded 227 Docks Operating Company, R.I.E., des- 
cribes an incident at Morib on September 13th. ‘I was coming off 
my ship in a Dukw’’, he writes, ““when I saw a bulldozer stuck in the 
mud with its Bengal Sapper driver perched on top. The water was 
already up to the man’s waist and the tide was still flooding in. 
I asked the driver what he intended to do when the tide rose another 
three feet. He replied calmly that his officer had ordered him to 
remain till he returned. I told him to get into my Dukw, but he 
was very loath to leave and was only partially satisfied when I fixed 
a stick, with a bit of cloth on the end, on top of the bulldozer so that 
he could locate the machine even when the tide was at its highest. His 
attitude showed his devotion to duty regardless of his own comfort.” 

As the 23rd Division flooded into Malaya in the wake of the 25th 
Division, its Divisional Engineers became widely dispersed. 68 Field 
Company, with the Ist Brigade, moved to Seremban and then south- 
wards to Segamat on the railway leading from Kuala Lumpur to 
Singapore. The Company repaired bridges and levelled a site for 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 429 


an airstrip. 71 Field Company remained for a time with the 49th 
Brigade south of Port Dickson and moved southwards through 
Kuala Lumpur to Raub, beyond Bentong, to provide ferries at several 
river crossings along the road to Kuantan on the east coast. 91 Field 
Company, with the 37th Brigade near Port Dickson, moved to Kuala 
Pilah, east of Seremban, and afterwards, passing through Segamat, 
built a 140-feet Double-Single Bailey bridge between Segamat and 
Kluang on the road leading to Singapore. However, only ten days after 
the 23rd Division had landed in Malaya, news arrived that it would be 
transferred shortly to Java, so the 23rd Divisional Engineers had only 
a very brief experience of the country. Lieut.-Colonel Holloway left 
Seremban on September 24th with a small advance party to fly from 
Singapore to Batavia. 68 Field Company sailed from Port Dickson 
with the Ist Brigade early in October, and 91 Field Company and 
323 Field Park Company followed with the 37th Brigade in the middle 
of the month. 7! Field Company, with the 49th Brigade, was the last 
to leave Malaya but soon rejoined the other units in Java. 

The 25th Divisional Engineers were then left to cope with the work 
north of Johore State, but by no means alone, for Army, Corps, 
and Forward Airfield Engineer units were pouring into the country. 
The chief task was to restore and extend the communications so that 
prosperity could be revived and troops moved quickly to any point. 
Jungle tracks had to be made fit for military traffic. This was an 
arduous and unhealthy business and it became the usual practice 
for the platoons of Field Companies to relieve each other at intervals 
of three weeks. Another major requirement was the provision of 
accommodation for about 50,000 soldiers instead of the 1,000 who 
had been stationed in Malaya, outside Singapore, before the war. 
Existing buildings were used as far as possible, but an enormous 
amount of hutting was needed to protect the troops against the 
monsoon. Camps surrounded by barbed wire had also to be built 
to hold Japanese prisoners-of-war. This work was executed mostly 
by civilian labour under the direction of senior Engineer officers of 
the Military Engineer Services, though it sometimes entailed super- 
vision by Indian Engineer units. 

At least a dozen companies of Army or Corps Troops Engineers, 
or Forward Airfield Engineers, arrived in Central Malaya during 
September 1945. The majority were supplied by the Madras Sappers. 
430 and 431 Field Companies (458 Forward Airfield Engineers) 
landed on the Morib beaches on September 9th and 10th with the 
2Ist Engineer Battalion. Soon afterwards 404, 405 and 423 Field 


430 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Companies and 326 Field Park Company (Army Troops Engineers). 
appeared on the scene. On September 12th, 432 Field Company 
landed at Morib, and on the 25th, 434 Field Company. Four field 
units of the Bombay Sappers arrived also—24 and 485 Field 
Companies on September 12th, 324 Field Park Company on the 
15th, and 30 Field Company on the 19th. 76 Field Company 
of the Bengal Sappers was sent direct to Penang Island. Technical 
and Works units made their apppearance and, with the others, 
spread over the Malay States north of Johore to complete the 
work begun by the Divisiona} Engineers and to initiate more 
ambitious projects with the aid of civilian or Japanese prisoner- 
of-war labour. Most of these units passed through Kuala Lumpur, 
moving along fine roads bordered by rubber plantations in 
which they remarked a strange absence of animal or bird life. 
Kuala Lumpur, the capital, had about 140,000 inhabitants and was 
located on a plain overlooked by hills to the north and east. It had 
wide streets and many large buildings but was pervaded by an un- 
pleasant odour of dried fish, wafted by the breeze from the Chinese 
quarter. There was little to buy in the shops, and the prices were exor- 
bitant. Some units, such as 30 Field Company and 434 Field Park 
Company, moved northwards to the Thailand border or even beyond it; 
others worked in Penang, Taiping, Ipoh, Telok Anson and Raub, north 
of Kuala Lumpur; others again at Klang, or at Seremban to the south. 

All these units were very busy during the closing months of 1945. 
A number of bridges along the main west road from Penang south- 
wards had to be rebuilt, often with Bailey equipment. The largest 
were at Gedong and Juru. They were built by 404, 405 and 
423 Field Companies and 326 Field Park Company. The Juru 
Bridge was the biggest in South-East Asia for it had two 
190-feet triple-triple spans and one 110-feet triple-single. When 
completed in March 1946, it was opened by Lieut.-General Sir Frank 
Messervy, the G.O.C. Malaya. A great amount of bridging was done 
on the railways in 1946 by 62 Field Company (Madras) under 
Major J. H. Hoare, R.E. In March it repaired a 324-feet Japanese 
timber bridge north of Kuala Lipis on the central line, and in May 
erected a 120-feet Double-Double Bailey at Bidor near Telok Anson. 
Early in July it finished its bridging duties near Kuala Lipis and 
subsequently moved southwards to Kluang for airfield work. 

While on the subject of communications in Malaya it may be well 
to mention the construction of the east coast route from Kuantan 
northwards to Kota Bahru and the improvement of an extension to 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 431 


the Thailand border at Hat Yai which was begun by Engineer units 
at the beginning of 1946 with the assistance of civilian and Japanese 
labour). It was at Kota Bahru that the Japanese made their initial 
landing in 1942, and since then they had dismantled large sections 
of the railway line through Kuala Krai, Kuala Lipis and Jerantut 
which had formed a connection with the southern States. A road was 
therefore needed to replace the railway. Kuantan was linked with 
Kuala Lumpur by a good lateral highway which crossed the Pahang 
River, passed through Bentong and surmounted the central range of 
hills; but southwards down the east coast towards Mersing there was 
no road of any description, and northwards, to Kota Bahru, only a 
rough track. Altogether, about 250 miles of new roadway were needed 
involving the crossing of eleven rivers or streams. 

The first steps in the east coast road project were taken by the 25th 
Divisional Engineers in October 1945 when 63 Field Company was 
sent to Kuantan, leaving a Section at Jerantut to assist in operating 
a 300-yards’ ferry across the Pahang. In February 1946, 93 Field 
Company moved southwards from Alor Star to Kuala Lumpur and 
thence eastwards to Karak, a few miles beyond Bentong, to commence 
bridging along the route to Kuantan. Colonel A.E. Anstruthers, 
commanding 472 A.G.R.E., launched the main undertaking in June 
1946, concentrating first on a section of the road from Kuantan 
northwards to Trengganu, a distance of 128 miles. He had at his 
disposal 63 and 425 Field Companies and 325 Field Park Company 
(25th Divisional Engineers) 58, 404, 405 and 423 Field Companies and 
326 Field Park Company (Army Troops Engineers), and 430 and 
and 431 Field Companies and the 2lst Engineer Battalion (For- 
ward Airfield Engineers). There were also some technical formations 
and four battalions of Japanese prisoners-of-war for manual labour. 
Owing to a shortage of tar and bitumen, only certain sections of the 
road could be tarred; the rest was merely soled and surfaced. Stone 
causeways up to half a mile in length were needed in some places, 
so several quarries were opened to supply the necessary material. 
Numerous ferries were improved and 16 bridges and 72 culverts 
built, and in November 1946, when the road was handed over to the 
Public Works Department, it was nearing completion. 

It is advisable at this stage to revert to September 1946 to describe 
the re-occupation of Singapore and Southern Malaya which was 
accomplished without opposition while the 34th Corps was landing 





1 See the map of Malaya included in Chapter VII. 


432 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


further north. As already recorded, the Sth Indian Division under 
Major-General E. C. Mansergh, originally ear-marked as a ‘follow- 
up’ formation for the landing by the 25th and 23rd Indian Divisions, 
was diverted to Singapore in consequence of the enemy’s surrender. 
The Division had sailed from Rangoon on August 27th, 1945, when there 
was still some uncertainty as to whether the 96,000 Japanese troops 
on Singapore Island would obey the order from Tokyo to lay down 
their arms. On September 3rd, the convoy of 32 ships was off Penang 
where the 9th Brigade was detached in case its services were needed. 
Some Royal Marines, however, had already disembarked and 
consequently the 9th Brigade followed the rest of the Division 
southwards. In the meantime, mine sweepers had been clearing 
the Malacca Straits and were approaching Singapore, and early on 
September 4th, H.M.S. Sussex, with Admiral Holland, Lieut.-General 
Christison and Major-General Mansergh aboard, lay some twenty 
miles off the city awaiting the arrival of Japanese representatives 
empowered to accept and carry out surrender terms for Malaya. 
General Itagaki, commanding the Japanese Seventh Area Army, 
and Vice-Admiral Fukudome, commanding the Tenth Area Fleet, 
came alongside in a tug and were received aboard the Sussex by the 
British representatives who had assembled ina cabin. The proceedings 
lasted nearly four hours. Itagakiendeavoured to bargain, but in the end, 
with tears running down his face, signed the surrender document. He 
was more to be pitied than Fukudome who had tried to ingratiate himself 
with the British Commanders by an exhibition of joviality and camara- 
derie. The terms were harsh. Surrender was to be unconditional. 
Most of the Japanese garrison of Singapore Island was to march to 
the mainland, starting that same night. All arms must be handed 
in, but uniform and badges of rank would still be worn. The Japanese 
officers would remain responsibible for the discipline of their men, 
the protection of certain public buildings, the feeding of the civilian 
population and the maintenance of essential services until relieved 
of these duties. As a temporary measure, they would provide small 
guards to prevent damage or looting. No demolition would be pet- 
mitted. All documents, records, cyphers and lists of available supplies 
were to be produced. The locations of all Allied prisoner-of-war 
or internee camps were to be given, and also those of all fortifica- 
tions, naval installations, tank depots and ammunition dumps. 
No Japanese aircraft was to leave the ground; no ship was to move. 
Every Japanese flag must be hauled down before the Allied forces 
landed. A curfew would be imposed from sunset till sunrise. A 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 433 


Japanese General must report twice daily to General Mansergh for 
orders. The other enemy Generals would be confined in Raffles 
College till evacuated. These were some of the peremptory orders 
issued, and they were obeyed to the letter. By dawn on September 
5th, 35,000 Japanese soldiers had crossed the causeway from 
Singapore Island to the mainland. 

During the night of September 4th/Sth, the 5th Divisional convoy, 
blazing with lights, followed a swept channel through the straits 
and approached Singapore. H.M.S. Sussex was already there with 
her guns trained on the city. Nothing was left to chance, and when 
two battalions of the 123rd Brigade landed in the morning they did 
so fully armed and equipped and ready to fight. However, there 
was no resistance. The infantry fanned out from the docks and 
occupied all key positions such as arsenals, airfields, the railway terminus 
and camps. The 1J6lst Brigade followed and advanced across 
the island to the naval base on the northern shore and the causeway 
leading to the mainland. The Japanese were collected in concen- 
tration areas pending their removal. They were well treated but were 
allowed no luxuries, and the British and Indian troops had already 
been warned that there must be no fraternization. As soon as the 
5th Division had begun to disembark, some officers had made straight 
for the Changi prisoner-of-war camp at the eastern end of the is- 
land and the civilian internment camp at Syme Road. In the womens’ 
section of the latter, they were infuriated to find Lady Shenton Thomas, 
wife of the Governor, clad in ragged clothing and without shoes or 
stockings, making grass soup in an old bully-beef tin. Supplies were 
rushed immediately to the Allied prisoners-of-war and internees. 
There were more than 32,000 prisoners on the island including 16,000 
Indians, 6,000 British, 5,000 Australians and 4,000 Dutch. All were 
emaciated and dressed in rags. They seemed dazed and spoke little 
of their horrifying experience, but their spirit was not broken. Some 
of the Indian soldiers, for instance, mounted guards on their camps, 
armed with only sticks, and when a senior Allied officer approached 
‘presented arms’ in smart fashion. The seriously ill were evacuated 
to hospitals or hospital ships, and the remainder clothed and fed; 
but they could eat little after years of semi-starvation and the effects 
of disease and neglect. The worst cases were those who had slaved 
on the Japanese railway line from Thailand to Lower Burma. Lieut.- 
Colonel Lindsell gives a graphic description of the privations 
suffered by the Indian Engineer prisoners-of-war in Singapore and 


434 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


elsewhere!. It is an inspiring tale of fortitude in adversity, but cannot 
be repeated here. The recovery and welfare of the ex-prisoners and 
internees was undertaken by an organization known as ‘“‘R.A.P.W.J.” 
(Recovery of Allied Prisoners-of-War and Internees) and was most 
efficiently carried out. The Bombay Group of the Indian Engineers 
had been the chief sufferers in 1942 as regards the number of units 
lost, and between September and December 1945 no less than 17 
British Officers and 1,143 Indian ranks, mostly from Malaya, arrived 
in Kirkee from prison camps overseas. 

The units of the 5th Divisional Engineers which landed at Singapore 
on September Sth, 1945, or a few days later, were commanded by 
Lieut.-Colonel R.C. Orgill, R.E. They were 2 Field Company (Bengal) 
under Major C. W. Williams, R.E., 20 Field Company (Bombay) 
under Major E. C. Fisher, R.E., 74 Field Company (Bengal) under 
Major D. Brunt, R.E., and 44 Field Park Company (Madras) under 
Major H. F. Thompson, R.E. ““The Sappers and Miners had many 
problems to face’, writes Antony Brett-James?. ‘“‘The water-supply 
was improved, public utilities repaired, and reconnaissances made 
of store dumps. In South Malaya, communications were restored 
and airfields repaired. Drains were cleared, anti-tank ditches and 
pot-holes filled in, bridges strengthened or replaced, and road-blocks 
removed. Classification signs were erected on bridges. Stock lists 
of Engineer dumps were prepared, and saw-mills and quarries 
in Southern Johore reconnoitred. All bridges for the first 150 miles 
from Singapore to Malacca had to be replaced. At night, while the 
military police closed the road, a platoon or two of Sappers were 
hastily stripping an old timber bridge and putting up a Bailey bridge 
by the glare of headlights.” The preparation of lists of Japanese 
engineer stores was difficult because the Japanese had, or seemed 
to have, little idea of the amount and location of the materials. Their 
engineer stores were mixed with ammunition, signal and ordnance 
Stores, and at one spot the British discovered a barrack completely 
filled with new lathes about which the Japanese said they knew nothing 
whatever. 

The greatest hindrance to the early restoration of Singapore was 
the lack of transport. For some days, the 5th Division had only 
its unit vehicles. The Japanese had undertaken to produce a number 





tl hp a Ee ee 


* A Short History of Q.V’sO. Madras Sappers and Miners during World War U, 
1939-1945, by Lt. Col. R.A. Lindsell, R.E., pp. 55-58. 


? Ball of Fire, by Antony Brett-James, pp. 438-439. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 435 


of lorries and trucks, but they were slow to arrive. A major task for 
the Sth Divisional Engineers, and for the {5th Corps Troops Engineers 
who followed them, was the rapid construction of barbed wire en- 
closures to hold thousands of Japanese prisoners-of-war pending 
their evacuation to the mainland. Needless to say, having seen the 
condition of their friends released from captivity, the Sappers derived 
much satisfaction in thus turning the tables on the enemy. Before 
the end of the month, 2 Field Company moved northwards to Kluang 
in Johore State, building eight Bailey bridges along the road. A 
prisoner-of-war camp was to be prepared close to the Kluang air- 
field from which all the Japanese in Southern Malaya could be eva- 
cuated later to the Riouw archipelago south of Singapore Island. The 
other Engineer units continued to improve accommodation and 
communications; but all became aware, at a very early date, that they 
were mere birds of passage as the Sth Division was already ear- 
marked for service further afield. 

September 12th, 1945, was a red letter day in the whole of South- 
East Asia, for it was the occasion of the official surrender to Lord 
Mountbatten of all the Japanese forces in that vast area. The surrender 
took place in the Council Chamber of the Municipal Buildings at 
Singapore in the presence of senior officers of the British, Indian, 
United States, Australian, French, Dutch and Chinese forces. 
Mountbatten arrived in an open car through miles of cheering crowds. 
He had ordered Field-Marshal Terauchi, the Japanese Supreme 
Commander, to be present; but as Terauchi was ill, General Itagaki, 
who had already made the local surrender, was allowed to represent 
his superior officer at the major ceremony. Terauchi’s personal 
surrender was postponed until Mountbatten could visit the Japanese 
Headquarters at Saigon’. The chief Allied representatives at the 
ceremony in Singapore were Admiral Sir Arthur Power, Field-Marshal 
Sir William Slim, Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, Lieut.-General 
R. A. Wheeler (U.S.), Air Vice-Marshal A. T. Cole (Australia), General 
Leclerc (France), Major-General Feng Yee (China), Brigadier K.S. 
Thimayya (India) and Colonel B. van Vreeden (Holland). They sat 
in line at two long tables between which was a large desk for Lord 
Mountbatten. On Mountbatten’s left was Slim, and on his right, 
Wheeler, and at the right hand end of the line was Thimayya. Facing 
them at another table were seven Japanese representatives—General 


1 At Saigon, on November 30th, Lord Mountbatten received Field-Marshal Terau- 
chi's sword. : 


436 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Itagaki, General Kimura, Vice-Admirals Fukudome and Shibata, and 
Lieut.-Generals Nakamura, Kinoshita and Numata. They had filed 
in under guard and sat with stony faces, bareheaded and unarmed. 
In the background, a sentry, grenade in hand, watched the line of 
little bullet-headed men. The proceedings were brief and formal. 
Mountbatten announced the terms of surrender. The papers were 
carried across to Itagaki, and soon after 11.0. a.m. they were 
signed. Half an hour later, the Japanese were marched away amidst 
devastating jeers from the watching crowds. The Allied officers 
emerged and Mountbatten read a proclamation from the steps of 
the Municipal Buildings. On a parade of Allied troops, a British 
soldier then hoisted the identical Union Jack that had been lowered 
in 1942 and hidden ever since, while a salute was fired by an Indian 
Field Battery. The occasion marked the end of the armed might of 
Japan, though comparatively few of her armies had been defeated 
in battle. 

To meet the wishes of the Americans, the boundaries of the South- 
East Asia Command had been extended during August 1945 to include 
Java and some islands beyond it, in addition to Borneo, Celebes, 
Dutch New Guinea and part of French Indo-China. This added 
greatly to Mountbatten’s responsibilities. On September 30th 
the 15th Indian Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir Philip Christison}, 
was re-designated ‘‘Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies”, 
or briefly ‘“‘A.F.N.E.I.”’, and was ordered to move from Southern 
Malaya to Java and Sumatra. It comprised the 5th, 23rd and 26th 
Indian Divisions commanded respectively by Major-Generals E. C. 
Mansergh, D. C. Hawthorn and H.M. Chambers. At first it had been 
hoped that the 23rd Division would suffice for the occupation of 
both Java and Sumatra. Then it became apparent that a single Divi- 
sion could not hold both islands and that the 26th Division must 
assume responsibility for Sumatra; and finally, when Java proved 
beyond the unaided powers of the 23rd Division, the 5th Division 
had to be brought forward to occupy the eastern half of the island while 
the 23rd Division controlled the western half. Thus, in the end, only 
the 25th Division, under Major-General G. N. Wood, was left in 
Malaya; but reinforcements were on their way from India, and on 
December 8th, 1945, Malaya became a separate Command under 





i 


‘i On January 30th, 1946, Lieut.-General Sir Philip Christison was succeeded by 
Lieut.-General Sir Montagu Stopford. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 437 


Lieut.-General Sir Frank Messervy, formerly G.O.C., 4th Corps.! 
The A.F.N.E.I. Headquarters were to be established in Batavia, the 
capital of Java, by October 10th. The Chief Engineer of the new 
organization was Brigadier D.C. T. Swan? who had been C.E., 15th 
Corps, since April when he had relieved Brigadier L. I. Jacques. 
Swan had under his orders the Sth Divisional Engineers under Lieut.- 
Colonel R. C. Orgill, R.E., (later succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel D. W. 
Price, R.E.,), the 23rd Divisional Engineers under Lieut.-Colonel 
D. R. Guinness, R.E.,) and the 26th Divisional Engineers under Lieut.- 
Colonel H. C. G. Richards, R.E., (later succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel 
D.R. W. Waller, R.E.). There were also certain technical and specia- 
list formations. The Engineer cadre of A.F.N.E.I. was large, but 
nevertheless barely sufficient to cope with the commitments involved 
in the occupation of two enormous islands whose inhabitants were 
seething with discontent afters years of harsh Japanese rule. 

On September 25th, 1945, the Ist Brigade of the 23rd Division 
began to disembark in Batavia, and when the movement was com- 
pleted on October 4th sporadic fighting against guerilla bands of 
Indonesians was already in progress in and around the town. The 
37th Brigade followed to Batavia in the middle of October, while the 
49th Brigade, under Brigadier A.W.S. Mallaby, voyaged further east- 
wards and reached the Dutch naval base at Sourabaya on October 
25th. With the 49th Brigade was 71 Field Company (Bengal) under 
Major R.N.B. Holmes, R.E. The situation in Java requires 
some explanation. The sudden capitulation of Japan in the middle 
of August had left South-East Asia in a turmoil. In Thailand, there 
were clashes at Bangkok between the Thais and the Chinese. The 
Annamite National Movement (‘“Viet-Minh’’) in French Indo- 
China, and the Indonesian National Movement in Java and Sumatra, 
had been encouraged by the Japanese because they were directed 
against France or Holland, and it fell to Great Britain to restore order 
until those countries could resume control and decide what action 
should be taken. This, however, was against the wishes of the inhabit- 
ants who were obsessed, perhaps naturally, with the idea of self- 
determination. A section of the Indonesian movement in Java, under 


4 General Messervy held the Malaya Command until he was appointed G.O.C.-in-C., 
Northern Command, India, on October 15th, 1946, From August 15th, 1947, to 
February Ist, 1948, he was C-in-C., Pakistan. 


2 Brig. D.C.T. Swan held the appointment of C.E., A.F.N.E.I., until Jan. 20th, 
1946, when he was succeeded by Brig. G.A.T. Pritchard. 


438 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Dr. Soerkano, seemed willing to collaborate with our forces, but 
nevertheless Soerkano was resolved that Indonesia should soon 
become an independent Republic. Before the 23rd Division landed 
in Batavia and Sourabaya, the Indonesians had received large 
quantities of arms, ammunition and stores from the Japanese who had 
withdrawn into concentration areas. Promptly, the Indonesians 
turned upon the Dutch civilians in their midst and at Sourabaya 
murdered or imprisoned several hundreds of men, women and 
children. 

On the arrival of the 49th Brigade at Sourabaya, Brigadier Mallaby 
conferred with Dr. Moestopo, the local Indonesian leader, who had 
been instructed by Soerkano not to oppose a landing. The Brigade 
accordingly landed, occupying all key points in the town without 
bloodshed. On October 27th, some units moved inland to Darmo, 
a residential area at the southern end where there was a large Dutch 
civilian internment camp.! The Indonesians at once suspected that 
Mallaby intended to hold them down by force until he could hand 
over to their previous masters, the Dutch. They had 12,000 ex- 
Regular soldiers, trained and armed by the Japanese and supported 
by an armed mob 75,000 strong. On October 28th, this mob poured 
through the town, murdering isolated parties of British and Indian 
soldiers and many Dutch women and children. Street fighting began 
in earnest. Brigadier Mallaby was murdered, and after the 49th 
Brigade had lost 400 officers and men, it was withdrawn by Colonel 
L.H.O. Pugh to the dock and airfield area in the north. Shortly after- 
wards, Major-General E.C. Mansergh arrived by air to examine the 
situation and it was then decided that the greater part of his Sth 
Division should be sent from Malaya to reinforce the 49th Brigade 
of the 23rd Division. 

Sourabaya was a large town about six miles in length from north 
to south and in places nearly two miles wide. Most of its 300,000 in- 
habitants were Indonesians, but the total included about 38,000 
Chinese and some thousands of Europeans. Down the centre of the 
town ran a canalized river called the Kali Mas and further east a 
stream known as the Kali Semampir. Near the mouth of the Kali 
Mas was the Tandjoenperak dock area and an airfield. East of the Kali 
Mas were miles of squalid suburbs called ‘kampongs’. A truce had been 
arranged with the Indonesians in Sourabaya before the 9th Brigade 
under Brigadier H.G.L. Brain disembarked as the leading formation 


—_—————- 








* See the map of Sourabaya included in this chapter. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 439 


of the Sth Division. The landing was unopposed although the troops 
were obviously unwelcome. An unnatural silence brooded over the 
town. The 9th Brigade relieved the 49th Brigade in the area east 
of the Kali Mas and negotiations were begun for the return ofa battalion 
still remaining in Darmo after guarding the evacuation of 6,000 
wonien and children to the dock area. This battalion left Darmo 
during the night of November 7th/8th and rejoined the 49th Brigade 
safely. General Mansergh was then able to issue an ultimatum to 
the insurgents. He did so on November 9th, giving them till next 
morning to surrender all arms, failing which he would clear the town 
completely. The ultimatum had little effect, and accordingly, after 
the 123rd Brigade had landed, a general advance was begun on 
November 10th. The 161st Brigade was not present as it had been 
diverted to Batavia. By November 28th, after considerable street 
fighting, Sourabaya had been cleared of the insurgents; but 
operations had to be continued throughout December against isolated 
bands in the surrounding country, and the Sth Division could 
not be withdrawn to Malaya until the middle of January 1946. The 
fighting at Sourabaya was the last in which units of the Indian Army 
were commanded by British officers. 

The only Sapper unit at Sourabaya in the earliest days of the dis- 
turbance was 71 Field Company (Bengal) under Major R.N.B. Holmes, 
R.E., Indeed, the first troops to set foot in the town on October 
25th, 1945, were some men of the Company’s Mechanical Trans- 
port party. They had a sullen though not too unfriendly reception. 
The Company disembarked with most of the 49th Brigade on the follow- 
ing day and a subaltern was sent to reconnoitre the airfield, meeting 
with much obstruction from the Indonesian officials because they 
thought he was Dutch. On the 27th, the unit (less one platoon) moved 
through the town to the Darmo suburb. All was quiet at the moment 
and the Indonesian soldiers saluted our officers, but serious trouble 
was evidently brewing. It started on the 28th. There was much 
fighting in the centre of the town and some of the Company trans- 
port in the docks area was ordered to move to Darmo. This it did 
after dusk under heavy fire. News came that a convoy of nineteen 
trucks carrying women and children to safety had been ambushed 
while being escorted by men of the 123rd Company, R.I.A.S.C. Many 
of these women and children were bayonetted. Others perished when 
the houses in which they had taken shelter were set on fire. Only 
thirty survived out of two hundred. The Indian drivers put up a great 
fight, and all but eight were killed at their posts. 


440 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Early on October 29th, fire was opened on 71 Field Company’s 
position in the Darmo barracks. The Indonesians crept up to within 
fifty yards and casualties began to mount. Holmes then asked for 
artillery support which was given promptly. Captain D. C. Floyer, 
R.E., from a very exposed position, directed the fire on to 
the enemy’s trenches, and those Indonesians who tried to escape 
were mown down by machine guns. At 3.0 p.m. some Thunder- 
bolts came over and fighting ceased, but not before the Company 
had lost two killed and eleven wounded. October 30th was another 
exciting day. A detachment of Rajputs in the Darmo Railway Station 
was short of ammunition, so at 10.0 a.m. Holmes despatched a party 
to the station in a lorry. Heavy fighting was in progress; but the 
ammunition was delivered and several wounded Rajputs evacuated to 
hospital before the party returned to the barracks where the situation 
was becoming increasingly serious. The Indonesians swarmed on 
all sides, waving flags, shouting “Don’t shoot”, and demanding that 
71 Company should surrender. Floyer then set out, unarmed, with 
the Indonesian commmander, to the rebels’ headquarters, six miles 
away, to discuss matters. He returned safely, two hours later, in an 
armoured vehicle, having been forced to abandon his 15 cwt. truck. 
Meanwhile, Holmes had waited calmly outside the barracks facing 
an excited crowd but with four machine-guns placed in convienient 
positions behind him. Floyer’s return fortunately coincided with 
the arrival of a letter from Dr. Soerkano enjoining moderation. 
The rebels were sufficiently pacified to disperse to their homes, 
and soon afterwards Floyer was awarded the Military Cross. 
Supplies were dropped by aeroplanes, and for the next three 
days all was quiet at Darmo. On November 2nd, a convoy 
transported 1,400 women and children to the docks area. 71 Field 
Company followed on November 6th and joined in minor offensive 
operations during the next few weeks. On November 25th it 
embarked with the 49th Brigade for Batavia, very glad, no doubt, 
to see the last of Sourabaya. 

By that time, the 5th Divisional Engineers were installed in Soura- 
baya and fully employed. 20 Field Company (Bombay) under Major 
F.C. Fisher, R.E., had arrived with the 9th Brigade at the beginning 
of November, and soon afterwards came 44 Field Park Company 
(Madras) under Major H. F. Thompson, R.E. 2 Field Company 
(Bengal), now under Major J. S. Dhillon, R.I.E., landed on 
November 24th and was followed by 74 Field Company (Bengal) 
under Major D. Brunt, R.E. These units saw no fighting and their 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 441 


work was confined mostly to clearing debris, lifting mines, opening 
roads and railways, repairing bridges, restoring the sewage system 
and providing accommodation and water supply—in fact the usual 
engineer duties in devastated areas. 44 Field Park Company, how- 
ever, was especially busy for it had to repair and operate most of the 
public installations in the town in addition to its normal work. It took 
over the Electric Power Station near the docks and restored the electric 
lighting of the airfield. It repaired generators and pumps, controlled 
a plant for pumping oil to the Power Station, supervised cold storage 
plants, assembled perimeter searchlights, repaired cranes and road- 
rollers, manufactured coffins, and was even called upon to break 
open several safes whose owners had vanished with the keys. Anyone 
who required anything done in the mechanical or electrical line applied 
to the long-suffering Field Park Company and they were rarely dis- 
appointed. 2 Field Company was sent to Batavia in the middle of 
December but was back in Sourabaya by January 8th, 1946, and 
there it remained with the other units of the Sth Divisional Engineers, 
until it sailed for India in April. The first Dutch troops had arrived 
on February 4th, and by the middle of March a complete Dutch 
Brigade was present. The transfer of responsibility to the Dutch in 
Eastern Java was completed at the beginning of May 1946, and 
June 5th saw the departure of the last British and Indian units. 

While the 5th Indian Division was restoring law and order in 
Eastern Java, the 23rd Indian Division (less, for a time, the 49th 
Brigade) had been equally busy around Batavia in Western Java. Here, 
68 and 91 Field Companies and 323 Field Park Company of the 23rd 
Divisional Engineers, under Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Holloway, R.E., 
did excellent work pending the return of 71 Field Company from 
Sourabaya which took place towards the end of November 1945. 
68 Field Company had landed from Port Dickson early in October, 
and 91 Field Company and 323 Field Park Company had followed 
in the middle of the month. Other Sapper units reached Batavia 
during November among them being 433 Field Company (Madras) 
of the Forward Airfield Engineers, and in December, 78 Field Company 
(Bengal) of 41 Beach Group, under Major W. Byrde, R.E. The 23rd 
Division was not involved at first in much fighting although Batavia 
was the scene of many skirmishes between the Japanese and the Indo- 
nesians who wished to secure Japanese arms. At Bandoeng the 
Japanese retained their arms; at Semarang they handed them over. 
There were clashes also at Cheribon, Jogjakarta and other places. Jungle 
law had reigned in Western Java since the collapse of Japan. The 


442 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Indonesians wanted freedom, and the Japanese to be absolved from all 
responsibility, and when the 23rd Division began to arrive the country 
was already in the throes of a popular uprising. The Indonesians had 
taken charge of all public utility services. They ran the railways, 
the post and telegraph services, and the water-supply in Batavia. 
They commandeered any vehicle they fancied, and seized any building 
they desired, without interference from the police. The local Press 
hurled abuse at the Dutch. Ships lay unloaded in the docks. Shooting 
began in the streets about October 4th, and barricades appeared over- 
night. A week later, two officers of a Punjab battalion were killed 
in an ambush and our troops began to fight the Indonesians, so 
General Hawthorn proclaimed what virtually amounted to martial 
law. The situation in Batavia improved with the arrival of the 37th 
Brigade on October 16th, but there still remained the problem of 
ensuring the safety of 10,000 Dutch internees at Ambarawa and 
Banjoebiroe, some 20 miles inland from Semarang. This mountainous 
tract of Central Java was a hot-bed of unrest. On October 3lst, 
fighting started at Magelang, still further south, and it became 
increasingly difficult to hold Semarang and at the same time to 
guard the R.A.P.W.I. camps far inland. Semarang and Ambarawa 
became miniature battlefields, but the situation improved at the end of 
the November with the arrival of the 49th Brigade from Sourabaya. 
A fortnight later, Ambarawa was evacuated and our troops fell back 
on Semarang. 

Meanwhile, in Batavia, there had been desultory fighting every 
night between the Indonesians and the local Dutch, and hostilities 
now started at Bandoeng, 70 miles to the south-east, where our troops 
engaged the Indonesians. The first signs of improvement coincided 
with the arrival of additional forces to reinforce the 23rd Division. 
These were the 161st Brigade (Sth Division) originally earmarked 
for Sourabaya, the 36th Brigade (26th Division) transferred from 
Sumatra, and the Sth Parachute Brigade sent from Singapore. The 
36th Brigade moved southwards to Buitenzorg, while the Parachute 
Brigade went eastwards to Semarang after helping to restore order in 
Batavia. Convoys carrying supplies to Bandoeng had been having a 
most unpleasant time as the Indonesians, sheltering in fox-holes on the 
the hill-sides, took every opportunity to lob Molotov cocktails onto 
passing vehicles. Strong escorts were needed to clear a passage. 
Early in March 1946, Bandoeng became the scene of the final operations 
in Western Java. Four Dutch battalions were arriving in Batavia 
and the Ist Brigade was moving from Buitenzorg to Bandoeng to 


RIAREG Jou ppysry uvseleway oy) Buyonsysuoy 





MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 443 


replace the 37th Brigade. Aided by mines and road-blocks, the Indo- 
nesians launched a heavy attack on a large convoy and a five-day 
battle ensued in which our troops suffered 115 casualties. The fighting 
ceased, however, on March 15th when the last vestiges of insurrection 
began to die down. As more Dutch troops landed in Western Java 
our commitments were reduced gradually to Batavia alone, and finally, 
on November 30th, 1946, the last British and Indian units departed. 

The Engineer work in Western Java resembled that carried out in the 
eastern territory except that there was more to be done in the eva- 
cuation of internees and the repair of airfields. The internees had to 
be collected rapidly in places of safety, and as their camps were often 
located far inland, whole brigades had sometimes to be maintained 
in isolated spots for their protection. The roads leading to these 
distant concentrations needed constant attention in order that they 
might be kept open for large convoys escorted by armoured cars, 
and every convoy had to be provided with a detachment from 
an Engineer Field Company to lift mines and clear road-blocks. 
Occasionally the Field Companies were also called upon to help the 
Forward Airfield Engineers in improving airfields, though most of the 
heavy work was done by civilian labour or by Japanese prisoners-of-war. 
When Brigadier G.A.T. Pritchard succeeded Brigadier D.C.T. Swan as 
Chief Engineer, A.L.F.N.E.I., on January 20th, 1946, he found that 
Batavia itself needed much attention!. The main Power House had 
to be brought into use and maintained, the Flood Control system 
restored, and the Cold Storage Plant and main Water Supply re- 
paired and operated. The roads were in a shocking condition, and 
labour was scarce because the Indonesians refused to work under Dutch 
or Japanese supervision. Another urgent task was the clearance of 
drainage canals choked with silt and obstructed by a growth of water- 
hyacinth. The canals also contained many corpses which blocked 
the sluice gates and had to be removed and buried. 

In February 1946, as the greater part of the 23rd Division had 
already moved inland to the Bandoeng area, the Forward Airfield 
Engineers and a Works Section took over most of the engineer duties 
in Batavia. The 23rd Divisional Engineers were widely scattered. 
One Company remained in Batavia, another was at Buitenzorg, and 
the Headquraters and the third Company were at Bandoeng. During 
March, after Brigadier D. R. Guinness had been appointed Chief 
Engineer, A.F.N.E.I., the Indonesians made so many attacks on 





1 Notes by Major-General G.A.T. Pritchard, c.p.£., dated Feby. 1 {th, 1954. 


444 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


convoys between Batavia and Bandoeng that the Sappers were con- 
stantly required to reconnoitre demolitions and road-blocks and exe- 
cute rapid repairs or find alternative routes. Courses of instruction 
for Dutch Engineer units, expected shortly from overseas, had to be 
arranged. It was known that those coming from Holland would be 
fully equipped, but that others which were being raised in the Far 
East would have little or no equipment and all would need training 
in local methods. The Dutch companies arrived during July 1946 and 
were duly trained and, when necessary, provided with equipment, and 
thus the Indian Engineers and Forward Airfield Engineers were able 
at last to hand over charge and prepare to leave the country. 

68 Field Company (Bengal), under Major R. W. Allen, R.E., which 
was in Batavia until it moved to Buitenzorg early in February 1946, 
undertook an unusual task while stationed in the capital. This was 
the printing of The Fighting Cock, a 23rd Division newspaper. The 
first edition appeared on October 23rd, 1945, and was produced, 
curiously enough, with the full co-operation of both the Indonesians 
and the Dutch. The title was afterwards adopted for the Divisional! 
History!. 68 Field Company moved to Tjandjoer, half way between 
Buitenzorg and Bandoeng, in March 1946, and to Bandoeng itself 
in May. It returned to Batavia in July to prepare for evacuation. 
91 Field Company (Bombay), under Major H. A. Mavor, R.E., which 
had reached Bandoeng in the middle of December 1945, was employed 
until the end of May in clearing obstacles, lifting mines and improving 
airfields. Then it handed over charge to 68 Field Company and returned 
to Batavia, leaving a platoon at Buitenzorg until 71 Field Company 
arrived there on July Ist from Sourabaya. As the Dutch Engineers 
assumed control in Batavia, opportunities for games and_ sports 
became frequent, though the Sappers did not mix freely with either 
the Dutch or the Indonesians. 91 Field Company was composed of 
Hindu, Sikh and Punjabi Mahomedan Platoons, and it is noteworthy 
that during the Muslim period of Ramzan the Sikhs offered to relieve 
the Mahomedans of most of their guard duties. This is a happy 
instance of the good feeling which existed in 1946 between men of 
different creeds and helps to explain why the troubles arising from 
the separation of Pakistan from India in the following year had so 
few repercussions among the armed forces. 

While Java was in the process of pacification, the adjacent island 
of Sumatra was being occupied by the 26th Indian Division under 





1 The Fighting Cock, by Lieut.-Colonel A.J.F. Doulton, 0.5.8. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 445 


Major-General H.M. Chambers and with much less difficulty than 
was encountered by the Sth and 23rd Indian Divisions further east. 
Although Sumatra is more than 1,000 miles in length and three times 
the size of Java, its population in 1945 did not exceed eight million 
people, or about one-fifth that of Java. Medan, the capital on the 
east coast facing Penang Island across the Malacca Straits, had only 
77,000 inhabitants of whom 27,000 were Chinese and 4,000 Europeans. 
Palembang, an oil centre in the south-east had a population of 
108,000, while Padang, on the west coast, held 66,000. The communi- 
cations were poor, vast areas in the interior being either marshy or 
mountainous and covered with jungle. In Sumatra, as in Java, 
thousands of released Allied prisoners-of-war and civilian internees 
had to be collected and evacuated and large numbers of Japanese 
troops rounded up, and all this had to be done with the least possible 
interference with the local administration. 

The 4th and 71st Brigades of the 26th Division sailed from Madras 
at the beginning of October 1945 with 28 Field Company under Major 
C.J. Bewley, R.E., 98 Field Company under Major P. B. Button, 
R.E., and 328 Field Park Company under Major A. D. M. Dunne, 
R.E. All these units belonged to the Bombay Group, and with 72 
Field Company (Bengal) under Major J. B. H. Knight, R.E., comprised 
the 26th Divisional Engineers commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H.C. G. 
Richards, R.E. The 26th Brigade followed at the end of the month 
with 72 Field Company. Richards had also a couple of Electrical 
and Mechanical platoons and some Forward Airfield Engineers. 
General Chambers established his headquarters at Padang, where 
the 71st Brigade occupied all strategic points, and on October 
10th, 28 Field Company reached the town and began to improve 
the accommodation, water supply and road communications. 72 
and 98 Field Companies and 328 Field Park Company were sent to 
Medan with the 4th Brigade. Palembang was occupied at first by 
only one battalion, and no Sapper unit was available for the small 
garrison. At Medan the chief task was to improve the airfield so 
that the Divisional Headqurters could be transferred from Padang. 
This work proceeded so well that the transfer was effected in March 
1946. 

Soon after the arrival of the 26th Division the Indonesians began 
to give trouble, and particularly at Padang where our troops had to 
take strong defensive measures. At night, 28 Field Company guarded 
one of the three defended localities into which Padang was divided. 
This threw a heavy strain on the men, which became heavier later 


446 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


when it became necessary to detach one platoon to Palembang. Indo- 
nesian snipers and grenade throwers ambushed convoys or crept into 
the town after dark to attack the Dutch. Life at Medan was more 
orderly, and with the arrival of the 11th Engineer Battalion the work 
of restoration was accelerated. 328 Field Park Company was especially 
busy. After providing and operating an Engineer Stores Depot and 
running a stone-crushing plant, it was moved suddenly ten miles 
up the coast to Belawan to the site of an old railway workshop over- 
grown with jungle. It had not only to clear the site and build huts 
but also to rebuild and re-fit the workshop and organize a large out- 
put of metal and woodwork. 

By contrast with Medan, life at Palembang was unpleasant, and 
little engineering could be done by the platoon of 28 Field Company 
after the departure of the Japanese. The situation both in Palembang 
and Medan worsened during the summer of 1946 until the evacuation 
of the 23rd Division from Java provided some reinforcements. 71 
Field Company, now under Major M. L. Khetarpal, R.J.E., was sent 
to Palembang to help the detachment of 28 Field Company. Unrest 
was widespread. ‘‘The Indonesian tactics showed many resemblances to 
those of the Japanese’, writes Major J. S. R. Shave, R.E.,} ‘‘and it 
was clear that deserters from the Japanese were encouraging and 
training the guerillas. Captured arms and equipment were frequently 
of Jap origin. Our Mahomedan troops were encouraged to desert 
and promised promotion and good pay if they joined the republican 
army, but throughout the occupation the discipline and morale of the 
British and Indian troops was of the highest order. The year 1946 
saw a rapid decrease in the strength of our forces in the Far East, 
yet it was imperative that the eventual hand-over to the Dutch should 
be well prepared. The C.R.E. accordingly undertook the task of raising 
a Dutch Engineer platoon in Medan to take over the maintenance 
and operation of the plant and the port of Belawan from 328 Field 
Park Company. Some Dutch units arrived during September and 
October 1946, and a strong force was known to be sailing from Holland 
and was expected during November. Accordingly, the 26th Divisional 
Engineers were able to return to India in October, November and 
December feeling that their contribution towards the restoration 
of peace and the revival of the island as a productive colony had 
been considerable”. 72 Field Company embarked at Medan on 





* “Sumatra, 1945-46," by Major J.S.R. Shave, M.c., R.E., appearing in The R.E. 
Journal, Sept. 1951, pp. 254-263. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 447 


‘October 27th and the others followed. The O.C. 328 Field Park 
Company (now renumbered as 42) was disappointed to learn on October 
30th that his unit was due for disbandment and wrote in his War Diary 
“This information comes at a very late date and is considered in a 
very bad light... The fate of this hard-working unit was to be 
shared by a number of others. One cannot but sympathize 
with those who had hoped against hope that they would escape the 
axe. 

The Far-Eastern picture now switches to Thailand and reverts 
to the autumn of 1945 when it became necessary to land sufficient 
forces in that country to disarm and concentrate 113,000 Japanese 
troops, rescue and evacuate 20,000 Allied prisoners-of-war and inter- 
nees, and secure and repair the Don Muang airfield close to Bangkok, 
the capital, in order to assist the transport of part of the 20th 
Indian Division by air to French Indo-China. Thousands of coolies 
who had been brought from Malaya by the Japanese to labour on 
the new railway to Burma had also to be repatriated. All this had 
had to be done while maintaining friendly relations with the 
Government of Thailand which, though nominally in league with 
the Japanese, had secretly sided with the Allies. The task was allotted 
to the 7th Indian Division, under Major-General G. C. Evans, and 
was subsidiary to the main landing operations in Malaya. 

In August 1945, the 5th Division was concentrated in the Pegu dis- 
trict of Southern Burma after being relieved by the 17th Division 
in the Sittang bend, and in consequence of the decision that it should 
travel by air it actually provided the first troops in South-East Asia 
to enter enemy occupied territory, for an advance party, consisting 
of the tactical Headquarters of the 114th Brigade under Colonel 
Kalwant Singh and a detachment of 150 infantry, flew to Bangkok 
from Mingaladon early on September 3rd. It was followed quickly by 
the remainder of the the Brigade, and then by the greater part of the 
Division as aircraft became available. The advance party was received 
by a guard of honour and a number of senior Thailand officers at 
the Don Muang airfield, and contact was established at once with the 
Allied prisoners-of-war and internees and with the Japanese. By the 
end of the first week it was evident that the Japanese would obey all 
orders transmitted through their own officers, but their methods of 
achieving efficiency and promptitude were disconcerting. For instance, 
after it had been pointed out that a junior Japanese officer had failed 
to complete his allotted task in the proper time, General Evans was 
informed that the local Japanese commander had sentenced the 


448 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


offender to a month’s imprisonment “with bodily torture’! The 
incident reminds one forcibly of Gilbert and Sullivan’s opera The 
Mikado. 

The 7th Divisional Engineers comprised 62 Field Company 
(Madras) under Major W. T. Buttrick, R.E., 77 Field Company 
(Bengal) under Major E. R. B. Hudson, R.E., 421 Field Company 
(Madras) under Major R. S. A. Pryde, R.E., and 331 Field Park 
Company (Madras) under Major B. P. Shenoy, R.LE., the C.R.E. 
being Lieut.-Colonel P. G. Hatch, R.E. At the outset, owing to the 
absence of men on leave, a composite unit was formed from 62 and 
421 Companies. This composite Company was flown to Bangkok 
with the 114th Brigade and landed on the Don Muang airfield on 
September 7th, 1945. It began at once to prepare jetties for small 
vessels, accommodation for troops, and temporary camps to hold 
Japanese prisoners-of-war. 77 Field Company followed in October 
and was soon busy on water-supply and accommodation. 331 Field 
Park Company arrived on October 24th by sea, and 402 Field 
Company (Major O. M. R. Arnoll, R.E.), coming also by sea as part 
of the Forward Airfield Engineers, disembarked late in December. 

The employment of these units in and around Bangkok calls for 
no special remark, but the War Diary of 62 Field Company strikes 
an unusual note in the way of humour. ‘13th September. Moved 
into Bangkok itself. Guarding a dump and cutting grass on the Polo 
ground with Jap labour (with pen-knives). 2nd October. Officers’ 
latrine floated away on spring tide, but now riding safely at sea- 
anchor. 4th October. Japs on Polo ground have cut another two 
blades of grass, and the goal is well and truly wired in. 5th October. 
Polo ground nearly ready, but cannot be used because the only polo 
pony has died outside the entrance to H.Q., A.L.F., Siam. 9h 
October. Trades Havildar has painted a magnificent Madras Sapper 
crest for our main entrance. Our H.Q. Notice board also is SO 
splendid that twice we have been asked if this is H.Q., A.L.F., Siam, 
and who actually is this “Alfred Siam’? 13th-16th October. Making 
landing stages for I.S.Ts at Paknam. 1st November. Begin work on 
P.O.W. Camp in Bangkok. 6th November. Instructed to supply 
‘bangs’ on 11th to denote beginning and end of two minutes’ silence. 
7th November. Test ‘bang’ on Race Course so successful that 
Divisional H.Q. is said to be digging slit trenches. 11£h November. 





‘Golden Arrow. The Story of The 7th Indian Division, by Brig. M. R. Roberts, 
D.8.0., p. 267. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 449 


What a day! We got the wrong times for our ‘bangs’. The O.C. was 
simple enough to imagine that the attached Signal Section would 
have Signal time, and having marched a contingent to church, had to 
do a quick chukker around in a jeep to delay the bangs ten minutes. 
He just made it in time to lead the Sapper March Past. Ist December. 
Move for 89th Brigade Group imminent. 6fh-9th December. Bailey 
bridging over Menam River. Handed over to 77 Field Company on 
Oth. 12th December. Embarked in L.C.I. and transferred to ship. 
16th December. Landed at Port Swettenham, Malaya”’. 

On January | 1th, 1946, twenty-two Japanese Generals and Admirals 
surrendered their swords to Major-General G. C. Evans in Bangkok 
while similar ceremonies were held at outlying stations. In_ all, 
some thousands of swords were received. The troops on parade 
at the main ceremony included detachments from all Services under 
Brigadier E. H. W. Cobb, the 33rd Brigade Commander, who was. 
the senior Brigadier in the 7th Division. Cobb had assumed command 
of the 33rd Brigade on December 10th and remained in this appoint- 
ment until December 1946 when he went to England to join the 
Imperial Defence College.’ The high-ranking Japanese officers 
arrived on the parade ground under a strong escort of British 
officers. As each Japanese officer’s name was called he stepped for- 
ward, handed his sword to General Evans and marched to a flagstaff 
on which the Union Jack had been hoisted. He saluted the flag, 
bowed to it, and returned to his place. The effect on a large civilian 
crowd watching the ceremony was profound, for the proceedings 
emphasized the utter collapse of Japanese domination in the Far 
East. 

Its task completed, the greater part of the 7th Division began to 
leave Thailand in February 1946 to undertake internal security duties 
in Malaya. 62 Field Company had already departed with the 89th 
Brigade after building a fine Bailey bridge over the Menam River 
in Bangkok. 77 Field Company and 331 Field Park Company followed 
later, and 402 Field Company, of the Forward Airfield Engineers, 
reached Singapore from Thailand on March 30th for airfield work. 
62 Field Company was stationed at first near Kuala Lumpur but 
afterwards opened 81 miles of railway line from Kuala Lipis to 
Bertam. While in Bangkok, Major E. R. B. Hudson, O.C. 77 Field 
Company, was interested to meet Captain Hango, a Japanese officer 





1 Major-General E. H. W. Cobb, c.8., C.B.E., a most popular ex-Bengal Sapper 
and Miner, died on May 26th, 1955, as the result of an accident. 


450 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


who had commanded a Bridging Company of the 33rd Japanese 
Regiment and had reconnoitred the Sittang Bridge in Burma after 
our engineers had demolished it in 1942. For some months after 
the departure of the other units of the 7th Divisional Engineers, 
421 Field Company remained in Thailand with the 114th Brigade, 
but finally it moved in July 1946 to Malaya and was stationed at 
Kota Bahru on the north-east coast until it returned to India in 
March 1947. 

The occupation of Bangkok in September 1945 provided a re- 
fuelling base at the Don Muang airfield for aeroplanes flying further 
eastwards to French Indo-China. Saigon, the capital of that country, 
was known to be the headquarters of Field-Marshal Terauchi, the 
Japanese Supreme Commander in South-East Asia, and the task 
of occupying it and the surrounding territory was allotted to the 20th 
Indian Division, under Major-General D. D. Gracey, which included 
the 32nd, 80th and 100th Brigades. The Division was to remain 
in Indo-China until it was relieved by French troops from Europe, 
sending out parties to round up scattered Japanese forces and to 
guard bases, depots, dumps, airfields and ports. The Divisional Engi- 
neers, under Lieut.-Colonel R. A. G. Binny, R.E., comprised 92 Field 
Company (Bombay) under Major J. H. Clark, R.E., 422 Field Company 
(Madras) under Major L. S. Henderson, R.E., (who was succeeded 
by Major R. A. Loomba,R.1.E., on October 28th), 481 Field Company 
(Bombay) under Major J.P. A. Jackson, R.E., and 332 Field Park 
Company (Bengal) under Major P. B. Nicholls, R.E. When it was 
known that the Division was destined for Indo-China, many of the 
Sapper officers had begun to polish up their French, though with no 
great success, so it was fortunate that Colonel Binny could speak 
the language fluently. Later, when they met the local French 
officials, they were surprised to find how little was known about 
Indian nationalities, castes and creeds. To the French, all Indian 
troops were ‘‘Les Gurkhas” because of the preponderance of Gurkha 
battalions in the Division. Some of the Sappers were not amused, 
but nevertheless they accepted the name without protest. 

Saigon, 34 miles up the Saigon river, had wide boulevards, a cathe- 
dral, fine shops, modern office buildings, public gardens, clubs and 
several cinemas. In many respects it was quite Parisian, but adjoining 
it was the densely populated and rather squalid Chinese-Annamite 
quarter of Cholon which housed most of its 200,000 inhabitants. 
Waterways and canals, crowded with barges and sampans, intersected 
the place, while a couple of miles to the north was the main airfield 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 451 


which was still usable though it had been heavily bombed by 
American planes. The first arrivals by air were members of the R.A. 
P.W.I. organization to contact the Allied prisoners-of-war and inter- 
nees. After them came General Gracey and some of his Staff; also 
Colonel Binny and other Engineers and several members of a Control 
Commission. A battalion of Gurkhas followed. All were welcomed 
effusively by the French and entertained right royally. The Annamese 
were cold and distant. As in Java, they had been imbued by the 
Japanese with a militant spirit of nationalism; but they were more 
dangerous than the Indonesians because they were a warlike race 
and better armed and trained. Armed bands were often led by fana- 
tical Japanese officers who had refused to accept the surrender terms. 
At first, the Japanese, acting under British orders, were able to control 
the situation; but as the Annamese began to realize that the 20th 
Division had been sent to Indo-China not only to remove 70,000 
Japanese soldiers but also to reinstate the French, they became 
increasingly restive. The entire Annamite labour force vanished 
suddenly. All public services ceased to operate. Sniping began in the 
barricaded streets as Annamite bands attacked the French police. The 
Japanese, still armed, took no action until made to do so under British 
orders, and it seemed that Saigon would fare no better than Sourabaya. 
Anyone might be fired upon at any time. Under such circumstances 
Sapper work was not too easy and there were several narrow escapes. 
On one occasion, Major W. L. Lawler, an Australian Engineer who was 
Colonel Binny’s right hand man, was driving with another officer 
outside the city when the back of his car was suddenly riddled by 
machine-gun bullets. Though unarmed, ‘Lawler promptly got out, 
marched back to the firer, and told him in the broadest Australian 
a few home truths about his antecedents and ultimate destiny. Then 
he stalked back to the car, turned it round, and drove home past the 
gaping marksman while his companion removed a couple of bullets 
from the seat he was sitting on. 

It had been intended originally that the greater part of the 20th 
Division should be carried to Saigon by air; but because of bad weather 
and a shortage of aircraft, most of the troops and transport had to 
be sent by sea from Rangoon. However, 422 Field Company, the 
first Divisional Engineer unit to arrive, was given air transport. 
It was flown from Hmawbi Aerodrome, north of Rangoon, on Sep- 
tember 29th, 1945, while 92 Field Company was embarking with 
the transport of both units. The next to leave Rangoon by ship was 
332 Field Park Company which sailed on October 4th., and 481 Field 


452 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Company brought up the rear on October 10th. 92 Field Company 
landed at Saigon on October 7th, 332 Field Park Company on the 
11th, and 481 Field Company on the 17th. 92 Field Company carried 
out normal duties, mostly in the Cholon suburb, until it was ordered 
to Borneo on December 19th. 332 Field Park Company took over 
all Japanese Engineer stores and guarded dumps and camps until 
it was able to hand over charge to French reinforcements in January 
1946 and return to India. 481 Field Company was stationed at first 
in Cholon but soon moved with the 100th Brigade to Thu Duc, not 
far from the capital. There, on January 3rd, the Brigade headquarters 
were subjected to grenade and mortar bombardment by the rebels, 
so the Company was employed on demolishing a number of houses 
before it also embarked for India in the following month. 

Sapper detachments of 92 Field Company, detailed to guard and 
operate wells in the Cholon area, were often sniped at night and 
could never retaliate. Accordingly, permission was obtained to destroy 
the houses near any well where sniping had occurred. One afternoon, 
after some thatched huts had been set alight, a strong wind sprang up 
and part of Cholon quickly became a raging inferno. The panic- 
striken inhabitants blocked the streets as the conflagration spread, and 
it seemed that the whole suburb might be gutted and hundreds of lives 
lost. Attempts to check the fire with water-tank trucks, pumping sets 
and buckets proved futile; but fortunately the wind dropped suddenly 
and some rain extinguished the flames, though not before thousands 
of Annamese and Chinese had been rendered homeless. The in- 
cident provided a wholesome lesson to the peopje, and there was no 
more sniping near the wells while the Sappers were in charge. Apart 
from duty at the wells, 92 Field Company repaired roads, billets, 
and the watersupply and electric installations. It derived much 
assistance from a Japanese Engineer Regiment formed locally under 
Japanese officers. A Japanese D.C.R.E. was appointed and four 
Japanese Garrison Engineers, each with several Assistants who 
worked well under the direction of British or Indian Engineer officers 
acting in similar capacities. Colonel R. A. Loomba! writes that the 
Japanese proved obedient and efficient and displayed remarkable 
energy. Their main task was to repair and maintain the Saigon 


airfield, but their technicians were always available in an emergency 
to reinforce the Sapper tradesmen. 





‘Notes by Colonel R.A. Loomba, Engineers, dated August 14th, 1953. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 453 


Perhaps the best idea of Sapper experiences at Saigon can be 
obtained from the history of 422 Field Company written by Major 
D. W. McGrath, R.E. On September 19th, after two false starts, 
Colonel Binny, Major Lawler and a small party left Hmawbi Aero- 
drome in a plane carrying a load of watersupply equipment and the 
Company's pet dog. They refuelled at Bangkok and reached Saigon 
safely. ‘‘At first,’ writes McGrath, “‘everything was a shambles 
because the Annamese had gone on strike and the French were quite 
unable to handle the lighting and water systems. The Annamese were 
actively hostile, and the French, to safeguard themselves, had formed 
a body of armed auxiliary police who were very ‘trigger happy’ at 
night. As the French could not run the installations, we had to do so, 
and the day after our arrival two platoons were sent out to guard 
and operate various water-pumping stations dotted around Saigon 
and Cholon in particularly hostile areas. The Annamese were always 
on the watch to make life difficult, and on most nights parties of them 
used to creep towards the stations to throw grenades and fire at our 
men. In addition, they tampered with the electric lights by cutting the 
cables or firing at the porcelain insulators. The O.C. was appointed 
Garrison Engineer for the area with Lieuts. Jones and McGrath as 
A.G.Es. The main electric power stations were fast falling to pieces, 
so Lieut. Hindmoor was put in charge of repairs with a number of 
bricklayers and a Section of E & M. Sappers who had been flown 
in to look after the boilers and dynamos. Major Lawler, who 
operated the stations, was a brilliant electrical engineer and did wonders 
with the French, Indians and Japanese working under him although 
the available fuel consisted mostly of maize. There was abundant 
coal up-country, but armoured cars would have been needed to 
guard convoys bringing it to Saigon. The water-supply installation 
was in an appalling state. American bombing had broken most 
of the pipes and vast quantites of water were running to waste. At 
first, we could hardly cope with the work. Our transport had not yet 
arrived and we had only six Japanese lorries and three Staff cars. 
On October 12th, however, the transport turned up, and after the 
C.R.E. had organized a battalion of Jap Sappers to help us, the work 
was got under control. The Annamese were still hostile and it was 
impossible to go outside Saigon without a strong escort. The other 
two Brigades were further up-country. Saigon and Cholon were fairly 
quiet although some shooting went on at night. French troops had 
begun to arrive and fired a lot of ammunition. On October 28th, 
Major R.A. Loomba took over command from Major Henderson. 


454 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


He was an old friend to many of us who had passed through his 
hands at one time or another in Bangalore.” 

It was decided in November that, with the arrival of more French 
troops, the Japanese should be interned on Cap St. Jacques, a 
populated and fortified headland at the mouth of the Saigon River. A 
Sapper officer and a Staff officer went there in a Japanese gunboat to 
reconnoitre and were met by a Japanese deputation headed by an 
Admiral. They were bowed ashore, and after much heel-clicking and 
hissing intakes of breath by their late enemies, were driven in cars to 
the Grand Hotel where a sumptuous meal was ready. The Annamese 
had already demolished two reinforced concrete bridges on the road 
between Saigon and Cap St. Jacques along which the Japanese would 
have to march for internment, so 92 Field Company was detailed to 
repair the damage. The men and equipment were carried down the 
river in barges towed by a Japanese tug, and on arrival, the Sikhs 
were accommodated near the site of the work. The Mahrattas, 
however, were housed in the Grand Hotel, where the beds had the 
finest linen sheets and beautiful coverlets. Curtains shrouded the 
windows. Embroidered towels hung on brass rails. Never before 
had the rank and file enjoyed such luxury,.and they were most careful 
to keep their rooms as clean and tidy as possible. 

“Early in December’’, continues McGrath, ‘‘warning came that a 
French operation was about to take place against the Annamese 
north-west of Saigon for which the assistance of 422 Field Company 
would be required. Lieut. Hindmoor made an air reconnaissance 
on the 10th and saw that a 20-feet gap had been blown in the road, 
so No. 2 Platoon borrowed the Field Park Company’s prefabricated 
bridge of ready-made cribs, road bearers and decking and loaded it 
up, together with a bay of folding-boat equipment. The column left 
Saigon at 1.0 a.m. on December 15th. It consisted of armoured cars, 
armoured jeeps and four 30-cwt. trucks carrying infantry, with 
Hindmoor and No. 2 Platoon in the lead because the road was very 
narrow. Rain began to fall, and when the gap was reached at 2.45 a.m. 
it was found that the Annamese had already widened it to nearly 
50 feet. This ruled out the use of the Field Park bridge. A rope was 
therefore run across, and the infantry waded to the far side through 
three feet of water. There was some firing but not enough to cause 
trouble. While the Sappers were building a folding-boat raft, the 





_ *“Sappers and Miners in Saigon”, by Major J. H. Clark, m.c., R.E., appearing 
in The R. E. Journal, Sept. 1950, pp. 279-287. 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 455 


infantry sent back word that a bridge 300 yards further on had been 
damaged. The Annamese had ripped up the roadway and had tried to 
destroy the roadbearers. Here, the decking from the Field Park bridge 
proved valuable, and the Lance-Naik in charge of the work soon 
completed the necessary repairs. Seven armoured jeeps were first 
taken across at the ferry. They pushed on at once, followed in due 
course by the lorries. The armoured cars used a different route and 
rejoined the column later. Their work completed, thg Sappers were 
then sent back to Saigon while the French went on to take the 
objective. This was the first and only time that 422 Field Company 
co-operated with the French, and as always, the unit gave a good 
account of itself.” 

The 20th Divisional Engineers had only a short stay in French 
Indo-China because their services were urgently needed elsewhere, 
and the units were soon widely scattered when the Division was 
split up between Borneo, Celebes, Java and Malaya prior to returning 
to India for disbandment. As already recorded, 92 Field Company 
received orders on December 19th, 1945, to proceed to British North 
Borneo. It landed at Labuan with the 32nd Brigade on the 29th, 
after a voyage of 700 miles south-eastwards across the China Sea, 
and relieved 18 Field Company of the Royal Australian Engineers. 
Its duties in Borneo call for no special remark. On February 3rd, 
Major J. H. Clark, R.E., handed over command to Major H. E. 
Allison, R.E., under whom the Company sailed eventually for India 
on May 28th, 1946, after its embarkation orders had been altered no 
less than sixteen times! It reached India on June 8th, expecting to 
be disbanded; but instead its number was changed, and because 
of its war record, it was retained as one of the post-War units. 

The next to leave Saigon was 422 Field Company which embarked 
with the 80th Brigade on January 2Ist, 1946. Its destination was 
Macassar at the southern end of the octopus-shaped island of Celebes, 
south-east of Borneo. All vehicles were handed over to the French 
and all duties to 481 Field Company which was to remain in Indo- 
China for a time with the 100th Brigade. The 80th Brigade was under 
orders to relieve an Australian brigade in Celebes. An advance party 
of 422 Field Company started by air on January [1th and refuelled 
at Labuan. At a farewell parade in Saigon on the 14th, the Madras 
Sappers marched past the French General Leclerc at the head of 
the other troops and were much admired in their ‘Dupta’ fulldress 
head-gear. The voyage across the China Sea to Singapore was 
pleasant. After a halt of three days, it was continued until Celebes 


456 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


came in sight on January 31st in a rising gale. Threading a pre- 
carious way through a narrow passage in a coral reef, the ship came 
to anchor near some wharves behind which were clusters of palm 
trees and a number of buildings. ; 

Macassar was not looking its best under heavy rain, but it improved 
on acquaintance. The people were friendly, the roads good and the 
buildings modern. A platoon under Lieut. McGrath was sent at once 
to an airfield at Mandai, some ten miles inland, and found it in poor 
condition for it had been heavily bombed by Allied aircraft. Fifty- 
seven craters on the runway had been filled in roughly by the 
Australians, but they needed repair with graded stone and bitumen 
to secure a good surface. The stone was brought in trucks from a 
quarry seven miles away, and Javanese labour, imported by the 
Japanese,was employed on the airfield. This was the most important 
task undertaken by 422 Field Company in Celebes, though much 
was done also in Macassar itself in the way of repair. Conditions 
differed from those in Saigon in that the Dutch civilian organizations 
were in full operation and their engineers were prepared to carry out 
all major projects unaided. The island had belonged to the 
Netherlands ever since the Dutch had established trading centres there 
in the middle of the 17th Century, so its administration was based 
on sure foundations. The responsibilities of 422 Field Company 
were therefore confined chiefly to taking over a vast amount of stores 
from the Australians and issuing them from dumps, duties which 
would normally have devolved on 332 Field Park Company. The 
latter, however, was still in Saigon and under orders to return to 
India. On February 27th, the Mandai airfield was handed over to the 
Dutch and the detached platoon rejoined the Company in Macassar. 
The climate gradually became hotter and hotter, so it was fortunate 
that from April onwards it was possible to send large parties of men 
on short leave to Malino, a charming hill-station some forty miles 
inland. On May 22nd, Major Loomba had to be evacuated to Batavia, 
and afterwards, on account of illness, to India. The command of 
the unit then fell to Captain McGrath. Ata final parade in Macassar 
on July Ist, 422 Field Company headed the march past and immedi- 
ately afterwards embarked for India, where it was disbanded. It 
was the only Madras Sapper unit which had served both in French 
Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Meanwhile, 481 Field 
Company and 332 Field Park Company had sailed from Saigon on 
February 9th with the 100th Brigade. 481 Company arrived in 
Kirkee on the 19th expecting to be disbanded, but because of its 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 457 


war record it was retained on the establishment under a new 
number. 

Yet another post-War operation in which the Indian Engineers 
were concerned was the re-occupation of Hongkong, the British 
base on the southern coast of China about 1,500 miles north of 
Singapore. The tragic story of the fall of Hongkong on Christmas 
Day, 1941, has been outlined in Chapter VII, though no‘units of the 
Corps were involved in that major disaster. After the collapse of 
Japan, a mixed force of all arms under Major-General F. W. Festing 
was detailed for the re-occupation and sailed from Madras at the 
beginning of November 1945. With it was 96 Field Company (Bom- 
bay), under Major G. B. Dawson, R.E. The expedition reached Hong- 
kong about November 19th and the troops relieved some Australians 
and Royal Navy contingents already ashore. The Sappers began at 
once to repair the extensive damage to roads, bridges, docks and water 
and electric installations. On February | !th, 1946, Major K. H. St. C. 
Pringle, R.E. ,succeeded Major Dawson in command, and at the end 
of March, Major-General P. A. Ullman, Chief Engineer, A.L.F.S.E.A. 
arrived on a visit of inspection. The remainder of 1946 was spent on 
normal duties including the erection of a hutted camp at San Wai, 
the Company being stationed in Kam Tsin, a part of the Hongkong 
Colony. In the middle of January 1947, Major-General G. W. E. J. 
Erskine succeeded Major-General Festing as G.O.C. Hong ng 
Garrison. 96 Field Company continued to work at the San Wai 
site until warned in March that it would shortly leave for India. 
The actual date proved to be April 6th, when the unit embarked with 
other troops. Landing at Madras on April 16th it returned to 
Kirkee, where it was disbanded in July 1947 after a very adventurous 
career. 

The culminating triumph of the Allies in the Far East was the occu- 
pation of Japan itself, a task which was allotted to a cosmopolitan 
force under the American General MacArthur. This representative 
body of many nationalities had not only to destroy Japan’s capacity 
to make war but also to inculcate democratic principles into a hither- 
to autocratic regime. Wisely enough, disarmament was facilitated by 
permitting the Japanese Government to co-operate and by main- 
taining the prestige of the Emperor. The Government rapidly dis- 
solved its General Headquarters and disarmed and demobilized the 
naval, military and air forces stationed in the country. Forces out- 
side Japan were dealt with by the local Allied Commanders and the 
men sent back to Japan as soon as possible to resume civilian life. 


458 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


The task of abolishing the armed forces was completed within a few 
months, but the process of instilling democratic ideas was a long one, 
Although General MacArthur’s Occupation Force was chiefly 
American, it included a British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
(B.C.O.F.) of 35,000 men, commanded by an Australian, Lieut.- 
General J. Northcott. Australia supplied 11,000 men, Great Britain 
nearly 10,000, India about 9,600, and New Zealand about 4,400, 
Great Britain and India being represented by a British-Indian Division 
under Major-General D. T. (“‘Punch’’?) Cowan, famed for his ex- 
ploits in command of the 17th Indian Division in Burma during 
the war. 

The British-Indian Division destined for Japan was known at 
first as ‘“Brinjap’’. It was to have one Indian and one British brigade, 
with Divisional troops, and was to be formed from selected units 
of the 36th Indian and 2nd British Divisions. In August 1945, it began 
to’ assemble at Nasik. The 268th Indian Infantry Brigade, under 
Brigadier K.S. Thimayya, was selected to represent the Indian Army, 
its battalions being the 5/Ist Punjabis, 1st Mahrattas and 2/5th Royal 
Gurkhas. Brigadier Thimayya was well suited by personality and 
reputation for the responsible post he was called upon to fill in Japan 
having represented his country at the surrender ceremony at Singapore 
afteg leading the Brigade in strenuous fighting during the closing 
states of the campaign in Arakan. The British Army was represented 
by the 5th British Brigade comprising the 2nd Dorsets, Ist Queens 
Own Cameron Highlanders and 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers. Among 
the Divisional troops were the 7th Light Cavalry (Indian Armoured 
Corps) and 16th Indian and 30th British Field Batteries. The Divisional 
Engineers, with Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Calvert, R.E., as C.R.E., 
included 5 Field Company, R.E., 21 Field Park Company, R.E., 
429 Field Company, R.I.E., and 907 Indian Works Section. 

429 Field Company (Madras), under Major G. W. Pinto, R.E., 
arrived in camp near Nasik on September 16th, 1945, very happy 
to rejoin the 268th Brigade with which it had served during the war. 
The date of departure for Japan was postponed twice; but even- 
tually, on February 9th, 1946, a small advance party left India 
by air and landed a week later at Kure at the southern end 
of the Japanese island of Honshu. A contingent of 1,600 men 
Started by sea and reached Kure on March Ist. 429 Field Company 
was with this party, and disembarking on March 2nd, provided the 
first Indian guard on Japanese soil. It moved at once into billets 
at Hiro and began to prepare accommodation for the main body 


MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 459 


which was expected shortly. Japanese labour was available, though 
it was not very satisfactory because the workmen had been treated 
too generously by the 24th American Division already in occupation. 
The greater part of the main body arrived in two echelons, the first 
on April 5th and the second on May 19th. They had been preceded 
by Major-General Cowan who was received by a Guard of Honour 
from 5 Field Company, R.E., and 429 Field Company, R.I.E., 
when he landed from the S.S. Dunera on March 25th, a few days 
before the disembarkation of the 268th Brigade. The scene in Kure 
was one of extraordinary desolation. Large Japanese warships lay 
aground, wrecked and abandoned, while all naval structures on Kure 
Island and along the Inland Sea were mere masses of twisted steel. 
As Brigadier Thimayya stepped ashore he remarked ‘“‘We are sorry 
to have left India at this stage of political change, but the Indian 
Army has definitely earned a share in the honour of the occupation 
of Japan and we are looking forward to happy associations with the 
Empire and other Allied troops.”’ His anticipations were fulfilled. 
Before they quitted the country, the Indian soldiers stood high in 
the estimation of all the Allied forces and of the Japanese 
population. 

The designation of the British-[ndian Division had now been 
altered to ‘“‘Brindiv’’. Empire Day was celebrated in Tokyo on May 
22nd when General Northcott took the salute at a great parade of 
the Commonwealth Forces. On June 4th, after three months in Hiro, 
the headquarters of ‘‘Brindiv’’ were transferred to Okayama, 100 
miles further east, where arrangements had been made to take over 
charge from the 24th American Division. General Northcott was 
under orders to return to Australia to become Governor of 
New South Wales and was succeeded in the command of the Common- 
wealth Occupation Force by Lieut.-General H. C. H. Robertson, 
another Australian. During May and June 1946, additional units 
of the Royal Indian Engineers set foot in Japan. These were 363 
Field Company (Bombay), under Major R. P. Rocke, R.E., which 
landed at Kure on May 1[9th, and three Mechanical Equipment 
units of the Bengal Group.’ C.R.E. “Brindiv’’ had charge of all 
works in the Okayama area, with a D.C.R.E. posted at Shimono- 
seki at the extreme end of Honshu Island. An Australian C.R.E. 


? 653 Indian Mechanical Equipment Company, and 705 and 709 Indian Mechanical 
Equipment Platoons. 


460 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


was in charge of the atom-bombed Hiroshima district some 40: 
miles north-west of Kure. 

Early in July 1946, Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Calvert, R.E., was in- 
valided to India and Lieut.-Colonel H. Carrington Smith, R.E., became 
C.R.E. “Brindiv’’. The Sapper units were very busy, and in a work- 
shop at Okayama, 120 Japanese helped the tradesmen of 429 Field 
Company. Most of the building work was undertaken by Japanese 
contractors under the supervision of 907 Works Section while the 
subalterns of the Engineer Field Units acted as Garrison Engineers. 
429 Field Company, however, undertook the reconstruction of the 
Operating Theatre for the Military Hospital and the erection of 
a number of huts. It also improved an airfield and began to make 
Squash and Tennis courts for the Officers’ Club and six playing fields 
for other ranks. In October it had to prepare a tented camp and start 
operations to shift the hospital to a new centre. The Company did 
well in a number of Athletic Sports Meetings during the autumn, 
and when wintry conditions set in, took its full share in ceremonial 
military duties. For instance, on December 2nd, a large party was 
was sent to Tokyo to join the 5/Ist Punjab Regiment in Ceremonial 
Guard employment and mounted guards on December 6th in the 
Canadian Legation and the British Embassy. On January Ist, 
1947, another detachment mounted a guard at the Imperial Palace 
itself, and late in March, still another provided a guard at the Palace 
on no less than three occasions. The ‘‘Dupta”’ head-dress was worn 
and attracted much interest. 

The winter of 1946-47 was marked by an earthquake, no uncommon 
event in Japan. On December 21st, at 4.0 a.m., there were severe 
tremors at Okayama, lasting for five minutes. All barracks were 
evacuated forthwith, and 429 Field Company remained in the 
open till dawn. Happily, there were no casualties among the troops, 
though many buildings were damaged and fifty civilians were killed 
or injured. For the next two days the Company was employed in restor- 
ing the electricity and water-supplies; but apart from this interruption, 
the normal work of the unit continued steadily. On January 23rd, 
an 80-feet Bailey bridge was launched and completed at Kachimura 
on the road from Okayama to Imbe. This was the first Bailey to 
be built in Japan. It was constructed over an existing Japanese 
bridge which was incapable of carrying tank-transporters. 

Early in January 1947, the command of the 268th Brigade passed 
to Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh in relief of Brigadier K. S. Thimayya 
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MALAYA, THE EAST INDIES AND THE FAR EAST 461 


“Brindiv” was now dwindling rapidly in strength owing to the 
departure of men released from service, and in February the entire 
5th (British) Brigade sailed for Malaya. It was decided, therefore, 
that the units of “Brindiv” still in Japan should be formed into a 
268th Indian Infantry Brigade Group under the command of an 
Indian Officer, and on March 12th, 1947, Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh 
took over from Major-General D. T. Cowan who left Japan shortly 
afterwards. ‘“‘Brindiv’” was officially dissolved on May Ist. It had 
fulfilled its obligations to the letter and had made a lasting impression 
in the country. 

The transfer of 5 Field Company, R.E., to Singapore in the middle 
of February 1947 threw an additional strain on the depleted 363 
and 429 Field Companies of the Royal Indian Engineers. On April 
17th, 429 Field Company had to be reorganized on a basis of only 
three Sections to a Platoon owing to the departure of large drafts 
to India. Work became increasingly difficult because of a shortage 
of materials and mechanical equipment. The clock was running 
down. Yet although all eyes were turned homewards, the standard 
of accomplishment in work and play was not allowed to suffer. 
Brigade Sports on July 12th enlivened the proceedings, and on August 
15th, Independence Day was celebrated in proper style. It had been 
decided already that the Indian Contingent in Japan should shortly 
be withdrawn, and with the departure of Brigadier Shrinagesh to 
Australia on August 18th to represent India on a Japanese Peace 
Conference, the command of the 268th Brigade Group devolved 
on the O.C. 5/1st Punjab Regiment. 363 Field Company embarked 
for India on September 14th, and 429 Field Company and 653 
Mechanical Equipment Company on October 20th. The two Mecha- 
nical Equipment Platoons followed early in November. 429 Field 
Company had the honour of being the last Engineer Field unit to 
leave Japan just as it had been the first to land. It disembarked at 
Madras on November 16th and moved to Bangalore for dis- 
bandment. As Major-General Shrinagesh afterwards remarked, 
it had worthily upheld the traditions of the Madras Sappers while 
serving under his command. 

By 1947, the spheres of activity of the Royal Indian Engineers 
in the Far East were reduced to Japan, Hongkong and Malaya, most of 
the engineering work being in the Federated Malay States and on 
Singapore Island. 3 Field Company (Bengal) was sent to Malaya 
in the spring and returned to India before the end of the year. In 
March 1947, the Madras Group was represented in Malaya by 62, 


462 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


63, 421 and 425 Field Companies, 325 and 331 Field Park Com- 
panies and 1019 Bridging Platoon. 63 and 421 Field Companies 
and the Bridging Platoon embarked for India in the summer, leaving 
62 Field Company under Major J. H. Trigg, R.E., at Kluang, 425 
Field Company under Major G. A. P.N. Barlow, R.E., inthe Cameron 
Highlands, 325 Field Park Company under Major J. R. Radford, R.E., 
at Taiping, and 331 Field Park Company under Major G. W. Shaw, 
R.E., at Tampin; and of these units, 425 Field Company and 325 
Field Park Company left for disbandment in the middle of September. 
Thus the exodus from Malaya was fairly general. The Military Works 
Services and the Public Works Department could cope with 
most of the work, and the employment of Field units was rarely 
necessary. The only hostile elements in the country were the bandits 
who gave so much trouble in later years; but in 1947 they were too 
poorly armed and organized to cause much harm. 

With the declaration of Indian Independence on August 15th, 
1947, there could no longer be any justification for the retention 
of Indian Army units in areas over which the new Republic had no 
jurisdiction. The Indian Army was being depleted by the departure 
of thousands of Mahomedan soldiers to Pakistan: thousands more 
were in the process of demobilization. India itself was in an un- 
settled condition owing to the sudden nature of the partition. Engi- 
neering works and repairs, postponed during the war, demanded 
urgent attention. Every available pair of hands was needed to restore 
the country to its pre-War prosperity, and the services of every experi- 
enced officer were required to train recruits to replace the soldiers 
who had fought so well in many campaigns. India possessed no 
far-flung Empire, though she wisely elected to remain within the 
British Commonwealth of Nations. She proceeded, therefore, to 
concentrate her strength and build up her resources, and with such 
remarkable success that she was soon able to play her full part in 
world politics as a first class Independent Power. 


CHAPTER XV 
INDIA, 1944 - 47 


: HILE Indian Engineer units in great numbers were fighting 
Wine Germans in Italy and the Japanese in Burma, the work 

during 1944 at the three Group Headquarters in India, and 
indeed wherever the training of Engineer troops was being carried 
out, was heavy and unceasing. The Groups, which in 1939 were 
of battalion strength, now bore more resemblance to whole divisions. 
Yet the Commandants were still Colonels, and most of their officers 
held only temporary commissions. The responsibilities of the few 
Regular officers at the head of affairs were such that it was a marvel 
that they could be borne. Nevertheless, trained unit after trained 
unit was despatched to the battle fronts in a seemingly endless stream 
by a process of grinding toil which offered few prospects of honour 
and none of glory. 

The complexities of the changes in the organization and admini- 
stration of the Indian Army during 1944 and 1945 can find no place 
in this narrative. They are recorded fully in official documents. An 
outline can, however, be given of particular events and life in general 
at the headquarters of the Engineer Groups during the later stages 
of the war, and afterwards up to the partition from Pakistan, in order 
to supplement the details of earlier happenings included in Chapter I. 
This outline is based chiefly on letters written by officers who 
were serving at that time and on the brief histories of the Madras 
and Benga! Groups compiled by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell and 
Lieutenant G. Pearson. Some light is thrown also on the course of 
events by entries in War Diaries and by the News Letters of the 
three Groups, although the letters were necessarily subject to strict 
censorship while hostilities lasted. 

It was fortunate that, from 1944 onwards, the North-West Frontier 
gave little trouble except in Waziristan. There, the Faqir of Ipi was 
still actively hostile and disciplinary measures were occasionally 
needed. Most of these were trivial in comparison with those entailed 
by the rigid maintenance of the ‘Forward Policy” of former years, 
although at one time in 1946 plans were made to send two divisions 
into the Mahsud country. The Engineer units on*the Frontier, 


463 


464 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


together with the Military Engineer Services, had carried out an 
extensive programme of fortification, and the tribes were heavily 
subsidized. The powerful fortress of Razmak still dominated 
Waziristan.! Police forces, raised from the tribes, were gaining 
experience and becoming more reliable. The country had good 
roads which carried a considerable amount of motor traffic. Provided 
that Japan was defeated and Russia remained friendly, the tribes- 
men might hope to attain ultimately some form of self-government. 
All this should have contributed towards a more peaceful attitude. 
But the seeds of trouble still remained, and at the end of 1946, when 
communal tension was rising, a small expedition had to be launched 
against a gang of Hazaras. This was the last Frontier operation 
under British command. 

The Hazaras had raided Oghi, some 45 miles north-west of 
Abbotabad, where there were many Hindu traders. They burnt and 
pillaged the village, and as the ringleaders remained obdurate, it 
became necessary to despatch the 20th Brigade of the 7th Indian 
Division, with some medium artillery and tanks, to bring them to 
book.2. The Indian Engineer units stationed at Peshawar and 
Nowshera were | Field Company (Bengal), 27 Field Company 
(Bombay) and 64 Field Company (Madras), but those chiefly employed 
during the operation belonged to the 7th Divisional Engineers, 
under Lieut.-Colonel H. C. W. Eking, R.E., located at Rawalpindi 
and Campbellpore. They comprised 5 Field Company (Bengal), 
10 and 13 Field Companies (Madras), and 41 Field Park Company 
(Bengal). The route between Abbotabad and Oghi was kept open 
by 1 Field Company, but the weather soon broke and the road and 
the camp at Oghi became seas of mud. This was serious because 
the 20th Brigade was dependent almost wholly on wheeled transport. 
As the weather deteriorated, the truculence of the Hazaras increased, 
for they imagined that their lair in the hills overlooking Oghi would 
be beyond the reach of artillery fire. It was decided, therefore, to 





» Razmak was abandoned in December 1947 after 5,000 tons of equipment and 
stores had been evacuated along 73 miles of road. This was the first major military 
Operation undertaken by the Pakistan Army. The garrison comprised a Brigade 
Group under Brigadier R. S. Steed and included 31 Assault Field Company and 68 
Field Company, Royal Pakistan Engineers. The withdrawal was unopposed, though 
hampered by bitter cold. (See “Operation Curzon—The Evacuation of Waziristan”, 


by Lieut.-Colonel H.E.M. Cotton, 0.3.2. R E., appeari i 
.E.M. , 0.B.E., R.E., rin The R.E. Journal, 
September 1948, pp. 183-196). ee 2 


* Notes by Major-General C. de L. Gaussen, C.B., M.C., dated May 17th, 1955. 


INDIA, 1944 - 47 465 


build an approach track for jeeps and guns towards their hide-out, 
a project involving a length of 10} miles of track and an ascent of 
2,000 feet. Most of the excavation was done by working parties of 
infantry; but it was the bulldozers of the Divisional Engineers that 
enabled the track to be finished in less than three weeks. It might 
have been completed even more rapidly if adequate information 
about the area and proper large-scale maps had been available. The 
tribesmen realized that the guns would soon be able to command 
their positions, so their representatives came into Oghi on January 
18th, 1947, to give assurances of good conduct and arrange for the 
payment of a fine. The expedition affords a good example of the 
change in Frontier tactics brought about by the mechanization of 
Engineer equipment. 

Although parts of the North-West Frontier remained comparatively 
undisturbed by the turmoil in Northern India which preceded and 
followed the partition from Pakistan, the same could hardly be 
said of Waziristan. On April 15th, 1947, severe rioting broke out 
in Dera Ismail Khan and large areas of the city were burnt. Fire 
threatened the wheat market which supplied the whole of Waziristan, 
and it was only through the energetic action taken by a few Royal 
Engineer Officers and a small detachment of Indian infantry that 
order was restored and the conflagration limited by cutting fire- 
lanes. The garrison of Tonk reported a shortage of water because 
tribesmen had seized the headworks of the supply line which lay in 
tribal territory. This crisis was dealt with by a detachment of 9 
Field Company from Razmak, 8 miles of pipe-line being laid from 
an irrigation channel in 5 days.! All energies were then directed to 
evacuating the Hindu and Sikh employees in Government service. 
Communications broke down. Every road and every track was 
covered by armed parties of Mahsuds and Wazirs, and the only safe 
route was by air. The 1/4th Gurkhas, marching in from Wana, 
were ambushed in September 1947 in the notorious Shahur Tangi 
and lost nearly fifty men. Aircraft of all types, however, had been 
flying for some time from the airfields at Dera Ismail Khan and 
Bannu, and thus hundreds of non-combatants were saved. 

Turning back now to events further south, it may be recorded 
that during the last two years of the war, the Madras, Bengal and 
Bombay Groups of the Indian Engineers expanded to enormous 
dimensions. Then they began to diminish in size as ultimate victory 


1 Notes by Lieut.-Colonel A. F. Toogood, R.E., dated August 8th, 1955. 


466 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


became assured. Training for active service did not, however, account 
for the whole effort. In the autumn of 1943, for instance, four 
Companies of the Madras Corps were sent to Bengal to help in 
coping with a famine. Yet the most important tasks were certainly 
expansion and training. In August 1943, two Training Divisions 
had been formed. These were the 14th Indian Division with head- 
quarters at Chindwara in the Central Provinces and the 39th Indian 
Division located at Saharanpur in the United Provinces. To one 
or other of these Divisions, the Engineer Groups sent small parties 
of recruits who had already completed their initial training at head- 
quarters. The men were attached to Indian Engineer units serving 
with the Divisions and finished their training under the guidance of 
experienced instructors. Working in conjunction with other arms, 
they soon became first-class jungle fighters and were able to give 
a good account of themselves when transferred to the Burma front. 
Events in Bangalore during 1943 and 1944 are summarised as 
follows by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell.1. In October 1943, a Boys 
Battalion had been formed under Major E. C. Aldous, R.E., while 
Colonel M. M. Jeakes was Commandant of the Centre. This was 
an important innovation although Boys had actually been recruited 
and trained on a small scale since 1941. Towards the end of the 
year, the training of recruits in the three existing Training Battalions 
at the Bangalore headquarters was finally standardized. The men 
received their basic military and field engineering training in Nos. l 
or 2 Training Battalions and were afterwards posted to No. 3 
Training Battalion for instruction in trades. Outstanding men were 
selected as junior N.C.Os. and given special training before being 
posted to units in the field. The ordinary recruit was sent to one 
or other of the Training Divisions on leaving No. 3 Battalion. In 
the Boys Battalion, the lads were given an intensive training in trades 
for a period of eighteen months, supplemented by some general 
education. They then joined No. 3 Training Battalion for six or 
seven months’ recruit training before being posted to units. Although 
this system produced a steady flow of reinforcements it was found 
to be not altogether satisfactory and was improved at a later date. 
The Bangalore Centre continued to provide instructional courses 
for V.C.Os, and N.C.Os., and much attention was devoted to mecha- 
nical transport training. All these activities were noted in December 














‘A Short History of Q.V's O. Madras Sappers and Miners during World War II, 
1939-1945, by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., pp. 75-77. 


INDIA, 1944-47 467 


1943 by Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Charles, the Chief Royal Engineer, 
during a war-time tour of India where he had served for several 
years with the Bengal Sappers before the First World War. 

The Bangalore News Letter was revived in July 1944 after a lapse 
of nearly five years. The writer of the first letter mentions with 
pride the George Cross awarded posthumously to Subedar 
Subramaniam for his outstanding gallantry in Italy and records 
that the Subedar’s widow had received a personal message from the 
Governor of Madras and a grant of Rs. 7,500 which was supple- 
mented by another of Rs. 5,000 from the War Fund.) ‘Recruits 
training goes on as hard as ever’’, runs the letter, “‘and the new 
recruits are still of good physical standard on the whole. The Boys 
Battalion is full, and it is good to see the keenness displayed by the 
young entry. The boys (16 to 174) do about 18 months’ training, at 
the end of which time most of them have got an Artificer trade rating 
and a 3rd Class School Certificate. They are then mustered as 
Sappers and do a further seven months in the Young Soldiers 
Company. In February they had their Annual Sports: also their 
Boxing Tournament, the results of which were encouraging. Our 
Colonel, Brigadier R. C. R. Hill, has presented a shield to the 
Battalion as a boxing trophy, and we are entering a team for the 
All India Boxing Competition.” A new Hindu Temple was opened 
in the Meeanee Lines on April 7th, 1944, the foundation stone of 
which had been laid on October 16th, 1942, by Colonel J. F. D. 
Steedman who was then Commandant. The Madras Centre had 
received a visit on April 6th from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, 
Commander-in-Chief, India. In September 1944 the strength of 
the Madras Group was 616 Officers, 237 British Warrant and N. C. 
Officers, 466 V.C.Os, 31,710 I.O.Rs and 2,555 Followers, and there 
were 97 units. The Engineer Officers’ Training School (formerly 
O.C.T.U.) had expanded greatly. There were now 13 Officer Instructors 
and so many trainees that they had to be accommodated in tents 
crowded round the Mess. A Jungle Training Camp, started at 
Shimoga in 1942, provided a splendid testing ground for future 
officers and N.C.Os. during a four weeks’ course. The Indian 





10QOn October 24th, 1944, the widow was escorted to Delhi by the Commandant 
and a Guard of Honour to receive the George Cross from the Viceroy. 

2 The maximum strength was attained shortly after the defeat of Japan in 1945 
when there were 667 Officers, 217 B.W. & N.C.Os, 607 V.C.Os, 30,630 I.O.Rs. and 
2,898 Followers in 101 units. The maximum figure for Indian ranks in the First World 
War was 7,029. The comparison is worth noting. 


468 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Families Hospital was flourishing, and a Womens’ Club had been 
started for the wives of Indian ranks where dressmaking was practised 
and lectures were given. 

In January 1945, the Boys Battalion at Bangalore moved from 
the Clive Lines into a camp at Jalahalli near a Signals Camp where 
there was a workshop in which the lads could be trained. A boxing 
team was sent to Delhi and reached the semi-finals of the All-India 
Boys Championship. After the defeat of Japan in September, demo- 
bilization preparations absorbed the attention of one and all. The 
Madras Centre was then commanded by Colonel M. M. Jeakes. 
Lieut.-Colonels G. D. S. Adami and J. A. Cameron, R.E., were 
Assistant Commandants. Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell, R.E., was 
O.C. Training Wing; Lieut.-Colonel I. B. C. Taylor, R.E., commanded 
the Depot Wing, and other senior appointments were filled by Majors 
J. R. Henchy, J. H. Partridge, R. L. Forbes and R. N. Edwards, 
R.E. The first task was to form a Demobilization Centre and evolve 
an efficient system of working. This was accomplished in a fort- 
night. Hand in hand with the arrangements for the new Centre 
went those needed for giving Resettlement training to men about 
to be thrown on the world without adequate means of earning their 
living. Many trades and occupations were taught such as weaving, 
calico printing, lacquer work, basket making and pottery manu- 
facture. Instruction in farming was given in a Group Farm started 
some time before by Colonel Jeakes. On September Ist, the Centre 
was visited by Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, and eleven 
days later, a parade was held to celebrate the re-occupation of 
Singapore, on which occasion the Colonel of the Madras Corps, 
Brigadier R. C. R. Hill, took the salute at a march past. November 
1945 saw the formation of a Madras Sapper Officers’ Association 
and a launching of a Group Memorial Fund. The Boys Boxing 
Team went to Delhi and reached the finals. No. 3 Training Battalion 
was abolished before the end of the year, being merged into No. | 
Battalion, and this in turn was combined with No. 2 Battalion to 
form a single Training Battalion. The war being finished and Malaya 
re-occupied, large drafts of reinforcements were no longer needed. 

While the Madras Centre was engaged in these various activities 
during 1944-45, the Bengal Centre at Roorkee was equally industrious. 
Referring to 1944, Lieut. G. Pearson writes:—! “With field units 


' Brief History of the K.G.V sO. Be i u 
.G, . Bengal Sappers and Miners G R.LE., August 
1939-July 1946, by Lieut. G. Pearson, R.E., pp. 88-91. aii ° 


INDIA, 1944-47 469 


distinguishing themselves in action, Roorkee was busy with great 
quantities of work necessary to keep so many units supplied with 
men. Training continued in the light of the experiences of particular 
Companies, and a constant movement of officers and men in and 
out of the Centre was some indication of the growth of the Group. 
In March 1944, a peak of 23,850 men was reached, representing a 
seven-fold expansion of the pre-War strength. Early in this year, 
the Benga! Group was able to assist in the establishment of a School 
of Military Engineering (India) at Roorkee, and many of its courses 
were subsequently attended by officers of the Group. Within the 
Group, jungle training had become a fine art, and a Battle School 
flourished with a great deal of realism. The Bengal Sappers were 
particularly associated with the activities of the 39th Training Division 
which by 1944 was settled near-by. Some Field Companies were 
maintained on the North-West Frontier, and officers were supplied 
for the various Engineer Training Centres at Jhansi, Meerut and 
Nowshera. Men of the Group were engaged in operations with the 
Chindits in Burma; and others, who had long been patient, were 
encouraged by the prospect of an Airborne Division taking them 
into action. The Group had two companies with the 39th Training 
Division. These, originally with the 14th Division, were 367 Field 
Company and 306 Field Park Company. They were Training Com- 
panies. Platoons, complete with V.C.Os and N.C.Os, were sent out 
from the Reinforcement Battalion at Roorkee and did nine weeks’ 
training. A week was spent in watermanship and improvised jungle 
rafting on the Ganges, and the last two weeks were devoted to 
tactical and Engineer schemes in the jungle with platoons of other 
Field Companies. This system continued until April 1945. 33 Field 
Squadron and 40 Field Park Squadron were among the units of the 44th 
Armoured Division detailed in 1943 to defend the east coastal ports 
in the event of a Japanese invasion of India. By April 1944, however, 
the danger was past and the 44th Division was broken up, only a 
skeleton force being left for subsequent expansion into an Airborne 
Division. Early in 1945, 40 Field Park Squadron returned to Roorkee 
to re-form for airborne work. There had been rumours in 1944 
that 33 Field Squadron was going to become a Parachute Squadron, 
but in July it was armoured again. In September, however, orders 
were received for immediate conversion to an airborne role. Inten- 
sive physical training was begun, and there was tremendous enthu- 
siasm for jumping. The training was for an actual operation in 
Burma. Again there was disappointment, as the operation, and 


470 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


another which was planned later, were not required. This was the 
nearest that the Squadron got to going to the war. It was a tale 
of hope deferred.” 

At the beginning of 1944, there were three Training Battalions 
at Roorkee, and in March a Depot Wing was formed which included 
Reinforcement, Specialist, Depot and Demobilization Battalions. 
There was also a flourishing Boys Battalion which had begun its 
existence early in 1942. So great was the demand for men that the 
training period for recruits had been reduced in 1943 to only nine 
months and ended with the completion of a Field Works course. 
The men underwent a strenuous course in the Battle School before 
being posted to units. Two O.C.T.Us were located in Roorkee, for 
which the Bengal Group had to provide Instructors and Staff. In 
these institutions, cadets were trained for about seven months in 
engineering subjects before being posted as officers to Engineer 
Groups. The Roorkee News Letter of January 1944, the last to be 
issued for two years, describes some events at the Centre. ‘““The 
S.M.E., India, is now located in part of the Thomason College and 
has made an interesting addition to the atmosphere of Roorkee. In 
November last, the Chief Royal Engineer and Colonel of the Corps, 
Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Charles, visited us for four days and we 
did our best to entertain him. He saw all stages of our training, 
met those still] in Roorkee who had served with him when he was 
in the Corps, visited the Sergeants’ and V.C.Os’ Messes, the Knox 
Memorial School and the Indian Families Hospital, and dined in 
the Mess, Our proudest moment was the Ceremonial Parade of the 
whole Corps on the Corps Parade Ground at which our Colonel 
was accompanied by Lieut.-General Sir Clarence Bird, a Colonel- 
Commandant, R.E., and an ex-Bengal Sapper and Miner. The entire 
ground was covered with troops, and the inspection from a jeep 
took 93 minutes along the front ranks only. After nearly 34 years 
in Roorkee, Colonel H. N. Obbard has left us for G.H.Q. and 
Colonel W. L. D. Veitch has returned as Commandant.” 

The conditions of life at the Bengal Centre during 1945 are des- 
enitee by Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Connor.' “In March”, he writes, 
‘I returned from Burma to become Assistant Commandant (Training). 
I had been away three years, during which the face of Roorkee had 
ee enormously. There were two Messes, each filled almost 

0 overflowing. The hours of work were very long. The hot weather 


a a ak pe 


‘ Notes by Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Connor, c.n.z., R.E., dated Jan. 30th, 1955. 


INDIA, 1944-47 47} 


programme was 6.30 a.m. to 2.0 p.m. with a break from 8.15 to 
9.15 a.m., and then from 4.30 to 6.15 p.m., so there was hardly any 
time for relaxation. The end of the war in Europe made little difference 
to us except that a few British officers were allowed to go home as 
replacements arrived. The main expansion had been completed and 
the number of recruits was gradually dropping. This eased life a 
bit; but demobilization plans were in the offing and no one knew 
what was likely to happen in either the military or political fields. 
With the end of the war against Japan, and the return of troops 
from East and West, we had a very busy life and so felt rather guilty 
when we stopped the evening parade and resumed some peace-time 
activities such as Athletic Meetings and Games. During the cold 
weather of 1945-46, I managed to visit the jheels fairly frequently. 
They had changed for the worse since 1942. The Solani was flowing 
through Panchli Jheel, which had silted up, and later off southwards 
in one of its old beds, and the jheels which remained would take 
only four or five guns. Polo had died out in 1940-41 and was not 
resurrected; but a few horses were still in evidence and ran some- 
times in small race meetings on parts of the College Maidan which 
had not been built over.” 

Brigadier R. E. Holloway, who returned to Roorkee in 1945, 
corroborates much that Lieut.-Colonel Connor records.1 He found 
that the characteristic feature of the years 1945-47 in the Bengal 
Centre was a feeling of impermanence. In the effort to do their 
best, everyone worked at the highest pressure. The circumstances 
were rendered more difficult by the release and repatriation of many 
British Officers, although most of these held only temporary commis- 
sions and could not adapt themselves easily to peace-time conditions. 
There was a scarcity of almost every commodity—food, drink, 
clothes and cartridges—and what could be obtained was very expen- 
sive. Good servants also were rare. The Commandant and his 
Assistants were overwhelmed with correspondence and the details 
of a complex administration. The men, when off duty, had to walk 
out in uniform because Hindustani clothing was obtainable only at 
a prohibitive cost. The average Sapper, however, was more intelligent 
than his pre-War counterpart. He spent more, but in return he expec- 
ted more in the way of food, recreation and welfare generally. His 
family was already discarding the purdah, and the Commandant was 
always sure of a warm welcome when touring the family quarters or 





1 Notes by Brigadier R. E. Holloway, c.B.£., dated Feb, 7th, 1955. 


472 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


visiting the Womens’ Institute. The Joint Magistrate, though a 
Muslim, was very popular with the Hindus and Sikhs. Good feeling 
permeated the countryside. In fact, the Roorkee area was little 
affected by the disturbances elsewhere. Many of the Sappers had 
been recruited from the same villages. For instance, in the Jagraon 
District in Ludhiana there were what may be called ‘Sapper’ villages 
in which almost every family had relations serving in the Corps. 
The V.C.Os., especially the elder ones, were the mainstay of discipline. 
When it was found in 1945 that few Sikhs were volunteering for 
service as parachutists with 33 Field Squadron, the fact was men- 
tioned casually to the senior Sikh V.C.O. at the S.M.E. Roorkee. 
On the very next day, the Commandant was informed that the entire 
Sikh strength of the Corps were anxious to become parachutists. 
Could whole-hearted co-operation go further? 

In nature and composition, the Bombay Centre at Kirkee in 
1944-45 resembled closely the establishments at Bangalore and 
Roorkee. A Training Wing of three Battalions existed at Dighi, 
each Battalion having six Companies and a H.Q. Company. The 
intake for each Battalion was about 120 recruits a month. The 
Boys Battalion was doing well. Training in general, however, was 
more difficult than at Bangalore or Roorkee because of the lack of 
experienced instructors resulting from the loss of so many _ units 
when the Japanese overran Malaya in 1942. When Colonel H. P. 
Cavendish was Commandant in 1943, the system of training, which 
had catered hitherto for requirements in North Africa or Italy, was 
switched to those needed for the Burma front and a jungle training 
site was selected at Supa, near Londa in the Belgaum District. This 
provided not only for the instruction of Officer Cadets of the Engineer 
Officers’ Training School but also for that of V.C.Os. and N.C.Os. in 
jungle warfare and engineering. The conditions of life at Kirkee can 
be gathered from the following description given by Brigadier L. O. 
Clark who arrived there as Commandant in July 1945.1 “I had 
been away from India since 1939 and expected to find the country 
much changed. But it had changed remarkably little. Servants’ 
wages were higher, as were the prices of most European goods, and 
nobody, except Anglo-Indian railway guards, ever wore a fopi. 
When in uniform, I always wore a beret, hot or cold weather alike, 
and without any ill effects. Cantonment life went on as before. There 
was the Western India Club, and also the Poona Gymkhana Club 








* Notes by Brigadier L. O. Clark, 0.B.£., dated Jan. 22nd, 1955. 


INDIA, 1944-47 473 


which had as many Indian as British members and provided dances, 
Bridge, tennis, cricket and hockey. The Royal Connaught Boat 
Club, commonly knows as the ‘Rosherville’, still ran its sailing and 
rowing activities. At the Turf Club, racing was in full swing with 
its usual magnificent setting of priceless saris on green lawns. Out- 
side Cantonments, the country was peaceful, and the Mahrattas the 
kindliest of village hosts. My wife and I picnicked far and wide 
and always met with the utmost courtesy. We had two Officers’ 
Messes, one in the original Mess at Kirkee and the other for the 
Training Battalions at Dighi Camp, some miles away. Both were 
tun on pre-war lines except that officers usually wore Service Dress 
instead of Mess kit for dinner. The Indian officers conformed to 
the European style of feeding. Mess entertainments were held at 
Christmas and on ‘gala’ or Sports Days. The Corps had a high 
reputation for Tug-of-War, long-distance swimming and_ hockey. 
The work at headquarters was mainly the disbanding of war-time 
Field Companies, the re-fitting of regular Field Companies, and the 
demobilization of men, including some thousands of ex-prisoners-of- 
war of the Japanese. I shall not forget the arrival of the first batch 
of released prisoners. They were desperately thin and weak, though 
quite cheerful. They were dressed in any clothes “‘Welfare’’ had been 
able to provide; but every man, throughout three years of captivity 
in nothing but canvas shorts, had managed to retain his Royal Blue 
lanyard and displayed it proudly over his right shoulder. After 
some months, they had recovered sufficiently to dramatize their 
experiences, and it was wonderful to see a Mahratta, imitating a 
Jap officer, haranguing a recalcitrant working party of P.Ms. and 
Sikhs, all in excellent spirits. There were very few Regular British 
Officers at Kirkee below the rank of Lieut.-Colonel. Most were 
Short Service Majors, often promoted N.C.Os., and the remainder 
were young Captains or Lieutenants holding Emergency Commis- 
sions, but they were almost uniformly good.” 

Major P. M. Leslie-Jones, who arrived in Kirkee in October 1945, 
gives some details of the Boys Battalion.1 The unit was commanded 
by a Major and was located at that time in the Westmacott Lines 
which had been occupied before the war by the Training Battalion. 
In February 1946, however, it moved to Dighi and came under 
the command of the Training Wing. When hostilities ended in 
September 1945 the Boys were being trained rather on ‘mass produc- 














1 Notes by Major P. M. Leslie-Jones, R.E., dated Jan. 20th, 1955. 


474 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


tion’ lines. Drill, education and physical training were dealt with. 
adequately; but the Workshops’ course was very concentrated, and 
although the Boys emerged nominally as Class II or Class III trades- 
men, it was found that they did not come up to the necessary standards 
because they lacked experience. Thus the original conception of 
providing a cadre of high-grade tradesmen and potential N.C.QOs, 
was not being fulfilled. The policy was therefore changed and was 
concentrated on ‘leadership’ training on the lines of the Boy Scout 
Movement. The time spent in Workshops was reduced, and as an 
experiment, the Boys were given an introduction to all trades instead 
of specializing in one. The inculcation of a capacity for leadership 
was no simple problem because the Regular N.C.Os. and V.C.Os. 
who acted as instructors found some difficulty in giving the Boys a 
free hand. However, the instructors were induced to remain more 
in the background, and the Boys soon acquired confidence. Scout 
training had suffered hitherto from being classed under the general 
title of ‘Fieldworks.’ Now it came into its own. Another innovation 
was a Camp of three weeks’ duration in the jungle near the hill 
station of Mahableshwar. This was a great success. Later, a daily 
compulsory rest period was introduced. Boys were found to be 
failing to increase properly in height and weight in spite of good 
food, and the cause was diagnosed as over-work at too young an 
age. The Recruiting Officer became more selective. Families inti- 
mately connected with the Corps were often so eager to enter their 
sons that they were not too particular about a year or two in age. 
The general physical standard was much improved also by wrestling 
and boxing. Although the former still remained the favourite sport, 
boxing was taken up enthusiastically, and the Bombay lads soon 
became the chief rivals of those from the Madras Group. 

Some mention has been made in Chapter I of the formation of 
Engineer Groups between 1939 and 1941 in places other than 
Bangalore, Roorkee and Kirkee in order to cater for the prodigious. 
expansion entailed by the war. An Engineer Depot already existed 
at Lahore which produced some Artisan or Electrical and Mechanical 
Companies, but it was utterly inadequate for a World War and 
accordingly four new Groups of Indian Engineers were raised. These 
were No. 1 E and M. Group, No. 3 Construction Group and No. 6 
Mechanical Equipment Group at Lahore, and No. 4 Engineer Equip- 
ee at Sialkot. By August 1943, No. 1 Group had raised 
aa Sed 2 oe 20 Engineer Battalions, and No. 6 

- No. 3 Construction Group, however, should 


INDIA, 1944-47 476 


be awarded the palm for it had raised no Jess than 165 units com- 
prising a total of 15,000 trained men. Brigadier Partap Narain served 
with this Group as Assistant Commandant (Lieut.-Colonel) from 
April 1945 to April 1946, first under Colonel D. J. Middleton-Stewart 
and afterwards under Colonel F. W. L. MacC. Parker. Then he 
succeeded Parker as Commandant for six weeks. When he arrived 
in 1945, No. 3 Group consisted of two Training Battalions, a Holding 
Battalion, a Mechanical Transport Training Centre and a Battle 
Training School near Pathankot. The Group had been built up 
from scratch and was nearing its peak of efficiency when orders were 
received in May 1945 that it was to be disbanded. Training in farming 
and other useful pursuits was started at once for soldiers who were 
about to be demobilized. No. 3 Group was a very prosperous 
concern. It had a fine swimming pool, an excellent cinema, and an 
Officers’ Mess housed in a bungalow owned by Mr. Jinnah. How- 
ever, the unwelcome orders had to be obeyed and demobilization was 
begun in November. The three Groups at Lahore had been amalga- 
mated into one under Colonel E. A. E. Bolton and their records 
sent to the Bengal Group at Roorkee. The end came in January 
1946 when it was decided to close the Depot. Even then, the total 
strength at Lahore exceeded 18,000 men. No. 4 Group at Sialkot 
provided eventually a nucleus for the Royal Pakistan Engineers 
after the partition. The standard of the men in these Punjab Groups 
compared favourably with that of the Madras, Bengal and Bombay 
Groups. The northern Groups certainly helped in no small degree 
to meet the voracious demands of the Army, so their foundation 
was amply justified. 

Major-General C. de L. Gaussen, who returned to India in May 
1945 after an absence of five years, has much to record about the 
Indian Engineers and the changes which he noticed. “The Boys 
Battalions were exceedingly flourishing at all the Corps Headquarters”, 
he writes.! ‘‘They had been instituted in order to educate lads drawn 
from the fighting classes to provide suitable material for regular 
K.C.I.Os. Alternatively, if the Boys did not reach the requisite 


1 Notes by Major-General C. de L. Gaussen, c.B., M.c., dated May 17th, 1955. 

From May to December 1945, as a Brigadier, General Gaussen was C.E. Central 
Command which included the Bengal and Punjab Groups. Next, he was Deputy 
E-in-C. until September 1946, when he became C.E. Northern Command. In July 
1947, he was succeeded in that appointment by Brigadier M. R. Jefferis, who later 
became E-in-C., Pakistan. General Gaussen was then appointed E-in-C., India, under 
the old regime, and so remained until that post ceased to exist after the Partition as 
part of the British administration. 


476 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


standard for commissions, they could receive sufficient education to- 
fit them for the higher technical posts as Warrant Officers for which 
our previous system did not really provide. Only those who know 
the intense esprit de corps of the Sappers and Miners can fully 
visualise the keenness and energy that these lads displayed in order to 
become officers in their family Corps. It was very heartening to see 
them boxing—a sport foreign to them. The Madras boys were 
particularly good at boxing and almost swept the championships. 
It was amazing also to see the very wide use made of mechanical 
excavating equipment when one remembered that, six years earlier, 
the Sappers and Miners had only a few mechanical road vehicles. 
A sign of the times occurred when the Maharajah of Patiala appealed 
for the help of bulldozers after some disastrous floods. He obtained 
the use of such a large number that the flood defences of Patiala 
City were practically remodelled. So far as general training is con- 
cerned, the chief innovation was the part the Sappers played in the 
Training Divisions to which men went after completing their recruits’ 
courses. I visited the 14th Division in the Central Provinces and the 
39th Division near Hardwar. The C.R.Es of these Divisions kept 
in close touch with the Corps Commandants and the training was 
most practical, unhampered by any restrictions of boundaries or 
property. If timber was needed, it was felled in the jungle on the 
spot. Roads could be carved anywhere: demolitions carried out 
wholesale. Living conditions were hard; but the training made a 
permanent impression on the young British and Indian officers who 
went through it, quite apart from its value as a prelude to fighting in 
the Burmese jungles. The pride of the young British officers in their 
respective Sapper and Miner Groups was intense. They worked 
hard at .the language and took immense trouble to understand their 
men as well as mastering technical details. Even more striking were 
the King’s Commissioned Indian Officers. When I left India in 
1939 there had been only a handful of such officers who had been 
through the ‘Shop’, and they were still subalterns. Now they were 
Lieut.-Colonels and had, of course, been joined by scores of I.C.Os 
from the S.M.E. at Roorkee, T hey modelled themselves in every 
respect, including their family life, on the pattern set by their comrades, 
the British officers.” 

The years 1946 and 1947 were fateful ones for India. Victory had 
been won, but at a Staggering cost. Soldiers were streaming back to 
a4 country impoverished by war and permeated by political unrest 
which culminated eventually in a partition more drastic than any 


INDIA, 1944-47 477 


in history. The professional outlook of the Indian Engineers had 
to be revised almost overnight. Peace-time methods were needed 
to replace the improvized and often haphazard procedure learnt 
in war. “Engineering in peace is a matter of careful planning” said 
Major-General H. Williams when addressing the Institution of 
Engineers in Calcutta in 1954.1 “It requires the application of skill 
and knowledge to produce something to a definite specification. In 
war, other conditions prevail. Time is always short. Planning is 
often inadequate and must go on side by side with execution. Events 
and conditions are never static. Specialization is almost impossible. 
The Engineer is in competition with others for transport, labour 
and even space, and the enemy is continually seeking to upset his 
plans and destroy his work. Engineering in war is only a means 
to an end, which is victory in battle. The Engineer in the Forces 
must be a soldier first, well versed in the art of war but at the same 
time competent, though not necessarily highly specialized, in the 
engineering which concerns his arm.”’ So the post-War Indian 
Engineers had not only to reduce their establishments to what the 
country could afford and the political situation warrant, but also 
to reach so high a standard of professional attainment that they 
could match their skill against all competitors in the fields of civil, 
mechanical and electrical engineering. These tasks were undertaken 
with much determination. Modernization became the order of the 
day as India progressed along the thorny road leading to self-govern- 
ment. A heavy burden of responsibility had already rested on the 
shoulders of Major-General H. E. Roome who was Engineer-in-Chief 
during the later stages of the war’, and that which devolved on his 
successor, Major-General W. F. Hasted, in January 1946 was almost 
as onerous though different in nature. Roome had had to wield the 
sword; Hasted to turn it into a ploughshare. 

The Sapper units returning from service overseas in 1946 always 
received a hearty welcome on arrival, but few could have experienced 
rounds of festivities comparable with those staged in certain Indian 
States. Take, for instance, the story of the return of the Sirmoor 
Field Company from Burma in June. To start with, the unit had a 








1 Address by Major-General H. Williams, c.3., C.B.£., Engineer-in-Chief, India. 
as President of the Institution of Engineers, India, delivered in Calcutta on February 
13th, 1954, on the subject of the role of the Engineer in the defence of India (See The 
Journal of the Institution of Military Engineers, April 1954, pp. 84-93). 

2 Major-General H. E. Roome had succeeded Major-General R. L. Bond as E-in-C., 
India, in May 1943, 





478 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


fine reception in Calcutta, with speeches by Generals and gifts of 
flowers, cigarettes and sweets. Then, after a month in Roorkee, it 
left for Nahan, the State capital, which it had not seen since it 
departed for the North-West Frontier early in the war. ‘‘There was 
a whole month of festivities, nautches and parades” writes Captain 
T. le M. Spring-Smyth, R.E., the Company Commander at the time. 
“The first parade caught me napping. Much to the mens’ amusement, 
an enormous black charger was led up to me in front of the Company 
and I was told that it was mine for the month. Hastily remembering 
how to mount, I had to take over the entire parade for an inspection 
by the Commander of the Sirmoor State Forces. There were Cavalry, 
Pipes and Drums, a military Band and a battalion of infantry apart 
from the Field Company which was itself 300 strong. However, 
all went well because the charger knew everything about inspections 
and walked quietly in and out of the platoons and companies without 
any interference from me! Afterwards, there was a route march 
through almost every street in Nahan. The Sirmoor State, lying 
between Dehra Dun and Simla, is extremely hilly, and Nahan itself 
is built on a series of hills with hardly any level ground between. 
The streets were cobbled and spotlessly clean but very trying for 
marching. I had to stop continually to be garlanded, often by pretty 
girls from first-floor windows which, by virtue of the enormous size 
of my mount, were nearly level with me. It was not until August 
that, somewhat the worse for wear after the Maharajah’s hospitality, 
I reported to the Bengal Sappers at Roorkee and was sent to Ranchi 
to take command of 7 Field Company.” 

It may be mentioned in parenthesis that when 7 Field Company 
returned to Roorkee in October 1946 it was re-formed as an all-Sikh 
unit. It was probably the first Field Company to undergo this change 
although there was already an all-Sikh Field Park Company. Most 
of the men were Jat Sikhs and very carefully selected. No man was 
accepted whose height was less that 5’ 11”, and in addition he had to 
have high educational and trade qualifications. The men excelled in 
all games and sports, particularly hockey in which they never lost 
a match, even against Battalion teams. In the spring of 1947, as 
already recorded, the Company was sent to Burma as part of the 
post-War garrison of that country and did not return to India until 
October when everything was in a very unsettled state. Yet its disci- 
pline remained quite unaffected by political troubles. The second-in- 





} Notes by Captain T. le M. Spring-Smyth, R.E., dated May 14th, 1955. 


INDIA, 1944-47 479 


‘Command was still a Muslim officer whose relationship with the 
Sikh officers and other ranks was extremely cordial and whose even- 
tual departure to Pakistan was deeply regretted by them. 

A typical welcome home after service overseas was that experienced 
in 1946 by 65 Field Company (Madras) under Major R. C. Gabriel, 
R.E. When the transport from Burma docked at Madras, there was 
music from a loudspeaker and cigarettes and cups of tea were provided 
by the Womens’ Voluntary Services. The Customs authorities turned 
a blind eye and allowed a score of Japanese swords to pass without 
hindrance. A hearty reception was anticipated at Bangalore and 
everyone put on his smartest uniform; but little did Gabriel realize 
the sort of welcome which awaited the unit. As the troop train 
entered the Cantonment Station after dark, he found the Madras 
Sapper Band crashing out ‘Wings’, and a reception committee, 
headed by the Commandant, waiting on the platform. The officers 
were soon heavily garlanded and the men lined up for tea and 
cigarettes handed out by the W.V.S. They were then taken in lorries 
to the Woodcote Camp to be the guests of a Workshop Company 
before starting on the long process of reorganization and the release 
of those who did not wish to stay on. 

The process of demobilization is described as follows by Colonel 
R. A. Loomba.! ‘On return from S.E.A.C. in July 1946 I stayed 
at Bangalore for a short time. Units were then coming in regularly 
from overseas for disbandment, and those men who desired release 
were put through the demobilization machine. The “end of the war” 
atmosphere was evident throughout except in Group Headquarters 
where plans were in hand for post-War reorganization of the Centre 
and of field units. Each disbanding unit held a final parade and a 
“rich food” before it ceased to exist and passed into the pages of 
history. A constant stream of officers flowed through the Jalahalli 
Mess, recounting tales of adventure and praising the ‘thambi” 
(Madras Sapper) for his sense of humour and his endless capacity 
for hard work under the most trying conditions. Some were worried 
about what the future held for them. The men, on the other hand, 
were smiling and cheerful as they left the Depot dressed in the best 
of their newly acquired clothes and with money in their pockets. 
Their immediate concern was to reach their homes, where they could 
speak of their experiences to an admiring audience. As to the future, 
they would see about that after a few months of well earned rest.”’ 


1 Notes by Colonel R. A. Loomba, dated August 14th, 1954. 





480 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


Some events at the Bangalore Headquarters are brought to notice: 
by Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Lindsell in his Short History. On January 
18th, Colonel M. M. Jeakes handed over charge to Colonel F. W. L. 
MacC. Parker after having held the post of Commandant for three 
years, and at the same time Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Cameron, R.E., 
an Assistant Commandant, was repatriated to the United Kingdom 
and replaced by Lieut.-Colonel B. E. Whitman R.E.! Immediately 
after Colonel Jeakes’ departure came a change in nomenclature 
when, as mentioned in Chapter I, the title “‘Sappers and Miners” 
was relinquished with great regret in all three Groups. The Madras 
Group nearly lost also the dignified prefix of “Queen Victoria’s 
Own.”” The News Letter of June 1946 reads:— “A frightful Indian 
Army Order appeared not long ago which deprived us of our hard 
won title of ‘Q.V’s O.” This came as a complete bombshell to us 
all, including our Colonel. Protests have been innumerable, and we 
were the first to question the legality of such a revolutionary edict. 
However, water has passed under the bridge since then, and now, 
under another I.A.O., we are to be known as the ‘Q.V’s O. Madras. 
Regimental Centre, R.I.E.. We have thus retained ‘Q.V’s O.’; 
but ‘Sappers and Miners’ was a more difficult problem and we 
have been voted down. Yet we take heart from the knowledge that 
you cannot kill ‘Sappers and Miners’ in under twenty years.” 
Brigadier R. C. R. Hill, who had been Colonel of the Corps since 
1942, had no doubt expressed his opinions very forcibly, but un- 
happily his representations met with no success. With the bestowal 
of the title “Royal” on the Indian Engineers in February 1946, Hill 
became the first Colonel Commandant of the Madras Group, as did 
Major-General Sir Horace Roome of the Benga! Group and Lieut.- 
General Sir Francis Nosworthy of the Bombay Group. All were 
well-known ex-Sappers and Miners. 

News was received with satisfaction that the first re-union of the 
newly formed Madras Sapper Officers’ Association had been held 
in London on May 3lst. In June, the Madras Group had the honour 
of providing the main body of a Royal Indian Engineer contingent 
at the great Victory Parade in London on which it was represented 
by a V.C.O. and 29 other ranks under the command of Lieut.-Colonel 





‘Colonel B. E. Whitman was destined to be the last British Commandant at 
Bangalore. He held that appointment from October 9th, 1947, to March 11th, 1948, 


when he was relieved by Colonel R. K. Kochhar, the first Indian Commandant of 
he Madras Group. 


INDIA, 1944-47 481 


R. K. Kochhar. The contingent was accommodated in Kensington 
Gardens and was taken on several tours before returning to India. 
Demobilization continued steadily at Bangalore. In September 1946, 
the remains of the reinforcement Battalion were absorbed into the 
Depot Wing in the Meeanee Lines, and the Boys Battalion was moved 
from Jalahalli to the vacant Institute Camp. The Training Battalion 
still had 1,650 recruits and the Boys Battalion a strength of 540. 
The Boys’ Boxing team went to Delhi in December and won the 
All-India Boys’ Championship. Enthusiasm for this sport had now 
begun to spread throughout the Group, and the Bantam Weight 
All-India Championship at Poona was won by a Madras Sapper 
Naik. 

On September 2nd, 1946, orders were issued abolishing for general 
use the distinctive Madras Sapper head-gear known as the “‘ Doopta”’ (or 
‘“‘Dupta’’). Anexception was made in the case of the Band, and the Boys 
Battalion and men of the Depot and Training Wings were allowed 
to wear the “Doopta”’ until supplied with berets. It is now worn 
only by the Band. At a meeting of the Madras Sapper Officers’ 
Association in London in May 1946, Colonel W. D. Robertson, 
who had served in the Madras Corps from 1894 to 1904, explained 
how the ‘tall hat without a brim’ may have originated. He had 
heard the story from an old Subedar, fifty years before. In the days 
of the East India Company, many European military adventurers 
took service under Indian rulers. They trained the armed forces 
and contracted for the supply of rations and equipment when in 
the field. Most of these soldiers of fortune were Frenchmen, one 
being a certain De Boyne who trained the Mysore Army in the days 
of Haidar Ali and served later under Sindhia in Northern India.* 
After the fall of Seringapatam in May 1799, some Hyderabad units, 
trained by De Boyne, were incorporated into the East India Company’s 
forces and among these was a regiment of ‘Spahis’, officered by the 
Company’s Engineers and subsequently called ‘Madras Sappers.’ The 
“Doopta”, therefore, may have had a French origin for it resembles 
the old Spahi head-dress without the peak. 

At Roorkee, demobilization was planned to be carried out in 
three phases. The first men to be released were recruits with less 
than six months’ service. The next were those with longer service. 
This constituted the initial phase of the process. The second phase 


1 The Military Engineer in India, by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. C. Sandes, D.s.0., M.C., 
Vol. I, pp. 205-216. 


482 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


involved the release of trained soldiers, and by the middle of 1946 
more than half the men in the Bengal Group had gone. The third 
phase was intended to secure a reduction to peace-time strength, but 
it was postponed because of problems arising from the probable 
partition from Pakistan. No. 2 Training Battalion was converted 
into a Demobilization Battalion, and in addition to demobilization 
duties, gave instruction in useful peace-time occupations to men 
destined for release. The Battalion was commanded by a very shrewd 
Scot. On one occasion, when a visit of inspection was pending from 
the G.O.C. Lucknow District whose chief idiosyncracy was known 
to be a terror of flies, ‘D.D.T.’ disinfectant was poured into every 
hole and corner for hours and it was hoped that all would be well. 
But when the General came to the Demob Battalion Lines he spotted 
a couple of flies in a Dining Hall and at once started a harangue on 
his pet subject. A bad report seemed inevitable. The C.O., however, 
was equal to the occasion. In very broad Scotch he said ‘“‘You need 
not worry, Sir. I’ve noted these particular specimens for demo- 
bilization tomorrow’’, and in the resultant laughter, all was forgiven 
and forgotten. 

Demobilization was carried out as follows. A card was prepared 
for every man showing his qualifications, details of service and 
recommendations, and with this he appeared before the Commandant 
for an interview. The Commandant had two rubber stamps, one 
marked ‘‘Demob”’ and the other ‘“Retain’’, and the man’s fate was 
decided according to which stamp went on his card. It so happened 
that the “Demob” stamp was considerably larger than the ‘‘Retain” 
stamp, and very soon it was noticed that no man ever said whether 
or not he was being demobilized but whether he had been accorded 
the ‘Bara Mohar’ or the ‘Chota Mohar. The same expressions are 
probably in use to this day among ex-Bengal Sappers of the Second 
World War. 

In February 1946, the congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief 
on the conferment of the title “Royal” on the Corps of Indian 
Engineers were gratefully acknowledged by the Roorkee Command- 
ant. The post-war composition of the Bengal Group was announced 
as 50% Mussalmans, 40% Hindus and 10% Sikhs, and it was added 
that all post-War units were to be of one-class composition. These 
changes came gradually into force, and by the end of 1946 there 
were four Mussalman units (2, 4 and 5 Field Companies and 35 
Field Squadron) and five Hindu units (1, 3, 67 and 74 Field Companies 


INDIA, 1944-47 483 


and 6 Army Troops Company). 7 Field Company had became an 
all-Sikh unit. 

Some interesting impressions of Roorkee in 1946-47 are recorded 
by a former Bengal Sapper officer, Brigadier C. L. B. Duke, who 
revisited his old haunts after an absence of about ten years. He 
found that the traditions of the place remained the same, thanks 
largely to a few officers who had served almost continuously with 
the Group. The enormous expansion during the war had necessitated 
a large constructional programme. Barracks had been built right 
out to the Rifle Ranges, and two new ranges made beyond them. 
A Supply Depot, with its own siding, and a new Railway Station 
called “Dandhera’’, occupied the area between the railway and the 
old Range Road. The original Corps Parade Ground, which included 
Polo, Football and Hockey grounds, remained the same; but barracks 
filled the area south of the Polo Ground facing the old Training 
Battalion Office, once the Indian Military Hospital. The Workshops 
had expanded into all the buildings formerly used as Fieldworks 
Stores, and new Stores buildings had been built extending up to the 
Hill Cut. The rest of the Fieldworks Ground showed little alteration. 
New barracks covered the entire Grass Farm area between the main 
road and the Ganges Canal as far as Station Road. South of the 
railway, to a point beyond the Railway Officer’s bungalow, were the 
Boys Battalion lines and a farm. Behind the Corps Orderly Room, 
now faced by a new block of offices, stood ranks of buildings devoted 
to Records and Accounts. A billiard room had been added to the 
Officers’ Mess, and the former Commandant’s Bungalow served 
as a second Mess. Married quarters had appeared on the slopes 
beyond the bungalow. The old Station Parade Ground, and the 
Polo Ground on the College Maidan, were under crops of wheat. 
Such was the appearance of post-War Roorkee. It exemplified the 
Latin quotation ‘Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis. 

We turn now to Kirkee in 1946. The News Letters had been re- 
started after a lapse of several years, and we read in the January 
issue that more than 2,000 men out of a war strength of 24,000 had 
already passed through the Demobilization Centre to return to 
civil life. They were mostly pensioners and recruits, but normal 
releases had begun. No more recrutis were being enrolled although 
some were still under instruction in the single Training Battalion 
that remained. British officers and other ranks were arriving and 





1 Roorkee News Letter, dated March 1947, 


484 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


departing at a bewildering rate, and a Transit Camp had been formed 
for R.E. officers coming from England. The Engineer Officers’ 
Training School was under orders to close down. In April it is 
recorded that everyone looked askance at the order which dropped 
the time-honoured title of ‘‘Sappers and Miners” and introduced the 
alien term ‘‘Centre.’”’ The change, it is said, had been made with the 
assent of the Group, but by no means with its unqualified approval. 
The demobilization total had passed 5,000. The tide of repatriation 
and release flowed on unabated. Many Regular officers were going 
home to supplementary courses. By July 1946, more than 7,000 men 
had been demobilized. The Boys Battalion had reached the final 
of the All-India Boys Boxing Tournament at Delhi. The Group 
was doing well in Hockey. A Rugby Football team was in the process 
of formation. By October, 10,000 Indian other ranks had been 
released and the number of British officers and Warrant and N.C.Os. 
was diminishing at an alarming rate. No British replacements were 
being received. December found Kirkee returning to normal peace- 
time conditions. Bungalows were being re-painted; garden walls 
rebuilt. The Commander-in-Chief presented new colours to the 
Boys Battalion on a ceremonial parade. A figure of 15,000 released 
ranks was reached. The Group was the mainstay of the Poona and 
Kirkee Hunt and entered two teams in a Point-to-Point Race; but 
it was remarked that riding might end soon because horses were no 
longer authorized on the Peace establishments. Yet the Commandant 
seems to have been in great fettle judging by the following poetic 
query which he addressed to his Chief Engineer when threatened with 
a simultaneous visit by the Engineers-in-Chief of both India and 
the United Kingdom. 


‘When gathered in multitudes, twos and threes, 
Are they Es-in-C or E-in-Cs? 

The former suggests that they live in clover, 
The latter that often they're half-seas over. 
Perhaps as a compromise, seeing they’re few, 
We could leave it at E-in-C (bracketted) two.” 


Efforts to secure communal feeding among the men, and life in 
the Officers’ Mess, are described by Major P. M. Leslie-Jones. ‘Early 
in 1946”, he writes,’ “attempts were made to break down religious 
barriers between the three castes in the Bombay Group. This, I 


1 Notes by Major P. M. Leslie-Jones, R.E., dated Jan. 20th, 1955. 





INDIA, 1944-47 485 


think, was due to the return to India of units which had been serving 
in Italy and had mixed freely with European troops. For instance, 
one Company had all castes messing together even after its return 
to India. Individuals did not seem to mind much, although their 
religious leaders and some of the older V.C.Os. were against such 
an innovation. In the Boys Battalion we tried to induce all the lads 
to eat in the same /angar compound after the food had been prepared 
in separate caste /angars, and this system slowly gained acceptance. 
The Punjabi Mahomedans and Sikhs were the more co-operative 
though they sat in groups. The Mahrattas at first refused to eat in 
a communal compound but finally agreed to do so when a flimsy 
barrier had been put across part of it. When the Boys Battalion 
moved to Dighi, there was a definite set-back because of the dispersed 
langars. However, one central hut was set aside as a Mess and 
provided with tables and benches, and the Boys ate in groups in 
the hut. In the Officers’ Mess there had been little change since 
pre-War days. One was waited upon assiduously by one’s bearer. 
Servant’s kit was very expensive, and some of the bearers wore R.I.E. 
cummerbands. ‘‘Dining-in’ nights had not been instituted, and 
Guest Nights were rare. The most important occasion was the 
farewell ‘dining-out’ of Subedar-Major and Hon. Captain Taj Din. 
Three Commandants, Colonels Horsfield, Cavendish and L. O. 
Clark, were present, and all, including Taj Din, made speeches. 
Taj Din left Kirkee next morning, literally bowed down with garlands. 
He was regarded with much awe by the rank and file.” 

The year 1947 was perhaps the most momentous in the entire 
history of India. In March 1946 a Cabinet Mission had made far- 
reaching recommendations to implement the oft-reiterated policy 
of the British Government regarding the future of India as a self- 
governing country. The Mission had included Sir Stafford Cripps 
who, four years earlier, had tried to find a solution to what appeared 
to be a constitutional deadlock. It had been suggested in 1946 that 
an Interim Government might be formed; but inter-communal 
strife in some areas interfered with this solution of the problem. 
The only alternative seemed to be the division of the country into 
two separate Dominions. Accordingly, in February 1947, Admiral 
Earl Mountbatten was sent to India to relieve Field-Marshal Sir 
Archibald Wavell as Viceroy and to carry the separation into effect. 

Lieut.-General Sir Francis Tuker, then G.O.C.-in-Chief, Eastern 
Command, has much to say about the feelings of the troops regarding 


486 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the proposal. ‘‘At the end of the war in September 1945,”’ he writes, 
“we soldiers had been plunged at once into the cares of internal security 
and keeping the peace. We hoped that whatever disturbances there 
might be would be anti-British and not communal. These would 
be a smaller danger than a communal outbreak which would be 
far wider spread, might have its effect on the Army itself, and once 
started, would break out again and again. We knew that self-Govern- 
ment was imminent and that with it the Army must be nationalized, 
that is, offered entirely to Indians, before many years were out. We 
ardently desired that India should be united, strong and friendly 
to the British Commonwealth, if not a member of it, and that the 
Indian Army, to which we had devoted the best years of our lives, 
should remain a solid, efficient and faithful instrument of the new 
India; but it was apparent that, even in an united India, if the Army 
were to survive, it would only do so if reorganized into communal 
classes. So we urged that both officers and men should be grouped 
into communally homogeneous units and the sooner the process 
started the better. It was hoped that India would hang together 
and keep the Army integral; but it was expected that the 
country would split in half, and that the Army would thus, in any 
case, be as a consequence divided. That, it would seem, must be 
the end of our Army; but we saw that there was a chance of saving 
it if steps could be taken at once to attune everybody's mind before 
communal feelings became too fierce. Thus our chance lay in handing 
out to each of the two parts a contingent of its own and keeping 
a third party under the management of all three parties concerned, 
British, Hindu and Muslim. If possible, the third contingent should 
be built round one completely impartial body, the Gurkha Brigade 
under its British officers. Without this impartially controlled contin- 
gent we felt certain that there would soon be a struggle between the 
two States of Hindustan (India) and Pakistan, and preceding it, a 
race in armaments among peoples whose standard of living was 
already too low. There would then be no one left to guard the 
Strategic frontiers. Yet the frontiers were as deep a concern to 
Hindustan as to Pakistan, for once they were breached, Hindustan 
would have no natural frontier left to her. If Pakistan could be 
persuaded to stand beside Hindustan, the latter would have the 
advantage of this vast cushion of Islam between herself and danger. 


1 While Memory Serves, by Lieut.-General Sir Francis Tuker, K.C1.E., C.B., D.3.0., 
0.B.E., pp. 20-28. 


INDIA, 1944-47 487 


Any political solution that made-for tranquility within the country 
would leave India strategically stronger than one which held the 
country together in a resentful and troubled union. These and other 
reasons induced us, early in 1946, to anticipate that, whatever the 
political solution in meeting India’s demand for independence, some 
sort of impartially controlled contingent must be constituted for 
all-India defence.” 

Partition having been decided upon, many problems had to be 
faced. According to Brigadier Partap Narain, one of the most 
pressing was the retention of British volunteers. Most British officers 
wished to leave India, though many afterwards regretted their deci- 
sion. The names of all Muslim officers were listed at Army Head- 
quarters as they would naturally elect for transfer to Pakistan. There 
were very few senior Engineer Officers amongst them; in fact only 
two or three commissioned before the war, headed by Lieut.-Colonel 
Anwar Khan. The posting of replacements had to be arranged by 
Major-General W. F. Hasted who was Engineer-in-Chief, India, 
from January 1946 to July 1947 under the British regime. After 
the Partition the task devolved on Major-General J. F. D. Steedman, 
the first Engineer-in-Chief under the Indian regime, while General 
Hasted remained for a time as Engineer-in-Chief, Supreme Head- 
quarters. “It was rather interesting’, writes Partap Narain, ‘‘to see 
two Es-in-C. Headquarters, both at Kashmir House.” The decision 
to carry out the Partition was kept secret as long as possible. Some 
time before the cleavage occurred, Field-Marshal Sir Claude 
Auchinleck visited Kirkee to present a standard to the Boys Battalion. 
The Group Commandant, Colonel L. O. Clark, then remarked that 
it seemed a terrible mistake to return to the policy of “Class” 
Companies when, after 25 years of hard work, the Bombay Group 
had at last got all classes in its Field Companies to mess together. 
Auchinleck replied, rather sadly, that ‘‘these things had to be.” He 
knew then, which Clark did not, that Partition had already been 
decided upon and that therefore it was necessary to divide all 
prospective Pakistanis from Indians. 

It may be said of the British Raj in India, as Shakespeare said 
of the Thane of Cawdor, that ‘nothing in his life became him like 
the leaving it.’ Such was Lord Samuel’s tribute in the House of 
Lords to the creation by compromise and mutual consent of two 
new nations involving one-fifth of the entire human race.’ In 





1 Mission with Mountbatten, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 353. 


488 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


announcing to Parliament on February 20th, 1947, the appointment 
of Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy, the Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee) 
stated that he would be entrusted with the task of transferring to 
Indian hands the responsibility for the government of British India 
in a manner that would best ensure the future happiness and prospe- 
rity of the country. No better selection could have been made. 
Mountbatten had every attribute—youth, strength of character, a 
pleasing personality, diplomatic ability and experience in war on 
both land and sea. He was a natural leader, recognized as such 
by all the Allied nations. Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims knew him 
equally well and were aware also that he would be absolutely 
impartial. Army Headquarters had already begun to arrange for the 
nationalization of the Army with the exception of a small British 
Military Mission, and it was anticipated that the undertaking would 
be completed by June 1948; but the final decision that Partition 
was not only unavoidable but urgent necessitated drastic modifica- 
tions in the original plans and an advancement of the date. Partition 
Committees, representing both sides, were established on June 16th, 
1947, and August 15th of that year was fixed as the revised Partition 
date. There were then barely two months left in which to complete 
the immense task. 

The general basis on which the Army was to be divided was 824% 
to India and 174 °% to Pakistan, but this varied in certain instances.* 
India was to be allotted 15 infantry regiments, 12 armoured units, 
184 artillery regiments and 61 engineer units. Pakistan was to receive 
8 infantry regiments, 6 armoured units, 84 artillery regiments and 
34 engineer units. A Joint Defence Council was formed to cover 
both the new countries, and Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, 
the Commander-in-Chief, India, was to keep only administrative 
control of all existing forces while the division was in progress. 
After August 15th, he was to become “Supreme Commander” until 
there was no longer any need for administrative control. Lord 
Mountbatten gives a striking comparision to show the speed at 
which the Partition was actually carried out. It had, he said, taken 
three years to separate Burma from India, two years to separate 
the province of Bombay from Sind, and two years to separate Orissa 
from Bihar. The division of India, one of the biggest countries in 
the world, was accomplished in 2} months! The Army remained 








* India since Partition, by Andrew Mellor, pp. 38, 39. 


INDIA, 1944-47 489 


staunch. Its great traditions, and the ties of brotherhood in war, held 
all ranks, classes and creeds together until the crisis was past. Blood 
was certainly spilt—sometimes oceans of blood—but not the blood 
of serving soldiers. These did their best to minimize the massacres 
which occurred in the border areas between India and Pakistan, even 
to the extent of taking action against armed bands of their own kin, 
and thus they shortened the period of unrest. 

There were two factors which simplified the partition of the Corps 
of Indian Engineers between India and Pakistan. Firstly, all units, 
except a few of those overseas, had already been re-organized on a 
one-class basis; and secondly, the disbandment of the Groups at 
Lahore and Sialkot, and the Training Groups at Jullundur and 
Deolali, had recently been finished. Briefly, the plan was as follows. 
The Madras Engineer Centre at Bangalore remained practically 
unchanged; the Bengal Centre at Roorkee lost its Muslims, or 
about half its strength; the Bombay Centre at Kirkee suffered a 
similar loss, amounting in this case to about 40% of its strength. 
A new Engineer Centre was to be set up at Sialkot by the Pakistan 
Engineers, now accorded the title of “‘Royal.”’ As regards the class 
composition of the reconstituted Royal Indian Engineer Groups, 
that at Madras was to remain unaltered, the Bengal Group would 
have Hindus and Jat Sikhs, and the Bombay Group Mahrattas and 
Mazbhi or Ramdasia Sikhs. The chief sufferer would be the Bengal 
Group, not only in general strength and in the holders of key 
appointments, but also in equipment and property. As the Royal 
Pakistan Engineer Centre would have practically nothing at the start, 
it had been decided that about one-third of the available engineer 
equipment should be transferred to it from India, and that, partly 
because of convenience of transit, it should be drawn mostly from 
Roorkee. It was fortunate that the Bengal Group had certain equip- 
ment in excess of the peace scales which had been left over from the 
war, for otherwise the cupboard would have been swept almost 
bare. The Officers’ Mess, unlike those at Bangalore and Kirkee, 
was a Royal Engineer Mess; and although the Commandant was 
always President, it was not a Sapper and Miner Mess. Some of 
the Mess silver and other assets might therefore be regarded as the 
property of all the R.E. officers in the country; but this problem 
was solved, before the Partition, by the R.E. Corps Committee which 
had agreed, with the consent of all R.E. officers serving in India, 
that the Mess silver and assets should be presented to the Engineer 


490 THE INDIAN’ ENGINEERS 


Messes of the two new Dominions. A Sub-Committee in India 
worked out the details of apportioning funds and assets, including 
the division of the R.I.E. War Memorial Fund used for benevolent 
purposes. A further complication at Roorkee was the disposal of 
the Army equipment installed in the School of Military Engineering 
accommodated in part of the Thomason College, for the S.M.E. 
was already due to be transferred to Kirkee.! The S.M.E. had been 
unable to build up any private or Mess funds, so the question of the 
partition of such assets did not arise; but as the Thomason College 
had provided the institution with free accommodation during the 
war, most of the workshop equipment installed there by the military 
authorities was left for the use of the College, a portion only of the 
fieldworks equipment being allotted to the Bengal Centre to replace 
some of that transferred to Pakistan. 

The establishment of a School of Military Engineering at Roorkee 
had been sanctioned as early as September 1943. The technical 
education of I.E. officers was carried out there until 1945 as well 
as at the Punjab College of Engineering at Lahore and in certain 
Engineer O.C.T.Us. However, with the end of the war against 
Japan, it became apparent that these arrangements were inadequate 
to cope with the peace-time training of the greatly expanded Corps 
of Royal Indian Engineers. Early in 1946, the Education Depart- 
ment asked for the return of the Thomason College accommodation 
lent to the Army, and consequently the S.M.E. had to move else- 
where. In April a site was selected on the Mula River at Kirkee, 
and planning began at once.2 The move, however, was delayed by 
the rapid political changes as Partition approached, so that it was 
not until June 1947 that preparations could be started in earnest 
at Roorkee, and August 5th had been reached when the first railway 
wagons were loaded. The Commandant, Brigadier (now Lieut.- 
General Sir) H. Williams, was transferred to become C.E. Southern 
Command. Many of the British Instructors chose to leave India. 
Disturbances in the Punjab interfered with railway traffic. Floods 





* The Thomason Civil Engineering College was becoming the University of Roorkee. 
When the S.M.E. was transferred later to Kirkee, the part of the College previously 
occupied by it was taken over by the Punjab College of Engineering, displaced from 
Lahore and renamed “The East Punjab College of Engineering.” 


3“The Move of the S.M.E. (India) from Roorkee and its Re-establishment at Kirkee”’, 


by Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Forbes, Bt., R.E., appearing in The R.E. Journal, March 
1949, pp. 52-55, 


INDIA, 1944-47 491 


breached the lines. Yet the transfer was completed by the end of 
the year, and in February 1948, the instruction of J.C.Os.1 and N.C.Os. 
was begun at Kirkee. The first batches of young officers of the R.LE. 
and [.E.M.E. commenced their two years’ courses at Kirkee during 
the following summer, and thereafter the new establishment went 
from strength to strength. It will be seen that the School of Military 
Engineering, later renamed the College of Military Engineering, 
survived a very severe transplantation in a time of grave crisis. 
Much credit is due to those who carried the operation through toa 
successful conclusion. 

As already explained, the Bengal Engineer Centre was the chief 
sufferer in the Partition. H.Q. 622 Corps Engineer Group, with 31 
Assault Field Company, 33 Parachute Field Squadron, 2. 4, 5, 68, 
70 and 71 Field Companies, 43 and 322 Field Park Companies and 
a number of E. & M., Railway and other specialist units were ear- 
marked for Pakistan, leaving only H.Q. 623 Corps Engineer Group, 
!,3,7,67 and 74 Field Companies, 40 Airborne Park Company, 41 and 
682 Field Park Companies and some specialist units with the Bengal 
Centre. Almost all the Workshop equipment, and masses of field- 
works equipment and mechanical transport, were transferred to the 
R.P.E. Centre at Sialkot. On the assumption that the assets at 
Roorkee included the value of Government buildings and other 
static property, Pakistan’s share involved the transfer of almost 
everything that was mobile. Early in July 1947, the fateful hour 
arrived. A letter came from the Engineer-in-Chief, Supreme Head- 
quarters, announcing that the Bengal Engineer Centre would be 
split in two and would provide the equipment, tools and plant needed 
for the Royal Pakistan Centre at Sialkot, with the reservation that 
the requirements of the portion to remain at Roorkee must be kept 
in mind. Seven British officers chose transfer to Pakistan:? six 
elected to remain in India.8 Nine Muslim officers departed for 
Sialkot.4 The exodus was sudden and crippling. The Workshops 


1 Junior Commissioned Officers. 

4These were Colonel J. R. Connor, Lieut.-Colonel P. F. Hayes, Majors D. R, 
English, J. G. Wood and G. Black, R.E., and Major J. Davis, 1A. 

3 These were Colonel R. E. Holloway, Lieut.-Colonel W. G. A. Lawrie, Major T. 
le M. Spring-Smyth, and Lieuts. J. S. Coulson and R. W. S. Biggs, R.E. Most were 
posted later to the S.M.E. India. 

4 These were Majors J. A. Faruqi, D. M. Khan and M. F. Habib, Captains H. M. 
Khan, Noor Mohamed and Lehrasap Khan, Lieuts. Mohamed Afzal and Ahmed Din, 


and 2nd Lieut. K. M. Shah. 


492 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


were specially hard hit. The printing machinery was removed en 
masse in a single day. The engine sheds and machine shops were 
soon completely denuded. The Mechanical Transport School had 
to relinquish its most serviceable vehicles. Training in trades came 
pratically to a standstill. Instruction in fieldworks had to cease for 
several months because of lack of equipment and tools. The Scientific 
Library was emptied. Regimental funds were halved. Roorkee still 
had a well-equipped Indian Families Hospital, a Women’s Institute, 
the Knox Memorial School and Hostel and a Girls’ School, all with 
some equipment; but as a counter-weight, there had to be a transfer 
of over 5 lakhs of rupees to Pakistan. Practically all the moveable 
assets of the Roorkee Officers’ Mess vanished. Carpets, curtains, 
furniture, silver, crockery and cutlery went to Sialkot. The V.C.Os.’ 
Messes suffered similarly. The instruments, music scores and funds 
of the Band also departed so that Roorkee had the players but no 
instruments and Pakistan the instruments but hardly any players. 
The movement of men and stores was hindered not only by the 
tense communal situation in the Punjab but by heavy rain and floods. 
In July, Roorkee had 14 inches of rain in three days. The country 
aroynd the Solani River was under water, and the more distant Jumna 
rose 24 feet. Yet in spite of every handicap and every deprivation, 
the Bengal Centre survived and struggled slowly back to normal 
operation, and not only so but launched out later on a process of 
modernization the results of which can be seen today. 

According to Colonel R. A. Loomba, who returned to Bangalore 
in June 1947 to command the Depot Wing, the Partition effected 
the Madras group less than either of the others. The disbandment 
of war-time units was then almost at an end, and the post-war re- 
organization of the Centre was well in hand. The Boys Battalion 
had shifted to the Nilsandra Lines in which the Training Battalion 
had functioned before the war; the three Training Battalions had, 
by a process of amalgamation, shrunk to one; the Depot Wing 
was fast dwindling in strength, and the Engineer Officers’ Training 
School was about to close. Great uncertainty prevailed amongst 
the British officers who were called upon to decide suddenly whether 
they wished to serve in the new Dominion or not. Some were 
sceptical as to the future and chose to leave; others, with more 
faith and confidence, volunteered to remain. Plans were made to 
grant Regular and Short Term Commissions to deserving V.C.Os. 
to tide over the period during which there would be a shortage of 


INDIA, 1944-47 493 


officers. As regards the rank and file, only a handful of very young 
Muslim Sappers desired transfer to Pakistan, the remainder being 
unwilling to break away from past traditions to seek their fortunes 
in a new land which was completely foreign to their customary way 
of life. 

Events at Kirkee during the spring and early summer of 1947 are 
recorded in the Bombay News Letters of that period. By April, 
about 2,200 men had been released from service. The rate was 
falling because most of those who wished to go had already departed. 
The ‘one-classing’ of post-war units was nearing completion. The 
personnel of 17 and 98 Field Companies and 42 Field Park Company 
were still Punjabi-Mahomedans; those of 20 and 22 Field Companies 
and 37 Field Squadron were Mahrattas, and 18 and 21 Field Com- 
panies and 401 Field Squadron were manned by Sikhs. The compo- 
sition of 19 Field Company in Burma had not yet been decided.? 
Some units from the disbanded Transportation Training Centres at 
Deolali and Jullundur were joining at Kirkee, and others from the 
disbanded Groups at Lahore. The number of applicants to join the 
post-war units exceeded the vacancies. British officers, and Warrant 
and N.C.Os., were fast disappearing. Sport continued to play an 
important part in the daily life though Polo had ceased. The News 
Letter of July 1947 adds:— “‘Consequent on the declaration that 
all British officers will be out of India by June 1948, we are now 
hurriedly trying to nationalize the Group with Indian officers. This 
is no easy task as the number of Indians who have been given com- 
missions in the R.I.E. during the war has been small in comparison 
with other arms. Today we have in the Centre I5 I.C.Os. and in the 
field units, 20 I.C.Os. The peace establishment of a Field Company 
authorizes 4 officers, and that of the Engineer Centre is 53 officers. 
From these figures it can be deduced that we shall be very short of 
1.C.Os. A scheme is now in operation to grant suitable V.C.Os., 
who are under 40 and possess certain certificates of education, direct 
Regular Commissions in the Group. If they are granted commis- 
sions, we shall be able to complete nationalization by the due date, 
not otherwise. The rate of release of men since March has dwindled 
gradually, and the Demobilization Battalion ceased to exist on 
March 3lst. The total number released from August 15th, 1945, to 





1 It should be noted that, in the autumn of 1946, 27, 28, 29 and 92 Field Companies 
and 328 Field Park Company had been re-numbered 17, 18, 19, 22 and 42 


respectively. 


494 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


June 16th, 1947, is 16,519, i.e. V.C.Os. 219, I.O.Rs. 15,571, and B.W. 
and N.C.Os. 729. The elimination of the last named was practically 
completed in May. Five only now remain at the Depot. After a 
lapse of several months, rowing has been revived by a small band of 
enthusiasts. A race for Junior Fours, organized by the Royal 
Connaught Boat Club, was held on June Ist and was won by our 
crew.” 

The partition from Pakistan was an emergency operation, made 
at express speed. Almost all the units of the old Indian Army were 
of mixed composition, and therefore their transfer intact according 
to their local or territorial names was impossible. The Bengal Sappers 
and Miners, for instance, had not been recruited from Bengal for 
more than a century. Hindu squadrons or companies had to be 
allotted to India while their Mahomedan counterparts went to 
Pakistan. Officers and men who had lived their lives together found 
themselves separated as it were overnight. The vacuum caused by 
the rapid withdrawal of so many British officers holding high appoint-. 
ments resulted in junior Indian officers being raised suddenly to 
senior ranks. Young blood may be welcome in war: in peace, older 
and more experienced heads are preferable. In the Indian Army, 
many Field Officers had to be promoted to Brigadiers, or even 
Major-Generals, within a few months. Who then could fill their 
places as Battalion or Company Commanders? It was difficult to 
find Company Commanders with the necessary experience of peace- 
time administration, and this affected the Indian Engineers equally 
with other branches of the forces. 

The story of the disturbances along the boundary between India 
and Pakistan which preceded the actual Partition is a sad one and 
best forgotten, but some mention may be made of the efforts of 
certain Indian Engineer formations to minimize communal strife near 
Sialkot and Lahore in the area destined for inclusion in Pakistan. 
According to the anonymous writer of an article in The R.E. Journal,’ 
the trouble in the Sialkot Sub-Area started in February 1947 when 
two companies of the Frontier Force were deployed along the North- 
Western Railway in the Gujranwala District. The situation at 
Gujranwala and Wazirabad remained tense throughout the hot 
weather while 622 Group, R.I.E., under Lieut.-Colonel D. R. W. 
Waller, R.E., was forming at Sialkot. This Group comprised 14 
and 15 Field Companies (Madras) under Majors P. A. Walker, R. E. 





1 “Sappers at Sialkot’, appearing in The R.E. Journal, June 1948, pp. 89-93. 


INDIA, 1944 - 47 495 


and R. N. Kumar, R.LE., and 42 Field Park Company (Bombay) 
under Major A. D. M. Dunne, R.E. The two Field Companies had 
to find a mobile column while the Field Park Company guarded 
vital points. 622 Group was part of a Punjab Boundary Force 
under Major-General T. W. Rees and was required to co-operate 
in restoring order. This it did with great effect although 14 and 15 
Companies were about to become Dominion of India Troops, and 
-42 Company, being composed of Punjabi-Mahomedans, was destined 
for Pakistan. The achievements of these Sapper companies in the 
Sialkot Sub-Area, both before and after the Partition, are beyond 
praise. Except for a single company of infantry, they were the only 
active units in the hands of the local Commander, and they alone had 
proper transport and means of communication. Their discipline 
also was immaculate. At Lahore, 474 Engineer Brigade did equally 
well as part of the Boundary Force. The writer of another anonymous 
article in The R.E. Journal’ describes some of the nightmare incidents 
of July and August. Everything was in a ferment. The -Muslims 
blamed the Sikhs for massacres in Bengal in 1946. The Sikhs recalled 
the massacres of their own people in the Rawalpindi District in 
the spring of 1947. Lahore was given over to rioting and arson, 
while the Boundary Force did its best to maintain law and order in 
the disputed areas on both sides of the new frontier. 474 Engineer 
Brigade was used almost entirely in an infantry role. Its units tried 
to maintain order in eighty square miles of country including part 
of Lahore City. They provided guards for Refugee Evacuation 
convoys, protected the Lahore Railway Station, and operated with a 
column sent towards Amritsar. Often they quieted riotous mobs 
by the simple expedient of making the rioters sit down. The stream 
of refugees in both directions across the border was prodigious. 
The number is said to have exceeded the population of Ireland, 
and far more lost their homes and belongings during the upheaval. 
As at Sialkot, the Sappers at. Lahore did their duty without fear 
or favour and thus helped to reduce the sum total of death and 
misery. 

On August 15th, 1947, the policy of Partition having been accepted 
by the leaders of the main political parties of both sides on June 
3rd, the sub-continent of India ceased to be a British Dependency, 
and two new independent Sovereign States—India and Pakistan—- 





1“Sappers at Lahore”, by ‘Senator’, appearing in The R.E. Journal, December 
1949, pp. 379-394. 


496 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


came into being as full members of the British Commonwealth of: 
Nations. Shortly afterwards, Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck 
issued the following message to the British forces which had served 
under him as Commander-in-Chief, India:— ‘Nearly two hundred 
years have passed since British soldiers first came to India. The 
Empire of India under the British Crown has now come to an end 
and its place has been taken by two new member States of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations to be known as India and Pakistan. 
These States will be fully independent and responsible for their own 
borders. This great change means that there is no longer any need 
in this country for units of the British Army or the Royal Air Force 
to form part of the Armed Forces of the two new States. During 
the long sojourn of the British Army in India, it has always served 
in peace and fought in war alongside its comrades of the Indian 
Army. This partnership has been a close and glorious one and has. 
given birth to a great mutual respect and a warm friendship between 
the two Armies which reached its zenith, perhaps, in the hard school 
of the last war, the greatest of all wars. You, who are now about 
to leave these shores, have been worthy representatives of those 
that have gone before you, and you may go in the knowledge that 
your comrades of the Indian Army and the Royal Indian Air Force 
will not forget you or the trials and dangers you have faced together. 
You, for your part, will, [ am sure, remember them as great fighters 
and staunch friends. You have deserved well of India and its peoples, 
and in the name of its fighting men, I wish you God speed.” 

The withdrawal of British forces started at once. On August 
17th, a large contingent of the Royal Air Force sailed from Bombay. 
At the end of November, the Supreme Headquarters were closed 
and Field-Marshal Auchinleck left by air for the United Kingdom. 
The Headquarters, British Troops in India, under Major-General 
L. G. Whistler, moved to Bombay on December 22nd, and on 
January Ist, 1948, General Whistler assumed responsibility for the 
final departure of all British troops from India and Pakistan. His 
burden was eased by the full co-operation of the Armies of both 
States. Towards the end of February 1948 the only British unit 
remaining on Indian soil was the 1st Battalion, The Somerset Light 
Infantry, which had arrived by train in Bombay. At Karachi, in 
Pakistan, was the 2nd Battalion, The Black Watch. The latter 
embarked on February 26th, and the Somersets on February 28th. 
An impressive ceremonial parade was held at Bombay before a 
vast concourse of people. Guards of honour were provided by the 


INDIA, 1944-47 497 


Royal Indian Navy and regiments of the Indian Army. The parade 
was attended by H.E. Maharaj Singh, the Governor of Bombay, 
who took the salute and made a speech of farewell on behalf of al 
India. The colours of the Somerset Light Infantry were trooped 
between Indian guards of honour through the famous ‘Gateway 
of India’ and afterwards taken by launch to the troopship Empress 
of Australia, This historic departure was marked by a farewell 
message from General F. R. R. Bucher, C-in-C, Army in India, in 
reply to one sent by General Whistler. ‘“‘On behalf of all ranks of 
the Indian Army”, it ran, ‘‘] thank you for your message of good 
wishes. The British soldier’s impartiality, good humour and tolerance 
have given him many friends in this country. His ability to endure 
hardship, and his capacity for making the best of things wherever 
he is, have gained him our respect. We hope the comradeship between 
the Indian and British fighting soldier, which has stood the test of 
many battles, will long continue.” 

Many are the tributes to the good feeling which existed in India 
at the time of the Partition between the Muslim soldiers on the one 
hand and the Hindus and Sikhs on the other, and also between both 
and the departing British. Major P. M. Leslie-Jones mentions that 
when a Bombay Sapper party of Punjabi-Mahomedans, returning 
from service overseas, waS moving across the country on its way to 
Pakistan, the men insisted on going to say goodbye to their Mahratta 
and Sikh friends as they passed through Kirkee. Again, when train- 
loads of Punjabi-Mahomedans left Kirkee for Pakistan a little later, 
the Sikhs and Mahrattas flocked to the railway station to say fare- 
well. Colonel L. O. Clark, when driving to the station on his 
departure, noticed teams of combined classes still happily playing 
football and basket-ball together. Similar scenes might have been 
witnessed at Roorkee which was much closer to the boundary between 
India and Pakistan. The ties of brotherhood in war transcended 
differences of creed, and it was pitiable that they should have to be 
so rudely severed for political reasons. The British officers encountered 
on all sides the most profound expressions of regret at their approach- 
ing departure. It might have been thought that Independence Day 
on August 15th, 1947, would have been the occasion of demonstrations 
against them by the civilian population. In fact, the reverse was 
the case. The matter having been settled, the people wished to part 
from the British as friends. The Union Jack which had flown over 
the Lucknow Residency for ninety years had already been lowered 
after dark by British hands and the flagstaff itself removed by a 


498 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


party of Bengal Sappers from Roorkee. A new flagstaff was then 
erected, and the Indian National Flag was hoisted on the 15th in 
the presence of the Premier of the United Provinces, Pandit Pant. 
The old flag, and those also from the Dethi Fort and Fort William, 
Calcutta, were forwarded to Field-Marshal Auchinleck for disposal 
in England. The last British unit to leave Lucknow was a battalion 
of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the last to leave Delhi was the 2nd 
Battalion, The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment which, as the 76th 
Foot, had been the first to arrive there. Everywhere, the transfer 
of military control was carried out with due ceremony and the utmost 
goodwill, and thus the critics of British administration were con- 
founded. On the political side, the Indian Government agreed to 
the retention of Lord Mountbatten as the first Governor-General of 
India for a period of seven months after the Partition. Could 
diplomacy go further? 

The history of the Indian Engineers after the Partition will doubt- 
less be recorded later in another volume, but it may be remarked 
here that 1948 was a year which saw many changes not only in the 
higher military and political appointments but also in the three 
Sapper Groups. In January, Lieut.-General Sir Rob Lockhart, who 
had succeeded General Bucher, handed over the command of the 
Indian Army to General K. M. Cariappa, and in June Lord 
Mountbatten, the Governor-General, left the country. The responsi- 
bilities of Major-General J. F. D. Steedman as Engineer-in-Chief, 
India, from the time of the Partition to the end of 1947 had been 
heavy; but those of his successor, Major-General H. Williams, were 
certainly no lighter. ‘Bill’ Williams will always be remembered 
not only as a popular and efficient administrator for a period of 
eight years but also as a keen mountaineer and the leader of an Indian 
Engineer expedition which so nearly reached the summit of Kamet 
(25,447 feet) in June 1952.1 The last British Commandant at Roorkee 
was Colonel R. E. Holloway who was succeeded by Colonel 
J. S. Dhillon in February 1948. At Kirkee, in the same month, 
Colonel M. R. H. Z. Swinhoe handed over charge to Colonel A. P. 
Nanda. The latter unfortunately died in November 1948 and was 
followed by Colonel P. S. Bhagat, the first Indian recipient of the 


Victoria Cross during the Second World War. At Bangalore, in 


a ee ee 


a a eainek 1952”, by Major N. D. Jayal, Engineers, appearing in The Journal of the 
Institution of Military Engineers, January 1953, pp. 19-31. 


INDIA, 1944-47 499 


March 1948, Colonel B. E. Whitman handed over to Colonel R. K. 
Kochhar. During that year, the Indian Engineers were represented 
in military operations in the Hyderabad State, and also in Kashmi 
where 2nd Lieut. R. R. Rane of the Bombay Group was the first 
officer to be awarded the Param Vir Chakra (the equivalent of the 
V.C.) for conspicuous gallantry.! For several days during April, 
Rane was in charge of a party engaged in clearing mines and road- 
blocks so that tanks could get through. He and his men were always 
under close machine-gun and grenade fire but never rested until the 
road had been opened. The only British officer serving with the 
Bombay Sappers after 1948 was Major (later Lieut.-Colonel) A. B. 
Rhodes, R.E., who remained until the summer of 1954. A couple 
of months earlier, the Madras Sappers had lost their last two British 
officers, Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Henchy and Major D. W. Mc Grath, 
R.E. The Bengal Sappers had already been completely Indianized 
for several years. Captain J. S. Coulson, R.E., the last British 
officer to serve regimentally with them, had left Roorkee in April 
1948 with two other officers, Captain M. W. Mee and Lieut. R. W. S. 
Biggs, R.E. By the autumn of 1954, therefore, the exodus of Royal 
Engineers from India was complete with the exception of the Engineer- 
in-Chief, Major-General H. Williams, and one or two officers em- 
ployed as specialists or as instructors at the College of Military 
Engineering in Kirkee. 

“Sarvatra’’, the motto of the modern Corps of Indian Engineers, 
means ‘“‘everywhere.’” It emphasizes the link with the Corps of 
Royal Engineers whose motto is “Ubique.’’ The connection is 
shown also in the wreath appearing on the Indian Engineer badge, 
although the lotus leaf has been substituted for the laurel. In the 
centre of the badge is a fort based on the design of the Purana Qila 
at New Delhi, and around it a Chakra, the quoit-like Sikh weapon 
of war, on which is inscribed the motto. The name of the Corps 
appears on a scroll below, and at the top is the three-headed lion 
of the Asoka Pillar, a symbol of loyalty and integrity. True to its 
motto, the Corps served and fought over a large part of the globe 
during the Second World War. The wide tracts of the Sudan, the 
banks of the Nile, the barren wastes of the Western Desert, the 
fertile valleys of Tunisia, the rugged terrain of Italy, the deserts of 
Iraq and Arabia, the uplands of Persia, the jungles of Burma and 





1 Other modern Indian Army decorations are the Maha Vir Chakra (D.s.o. or 
D.c.M.) and the Vir Chakra (M.c. or M.M.). 


500 THE INDIAN ENGINEERS 


the swamps of Malaya, in each and all Indian Engineers shed their 
blood in the cause of freedom. The Corps Day is celebrated annually 
on January 28th. At a dinner in Delhi on that auspicious occasion 
in 1951, Major-General S. P. P. Thorat remarked that wherever 
Indian troops had fought, the Sappers had left behind them foot- 
prints for others to follow, recalling to mind scenes of unparalleled 
determination and devotion to duty, of technical skill and personal 
bravery. These, said he, would ever remain as living evidence of the 
achievements of the Corps of Engineers on the field of battle. No 
epitaph could be more appropriate to those who had fallen, no 
tribute more inspiring to those who still maintain the great traditions 
bequeathed to them by past generations. 


THE END 


APPENDIX * A’ 


MADRAS ENGINEER GROUP 


STATE OF THE GROUP IN SEPTEMBER 1939 


At the outbreak of World War If the Group was distributed as 
follows :-— 


At Bangalore 


Group HQ 

‘A’ (Depot) Coy 

Training Bn 

14 Field Coy 

32 Field Troop (Jater re-designated ‘“Squadron”’) 

44 Divisional HQ Coy (later re-designated “‘Field Park’’) 


Outside Bangalore 


9 Field Coy and 16 Army Troops Coy at Wana 
10 Field Coy at Razmak 
13 Field Coy in Mandalay 
11 Army Troops Coy, 12 Field Coy and 15 Field Coy which 
had been despatched to overseas theatres. 


Total strength in September 1939 


Officers 5] 
BW and NCOs 55 
VCOs 65 
IWOs 3 
IORs 3,300 


REORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION DURING THE WAR 


Due to the acute all-India shortage of equipment and the fact 
that it was not initially anticipated that Indian troops would be 
required in large numbers, the expansion during the first year of war 
was only 2,000 men. 

In 1940 the Group was responsible for raising three Engineer 
Training Centres which provided a permanent nucleus with adequate 
workshop facilities for training engineer units’in their areas. 


501 


$02 APPENDIX ‘A’ 


These Centres were :— 
No. 12 ETC at Secunderabad 
No. 15 ETC at Sialkot 
No. 20 ETC at Kohat 


The Centres remained in existence for about three years. 

In the meanwhile, at Bangalore in November 1940, Group HQ 
was first reorganized. In 1941 the Forming Troops Bn came into 
being. Its task was to foster new Engineer formations and to super- 
vise them in the initial stages, their training being co-ordinated and 
directed by the Forming Troops Bn. 

The existing Training Bn was rapidly becoming unwieldy and 
No. 2 Training Bn was therefore formed, and later, in September 
1941, No. 3 Training Bn came into being. 

In January 1940 an Officer Cadets Training Unit was formed in 
Bangalore. It functioned as a GHQ unit and remained affiliated to 
the Group throughout the war. In June 1941 two separate OCTUs 
were formed, but they were amalgamated in January 1943. The 
OCTUs was reorganized in September 1944 and became known 
thereafter as the EOTS (Engineer Officers’ Training School). This 
reached its maximum strength of 210 cadets in 1946 and was finally 
disbanded on December Ist, 1947. It is of interest to note that courses 
were conducted for Officers and NCOs of the West African Div 
Engineers in November 1943, for Afghan officers in October 1945, 
and for Burmese officers and cadets in April and December 1946. 

In April 1942 the strength of the Group had risen to 17,000 with 
fifty field units, many of which were serving overseas. 

The vast increase in the number of trainees led to a reorganization 
of the Workshops, when all non-mechanical trades were moved to 
the Meeanee lines. 

Boys first appeared in the Group in November 1941. A small 
Boys Cadre was formed in No. | Training Bn anda Boys Cadre in 
the Depot Bn, these being grouped together in October 1943 
as a Bn. The Boys Bn now took over Clive Lines from No. 1 
Training Bn which moved to Jallahalli, replacing the Forming 
Troops Bn which returned to the Meeanee Lines for disbandment 
in August 1944. Thus the three Training Bns were co-ordinated 
under one authority as a Training Wing. In January 1945 the Boys 


Bn moved to the Institute Camp and was accommodated in the 
Forming Troops Bn Lines. 


MADRAS ENGINEER GROUP 503 


THEATRES OF WAR 
During the peak period the following numbers of units were based 
on the Group. 


Field Coys 37 
Para Fd Coy : 

Workshop and Park cae . Zs 

Fd Park Coys... re a we, 


Army Troops Coy 
Construction Coy 
Heavy Bridging Coy 
E & M Coy ‘ 
Railway Construction and ‘Maintenance Coy 
Railway Workshop Coy 
Mechanical Equipment Coy 
Quarrying Coys .. 
M E Platoons 
Bridge Maintenance Pl 
Bridging Sections a - we vl 
Bridging Coy 
DCE ; 
Div Engineer Groups 
Army Engineer Groups 
Army Troops Engineer Groups 
Forward Airfield Engineer Groups .. 
Engineer Training Centres 
Engineer Bns 
Southern Army ME School 
and other minor units. 
Units were located in the following theatres :— 
MEF 
Paiforce 
CMF 
Italy 
Burma 
Malaya 
Assam 
Arakan 
Ceylon 
Java 
India Command 


—= NWNN WO | =— — = PW we ee BR RMR SK NN 


504 APPENDIX ‘A’ 


UNITS TAKEN PRISONERS-OF-WAR 


When Singapore fell on February 15th, 1942, the following units 
fell into Japanese hands in Malaya. 
46 Army Troops Coy 
13 Field Coy 
15 Field Coy 
6 Bridging Section 
14 Bridging Section. 


HONOURS AND AWARDS 
The following decorations were awarded to personnel of the 
Group during 1939-45. 
George Cross 
Order of Patriotic War (ist ass 


no — 


DSO 

OBE .. Wg are oe a 
MC a4 ns ae Be a6. 28 
Bar to MC ts wee a oe 2 
Durand Medal Sad Be is. te 
American Silver Star ged ei hs J 
OBI Ist Class... a 2 vce AT 
OBI 2nd Class... ets 55 .. 45 
MBE... i - ine wi, th 
IOM _.. Se 4d ier . 4 
DCM ee es - a2 | 
George Medal .. ats ae te 1 
IDSM .. bee a .. 18 
MM _... o ak 8 ss 3S 
BEM 


THE DEMOBILIZATION PERIOD, 1945-47 


Following the Japanese surrender came orders for the formation 
of a Demobilization Centre. This was started by the discharge 
of recruits with less than 16 weeks training in No. | Training 
Bn. The remaining recruits of No. 1 Training Bn were transferred 
to No. 2 Training Bn, leaving the staff of No. | Training Bn available 
for the new Demob Centre. 

The Demob Centre was divided into a HQ Coy, a Release Coy, 


a Resettlement Training and Trades Training Coy, and a Holding 
Coy. 


MADRAS ENGINEER GROUP 505 


Each man spent ten days in the Demob ‘machine’ during which 
he was issued with clothing, interviewed for resettlement and given 
trade tests and an MT driving licence if he so desired. 

With the return of units from overseas, the Demob Centre was 
working to full capacity in 1946. By March 1947, a total of 22,400 
men had been demobilized. 

The strength of the Group at the time of the Japanese surrender 
was :— 


Officers a ii is 667 
BW and NCOs .. 2s = s 217 
VCOs .. ‘i aoe ro tie 607 
IORs .. i Se, gs .. 30,630 
NCSE .. ae 28 ie .. 2,898 


There were [01 units in all. 


PARTITION 


Partition did not affect the Group appreciably. However, consi- 
derable changes took place. Indianization set in rapidly, and by 
December 1947 only three British Service officers remained. The 
three war-time Training Bns were absorbed into one Training Bn 
which moved into the Meeanee Lines. The Depot Wing shrank 
into a Bn commanded by a Major. The Boys Bn was much reduced 
and moved into the Nilsandra Lines. 


CLASS COMPOSITION 

The class composition of the Group remained predominantly 
Madrassi. Only in the Railway Engineer Group was there a 
sprinkling of other classes. 


APPENDIX * B’ 


BENGAL ENGINEER GROUP 


STATE OF THE GROUP AT THE TIME OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
In September 1939 the Group consisted of the following :— 


Corps HQ and Depot Units 


Corps Adjutant 
Superintendent of Instruction 
Officer In-charge Workshops 
Corps Quartermaster 
Records and Accounts 
Training Bn 

Detachment “‘H’’ Coy RE 


Active units 
Field Coys — 1,2,3,4and5 
Army Troops Coys — 6and 8 
Field Park Coys — 41 and 43 
Field Troops — 31 and 35 


The total strength of the Group at that time was 3,242 all ranks. 


REORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION DURING THE WAR 

At the outbreak of hostilities demands for manpower increased 
immensely. Field units had to be reorganized to make them battle- 
worthy. The immediate operational requirements resulted in the 
mobilization of the majority of field units then existing and a reserve 
of manpower had to be maintained by raising new units. 

The raising of new units naturally depended on a greater output 
of men from the Training Bn, Workshops and Field Works, and 
on drawing manpower from other resources such as the calling up 
of reservists and re-enrolment of ex-pensioners. 

All this resulted in a huge expansion which caused the following 
major changes :— 

Training Bn 


Apart from an increase in the holding and output of recruits, 
the number of Training Bns went up from 1 to 3, the last one 
being authorized in September 1941. 


506 


BENGAL ENGINEER GROUP 507 


Depot Wing 
The Depot Bn had to be separated from the Training Bn early 
in 1940. In April 1944 this unit eventually took the shape of a Depot 
‘Wing composed as follows :— 
Reinforcement Bn 


For holding all available man-power as reinforcements. 


Specialist Bn 


MT Coy — For holding MT trainees. 

Trades Coy — For holding Workshop trainees including 
clerks. 

Staff Coy — All Gp HQ instructional and other staff 


including the permanent staff of the Depot 
Wing and Depot Bn. 


Depot Coy — Low medical category personnel, arrivals 
from units and leave details. 
Duty Coy — General duties personnel. 
Boys Bn 


This was originally raised in January 1941 asa part of the Depot 
Bn. In January 1942 it was reorganized into an independent unit. 
The intention in raising this Bn was to recruit young boys between 
the ages of 15 and 16 years and to train them as tradesmen. 


OC Troops 
This appointment was approved in November 1940. The designa- 
tion was later changed to OC FTB (Forming Troops Bn). 


OCTU 

There were two such units in Roorkee which trained officers 
in all engineering subjects before they were posted to Engineer 
units. 

By March 1944 the Group had expanded to seven times its pre-war 
strength, the peak effective strength being 23,850. At this stage the 
number of various types of Field Units was as under :— 

Field Coys — 30 


Field Park Coys — 7 
Light Field Park Coy — tl 
Field Sqns — 2 
Para Sqn — | 

1 


Airborne Fd Sqn — 


508 APPENDIX 


Army Tps Coys 
Engineer Bn 

Bridging Sections 
Bridge Maintenance PI 
Ind Div Bridging Pls 
Independent Pls 

Road Roller Pls 
Special Section 


Commander Army Group 


Engineers (473) 
Corps Tps Engineers 
Divisional Engineers 


Engineer Training Centre 


IMPORTANT THEATRES OF OPERATION 


Middle East 


a 


SK Nm WN —| A — Nr 


wWwnnN = 


Western Desert (Sidi Barrani) 4 Fd Coy (4 Div) 


Mount Cochen 
Relief of Tobruk 
El Alamein 


Italy 


Cassino and 
“Operation Vandal” 


Malaya and Burma 


— do — 

4 Fd Coy (11 Bde), 1941 
2 Fd Coy (4 Div) 

4 Fd Coy 

41 Fd Pk Coy (10 Div) 


7 Fd Coy (8 Div) 


66 Fd Coy (8 Div) 

69 Fd Coy (8 Div) 

47 Fd Pk Coy (8 Div) 
1 Fd Coy (8 Div) 


4 Fd Coy (8 Div) 
5 Fd Coy (8 Div) 
41 Fd Pk Coy (8 Div) 


3 Fd Coy (11 Div), 1941 


43 Fd Pk Coy (11 Div), 194] 
70 Fd Coy (17 Div), 1942 


BENGAL ENGINEER GROUP 509 


Arakan 73 Fd Coy iS Corps, for- 
74 Fd Coy ; merly of 14 Div 


23 Engr Bn (15 Corps) 
77 Fd Coy (7 Div) 
17 Br Sec (7 Div) 
2 Fd Coy (5S Div) 
74 Fd Coy (5 Div) 


HONOURS AND AWARDS 


The following decorations were awarded to personnel of the 
Group :— 


CBE — | 
DSO — 1 
OBE — 8 
Bar to MC — 1 
MC — 39 
MBE — 26 
BEM — 8 
IOM 2nd Class — 7 
IDSM — 22 
MM — 42 
GM & Bronze Star — 4 
(American) 


REORGANIZATION AFTER THE WAR, INCLUDING THE DEMOBILIZATION 
PERIOD 

Demobilization was planned and carried out in three phases as 
follows :— 

Phase f 

Demobilization of re-employed pensioners and recruits with less 
than 6 months’ service. 

Phase II 

Release of trained soldiers to reduce the strength of the Group. 
This phase lasted from November 15th, 1945, to May 3st, 1946, 
and the strength of the Group was reduced by more than 50 per cent. 


Phase Ill 

Reduction to peace-time strength. Because of partition, this was 
not actually carried out. 

The demobilization was carried out at Group HQ by Records and 
Accounts and the Demob Bn. All personnel selected for demobiliza- 
tion were posted to the Demob Bn where they were placed in the 


510 APPENDIX ‘B’ 


Demob chain in batches of 60 to 100. Owing to a very exhaustive 
and comprehensive system, no major difficulties were experienced in 
effecting the bulk of the reduction. 

Pre-release training was arranged for all men other than recruits 
with less than 6 months’ service and re-employed pensioners. The 
main subjects in which training was imparted were :— 

Education; agricultural subjects; cottage industries; refresher 
trades; hygiene and sanitation. 


CLASS COMPOSITION 


The class composition was Hindus (Garhwalis, Purbeas), Muslims 
and Sikhs. Some units were based on a one-caste system while 
others were mixed to platoon level. There was no uniform policy, 
however, and class composition varied from unit to unit. 


APPENDIX ‘C’ 


BOMBAY ENGINEER GROUP 


STATE OF THE GROUP AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 


Establishment 
Officers 46 
BWOs and BNCOs 42 
VCOs 63 
ORs 2,855 
Units 


Corps Headquarters 
Training Bn composed of: 


A Coy Depot Permanent Staff 
B Coy 

C Coy Training Coys 

D Coy 


Field Units 

18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 Field Coys 
42 Div HQ Coy 

55 Printing Section 

CRE 2nd Ind Div, Quetta. 


REORGANISATION AND EXPANSION DURING THE WAR 

Early stages 

Rapid expansion of S & M units had to be catered for during the 
war. Reservists were called up for colour service by stages beginning 
from August 1939. By the end of 1940, practically all reservists had 
been called up. 24 Field Coy was raised in May 1940. Reorganization 
of the Corps HQ and Depot establishment took place during the 
same period in addition to the raising of an Army Troops Coy. 
The Training Bn was also expanded by the addition of F-6 and 
F-7 Coys at Quetta and Kohat, and 23 Field Coy was raised in 
September 1940. 

The training period for recruits, which was reduced to 50 weeks 
at the end of 1939, was further reduced to 36 weeks in July 1940, 
but after a few months it was raised to 52 weeks as it was found 


511 


§12 APPENDIX ‘C’ 


that personnel with only 36 weeks’ training could not have the full 
trades training. 

The strength of Indian personnel in the Field rose to 10,490 in 
June 1943, with a monthly intake of 345 recruits and an output of 
276. A total of 3,290 men were under training. The strength of the 
Group was nearly double the above by the end of 1943. 

Pioneer Bns were formed in 1941, and Training teams were supplied 
by the Group. Ex-VCOs on the pension establishment had to be 
recalled for active service to meet the requirements of the Training 
teams. 

Training teams were also provided for the Engineer Depot, Lahore, 
to raise Artisan Works Coys (15, 16, 17, 18 and 19) in 1941. 


The Peak Period 


During the peak period in 1943-45, trained men were required in 
large numbers to raise the many emergency units of the Group. 
The Group suffered heavy losses of well-trained pre-war personnel 
in Malaya, and it was an extremely difficult task to find sufficient 
men to train recruits. The Training Centre was organized into three 
Battalions, and a system was built up to turn out Sappers who 
were fit to serve in field units. 

The intake of each of these Training Bns was fixed at 120 men per 
month, though this varied considerably. The recruiting was originally 
done by a Group Recruiting Officer. As requirements continued to 
increase, he was re-designated as the Group Liaison Officer. His 
task was to act as a link between the Recruiting Officers and the 
Training Wing in order to maintain a flow of suitable recruits. 

Due to the expansion of the Group, the entire Recruit Training 
Organization was moved to Dighi early in 1942. A Training Wing 
consisting of 3 Training Bns (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) was formed at Dighi. 
The recruits were sent to the three Training Bns, each of which was 
organized as six Training Coys and one HQ Coy. The Training 
Coys were numbered from F-1 to F-18. There was also a Boys Bn, 
and all four were controlled by HQ Training Wing. A branch of 
the Workshops for trades’ training was also moved to Dighi under 
an Assistant Instructor, Workshops, who was responsible to the 
Chief Instructor, Workshops, at Group HQ. 


BOMBAY ENGINEER GROUP 513 


THEATRES OF WAR IN WHICH UNITS FOUGHT 
The Group lost the following units in Malaya in the early stages 

of the war:— 

HQ 9 Divisional Engineers 

HQ 11 Divisional Engineers 

17 Field Coy 

19 Field Coy 

22 Field Coy 

23 Field Coy 

42 Field Park Coy 

45 Army Troops Coy 


The undermentioned units of the Group took part in major opera- 
tions during the war, and the men, by their discipline and strong 
sense of duty, won a good name for the Group. Col. P. S. Bhagat 
was awarded the Victoria Cross for conspicuous gallantry on active 
service in the Middle East. He was the first Indian to receive this 
much coveted award during World War II. 


HQ 5 Indian Divisional Engineers 

18 Field Coy Middle East and North 
20 Field Coy Africa 

21 Field Coy / 


HQ 11 Divisional Engineers and 
units as stated ¢ Malaya 


24 Field Coy Burma 


DECORATIONS AND AWARDS 


The following is a summary of outstanding decorations and awards 
won by the Group :— 


vc a a a est. * al 
DSO... is S35 ices, 22 
MC = ss i .. 25 (including 2 bars to 
MC) 
10M _ a. is oe 1 
. Medal of Royal Victorian Order 1 
OBE... os 5 wwe 29 
MBE... a a .. 18 
BEM .. ag 24 3 
IDSM os 4 we. 42 
MM .. ey ame .. 13 (including 1 bar to 


MM) 


$14 APPENDIX ‘C’ 


DISBANDMENT 


The various types of units disbanded were :— 
Field Coys ba es Sac ol 
Field Park Coys 
Field Stores Platoons 
Army Troops Coy 
Airfield Engineers 
Ind Div Engineers A 
Pipe Line Operating Platoons . 

Bridging Platoons ; 
Pipe Line Operating Engineers: 
Field Troops : 
Southern Army Badaineg Carp: 
Army Troops Engineers 
Forward Airfield Engineers 
Engineer Bn 
Corps Troops Engineers 
Printing Sections 
The following numbers were ieleised peivicen August 15th, 1947, 
and December 31st, 1947. 


NNKF ENB KR WNHK KK HU 


JCOs 236 

ORs 16,055 

NCs (E) 818 
PARTITION 


Move of Personnel 

Orders for the move of Punjab Musalmans to the Pakistan Engineer 
Centre, Sialkot, were received in September 1947. Practically no 
difficulty was encountered in carrying out the partition of the Group. 
The move of the troops was accomplished in three phases, as under, 
by special troop trains :— 


Ist Phase — September 28th, 1947. 
2nd phase -— September 29th, 1947. 
3rd phase — October 19th, 1947, 


All civilians belonging to Pakistan were discharged with effect 
from September 30th, 1947, and moved in the troop trains. 


REORGANIZATION AFTER THE WAR, INCLUDING THE DEMOBILIZATION 
PERIOD 


On the fall of Japan in 1945, the release of the Indian Army started. 
A Demobilization Centre under the command of a Lieut.-Colonel 


BOMBAY ENGINEER GROUP $15 


was established on September 29th, 1945, in the Depot Wing of 
the Group at Kirkee. 


Training in Rural Development and Cottage Industries 


Facilities existed in the Rural Development Training Centre for 
training in the following subjects :— 


Improved methods of farming 
Animal Husbandry 

Village improvement 

Poultry farming 

Weaving 

Sericulture 

Rope-making 

Construction of bamboo screens 
Making of rush mats 
Tailoring 

Dairy farming. 

The Demob Bn ceased to exist on March 31st, 1947. Thereafter the 
Demob Centre consisted of one Demob Coy which had disappeared 
finally by the end of 1947. The Training Wing moved from Dighi 
to Kirkee during the month of November 1947. The Reinforce- 
ment Bn was merged into the Depot Bn on March 3lst, 1948. 


RESETTLEMENT 


A Resettlement Advice Officer, with staff, was attached to the 
Demob Centre to give advice and to help men in resettlement. 


REORGANIZATION AFTER THE PARTITION 


The Peace Establishment of the Centre remained the same after 
the Partition. In fact, very little reorganization took place after the 
elimination of the Muslim element. As the Field Coys were already 
organized on a one-caste system, they were not affected at all. 

The Training Bn suffered a loss of trained NCOs which were 
later replaced gradually from the Field Coys. 

A few men had volunteered for training under the Technical 
Training scheme and were called up for training. 

6 Docks Group was badly affected as 40 per cent of its strength 
chose transfer to Pakistan and moved to Sialkot. The Centre, which 
was already depleted in strength, was not in a position to reinforce the 
Training units, especially with important tradesmen such as Serangs 
and Foremen. 


516 APPENDIX ‘C’ 


As a result of partition, the Group lost some Field Park and E/M 
Coys which were manned wholly by Musalmans. 

At the end of 1947, British Service officers were asked to volunteer 
for service with the Indian or Pakistan dominions, but very few did 
so at that time. The Group was completely nationalized by December 
1947, when only two British Service officers were left with the 
Group. 


CLASS COMPOSITION 


The olass composition of the Group during the War remained as 
1/3 Punjabi Musalmans, 1/3 Sikhs and 1/3 Marathas. Amongst 
the Punjabi Musalmans only Sunnis were enlisted, and amongst the 
Sikhs only Mazhbis and Ramdasias. A few Shias and Ahmedias who 
were enrolled in 1940 and 1941 were transferred gradually to other 
Corps. The amalgamation of Nos. | and 2 Transportation Training. 
Centres brought all classes into the Group. 


INDEX 


Note 1: Abbreviations for countries and theatres of war:— 


B — Burma (incl. Manipur) 
FE — Far East (incl. Hong Kong) 
Gr — Greece (inc!. Crete) 
Ind — India (incl. Pakistan) 
Ir — Iraq 
It — Italy (incl. Sicily) 
Ma — Malaya 
Mid E — Middle East (incl. Dodecanese Is. and Cyprus) 
NAf — North Africa (incl. Egypt, Libya, Tripolitania and Tunisia) 
Me Af — Sudan, Eritrea, Abyssinia and British Somaliland 
— Persia 
SEA — ee Asia (incl. Thailand, Indo-China and the East 
Indies 
Sy -—— Syria and Palestine. 
Note 2: Abbreviations for units and formations:— 
Armd — Armoured Pk — Park 
Bde — Brigade Para — Parachute 
Bn — Battalion Pl — Platoon 
Br — Bridging Por — Pioneer 
Const — Construction R — Royal! 
Coy — Company Regt — Regiment 
Div — Division Rly — Railway 
Engrs — _ Engineers S & M— Sappers and Miners 
Fd — Field Sec — Section 
Fwd — Forward Sqn — Squadron 
Gp — Group Tk — Tank 
HQ — Headquarters Tp — Troop 
Inf — Infantry Trg « — Training 
IWT — _ Inland Water Transport TTC — Transportation 
LRP — Long Range Penetration Training Centre 
OCTU — Officer Cadet Training Unit Wks — Works. 


Note 3: The rank shown against a person’s name is usually the highest mentioned in 
this book, not necessarily the highest attained. 


A 


Abdul Majid, L/Naik, 336 
Adami, Lt-Col G.D.S., 468 
Adcock, Maj, 59 
‘Admin Box’, Sinzweya, 288-293 
Aerial ropeways, /t, 164; B, 296, 338, 
345, 349, 411 
Ahmed Din, Lt, 491 
Air evacuation of casualties, 247 
Airfield construction and repairs, Ind, 
12, 247-249; Ir, 66; N Af, 87; Ma 
178, 428, 429; B, 269, 303, 305, 309, 
348, 361-363, 367, 372, 380, 381, 385, 
388, 390, 391, 396, 404, 407, 411; SE 
A, 443-445, 447, 452, 456: FE, 460 
Air lifts 
5th Indian Div, B, 270, 294, 331, 333, 
356, 371, 379; SE A, 447 
other units and formations, Tr, 53; 
B, 268, 269, 309, 332, 373, 378, 


517 


388; SE A, 448, 451, 455; FE, 458 
refugees, 465 

Air supplies, /r, 54; B, 262, 287, 288, 
292, 299, 308, 321, 331, 334, 340, 342, 
343, 348, 350, 358, 361, 371, 372, 377, 
396, 404, 408 

Aizlewood, Brig J. A., 61, 63 

Akarit, battle of. 133, 134 

Akyab, landing at, 299-303 

Alamein, battle of, 108, 113-120 

Alam el Halfa, battle of, 108, 110, Lif 

Alanbrooke, Lord, 108, 150 

Aldous, Maj E. C., 466 

Alexander, Field-Marshal Viscount, of 
Tunis, Mid E, 108, 123, 134, 135, 138; 
It, 142, 143, 150, 156, 161, 174; B, 
221-225, 230, 233, 239, 241 

Alfrey, Lt-Gen Sir C., 137 

Allen, Maj R. W., 444 

Allison, Maj H.E., 455 


518 


Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies | 


(AFNE]D), 436, 437, 443, 457 
Allied Land Forces, South East Asia 
(ALFSEA), 404, 457 
Amba Alagi, battle of, 45, 46 
Anant Singh, T/Capt, 4, 72 
Anderson, Lt-Gen K. A. N., 122 
Anstruthers, Col A. E., 431 
Anwar Khan, Lt-Col, 487 
Aosta, Duke of, 20, 44, 45 
Appa Rao, Jemadar, 328, 329 
Arakan campaign, Ist, 274-284; 
285-297; 3rd, 298-307 
Archibald, Lt-Col B. M., 144 
Arden, Maj A. D., 419 
Arjan Singh, Col, xiii, 2, 30, 32, 299 
“Ark Force’, 80 
“Ark” tank, 163, 166, 168 
Armies, American 
5th, 142-144, 150-152, 156, 159, 161-164, 
167, 169 
7th, 140 
Armies, British 
Ist, 122. 126, 132, 135 
8th, originally Western Desert Force, 
N Af, 24, $2, 85, 88, 92, 97, 108, 109, 


INDEX 


18th (later 518th), 214, 216, 228, 234, 
237, 512 

19th, 512 
25th, 252 
536th, 352 

Artisan Works Engr Depot No. 3 (later 
Const Gp), 7, 474, 475, 512 

Artisan Works Pnr Bns, 22nd, 33rd, and 
36th, 252 


' Aserappa, Brig R. E.. 4, 72, 171 


' Assault landings, B, 300-311; 
2nd, | 


Ma, 424 

Assault river crossings, Jf, 146, 147, 154, 
155, 166, 168-170; 8B, 349, 360, 363, 
364, 368, 369, 373-376, 389, ‘402 


| Auchinleck, Field-Marshal Sir Claude, 


Mid £E, 76, 84-87, 97, 106, 108; Ind, 
21, 254, 332, 419, 467, 468, 487, 488, 
496, 498 

Aung San, Maj-Gen, 386, 420 


B 
Badhani, Maj T. D.. xiii, 388, 389, 394 


: Badoglio, Marshal, 141 


’ Bailey bridge equipment, 


111, 113, 114, 122, 123, 126, 132, 134- 


136; 11, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 149- 
152, 156, 157, 


12th, 404, 405, 412 

14th, 225, 256, 260, 262, 284, 300, 
304, 307-310, 314, 318, 336, 338, 
343-346, 348, 352, 355-357, 363, 
382, 383, 387, 403, 404, 423 

Army in Burma, 923 


Armies, “Burma Independence’, 226, 386 
“Burma National’’, 386, 404, 405, 420 

Armies, Chinese, 5th, 211, 225, 229, 236 
6th, 211, 222 

Armies, German, 14th, 170 

Armies, ‘Indian National’, 287 

Armies, Japanese, 7th Area, 432 
tae 261, 269, 313, 344, 346, 356, 404 

t 

33rd. 408, 406 

Armstrong, Lt-Col A. E., 55 

Armstrong, Brig E. F. E., 318, 412 

Armstrong, Maj W. B. J., xiii, 68, 390, 
391, 393, 394 

Army Groups, British, 11th, 260, 299 
21st, 150 

one Groups R.E. (AGRE), 4th Corps, 


16th, 165 
472nd, 431 
473rd, 508 
Army Troops Engrs, 7, 503; B, 164, 388, 
92, 395, 407, 409; Mi a, 429-431 
465th, 316 
Arnim, Gen von, 135-138 
Amoll, Maj O. M. R., 448 
Artisan Works Coys, a 61, 145 
Ist, 182, 183, 191 
15th, 16th, and 17th, 512 


““Bagush Box”, defence of, 23 


It, 146, 1553. 


B, 249, 388, 396 


‘ Bailey bridging, see Bridging 


159, 161-164, 166-169 


Balbo, Marshal, 20, 22, 23 


Baldwin, Ltd. R. S., 133 


Balkaran Singh, Havildar, 155 

Balkrishna Korde, Naik, 420 

Balston, Lt H. R., 368 

Bangalore (HQ Madras S & M), vii, 17, 
18, 466-468, 481, 501, 502 

Bannerjee, Lt J. L., 102 


' Bardell, Capt D. H., 55 
Eastern Army, 240, 247, 254, 260 


Barlow, Maj G. A. P. N., 428, 462 
Barnes, Maj J. E., 251 


_ Barstow, Maj-Gen A. E., 182, 201 


Bashir Ahmed, Lt, 217 


| Batavia, fighting in, 437-444 


- Bate, Maj J. E., 


182 


, Bateson, Capt T. C. H., 157 
: Battye, Maj S. H. M., 55 
_ Beach Gps, Mid E, 77; B, 300, 303; Ma, 


427, 428 
4lst, B, 300, 303, 304, 306, 307, 310; 
Ma, 424; SE A, 441 
42nd, 43rd, and 44th, 300 
45th, 300, 424 
46th, 424 
Beattie, Maj A. R., 182, 186, 198 
Beaumont, Maj T., xiii, 301, 305, 306 


; Beddows, Maj J. S., 320, 330 


Bell, Maj M. E. F., 

Benedict, Havildar’ John, 203 

Bengal Sappers and Miners, re-designated 
King George V’s Own Group, Royal 
Indian Engineers, and now called 
Bengal Engineer Group, Corps of 
Engineers, (see Appendix B), 
changes in title, i 71, 419, 480, 482 
class composition, 3 , 8, 478, 482, 483, 


Colonels or Colonels-Commandant, 


15, 470, 480 


INDEX 


Commandants, xi, xii, 2, 4, 9, 15, 
133, 470, 471, 482, 489, 498 


Companies and other units and sub-units, 


507, 508 
1 Fd Coy, t, 6, 506; fr, 55, 67, 68, 
Sy, 74; Mid E, 77; It, 145, 157, 


173, 508: Ind, 464, 482, 491 

2 Fd Coy, 1, 6, 13, 506; NE Af, 29, 
31, 36, 37, 41-45: 
Af, 89, 94, 95, 100, 109, 112, 118, 
120, 123; B, 267, 286, 293, 335-337, 
343, 349, 350, 388-390, 406, 407, 
509; Ma, 434, 435; SE A, 440, 441, 
Ind, 482, 491 

2 Br Sec (formerly 
29, 31 

3 Fd Coy, 2, 6, 506; Ata, 182, 183, 186, 
189, 193-196, 
508. Ind, 482, 491 

4 Fd Coy, 2, 6, 12, 13, 21, 

506: N Af. 22, 23, 26; NE Af, 36, 

37, 40, 48, 43; Gr, 80, 81; Sy, 88, 

94; N Af. 49, 82- 84, 87, 88, 94, 100, 

102, 169, 112, 118, 120, 123- 125, 

127, 129-131, 134, 136-138, 508; /t, 

145, 151, 153, 161, 166, 508; nd, 

482, aks 

Fd Coy, 3, 6. 21, 506; Jr, 53, 55 

67, 68, 72, P, 61, 62, "3; Sy, 74; 

Mid E, 77, 78: It, 145 ‘157, 158, 

162, 166, 173, 508; Ma, 180; Ind, 

464, 482, 491 

Br Sec, 151 


2 Br Train), 13, 


aA 


? 


5 
6 Army Tps Coy, 6, 13, 21, 506; NE 


Af, 29-32, 36, 37; Ir,55, 74; N Af, 

49, 75 82; Gr, 80; Ind, 483 

Fd Coy, 13; Ir, 55, 61; P, 61; It, 

144-146, 148, 149, 154-157, 163, 

166, 168-170, 173, 508; B, 420; 

Ind, 478, 483, 491 

8 Army Tps Coy, 6, 13, 506; NE 
Af, 29, 32, 45, 46; Ir, 74, 75 

17 Br Sec, 290, 509 

23 Engr Bn, 391, 412, 509 

31 Fd Tp (later Fd Sqn; finally Assault 
Fd Coy), 6, 506; Sy, 58, 79; Ir, 
15; N Af, 95, 98, 99; Ind, 491 

33 Fd Sqn (later Para Fd Sqn), 469, 
472, 491 

35 Fd Tp (later Fd Sqn), 3, 6, 506; N 
Af, 48, 49; Ind, 482 

40 Fd Pk Sqn (later Air-borne Pk 
Coy), 469, 491 

41 Fd Pk Coy (formerly Div HQ Coy), 
3, 6, 506; Ir, 53, 54, 68; Sy, 58, 
59; P, 64; Mid E, 76, 77; N Af, 
95, 100, 101, 508; Jr, 145, 157, 158, 
160, 164, 173, 508; Ind, 464, 491 

43 Fd Pk Coy (formerly Driv HQ 
Coy), 2, 3, 6, 506; Ma, 182, 183, 
186, 193, 204, 508; Ind, 491 

47 Fd Pk Coy, 14; Ir, 55, 68, 75; P, 
61; Jt, 144-150, 163, 166, 173, 508 

54 Fd Stores Sec, 182, 200 

66 Fd Coy, 13; Ir, 55, 67; N Af, 95, 
105-107; it, 144-146, 148, 150, 154- 
156, 168-170, 173, 508 


~ 


198-202. 204, 461, | 


Mid E, 76; N , 


519 


67 Fd Coy, B, 352, 354, 403; Ind, 
482, 491 

68 Fd Coy, B, 244, 245, 250, 251, 
267, 328-330; Ma, 428, 429; ‘SE A, 
441, 444; Ind, 491 

69 Fd Coy /r, 55, 67, 75; It, 144- 
146, 148-150, 154-156, 163, 166, 
168, 170. 173, 508 

70 Fd Cov, B, 214, 
230, 232, 234-237, 244, 254, 
257, 263, 264, 267, 272, 315, 316, 
319, 342, 343, 370, 374, 388, 
39-4-396, 413, 417, 5083; frei, 491 

71 Fd Coy, 8, 239, 244, 245, 250, 
251, 267, 320, 328, 330; Alu, 428, 
429; SE A, 437, 439-441, 444, 
446; Ind, 491 

72 Fd Coy. 8, 280. 281, 293, 295, 305, 
308, 30%, 310, 441; SE A, 445, 446 

73 Fd Coy B, 267, 276, 277, 280, 281, 
293, 303, 310, 509 

74 Fd Coy, Aid £, 78; B, 276, 277, 
280, 286, 293, 335, 336, 349, 350, 
355, 374, 389, 390, 395, 406, 509; 
Ma, 434; SE A, 440; Ind, 482, 491 

75 Fd Coy, B, 251, 252, 267, 322, 327, 
355, 371, 376, 392, 418 

76 Fd Coy, B, 352, 403; Ma, 430 

77 Fd Coy, B, 267, 284, 285. 290, 294, 
336, 337, 370, 376, 402, 509; 
SE A, 448, 449 

78 Fd Coy, B, 300-307, 310; Ma, 424; 
SE A, 441 

80 Fd Coy, 392, 410 

81 Fd Coy, 391, 392 

94 (Faridkot) Fd Coy, 3, 267, 325, 345 

95 (Mandi) Fd my (formerly of 
Bombay S & M), 1 

302 Fd Pk od (formerly of Bombay 
S & M), § 

306 Fd Pk chy "469 

322 Fd Pk Coy, /r, 76; B, 267, 328, 
354, 356, 403 

332 Fd Pk Coy, B, 267, 328; 
SE A, 450, 456 

361 Fd Coy, 300, 352, 355, 403 

367 Fd Coy, 469 

a Br Const Sec (later Fd Pk Coy), 

239, 242, 244, 245, 264, 267, 

sis 317, 370, 388, 413, 416, 417 

622 Corps Ener Gp HQ, 491, 494, 495 

623 Corps Ener Gp HQ, 491 

eeae Mechanical Equipment Coy, 459, 


682 Fd Pk Coy, 491 

705 and 709 Mechanical Equipment 
Pls, 459, 461 

A Br Pl, 157 

Boys Bn, 8, 475, 476, 507 

Forming Tps Bn, 9, 507 

HQ and Depot, or Centre, vii, 1, 3, 
6, 12-15, 18, 19, 463, 468-47 1, 475, 
489, 491, 506, 507, 509, 

OCTUs, 8, 470, 507 

Road Roller Pi, 14, 508 

Special Secs, 261, 508 


223, 224, 228, 


256, 


520 


Trg Bns, 2, 6, 9, 15, 470, 482, 506, 
507 


Trg Coys, 469 

Seer a 420, 470, 481, 
482, 509, 

expansion, ss "D9, 463, 465, 468, 483, 
506-508 

honours and awards, 509, see also main 

heading 

Indianization, 3-5, 180, 498, 499 

losses, NE Af, 41; Mid E78; N Af, 
98-100; It, 156, 163; Ma, 1 

Partition and reorganization, 488-492, 


9 

Bennett, Maj C. M., 53, 68, 95, 103 
Bennett, Lt, 98 
Bennett, M3j- Gen Gordon, 182, 202 
Bennett, Maj P. M., xiii, 294, 295, 308 
Bennett, Rev R. M., 333, 345 
Beresford-Peirse, Lt-Gen Sir N. M., 37- 

39, 82, 240 
Bergonzoli, Gen, 25 
Bewley, Maj C. J., 445 


Bewoor, Maj M. G., 72, 180, 181, 284, 289 


Bhadra, Subedar (IAMC), 326 

Bhagat, Lt-Col N. S., 4, 72, 182, 193, 
194, 197 

Bhagat, Col Premendra Singh, VC, 35, 
36, 498, 513 

Bhaginji More, Jemadar, 207 

Bhimrao Khape, Sapper, 420 

Biggs, Lt R. W. Se 491, 499 

Binny, Lt-Col R. A. G., 450, 451, 453 

Bird, Col A. J. G., 4 

Bird, Lt-Gen Sir Clarence, 3, 470 

Birse, Capt G. M., xiii 

Black, Maj G., 491 

Black, Lt, 99 

Blagden, Mai R., 239, 264, 315 

Blundell, Lt- Col J. H. , 112, 118, 123, 127, 
129. 131, 133 

Boileau, Brig-Gen G. H.. 15 

Boggs, Brig W. W., 372, 377, 387 

Bolton, Col E. A. E., 475 

Bomb disposal, 120, 362 


Bombay Sappers and Miners, re-designat- 
ed Royal Bombay Group, Royal Indian : 


Engineers, now called Bombay Engi- 
neer Group, Corps of Engineers, (see 
Appendix C), 

changes in title, 15,71, 419, 480, 484 
we Suepeslinns ',, 444, 489, 493, 
Colones e Colonels-Commandant, 15, 


Commandants, xi, xii, 9, 15, 36, 472, 
485, 487, 498 


Ci ao and other units and sub-units 


9 Br Sec, 267, 276 
11 Br Sec, 276 


17 Fd Coy, a Ma,182, 183, 189, 
193-197, B, 252; Ind, ‘493 


18 Fd Coy, rs 12, ae 26, Sil; NE 
Af, 40; Sy, 58; N Af, 49, 82, 90, 
92, 94, 101, 105, 515; Ind, 493 


INDEX 


19 Fd Coy, 6, 14, 511; Ma, 182-184, 
191, 513; 8B, 420, 493 

20 Fd Coy, 6, 511; NE Af, 29, 32, 
43, 44; Ir, 68, 69, 75; Mid E, 76; 
N Af, 49, 89, 94, 101, 105, 107, 
112, 513; 3B, 267, 286, 335, 336, 
338, 349, 350, 389, 390, 406; Ma, 
434; SE A, 440; Ind, 493 

21 Fd Coy, 6,511; NE Af, 29, 31, 32 
43; Mid E, 76, 77, Gr, 80, 81; N Af, 
49, 89, 94, 105, 124, 134, 136, 138, 
513; It, 145, 151, 153; Ind, 493 

22 Fd Coy, 3, 6, 14, 180, 511; Ma, 
180, 182, 183, 185, 191, 199-201, 
§13; Ind, 493 

23 Fd Coy, 14, S11; Ma, 182, 183, 
193, 198, 199, 513 

24 Fd Coy, S511; B, 214, 216, 217, 
228, 229, 231, 232, 236, 237, 251, 
252, 267, 317, 320-322, 513; Ma, 430 

24 Engr Bn, 289 

25 Rly Const Coy, 10 

26 Fd Coy, 276, 277, 281 

26 Rly Const Coy, 10 

27 Fd Coy, Ir, 55; P, 75; Ind, 464, 
493 


28 Fd Coy, B, 267, 276, 277, 281-283, 
304, 310; SE A, 445, 446; Ind, 493 

29 Fd Coy, B, 252, 351, 352, 361, 
363, 364, 381, 392, 407, 408, 410, 
411, 419; Ind, 493 

30 Fd Coy, B, 267, 358, 360; Ma, 

37 Fd Sqn, 493 

42 Fd Pk Coy (formerly Div HQ 
Coy), 6, 14,511; Ma, 182, 183, 191, 
199, 513; B, 252; Ind, 493, 495 

45 Army Tps Coy, 14; Ma, 182, 183, 
189, 190, 195, 200, 207, 208, 513 

49 Army Tps eae 55, 68, 69 

55 Printing Sec, 6, 511 

91 Fd Coy, B, 243, 251, 267, 320, 330; 
Ma, 428, 429; SE A, 441, 444 

92 Fd Coy, B, 251, 267, 323-325, 

341, 365-368, 398, 401; SE A, 450- 

452, 454, 455 

93 (Mandi) Fd Coy, B, 294, 303-305, 

308; Ma, 428 

95 (Mandi) Fd Coy (later transferred 

to Bengal S & M), 16 

Poa Coy, B, 296; FE,457; Ind, 

97 Fd Coy, Ir, 74, 75; Mid E, 77; 
It, 145, 157, 158, 165, 173 

98 Fd Coy, B, 267, 305, 310; SE A, 
445; Ind, 493 

301 Fd Pk Coy, Ir, 55, 67, 68, 75; 
It, 145, 157, 165, 171 

302 Fd Pk Coy, (later transferred 
to Bengal S & M), 55, 

sy a4 Pk Coy, 276, 371, 376, 392, 


324" Fd Pk Coy, 358, 


430 
328 Fd acs Coy, (ater 42 Fd Pk 
Coy), 445-447, 493 


362 Fd Coy’ 321, 322 


INDEX 


363 Fd Coy, B, 267, 392, 407; FE, ! 


459, 461, 

401 Fd Sqn, 399, 493 

402 Fd Coy, B, 267, 327, 392, 407; 
SE A, 448, 449 

403 Fd Pk Coy, 296 

481 Fd Coy, B, 251, 267, 325-327, 
365-367, 369, 398-401; SE A, 450- 
452, 455, 456 

483 Fd Coy, 267 

485 Fd Coy, 430 

889 Br Sec, 267 

Boys Bn, 8, 472-476, 484, 485, 512 

Br Pl, 417 

Forming Tps Bn, 9 

HQ and Depot, or Centre, vii, 1, 3, 6, 


12-15, 175, 463, 472, 484, 489, 
493, 511, 512, 515 

OCTU, 8 

Por Bons, 512 


Trg Bns, 6, 9, 15, 472, 473, 511, 512, 
515 

demobilization, 419, 420, 473, 484, 493, 
514, 515 

expansion 5-9, 463, 465, 511, 512 

honours and awards, 513, 514, see also 


main heading 
3-5, 180, 493, 494, 


Indianization, 
498, 499, 516 
losses, N Af, 90, 105; Ma, 6, 14,175, 
196, 201, 207, 434, 472, 512, 513 
Partition and reorganization, 488-490, 
493, 494, 514-516 
Bond, Lt-Gen Sir Lionel, xii, 19, 179 
Bond, Maj-Gen R. L., 477 
Bonetti, Adiniral, 44 
Bossard, Maj J. W., 248, 271 
Bower, Maj N. H., xiii, 428 
Boydell, Maj D. H., 157 
Brain, Brig H. G. L., 438 
“Brick Force’, 77, 78 
Bridge classifications, 150 
Bridging 
“Ark”, 163, 166, 168 
Bailey, Gr, 81; It, 146-150, 154-156, 
164-166, 168,169, 173; B, 251, 255, 
259, 338, 350, 352-354, 388, 389, 
391, 392, 394-396, 401, 402, 407-411, 
415, 418, 419; Ma, 429, 430, 434, 
435; FE 460 
floating, excluding Bailey, Ind, 2; Ir, 
58, 69; P, 61, 62; 
168-170; Ma, 185, 200, 454, 455; 
B, 259, 401, 402 
Hamilton, 74 
Inglis, Jr, 74; B, 242, 244, 245 
“Scissors’’, 390-393 
submerged, 63, 164 
suspension, 259, 321, 322, 338, 407- 
4i1 


timber, /r, 58; Gr, 81; /t, 164; B, 245, 
277, 294, 295, 321, 339, 361, 367, 
394, 408, 409, 415 

Bridging units 
Br Coys, 353, 364, 388; 
854th Coy, 376 


It, 148, 164, ; 


1 
I 
| 
1 
| 
\ 
| 
i 
| 
| 
| 


52h 


Br Pts or Secs, 14, 80, 503, 508, 514,. 
see also Madras, Bengal and Bombay 
S & M respectively 

Engr Depot No. 3, 7 

Heavy Br Coy, 503 

Heavy Br Pls, 290, 291 


Brigades, Australian, 22nd, 183, 185, 
206 


27th, 183 


Brigades, British, Ist Army Tk, 85 


3rd Commando, B, 300, 303-307, 343; 

Ma, 424 

4th Armd, 25, 85, 96 

Sth 458, 460 

5th Para, 442 

6th, 277, 279, 281, 334 

et eee N Af, 83; B, 222, 226, 
8 


8th Armd, 126, 127 

16th, 27 

22nd Armd, 126 

22nd Guards, 83 

23rd LRP, 335, 338, 343, 344, 346 

26th, 359 

32nd Tk, 85 

53rd, 202 

72nd, 359 

74th, 294, 298 

20Ist Guards, 85, 126, 135 

255th Tk, B, 370, 375, 378, 383, 384, 
387, 390, 391, 404 

LRP, 250, 261, 268 


Brigades, Burma, Ist, 214, 222 


2nd, 211-214. 217, 222 


Brigades, East African, 22nd, 404 


28th, 370, 373, 376 


Brigades, Indian 


Ist, B, 317, 318; Ma, 424, 428, 429; 

SE A, 437, 442 

2nd Annd, 61, 63, 65 

3rd Motor, 20, 48, 49, 95, 96, 98 

4th, B, 308; SE A, 445 

Sth, NE Af, 34, 39, 40; Sy, 58, 
59; N Af, 26, 27, 49, 90, 92-94, 101, 
102, 107, 118, 128, 133; B, 345 

6th, 181-183, 189, 196, 198 

Tth, NE Af, 41, 44; N Af, 29, 88, 
92-94, 127, 131-133, 137 

8th, 181-184, 191 

9th, Armd. 61, 63, 114 

9th, NE Af, 29, 31, 35, 41, 42, 44; 
N Af, 94, 97, 105, 107; B, 291, 
331, 338, 379; Ma, 432, 439, 440 

10th, NE Af, 29, 31, 34, 36, 41, 
42, 44; N Af, 97 

llth, NE Af, 34, 39, 40; N 4f, 22, 
27, 82, 83, 92-94 

a “Emu”), 180-182, 196, 198, 


13th, 214, 222 

15th, 182, 183, 198 

16th, 212-214, 217, 218, 220, 222 
17th, ir, 56, 57; It, 148 

18th, 61 

19th, 148 

20th, Jr, 31, S53, 56, 57; Ind, 464 


322 


2ist, Ir, 54, 56, 57; Sy, 58; P, 63; 
N Af, 95, 102, 103 

“782. 183, 185, 200, 201 

24th, 60, 61 

25th. Ir, 56, 57; P, 61 65; N Af, 


102 

26th. 281, 332 

27th, 424 

28th, NE Af, 44; Ma, 183, 197-199 

29th, NE Af, 29, 34, 39, 42, 44, 45; 
B, 359 

32nd, N Af, 86, 89, 95, 97, 105; 
B, 271, 322-325, 339, 341, 365, 366, 
368, 369, 399; SE A, 450, 455 

33rd, B, 284, 290, 294, 332, 335, 
337, 377; SE A, 449 

36th, 282, 442 

37th, B, 317, 318, 320, 328; Ma, 424, 
427, 429; SE A, 437, 442, 443 

44th, 205, 206 

45th, 202 

46th, 212-214, 216-218, 220 

47th, 277, 278, 281 

48th (Gurkha), B, 213, 215, 217-219, 
222, 230, 231, 316, 319, 323, 342, 
349, 350, 378, 394, 417 

49th, B, 244, 317, 318, a 330; Ma, 
424, 429; SE A, 437-44 

50th, Para, "B, 270, 273, 309, 314, 318, 
330, 331, 34 

SIst, ’B, 294, 298, 303, 305, 306; 
Ma. 427 

S3rd, B, 294-296, 298, 307; Ma 

S$5th, 277-281 

62nd, 351, 352, 409 

63rd, B, 222, 231, 254, 263, 266, 316, 
320, 323, 339, 378, 388, 394, 395, 413 


, 427 


64th, 351, 352, 408 
Tist, B, 278, 279, 281, 304, 305; 
»E A, 445 


77th, (Chindits), 249 
80th, B, 271, 322, 323, 365, 369, 399, 
400, 402; SE A, 450, 455 
88th, 277 
89th, B, 284, 289, 292, 293, 332, 338 
402; SE A, 449 
98th, 351, 352, 363, 381, 409 
99th, 378, 389 
100th, B, 322, 323, 326, 365, 369, 400; 
SE A, 450, 452, 455, 456 
114th, B, 284, 288-290, 292, 332, 402; 
SE A, 447, 448 
\23rd, B, 276-280, 286, 292, 293, 331, 
338, 349; Ata, 433, 439 
16lst, 
Ma, 433, 439; SE A, 442 
234th, 77, 78 
254th Tk, 318, 343, 379 
268th, 8, 351 
398, 404; FE, 458, 460, 461 
474th Engr, 495 
Gurkha, 486 
Lushai, 343, 351 
Brigades, Malaya, 205 
Brigades, South African, Ist, 45, 46 
Briggs, Brig H. R., 41, 93, 284, 293, 331, 
334, 337 


: Casualties, 


B, 294, 331-335, 349, 350; 


> 356, 364, 383, 397, . 


INDEX 


“Brindiv” or “Brinjap”’, 459-461 

Britten, Maj R. W. T., 381, 407 

British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
(BCOF), 458, 459 

Broad, Gen Sir C., 240 


Brooke, Gen Sir Alan, later Lord 
Alanbrooke, 108, 150 

Brown, Maj J. G., 151 

Browning, Capt D. C., 165 

Brownlie, Maj T. A. C., 239, 244 


Bruce-Scott, Maj-Gen J., 211, 223 

Brunt, Maj D., 389, 434, 440 

Bucher, Gen F. R. R., 447, 498 

“Bunkers”, description of, 264, 330 
demolition of, see Demolitions 

“Burcorps’’, 225, 229 

Burma, retreat from, 210-239 

Burma Sappers and Miners, 413, ist Fd 
Coy, 214, 226 

Burrell, Maj P. G., 399 

Butlin, Maj J. F., xiii, 305 

Butterfield, Maj M. C., 151 

Button, Maj P. B., 445 

Buttrick, Maj W. T., 448 

Byrde, Maj W., 301, 310, 441 


Cc 


C.A.G.E., 389, 473rd, 508 

C.A.G.R.E., 4th Corps 376 

Caffin, Maj C. G., a i 

Callaghan. Maj O, x 

Calvert, Lt-Col H. B. 144. 458, 460 

Calvert, Maj J. M., 249 

Cameron, Maj D. K. S:; 

Cameron, Lt-Col J. A. 
133, 136-139, 468, 480 

Campbell, Maj- -Gen Sir Archibald, 420 

Campbell-Johnson, Alan, 487 

Cariappa, Gen K. M., 5, 498 

Carrick, Capt, 118 

Carrington-Smith, Col H., 460 

Carter, Maj R. S. O., 391 


55 
112, 118, 123, 


» Carter, Maj W. G., 296 


Cassino, battle of, 151-156 

American, 187 

British and Indian, Mid E, 50, 78; P, 
64; N Af, 94, 97, 104, 117, 138; 
Ma, 201, 202, 207; B, 212, 237, 
240, 244, 247, 279, 306, 309, 328, 
340, 406, 416; SE A, 443 

Civilians, Ma, 195; B, 236, 416 

Engincers, see under Madras, Bengal 
and Bombay S & M, losses 

German and Italian, N "Af, 24-26, 117, 
138; NE Af, 43-45, 47; Mid E,78 

Japanese, 221, 306, 309, 326, 335, 336. 
340, 346, 379, 384, 385, 406 


: Cator, Lt-Col P. J., 284, 288, 290 


Cavendish, Col H. P., 9, 21, 48, 84, 472, 
485 


Chambers, 2/Lt, 243 


Chambers, Maj-Gen H. M., 309, 310, 
436, 445 


i Chanan Singh, Havildar, 1 
: Charles, Lt-Gen Sir Roald: 15, 467, 470 


INDEX 


Chemical Warfare Gp, Ist Indian, 248 
Chiang Kai Shek, Gen, 211, 355 
Chindits, 249, 250, 261, 268, 269, 361 
Chinese tps, 221, 228, 230, 232, 241, 243, 
245, 246, 250, 261, 262, 268, 346, 355; 
see also Armies and Divisions 
Chinnadurar, Jemadar, 203 
Chopra, Brig D. B., xili, 27, 37, 40, 72 
Christison, Lt-Gen Sir Philip, B, 241, 260, 
268, 284, 286, 288, 294, 297, 298, 307, 
355, 403; Ma, 432, 436 
Churchill, Rt Hon Winston, 10, 13, 28, 
108, 126, 140, 150, 213 
Clark, Lt-Col G. C., 18 
Clark, Ltl. A. A., 282, 301 
Clark, Maj J. H., xiii, 282, 323, 341, 366, 
368, 369, 450, 455 
Clark, Brig L. O., xiii, 472, 485, 487, 497 
Clark, Gen Mark, 142, 143, 151, 156, 164 
Clayton, Lt-Col G. A., xiii, 354 
Cobb, Maj-Gen E. H. W., 377, 449 
Cole, Air Vice-Marshal A. T., 435 
College of Military Engineering (formerly 
the S.M.E.), xii, 4, 469, 470, 476, 490, 
491, 499 . 
Collins, Brig L. P., 4 
Colter, Maj H. C., 80 
Colvin, Lt W. M., 326, 327 
Commissions, types of, 4, 8, 9, 171, 420, 
473, 476, 491-493 
Connor, Col J. R., xiii, 470, 471, 491 
Construction Gp No. 3, 474, 475 
Cooper, Capt A. C., 112, 157 
Cooper, Lt S. T., 393 
Cooper, Capt W. H., 55, 61, 146 
Cooper, Maj W. S. D., 288 
Corbet, Maj J. V., 263, 318 
Cordery, H. A., xii 
Corfield, Capt, 219 
Corps, American,.2nd, 132, 135, 151, 152 
6th, 142, 151, 152, 161 
Corps, British, 3rd, 67, 74 
9th, 135 
10th, N Af, 113, 114, 116, 117, 121, 
122, 127, 132; Jt, 142, 143, 151, 
152, 159, 162, 169 
, 85, 113-116; Jt, 146, 


30th, N Af, 85, 97, 99, 113-116, 127, 133 
Corps, Burma, Ist (originally * ‘Burcorps” ; 
finally 4th Indian), 224-226, 229 
Corps, Canadian, Ist, 156, 162 
Corps, French, 152 
Corps, German, Afrika Korps, 47, 86, 137 
Corps, Indian, 3rd, 182, 183 
4th, B, 58, 225, 229, 239, 240, 241, 
245, 246, 249, 252, 260-262, 267, 
268, 270, 272, 273, 297, 309, 310, 
313, 314, 318, 323, 331-333, 335, 
338, 340, 343, 344, 347, 351, 355- 
357, 370-373, 377-379, 383-387, 389, 


3 06, 437 

Sth, N Af, "137, 138; Jt, 144, 146, 152, 
154, 157, 159, 162, 167-170 

15th, ’B, 225,240, 241, 260, 262, 268, 
270, 283-287, 297, 299, 307, 309, 
355, 403, 509; Ma, 424, 436, 437 


} 
4 


523 


343, 
352, 354-357, 361- 
397, 


33rd, B, 297, 300, 332, 333, 338, 
344, 347, 351, 
363, 370, 371, 373, 381, 383, 
398, 404 

34th B, 403; Ma, 423, 424, 431 

Defence of India, 11 


- Corps, Polish, 2nd, 156, 159, 167, 169 


: Corps Engr Gps, 


622nd, 491, 494 
623rd, 491 


Corps of Engineers, 15, 499, 500 


Corps of Indian Engineers, 4-7, 10-12, 
15, 36 

Corps Tps Engrs, /t, 155, 164, 168; 
Ma, 429, 508, 514 


3rd, 55, 66, 67 
Ath, 246, 249, 252, 253, 267, 268, 270, 
371, 376, 388 390, 392, 394, 395, 
407, 418 
10th, 159 
15th, 435 
33rd, 403, 
466th, 145, 157, 165 
Coulson, Capt J. S., 491, 499 
Cowan, Maj C. H., "304, 327 
Cowan, Maj-Gen D. T 221, 223, 231, 
232, 235, 267, 270, 313, 314, 316, 370, 
458, 459, 461 
Cox. Lt E. G., 90 
Coxwell- Rogers, Maj-Gen N. A., 147 
Crabtree, Lt, 253 
Crawford, Brig K. B. S., 183 
Creagh, Maj-Gen M. O’M., 25 
Crete, battle of, 50, 51 
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 485 
Crockwell, Capt W., 214 
Crowther, Brig D., 293 
“Crusader” campaign 85 
Sunni nea, Gen Sir Alan, 29, 45, 46, 85 


ance Lt-Col R. V., 21 
Cyprus, engineer work i in, 76, 77 


D 


Darley, Maj G. V. C., 231, 232, 251 

David, Maj D.C. S., 277, "286, "335 

Davies, Maj-Gen H. AE 294 

Davis, Lt- Col H. A., 1 

Davis, Maj J., 491 

Dawson, Maj. G. B., 457 

Dedman, Capt R. A., 320 

Defences and fortihation. Ind, 12, 16; 
ite 66-69, 72; P, 73; Mid E, 76; 

N Af, 23, 82, 84, 85, 89, 94, 126; Ma, 

175, 178, 179, 184, 186, 200, 205; B, 
228, 270, 328, 330, "380; Ind. 464 

De Guingand, Maj-Gen, 134, 142 


Demolitions 
Bridges, NE Af, 31; Ma, 190, 
191, 193. 194, 196-200, 202-204; 
B, 216-221, 223, 224, 227, 231, 232, 

319, 320 
“Bunkers” B, 263-265, 286, 287, 
297, 307, "328, 330, 336, 337, 367, 402 
Installations, stores, equipment, Jr, 67, 
68, 72; Mid E 76; WN Af, 87-89, 
100, 102; FE, 187; Ma, 185, 186, 


522 


2st, Ir, 54, 56, 57; Sy, 58; P, 63; 
N Af, 95, 102, 103 

22nd, 182, 183, 185, 200, 201 

24th, 60, 61 

25th, Ir, 56, 57; P, 61 65; N Af, 


102 

26th, 281, 332 

27th, 424 

28th, NE Af, 44; Ma, 183, 197-199 

29th, NE Af, 29, 34, 39, 42, 44, 45; 
B, 359 

32nd, N Af, 86, 89, 95, 97, 105; 
B. 271, 322-325, 339, 341, 365, 366, 
368, 369, 399; SE A, 450, 455 

33rd, B, 284, 290, 294, 332, 335, 
337, 377; SE A, 449 

36th, 282, 442 

37th, B, 317, 318, 320, 328; Ma, 424, 
427, 429; SE A, 437, 442, 443 

44th, 205, 206 

45th, 202 

46th, 212-214, 216-218, 220 

47th, 277, 278, 281 

48th (Gurkha), B, 213, 215, 217-219, 
222, 230, 231, 316, 319, 323, 342, 
349, 350, 378, 394, 417 

49th, B, 244, 317, 318, 320, 330; Ma, 
424, 429; SE A, 437-440 

$0th, Para, "B, 270, 273, 309, 314, 318, 
330, 331, 343 

Sist. B, 294, 298, 303, 305, 306; 
Ma. 427 

53rd, B, 294-296, 298, 307; Ma, 427 

55th, 277-281 

62nd, 351, 352, 409 


63rd, B, 222, 231, 254, 263, 266, 316, 
320, 323, 339, 378, 388, 394, 395, 413 

64th, 351, 352, 408 

Tist, B, 278, 279, 281, 304, 305; 
SE A, 445 

7Tith, (Chindits), 249 


80th, B, 271, 322, 323, 365, 369, 399, 
460, 402; SE A, 450, 455 

88h, 277 

89th, B, 284, 289, 292, 293, 332, 338, 
402; SE A, 449 

98th, 351, 352, 363, 381, 409 

99th, 378, 389 


100th, 8B, 322, 323, 326, 365, 369, 400; 


SE A, 450, 452, 455, 456 





- Casualties, 


114th, B, 284, 288-290, 292, 332, 402; 


SE A, 447, 448 
123rd, B, 276-280, 286, 292, 293, 331, 
338, 349; Ma, 433, 439 
16lst, 
Ma, 433, 439; SE A, 442 
234th, 77, 78 
254th Tk, 318, 343, 379 
2681h, B, 351, 
398, 404; FE, 458, 460, 461 
474th Engr, 495 
Gurkha, 486 
Lushai, 343, 351 
Brigades, Malaya, 205 
Brigades, South African, Ist, 45, 46 
Briggs, Brig H. R., 41, 93, 284, 293, 331, 
3M, 337 


B, 294, 331-335, 349, 350; | 


356, 364, 383, 397, | 


INDEX 


“Brindiv” or ‘“‘Brinjap’, 459-461 

Britten, Maj R. W. T., 381, 407 

British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
(BCOF), 458, 459 

Broad, Gen Sir C., 240 

Brooke, Gen Sir Alan, 
Alanbrooke, 108, 150 

Brown, Maj J. G., 151 

Browning, Capt D. C., 165 

Brownlie, Maj T. A. C., 239, 244 

Bruce-Scott, Maj-Gen J., 211, 223 

Brunt, Maj D., 389, 434, 440 

Bucher, Gen F. R. R., 447, 498 

“Bunkers”, description of, 264, 330 
demolition of, s Demolitions 

“Burcorps’’, 225, 2 

Burma, retreat a. 210-239 

Burma Sappers and Miners, 413, Ist Fd 
Coy, 214, 226 

Burrell, Maj P. G., 399 

Butlin, Maj J. F., xiii, 305 

Butterfield, Maj M. C., 151 

Button, Maj P. B., 445 

Buttrick, Maj W. T., 448 

Byrde, Maj W., 301, 310, 441 


later Lord 


C 


C.A.G.E., 389, 473rd, 508 

C.A.G.R.E., 4th Corps 376 

Caffin, Maj C. G., 55, 68 

Callaghan, Maj O, xiii 

Calvert, Lt-Col H. B., 144, 458, 460 

Calvert, Maj J M., 249 

Cameron, Maj D. K. S.. 55 

Cameron, Lt-Col J. A., 112, 118, 123, 
133, 136-139, 468, 480 

Campbell, Maj- Gen Sir Archibald, 420 

Campbcell-Johnson, Alan, 487 

Cariappa, Gen K. M., 5, 498 

Carrick, Capt, 118 

Carrington-Smith, Col H., 460 

Carter, Maj R. S. O., 391 

Carter, Maj W. G., 296 

Cassino, battle of, 151-156 

American, 187 

British om Indian, Mid E, 50, 78; P, 
64; N Af, 94, 97, 104, 117, 138; 
Ma, 201, 202, 207; B. 212, 237, 
240, 244, 247, 279, 306, 309, 328, 
340, 406, 416; SE A, 443 

Civilians, Ma, 195; B, 236, 416 

Engineers, see under Madras, Bengal 
and Bombay S & M, losses 

German and Italian, N Af, 24-26, 117, 
138; NE Af, 43-45, 47; Mid E,'78 

Japanese, 221, 306, 309, 326, 335, 336; 

» 379, 384, 385, 406 


' Cator, Lt-Col P. J., 284, 288, 290 


Cavendish, Coil H. P., 9, 21, 48, 84, 472, 
485 


Chambers, 2/Lt, 243 
ne de Maj-Gen H. M., 309, 310, 


436, 
i Chanan Singh, Havildar, 100 
| Charles, Lt-Gen Sir Ronald, 15, 467, 470 


INDEX 


Chemical Warfare Gp, Ist Indian, 248 
Chiang Kai Shek, Gen, 211, 355 
Chindits, 249, 250, 261, 268, 269, 361 


Chinese tps, 221, 228, 230, 232, 241, 243, | 


245, 246, 250, 261, 262, 268, 346, 355; 
see also Armies and Divisions 

Chinnadurar, Jemadar, 203 

Chopra, Brig D. B., xiii, 27, 37, 40, 72 

Christison, Lt-Gen Sir Philip, 8, 241, 260, 
268, 284, 286, 283, 294, 297, 298, 307, 
355, 403; Ma, 432, 436 

Churchill, Rt Hon Winston, 10, 13, 28, 
108, 126, 140, 150, 213 

Clark, Lt-Col G. C., 18 

Clark, Lt I. A. A., 282, 301 

Clark, Maj J. H., xiii, 282, 323, 341, 366, 
368, 369, 450, 455 

Clark, Brig L. O., xiii, 472, 485, 487, 497 


Clark, Gen Mark, 142, 143, 151, 156, 164 | 


Clayton, Lt-Col G. A., xiii, 354 

Cobb, Maj-Gen E. H. W., 377, 449 

Cole, Air Vice-Marshal A. T., 435 

College of Military Engineering (formerly 
the S.M.E.), xii, 4, 469, 470, 476, 490, 
491, 499 . 

Collins, Brig L. P., 4 

Colter, Maj H. C., 80 

Colvin, Lt W. M., 326, 327 

Commissions, types of, 4, 8, 9, 171, 420, 
473, 476, 491-493 

Connor, Col J. R., xiii, 470, 471, 491 

Construction Gp No. 3, 474, 475 

Cooper, Capt A. C., 112, 157 

Cooper, Lt S. T., 393 

Cooper, Capt W. H., 55, 61, 146 

Cooper, Maj W. S. D., 288 

Corbet, Maj J. V., 263, 318 

Cordery, H. A., xii 

Corfield, Capt, 219 

Corps, American,.2nd, 132, 135, 151, 152 
6th, 142, 151, 152, 161 

Corps, British, 3rd, 67, 74 
9th. 135 


10th, N Af, 113, 114, 116, 117, 121, 


122, 127, 132; It, 142, 143, 151, 
152, 159, 162, 169 
13th, N 4f, 85, 113-116; “It, 146, 


156, 162, 169, 170 
30th, N Af, 85, 97, 99, 113-116, 127, 133 
Corps, Burma, Ist (originally ‘ ‘Burcorps” ; 
finally 4th Indian), 224-226, 229 
Corps, Canadian, Ist, 156, 162 
Corps, French, 152 
Corps, German, Afrika Korps, 47, 86, 137 
Corps, Indian, 3rd, 182, 183 
4th, B, 58, 225, 229, 239, 240, 241, 
' , 249, 252, 260-262, 267, 
268, 270, 272, 273, 297, 309, 310, 
313, 314, 318, a 331-333, 335, 
338, 340, 343, . 347, 351, 355. 
357, 370-373, *s77.479, 383-387, 389, 
396, 397, 404-406, 437 
5th, N Af, 137, 138; Ir, 144, 146, 152, 
154, 157, 159, 162, 167-170 
15th, B, 225,240, 241, 260, 262, 268, 
270, 283-287, 297, 299, 307, 309, 
355, 403, 509; Ma, 424, 436, 437 


523 


33rd, B, 297, 300, 332, 333, 338, 343, 
344, 347, 351, 352, 354-357, 361- 
363, 370, 371, 373, 381, 383, 397, 
398, 404 

34th B, 403; Ma, 423, 424, 431 

Defence of India, 11 


. Corps, Polish, 2nd, 156, 159, 167, 169 


‘ Corps Engr Gps, 


622nd, 491, 494 
623rd, 491 


Corps of Engineers, 15, 499, 500 


, Corps of Indian Engineers, 


4-7, 10-12, 
155, 164, 168; 


15, 36 
Corps Tps Engrs, /f, 
Ma, 429, 508, 514 
3rd, 55, 66, 67 
4th, 246, 249, 252, 253, 267, 268, 270, 
371, 376, 388 390, 392, 394, 395, 
407, 418 
10th, 159 
15th, 435 
33rd, 403, 
466th, 145, 157, 165 
Coulson, Capt J. S., 491, 499 
Cowan, Maj C. H., "304, "327 
Cowan, Maj-Gen D. T 221, 223, 231, 
232, 235, 267, 270, 313, 314, 316, 370, 
458, 459, 461 
Cox. Lt E. G., 90 
Coxwell-Rogers, Maj-Gen N. A., 
Crabtree, Lt, 253 
Crawford, Brig K. B. S., 183 
Creagh, Maj-Gen M. O’M., 25 
Crete, battle of, 50, 51 
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 485 
Crockwell. Capt W.. 214 
Crowther, Brig D., 293 
“Crusader” campaign 85 
nen, Gen Sir Alan, 29, 45, 46, 85 


Cutler, Lt-Col R. V., 21 
Cyprus, engineer work in, 76, 77 


147 


D 


Darley, Maj G. V. C., 231, 232, 251 

David, Maj D.C. S., 277, 286, "335 

Davies, Maj-Gen H. L., 294 

Davis, Lt-Col H. A. 1 

Davis, Maj J., 491 

Dawson, Maj G. B., 457 

Dedman, Capt R. A, 320 

Defences and fortification, Ind, 12, 16; 
Ir, 66-69, 72; P, 73; Mid E, 76; 
N Af, 23, 82, 84, 85, 89, 94, 126; Ma, 
175, 178, 179, 184, 186, 200, 205; B, 
228, 270, 328, 330, "380; Ind, 464 

De Guingand, Maj-Gen, 134, 142 


Demolitions 
Bridges, NE Af, 31; Ma, 190, 
191, 193, 194, 196-200, 202-204; 
B, 216-221, 223, 224, 227, 231, 232, 

319, 320 
“Bunkers”, B, 263-268, 286, 287, 
297, 307, "328, 330, 336, 337, 367, 402 
Installations, stores, equipment, /r, 67, 
68, 72; Mid E 76; N Af, 87-89, 
100, 102; FE, 187; Ma, 185, 186, 


524 INDEX 


195, 201, 202; B, 212, 215, 222, 15th Panzer, 86, 95, 111, 117, 121, 127, 
228, 230, 234, 276, 319, 324, 325 129, 134, 140 

strong points and road blocks, 336, 21st Panzer, 86, 95, 111, 116, 117, 
381, 409 21 


1 

Dempsey, Gen Sir Miles, 404, 423 90th Light Motor, 47, 86, 111, 127, 

Dentz, Gen, 51, 56, 57 134 . 

“Desert Rats” : ’92 Hermann Goering, 140 

De Souza, Maj D., xiii, 372 Divisions, Indian, 2nd, 511 

Devonald, Lt N. S. J., 100 4th, NE Af, 28-30, 32, 34, 36-44; 

Dexson, Maj A., 337 Gr, 80, 81; N Af, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 

Dharam Singh, Jemadar, 257 27, 82, 84, 85, 87-90, 92-94, 109, 

Dillon Colca Oe 251, 440, 112, 114, 116-118, 120, 123, 127-138, 

ee 508; /t, 145, 151-154, 157-159 

Dinwiddie, Lt-Col R., xiii, 182, 190, 195 iat. ico 166. , 

Divisional Engineers, see Divisions con- Sth, 13; NE Af, 28-32, 34, 36, 39- 
cerned 46, 513; Ir, 65; Mid E, 76; N 

Divisions, American, Ist Armd, 135 4f, 20, 49, 89, oi, 93.95, 97, 101, 
3rd, 151 105, 107, 109, 112, 513; B, 260, 
24th, 459 270, 284-294, 323, 331-334, 336-340, 

Divisions, Australian, 213 342, 343, 349-351, 371, 373, 379, 
ae, se 2A, 1 383-386, 388-390, 404-406, 509 : Ma, 

-435; SE A, 

8th, te 3183, 1202, 208 ae 435; , 
9th, 47, 48, ; 

Divisions. British 6th, 20, 55, 64, 65, 74, 144 


Ist Armd (formerly 31st Armd), Sy, 
79; N Af, 91-93, 96, 97, 114, 115, 
121, 127 

Ist, 151, 152 

2nd Armd, 47, 48 

2nd, B, 277, 332-337, 343, 344, 346, 
348, 356, 361, 365, 370, 383, 397, 
404; Ma, 424; FE, 458 

3rd, LRP, 250, 261 


4th, 135, 137 9th, Ma, 20, 182-184, 190, 191, 
Sth, 146, 151 200-202, 204, 513 


| 7th, N Af, 96; B, 260, 283-291, 294, 
| 

6th Armd, 135-137, 170 | 10th, Jr, 20, eh 53-57, 65, 66; Sy, 58, 
| 
| 


332, 335-338, 343, 344, 356, 370- 
374, 376, 377,383, 385, 397, 398, 
402, 404, 406, 407, 412, 413, 5095, 
SE A, 447-450; Ind, 464 


8th, 13; Ir, 55, 65-67; P, 60, 61, 64, 
73; Sy, 74; N Af, 105, 144; It, 145- 
149, 154- 159, 163, 164, 166, 168- 
170, 173, 508 


7th Armd, N Af, 20, 23-25, 90, 96, 59,79; N Af, 95, 100, 101, 103, 
114, 115, 117, 120-123, 126, 127, 104, 508; Mid E, 109, 144; It, 145, 
135-137 157-159, 162, 165- 167, 169, 171, 

8th Armd, 108 173, 224 

10th Armd, 108, 114. 115 11th, Ma, 20, 181-186, 190, 195, 196, 

18th, 202, 205 200-202, 204, 205, 508, 513 

31st Armd, 79 14th, B, 274-278, 280, 509; Ind, (Trg 

36th, B, 285, 294, 347, 356, 358-361, Div), 466, 469, 476 
370; FE, 458 17th, B, 20, 212-219, 221-228, 230, 

44th, 108, 114 231, 245, 249, 254, (Light Div). 

50th, Mid E, 76; N Af, 97, 101, 114, 253, 255, 257-260, 262, 264, 267, 
126-129, 132 272, 273, 310, 313-320, 322, 323, 330, 





Sist (Highland), 108, 114, 115, 117, 269, 270, 339-343, 346, 356, 370, 
120. 126, 132, 133 371, 373, 374, 376, 378, 383-389, 

56th, 167, 169 391, 394-397, 404-406, 412-417, 447, 

70th, 85 458, 508 

78th, 141, 142, 144, 146, 148, 152, 19th, 'B, 351, 352, 356, 361, 363-365, 


167,169 
Airborne, 142, 143 
“Brindiv’” or “Brinjap’, 458-461 
Division Burma, Ist (“Burdiv”’, later 
39th Ind Div), 211, 214, 222, 223, 
2258-227, 229, 232-234, 253 
Divisions, Canadian, 161; ist, 146, 148,149 
Divisions, Chinese, 55th, 22 3 
Divisions, East African, llth, 46, 346- 
oat 351, 353, 354, 356, 361, 365, 370 : 
t 


Divisions, Free French, 161 
Divisions, German, Ist Para, 152 


| 370, 371, 379-381, 384, 386, 404- 
406, 408, 409, 417 
| 20th, B, 260, 262, 270, 272, 273, 313, 
314, 322, 323, 327, 337-339, 343, 
346, 356 365, 367-370, 383, 398, 
401, 402, 404; SE A, 450, 451, 455 
23rd, B, 238, 244, 245, 249, 250, 253, 
| 260, 262, 270, 273, 313, 314, 317, 
318, 320, 323, 328, 329, 331, 339, 
343, 344, 346, 403; Afa, 424, 428, 
| 429, 432; SE A, 436-438, 441-446 
| 25th, B, 285, 294-298, 301, 305-308, 
| Ma, 424, 427-429, 431, 432. 436 


INDEX 


26th, B, 260, 278-280, 282-285, 290, 
292-295, 297, 298, 304, 307-310, 
384, 386, 387, 394, 396, 398, 401, 
403; SE A, 436, 437, 442, 445, 446 

39th Light (formerly Ist Burma), 
253; Ind, (Trg Div), 466, 469, 476 

44th Armd, 469 

“Brindiv” or 458-461— 

Tre, 283 

Divisions, Italian, 86, 111 
Divisions, Japanese, 261 
15th, 272, 273, 313, 322, 323, 331, 344, 


346 
18th, 261, 346, 406 
31st, 261, 272, 273, 314, 320, 330-333, 
335, 344, 346, 356 
33rd, 225, 261, 262, 269, 272, 273, 
313, 314, 322, 323, 339, 340, 343, 
344, 346, 349 
53rd, 406 
54th, 307 
55th, 212, 226, 261, 283, 287, 307, 406 
56th. 226, 261 
Divisions, New Zealand, 2nd, N Af, 85, 
97, 111, 114-116, 120, 126-128, 
132; It, 152, 167-176 
Divisions, South African, Ist, NE Af, 46 
N Af, 85, 97, 114-116 
2nd, 86, 
Divisions, West African, 81st, 260, 285- 
287, 297, 298, 305, 
82nd, 297, 298, 306-309, 398, 404 
Dobbie, Maj-Gen W. G. S 
Dobson, Col A. C., 178 
ee ee 5 Docks and IWT Depot, 


7, 
Nee " Docks Group, 516 
Operating Coys, 11; 227th, Coy, 428 
Dodecanese Is., operations ‘in the, 51, 
Dorairaj Nadar, Naik, 266 
Doulton, Lt-Col A. J. F., 318, 328 
Dowse, Maj A. K., 407 
Dubashi, Maj L. S., xiii, 216, 228 
Dubey, Brig K.N., "22 
Duke, Brig C. L. B, 2, 483 
Dunne, Maj A. D. M.. 445, 495 
Dutch Engineers, 444, "446 


“Brinjap”, 


E 


Eagan, Maj R. H., 134, 151 

Eason, Maj, W. F, 157, 165 
Easton, Lt-Col P. A., 358 

Eccles, Maj G. M., 227 

Edwards, Col A. W., 300 

Edwards, Maj R. N., 468 

Eisenhower, Gen, 122, 123, 132, 135, 150 

Ekin, Brig R., 212, 218 

Eking, Lt- Col H. Cc. W., 464 

EI Alamein, battle of, 108, 113-120 

Electrical and Mechanical (E & M) units 
No. 1 Depot (later Group), 6, 7, 474 
Madras S & M, 503 
Platoons, 445 

Electrical installations, repair and main- 
tenance, Ind, 12; Ir, 74; Gr, 80, N Af, ! 


525 


88; B, 243, 404; SE A, 441, 443, 
452, 453; FE, 457, 460 ; 

“Elephant Bill’? (Lt-Col J. H. Williams), 
238, 367 

“Emu” Brigade, 180-182 

Elkington, Lt-Col J. R. S. W., xiii, 183, 


185 
Elphinstone, Maj H. G. R., 55, 95, 105, 


106 
Engineer Base Workshops (EBWs), 33, 34 
Ist Coy, 59 
Engineer Battalions, 7, 66, 145, 253, 348, 
474, 503, 508, 514 
Ist, 333 
3rd, 417 
6th, 252 
7th, 171 
8th, 276, 316, 321 
10th, 276 
llth, 446 
12th, 371, 372, 376 
14th, 300 
15th, 358, 408 
16th, 252 
2Ist (Madras), 363, 429, 431 
23rd (Bengal), 391, 412, 509 
24th (Bombay), 289 
No. 4 Engr Depot, 7, 474 
Engineer Battalions, Japanese, 392, 418 
Engineer Brigade, 474th, 4 
Engineer Centre, Pakistan, on 489, 491, 
514, 516 
Engineer, Centres, formerly Regtl Centres, 


ene Depots, renamed Groups or 
Training Centres, vii, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 
474, 475, 489, 512 

Engineer Equipment Group No. 4, 474 

Engineer Officers Training Schoo! (BOTS), 
8, 467, 492, 502 

Engineer Stores Base Depots (ESBDs), 
33, 34 

Engineer Training Centres (ETCs), 9, 
469, 501-503, 508 

Engineers, Corps c of, vii, 15, 499, 500 

English, Maj D. R., 491 

Erskine, Maj- Gen G. W. E. J., 457 

Evans, Maj-Gen G. C,, 289, 293, 349, 
370, 447, 449 

Excavating Machinery units, 
No. 6 Engr Depot (later Be: 6 
Mechanical Eauipaeat Gp), 7, 474 
Excavating Coy, 23) 


F 


Faqir of Ipi, 463 

Faridkot Sappers and Miners, 16 
2 Fd Coy, 371, 376, 418 
94 Fd Coy, 3, 267, "325, 345 

Farley, Brig E. L., 19 

Faruqi, Maj J. A., 491 

Feng Yee, Maj- Gen, 435 

Ferrying operations, P, 61; 68, 69; 
Ma, 196, 429, 431; It, a7, 169, 170; 
B, 212, 215, 229, 235, 250, 255, 257, 


526 


280, 298, 299, 309, 348-353, 355, 360, 
361, 363, 364, 366-369, 374-378, 395, 
402, 403, 409, 411 

Festing. Maj- -Gen F. W., 294, 347, 358, | 
457 


British, 30th, 458 
18th, 


Field Batteries, 
Indian, 16th, 458 

Field Companies, Australian, 183; 
455 


Field Companies, British, 23 
Sth, 458, 459, 461 
2ist Fd Pk, 458 
236th, 358 
564th, 168 
Field Companies, Canadian, 155 
Field Companies, East African, 371, 372 
Field Companies, Indian, see under 
Madras, Bengal, Bombay, Burma, and 
Indian States S & M respectively 
Field Companies, Indian and British 
mixed, 89th, 90th, 261 





Field Companies, New Zealand, 153, 168 ° 


Field Companies, Pakistan, 491 
31 Assault Fd Coy, 464, 491 
68 Fd Coy, 414 

Field Survey Companies, 11, 12 

Figgins, Maj C. G., 276 

Finch, Maj J. R. G., 243, 251 

Fisher, Maj E. C., 434, 440 

Floyer, Capt D. C., 440 

Forbes, Lt-Col Sir John, 490 

Forbes, Maj R. L., 468 

Forestry Companies, 276, 352 

Fortress Engincers, Singapore, Compa- 
nies, 195, 205 
35th, 36th, 183 
41st, 183, 206 


INDEX 





Maj P. F., 227, 233 

, Gaussen, Maj-Gen, C. de L., xiii, 475 

| “Gazelle Force’, 31, 34, 36-38 

General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF), 
247, 248, 251, 270, 328 

| George Cross, awards, 154, 170, 504 

Gerrard, Maj R. T., 55, 61, 366 

Ghosi Khan, Sapper, 155 

Giffard, Lt-Gen Sir George, 260, 355 

Gilmour, 2/Lt A., 207 

Godwin, Maj J. F., 180 

Godwin-Austin, ek Gen, 85 

Gomes, Col A 2 

oo Capt 6 E, M., 288, 289, 375, 


Goodier, Maj B. G., xiii 

Gott, Lt-Gen, 97, 108 

Gracey, Maj-Gen D. D., 57, 262, 314, 
322, 323, 337, 368, 450, 451 

Graham, Lt R. E., 413 

Grand, Brig L. D., 66, 252 

Grant, Lt-Col N. B,, 131, 354 


: Grattan, Maj H., 29, 30, 55 
! Graziani, Marshal, 23-26, 47 


Greece, operations in, 24, 35, 49, 50, 80, 
81 


Greenwood, Lt-Col H. R., 428 
Greet, Capt R. C. H., 326 
Gregson, Maj H. R., 359 
Gritfith, Maj J. M.. 95, 98, 99 
Grover, Maj-Gen J. M. L., 332 
Groves, Lt-Col J. J. D., 418 
Guinness, Brig D. R., 437, 443 


H 
Habib, Maj M. F., 491 


: Haile Selassie, Emperor, 30, 44 


| Hall, Maj L. C., 


: Haley, Capt A. W., 200 


80 
Hannington, 2/Lt J. R., 201 


. Harbans Singh, Capt, 55, 72 
: Hards, Brig F. W. T., 74, 80 


45th, 206 
Forward Airfield Engineers, 503, 514; 
B, 248, 372, 385, 390-392, 407; 
Ma, 429, 431; SE A, 441, 443-445, | 
, 449 
458th, 429 
459th, 363, 364 


Foulkes, Li-Col T. H. F., xiii, 370, 388, 
413, 415 

Fowkes, Maj-Gen C, C., 354 

Francis, Havildar-Clerk G , 104 

Francis, Lt P. R., 301, 304. 306, 307 

Fraser, Lt, 159 

Fraser, Maj C. C., 151 

Fraser, Maj P. H., 125 

Fraser, Maj-Gen W. A. Ky 


Free French. Sy, 56, 57; N WS, 96, 114; 
Tt, 152, 161 

French, Maj F. H. R., 55, 68 

French, Brig J. L., 71 

French, Maj J. R. G., 80 

Freyberg, Maj- Gen B. C., VC, 51 

Frusci, Gen, 34, 38, 41. 43 43, 44 

Fukudome, Vice-Admiral, ‘432, 436 


G 
Gabriel, Ya R, a ery » 417, 418, 479 


Gardiner, C t D 
Gardiner, Brig R., 9, 29, 44, 55 


Harkirat Singh, Brig, 72 
Harradine, Maj R. R. L., 336 
Harvey, Maj-Gen, C. O., 60, 66, 73 
Hasted, Maj-Gen W. F., 477, 487 


’ Hatch, Lt-Col P. G., 286, 335, 350, 448 
' Hawthorn, Maj-Gen D. C., 424, 436, 442 


> Hayes, Lt-Col P. F., 


49, 491 


: “Hazel Farce’, 63 
: Heard, Maj H. T., 182 
! Heath, Lt-Gen Sir Lewis, 29, 31, 182 


Hedley, Maj T. W. 1., 320, 330, 428 
Heep, Maj J. H., 182 


Haley Lt-Col A, G., xiii, 49, 238, 242, 


Heachy; Lt-Col J. R., 468, 499 
Henderson, Maj L. S., 398, 450, 453 
Henson, Capt F. E., 304 
Hewson, Maj Ci; 407 
Hibbert, Maj J. D., 238, 251 
Higham, Maj R. G. G., 146 
Hill, Lt-Col A. J. R., 71, 316, 317 
Hilt ee -Col F. M., 351, "382 

i rig R.C.R., 15, 17, 467, 468, 480 
Hitler, 1, 47, 52, 112, 116° 


INDEX 


Hindmoor, Lt, 453, 454 

Hoare, Maj J. H., 430 

Hodgson, Lt G. C.. 390 

Holland, Maj J. D., 389 

Holland, Admiral, 432 

Holloway, Brig R. E., xiii, 428, 429, 441, 

471, 491, 498 
gata Maj R. N. B., 428, 437, 439, 


Hong Kong, loss of. 187, 188; reoccu- 
pation, 457 
Honours a awards, Ind, 18, 19, 499; 
NE Af, 35, 37, 41; 
It, 1Shiss. 170, 171, 173, 203, 208, 266, 
‘467; B, 297, 308, 329, 350, 354, 359, 
360, 381, 409, 419; SE A, 440 
summaries of, 504, 509, 513 
Hooper, Maj J. B., 428 
Horne, Maj G., xiii, 62 
Horrocks, Lt-Gen B. C., 113, 135 
Horsfield, Brig H. E., 9, 36, 256, 282, 
318, 336, 485 


527. 


Iraq, operations in, 51-60, 65-72, 74-76 


| Ireland, Maj 1. R., 
: Irving, Maj J. B., 401 


N Af, 83, 133; | 


Irwin, Lt-Gen N. M. S., 240, 254 
Itagaki, Gen, 432, 435 


J 


Jackson, Maj J. P. A., 450 

Jacques, Brig L. J., 53, 437 

Jahan Dad, Jemadar, 349 

James. Capt G. N. F., 415 

Jamieson, Maj T. G., 402 

ate Engineers, 415-417, 450, 452, 
3 


+ Japan, occupation of, 457-461 


Hospitals, construction of, Ind, 12; Ir. : 
i Jitra, action at, 193-195 


69, 75; Ir, 158 
How, Maj R. W. W., 29, 89, 94, 105 
Hudson, Lt, 217, 219 
Hudson, Maj E. R. B.. 448, 449 
Hugh-Jones, Brig N., 218, 219 
Hull, Brig G. B. G., 62, 63 
Hunter, Maj Norman, 304, 307 
Hutchinson, Col G. F. xiii, 157, 158, 160 
Hutting, Ind, 12; Ir, 74; Ma, 429; 
FE, 457, 460 
Hutton, Lt-Gen T. J., 211, 222 
Hyamson, Lt T. D., 207 


I 


Ichida, Maj-Gen, 412 

Tevers, Maj E. H., 2, 18 

Imphal operations, 267-269, 272, 313-345 

India, Army in, vii 

India, C-in-C, 36, 84, 211, 240, 254, 274, 
332, 419, 467, 482, 484, 488, 496-498 

India, E-in-C, xii, 3, 6, 7, 10, 248, 318, 
477, 487, 491, 499 

Indian Engineer Groups, vii, 6, 7, 15, 
463, 474, 475, 489, 501-516 


Jardine, Capt A. R., 215 

Jayal, Maj N. D., 498 

i Col M. M., xiii, 16, 17, 466, 468, 
48 


Jefferis, Brig M. R., 475 
Jenner, Capt A. C., xil 
Jepson, Lt, 253 


Johnson, Capt, 98 
Johnson, Maj R. B., 294 
Jolly, Maj J. H. F. H., 251, 327 


‘ Jones, Brig J. K., 218 


Indian Engineers, Corps of, vii,4-7, 10-12, - 


15, 36, 71, 419, 499 


I 
Indian Engineers, used as infantry, NE Af, . 
' Kinoshita, Lt-Gen, 436 


41; N Af, 90, 99, 100; Ma 194; B, 
227, 280. 282, 289, 290, 314, 325-327, 
388; Ind, 495 
Indianization, 3-5, 180, 488, 493, 494, 
498, 499, 505, 516 
Indian Military Acadenny, 4, 8 
Indian States Sappers and Miners, 3, 16 
Indo-China operations, 450-455 
Inland Water Transport, 7, 10, 11; 
298, 299, 352, 361, 403, 407 
No. 5 Engr Depot, later No. 1 TTC, 
7, 10, 516 
123rd IWT Coy, 234 
Indian Works Sections, 443 
907th, 458, 460 
see also Works Services 


Jones, Lt, 453 


K 


Kader Khan, Jemadar, 393 

Kaltwant Singh, Col, 447 

Kashyap, Col A. N., 4, 72, 180 

Kean, Maj R. B., 413 

Keating, Maj M. J. P., 286, 335 

Kelly, Maj H. F., 284 

Kent, Capt R., 214, 226, 227 

Keren, battle of, 34-36, 39-43 

ee i: Field-Marshal, 141, 143, 163, 


17 

Khalil Ur Rahman, Jemadar, 220 

Khan, Maj B. A., 217, 219, 220 

Khan, Maj D. M., 491 

Khan, Capt H. M., 491 

Khetarpal, Maj M. L., 446 

Kiff, Capt R., xiii 

Kimura, Gen, 344, 346, 356, 379, 385, 
405, 412, 436 

King George VI, 138, 139, 162 


Kirat Singh, Jemadar, 37 
Kirkee (HQ, Bombay S & M), vii, 1, 
175, 472, 473, 483, 484, 493, 515 


’ Kirkland, Lt-Col G. W., 71 
> Kirton, Mali L. G., 251, 327 
- Kirwan, Lt-Col P. L., 144 

: Kuisch, Brig F. Ef., 129, 133 


B 


Kitson, Maj H. W., 55, 138 

Knight, Maj J. B. H., 445 

“Knightsbridge”, operations at, 95-97 

Kochar, Brig R. K., 72, 180, 214, 253, 
258, 263, 480, 499 

Koenig, Gen, 97 

“Krocol’’, 189, 190 

“Kubo” Force, 287, 289 


528 


Kuldip Singh, Lt-Col, xiii, 123 
Kumar, Maj R. N., 495 


L 


Labour, unskilled, NE Af, 32; 
67, 72; Mid E, 76; Ma, iv, "430, 
431; B, 251- 253, 255, 257, 258, 271, 
282, 285, 343, 363, 396, 397, 411, 412, 
416; SE A, 447, 456; FE, 459; Ind, 
465 


Lambert, Col J. M., 113 
Landon, Maj P. G. ’O., 78, 95, 102, 120 
Lawler, Maj W. L., 451, 45 3 
Lawrie, Lt-Col W. 'G.A , 55, 491 
Leahy, Lt-Col A. G. pe 329, 407, 417 
Leclerc, Gen, 435, 455 
Lee, Maj H. C., a 290, 336 
Lee, Col K. J., 
Leese, Lt-Gen Sir «Oh isk: 113, 150, 163, 
299, 355, 404 
Lehrasap Khan, Capt, 491 
Lentaigne, Maj-Gen W. D. A., 269 
Leslie-Jones, Maj P. M., xiii, 473, 484. 
497 
Lewis, Maj A. C., 251 
Libyan campaigns, Ist, 22 
d, 23, 26 
3rd, 26, 47 
4th, 85-87, 89 
Sth, 92 
6th, 95-98 
7th, 108, 113 
Lillie, Maj W. M. S., 55, 68 
Lindesay, Lt-Col T. H., 183 
Lindley, Lt R. M., 207 
Lindsay, Maj J., on 419 
Lindsell, Lt-Col R. A., 157, 433, 463, 466, 
468, 480 
Livines, Maj W. A., 388 
Lloyd, Maj- Gen W. L., 274, 278 
Loch, Lt-Col I. G., 53, 61, 72, 294 
Lockhart, Lt-Gen Sir Rob, 498 
Locock, Capt, 103 
Lomax, Maj-Gen C, E, N 


, 279 
Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPGs) 


250, 261 
23rd Bde, 335, 338, 343, 344, 346 
Loomba, Col R. A., xiii, 33, 72, 450, 
452, 453, 456, 479, 492 
Lubert, Maj L., 305 
Lucas, Lt-Col A. R. S., 322, 365, 398 
Lumsden, Lt-Gen Sir Herbert, 113 


Lyall-Grant, Maj I. H., 214, 223, 224, 
231, 235, 237, 244, 315 
M 


MacArthur, Gen, 187, 457, 458 

Mc Carthy, Maj D. WwW. C., 407 

Macdonald, Maj J. R., 305 

Mackay, 2/Lt, 232 

Macklin, 2/Lt, 219 

McGrath, Maj D. W., xiii, 367, 
398-400, 453, 454, 456, 499 

Maclachlan, Lt-Col C, M., 66, 73, 144 

Maclaurin, Maj L. G., 327 


, 66, 


| 
| 
| 
: 
| 
| 


369, 


INDEX 


McLean, Maj J., 146 
Madras Sappers. and Miners, re-designat- 


ed Queen Victoria's Own Group, 
Royal Indian Engineers, and now 
called Madras Engineer Group, Corps 
of Engineers, (see Appendix A), 
change in title, 15, 71, 419, 480 
class composition, 8, 489, 505 
Colonels and  Colonels-Commandant, 
15, 17, 467, 468, 480 
Commandants, xi, xii, 9, 15, 171, 252, 
466-468, 479, 480, 499 
Companies and other units and sub-units, 
503 


1 Br PI (later Br Sec), ir, 55; P, 61, 

, 65; B, 267 

6 Br Sec (later Br Pl), 183, 196, 504 

9 Fd Coy, 5, 16, 501; /r, 53, 54, 
68; Sy, 58,79; P,61; Mid E, 77, 
78, 103; N Af, 95, 101-103, 120, 
121; Ind, 465 

10 Br Sec, 267 

10 Fd Coy, 5, 501; Jr, 53, 54, 68; 
Mid E, 77; N Af, 95,103; It, 157, 
159, 164, 171, 173; Ind, 464 

11 Army Tps Coy (later Fd Pk Coy), 
5, 12, 21, 501; Mid E, 76; Gr, 
80; N Af. 22, 26, 49, 82, 112, 118, 
120, 123, 124, 127, 129, 133, 136- 
138; /t, 145, 151, 154, 170 

12 Fd Coy, 5, 12, 21, 501; NE Af, 
37, 40, 41,44; Mid E, 76, 94; Gr, 
80; N Af, 22, 26, 27, 48, 49, 82, 
83, 89, 92-94, 112, 118, 120, 123, 124, 
127, 129-131, 133, 134, 136-138; 
It, 145, 151, 153 

13 Fd Coy, 5; B, 501; 
202, 203, 504; Ind 464 

14 Br Sec (later Br Pl), 183, 504 

14 Fd Coy, 5, 501; dr, 55, 67, 
69; Mid E, 77; Jt, 145, 157, 158, 
173; Ind, 494, 495 

15 Fd Coy, 3, 5, 501; Ma, 1, 2, 180, 
182, 196, 204, 504; Ind, 494, 495 

16 Army Tps Coy (later Workshops 
& Pk Coy), 5, 13, 16; NE Af, 
29, 32, 33; /r, 76 

21 Engr Bn, 363, 429, 431 

32 Fd Tp (later Fd Sqn), 5, 501; Jr, 
55, 68, 75; P, 64, 65, 68 

36 Fd San, 370-372, 375, 376, 390-393 

39 Fd Pk Sqn, P, 68, 69; Ir, 75 
Sy, 79, 80 

44 Div HQ Coy (later Fd Pk Coy), 
§, 13, 501; NE Af, 29, 32; Ir, 75; 
Mid E, 16; N Af, 89, 94, 95; B, 267, 
286, 293, 335, 336, 349, 389, 406; 
Ma, 434; SE A, 440, 441 

46 Army Tps Coy (later Fd Pk Coy), 
183, 185, 186, 193, 196, 207, 504 

50 Fd Pk Coy, 214, 226, 227, 233, 
234, 237, 2A1 

$1 Printing Sec, 5 

52 Army Tps Coy, Tr, 55, 68, 69; 
P, 62; It, 145, 151, 157, 173 

56 Fd Coy, 13; B, 214, 226, 227, 233, 
234, 237, 267 


Ma, 183, 


INDEX 529 


57 Fd Coy, Ir, 55, 68, 75; P, 62, 
68; Sy, 79 

58 Fd Coy, Ir, 55, 75; P, 68; Sy, 
79; N Af, 106; B, 358-361; Ma, 431 

59 Fd Coy, 238, 239, 251, 252 

60 Fd Coy, B, 214-216, 220, 222, 227, 
228, 234, 237, 254-256, 258, 263, 
267, 315, 370, 376, 388, 394, 395, 
402, 412, 413, 415, 417 

61 Fd Coy, /r, 55; P, 64, 65; Mid 
E, 76, 77; N Af, 95, 102-104; It, 
145, 157, 159, 164, 171, 173 

62 Fd Coy, ’B, 267, 285, 
290, 336-338, 370, 375, 376, 378, 402, 
407; Ma, 430, 461, 462 

63 Fd Coy, B, 260, 294, 297, 299, 
303, 304, 307; Ma, 428, 431, 462 

64 Fd Coy, B, 351, 352, 361, 363, 364, 
381, 407, 417, 420; Ind, 464 

65 Fd Coy, B, 351, 381, 392, 407-411, 
417, 418; Ind 479 

101 Rly Const Coy, 10, 503; NE 
Af, 29, 44, 55; B, 267 

303 Fd Pk Coy, 267, 288, 290, 291 

309 Fd Pk Coy, 270, 322, 365, 362, 


398 

323 Fd Pk Coy, B a 267, 320, 330; 
Ma, 428. 429; SE 441 

325 Fd Me oe B, 294, 298; Ma, 428, 
431, 

326 Fd Pe Coy, B, 267, 305; Ma, 430, 


431 

327 Fd PkCoy, B, 267, 351, 362, 381, 
382, 392, 407 

330 Fd Pk Coy, 267 

331 Fd Pk Coy, B, 284, 337, 370, 
376, 402; SE A, 448, 449; Ma, 462 

362 Fd Coy, B, 248, 249, 267, 270, 
271, 322, 389, 392; SE A, 451, 
452, 456 

364 Fd Coy, 392, 410 

365 Fd Coy, 267, 392 

404 Fd Coy, B, 305; Ma, 429-431 

405 Fd Coy, B, 305; Ma, 429-431 

421 Fd Coy, B, 267, 284, 289, 290, 336, 
337, 370, 372, 373, 376, 402, 407; 
SE A, 448, 450; Ma, 462 

422 Fd Coy, B, 251, 270, 322, 328, 
329, 338, 365-367, 369, 398-401; 
SE A, 450, 451, 453-456 

423 Fd Coy, B, 305; Ma, 429-431 

424 Fd Coy, B, 251, 252, 267, 270, 
325, 371, 376, 392, 407 

425 Fd Coy, B, 294-299, 308; Ma, 
428, 431, 462 

428 Fd Coy, B, 251, 252, 263, 264, 
266, 267, 270, 317, 318, 418 

429 Fd Coy, B, 251, 267, 270, 321, 
322, 327, 364; FE, 458-461 

430 Fd Coy, B, 267; Ma, 429, 431 

431 Fd Coy, B, 267, 364; Afa, 429, 


431 
432 Fd Coy, 267, 430 
432 Independent Pl, 260 
433 Fd Coy, 441 
434 Fd Coy, 430 
1019 Br Pl, 462 


Boys Bn, 8, 466-468, 475, 476, 481, 
492, 502, 505 
Forming Tps Bn, 9, 502 
HQ and Depot, or Centre, vii, 
1, 3, 6, 12-18, 463, 466, 481, 489, 
492, 501, 502 
OCTUs, later Engr Officers Trg School 
(EOTS), 8, 9, 467, 492, 502 
Training Bns, 5, 9, 15, 466, 468, 481, 
492, 501, 502, 504 
demobilization, 419, 420, 468, 479, 481, 
492. » 505 
expansion, 5-9, 17, 463, 465-467, 
501-503, 505 
headdress, 455, 460, 481 
honours and awards, 504; see also 
main heading 
Indianization, 3-5, 180, 498, 499, 505 
losses, Mid E, 71, 78; N Af, 94, 102- 
104; It, 154, 159; Ma, 175, 203, 
504; B, 239, 241, 271, 288, 289, 
360, 367, 393, 394 
Partition and reorganization, 488, 489, 
492, 505 
Maharaj Singh, H.E., 497 
Mahomed Anwar Hussein, T/Capt, 72 
Mais, Lt-Col A. R., 71 
Malaria, 176, 236-239, 243, 244, 247, 249, 
a 253, 260, 279, 281-283, 340, 346, 
Malaya Volunteers, 181, 205 
Malerkotla Sappers and Miners, 16, 
Fd Coy, 3; B, 214, 217-220, 226, 233, 
237, 295 
Mallaby, Brig A. W. S., 437, 438 
Malligarjunan, Jemadar, 215 
Mandalay recaptured, 380-382 


Mandi Sappers and Miners, 16; 93 Fd 
Coy, B, 294, 303-305, 308; Ma, 428 
95 Fd Coy, 16 

Mangat Rai, Brig C. R., xiii, 2, 53, 58, 
64, 72, 100 

Mann, Lt- Col T., 48 

Mansergh, Maj-Gen E. C., 371, 424, 432, 
433, 436, 438, 439 

Mareth, battle of, 126-132 

Marriott, Brig J. C. O., 29 

Mason, Capt K., 409 

Mavor, Maj H. A., 444 

Mayne, Lt-Gen A. G. O. M., 29, 45, 73, 
74, 76, 89, 260 

Mechanical Equipment units, 300, 377, 

388, 418, 459, 461, 503 
No. 6 Engr Depot or Group, 7, 474 

Mee, Capt M. W., 499 

Meiktila operations, 378-380 

Merry, Lt-Col D. C., 352 

Messe, Gen, 128,134 

Messervy, Lt-Gen Sir Frank, NE Af, 31, 
M4, 42: N Af, 48, 82, 90, 91, 96; 
283, 284, 288, 289, 291-293, 309, 332, 
355, 370, 377, 383, "385, 387; Ma, 430; 

43 


SE A, 437 
Middleton-Stewart, Col D. J., 55, 68, 475 
Miles, Maj P. P., 105 


530 


Military Engineering Services, 6, 7, 12, 
33, 34, 247, 464; 
Services 

Milton, Lt W., 375 

Mine booby-traps, N Af, 102, 103, 119, 
122, 125, 159, 163, 270; B, 286, 315, 
319, 348, 392, "394 

Mine clearance, NE Af, 35, 38, 41, 44, N. 
Af, 23, 26, 83, 84, 87, ‘88, 
118-121, 125, 131, 137; It, 146-148, 
154, 156-160; B, 286, "295, 304, 309, 
337, 348, 380, 393, 399, 408, 409; SE 
A, 441, 443, 444 

Mine clearance drills, 84, 109, 119,304 

Mine detector, Polish, 109 

Mine laying, N Af, 23, 48, 84, 87, 88, 94, 
100-103, 105-107, 109, 112, 113; B, 
316, 319, 320 

Mines, types of, N Af, 23, 83, re i 
125, 147, 159, 160, 163; ’B, 304, 3 

Mitchell, Lt-Col A. c 48 

Mitchell, Maj J. G., 325 

Mitchell, Maj R. D., 420 

Moestopo, Dr, 438 

Mohamed Afzal, Lt, 491 

Montgomery, Gen B. L., N Af, 108-111, 
113, 114, 116, 117, 122, 123, 126, 127, 
132, 134, 135; It, 140-142, 147; to 21st 
Army Gp, 150, 151 

Moodie, Maj F. K., 29 

Moody, Maj N. M. R., 79 

Moore, Lt-Col P. N. M., 23, 48 

Morris, Capt John, 59 

Morrison, Brig-Gen J. W., 420 

Morton, Lt-Col T. G., 403 

Moss, Maj J. H., 284, 337 

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, B, 
254, 259, 260, 270, 284, 285, 309, 331, 
340, 356, 396; Ma, 435, 436; Ind, 485, 
488, 498 

Muir, Lt-Col R. B., 182, 190, 198 

Muirhead, Brig R. H., 276 

Murray, Col A., 372 

Murray, Lt A., 153 

Murray, Lt-Col J., 18 

Mey Maj W. J. A., 123-125, 130, 131 


Murray-Lyon, Maj-Gen, 181 
Mussolini, 1, 24, 30, 141 
Mutagachi, Lt-Gen, 269, 313 


N 


Nakamura, Lt-Gen, 436 

Nanda, Col A. P., 72, 498 

Napier, Lt-Col A. H. G., 19, 21, 43, 76, 
89, 94, 112 

Naresh Prasad, Lt, 301 


Nannder Singh, Subedar, 138 
Nash, Lt, 


Nash, Ma Tr. W., teal 

Neame, Maj B. D., 

Neame, Lt-Gen Sir Philip, VC, 47 
New Zealand Engineers, 153, 168 
Ngakyedauk Pass operations, 284-294 
Nicholls, Maj P. B., 450 

Nicholson, Maj}- Gen C. G. C., 365 


INDEX 


- Nolte, Col, 137 


see also Works 


00, 109, 


Noor Mohamed, Capt, 491 

Norrie, Lt-Gen W., 85, 86 

Northcott, Lt-Gen J., 458, 459 

Northern Combat Area 
(NCAC), 260, 356 

North-West Frontier operations, 1, 15, 
16, 464, 465 

Nosworthy, Lt-Gen Sir Francis, 480 


Command 


' Numata, Lt-Gen, 436 


O 


- Obbard, Col H. N., 9, 470 
. O'Callaghan, Maj 238, 242 


O’Connor, Lt-Gen R. N., 24-26, 28, 35, 
47 

O’Ferrall, Maj J. G. A. J., 87, 100, 112 

Officer Cadet Training Units (OCTUs), 
8, 9, 467, 470, 502, 507 

Officers Training School, Engineer (EO- 
TS), 8, 467, 492, 502 

Oghi operations, 464, 465 

Omars, battle of the, 86 


» Orgill, Lt-Col or C., 214, 217, 219, 220, 
37 


226, 388, 434, 4 
Orr, Lt D. A., 390 
Owen, Lt-Col Frank, 337 


P 


“Paiforce’’, 59, 70-72. 75 

Paintal, T/Capt J. S., 72 

Pakenham-Walsh, Maj-Gen R. P., xii 

Pakistan, C-in-C, 437 

Pakistan, E-in-C, 475 

Palfrey, Lt J. A., 355 

Panch,. Maj V., 72, 294 

Pandiayan, L/Naik, 266 

Pandit Pant, 498 

Panzer Divisions, see Divisions 

Pappala Yakub, Subedar, 381 

Papworth, Maj P. J., 420 

Param Vir Chakra award, 499 

Paris, Brig A. C. M., 180, 181, 205 

Park, Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith, 435 

Park, Lt, 227 

Parker, Col F. W. L. McC., 475, 480 

Partap Narain, Brig, xiii, 72, 180, 251, 
261, 263, 264, 266, 475, 487 

Partition of India, ’and ‘its effects, 462, 

486-499, 505, 506, 515, 516 

Partridge, Maj J. H., 95, 468 

Paten, Lt-Col L. A. B., 53, 58, 61, 68, 81 

Patterson, Lt-Col N. E. V.,1 

Patton, Gen, 140 

Paulus, Field-Marshal Von, 71 

Pawsey, Charles, 334 

Pearl Harbour, attack on, 187 

Pearson, Lt G., 74, 463 

Pegler, Lt-Col C. A. N., 165 

Penney, Col T. M. M., xii 

Penny, Capt R. D., 123 

Pennycuick, Brig J. A. C., 

Percival, Lt-Gen A. 

Perdue, Capt D. I., 

Perowne, Brig L. 

Persia, operations in 


183 
E., 179, 192, 204, 207 
253, 318 
“CM, 


50. 338 
, 60-6 5 SOL, 73-16 


INDEX 


Philbrick, Maj G. E. H., 29, 32 
Phillips, Admiral Tom, 194 
Phipps, Brig C. C., xii 

Pillai, 2/Lt M. M., 202, 208 
Pimm, Sgt, 393 

Pinto, Maj G. W., 364, 458 


Pioneers, 7, 512; P, 61, 73; Ir, 66; B, 


300, 305, 348, 412 


Artisan Wks Bns, 22nd, 33rd, and 
36th, 252 
Auxiliary Bns, 15th, 276; 17th, 252, 


276; 39th, 252; oo os ‘42nd. 
276; Sist, 252; 55th, 2 
Ist Madras Bn, 420 
Pipe line operating units, 7, 514 
Pipe lines, oil, /nd, 12, 248: B, 396 
Pipe lines, water, Ir, 59; B, 263, 411; 
Ind, 465 
Platt, Maj R. H., 29 
Platt, Lt-Gen Sir W., 29, 34, 35, 38, 41, 


? 

Potts, Capt T. E., 123 

Power, Admiral Sir Arthur, 435 

Poyser, Lt S. V., 189, 199 

Price, Lt-Col D. W.. 437 

Pringle, Lt, 253 

Pringle, Maj K. H. St. C., 457 

Prisoners of war, NE Af, 44 45; ir, 52; 
N Af, 24-26, 97, 104, 117, 133, 134, 
137; /t, 171-173, FE 188; B, 379, 387 
397, 413-416; Afa, 175, 191, 203, 204, 
207, 208, 261, 431-435, 504; SE A, 442, 
445, 447, 448, 451; ind, 473 
Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War 


and Internees organisation (RAPWI), 


434, 451 
Pritchard, Maj F. W., 244, 320, 330 
Pritchard, Maj-Gen G. A. T., 238, 242, 
7, 443 


Pritchard, Maj M. 1., 251, 325-327, 366 
400 


Pryde, Maj R. S. A., 375, 448 

Public Works Department, B, 248, 258, 
421; Ma, 431; FE 462 

Pugh, Col L. H. O., 438 


Q 


Quarrying, B, 248, 251, 259, 348; Ma, 431 
Coys, 7, 503; 442nd, 259, 317 
Quinan, Lt-Gen E. P., 51, 54, 60, 63, 65, 
70 


R 


Radcliffe, Maj M. Delmé, 182 

Radcliffe, Maj P. A. D., 79 
Radcliffe-Smith, Maj H. A. H., 55, 61 
Radford, Maj F. F., 157 

Radford, Maj J. R., 462 

Rahmat Khan, Havildar, 99 

Railway construction and repairs, Ir, 54- 


56; P, 70-72; N Af, 121; B, 358, 388, 


404, 418, 419 
Railway operation, B, 216, 226, 358, 359, 
382, 407, 412, 416 


531 


aay units 


Bn, 

Br ‘Coy. 418, 8 

Coys, 10; 8th, 

Const Coys, 6, 25 503 

25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th, 10 
lOlst (Madras), 10, 29, 44, 55 


105th, 55, 72 
106th, 120th, 136th, and 137th. 545 
No. 2 (later No. 2 


Engr Depot 
TTC), 7, 10, 505, 516 
Maintenance Coys, !21st, 145th, 55 

Operating Coys, 115th, 122 
Workshop Coy, 503 

Rajwade, Lt M. R., 360 

Ralph, Maj J. E., 328, 329 

Ramakrishnan, Lt P. K., 171 

Ramasamy, Sapper, 297 

Ramree Island, capture of, 303-305 

Rane, 2/Lt R. R., Param Vir Chakra, 499 

Rangoon, evacuated, 217, 222, 224, 
recaptured, 309-311 

Rashid Ali, 51, 52, 56, 58 

Rawlence, Maj J. R., 244 

Raymond, Lt C., VC, 308 

Razabil fortress, 284, 286, 287, 294 

Razmak, 16 

Recruiting, 7, 8, 512 

Reed, Maj C. D 

Rees, Maj-Gen T W. 351, 361, 365, 495 

Regiments, African, King’ s African Rifles, 
46 


Regiments, British, 
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 
204 


Buffs, 90 

Cameron Highlanders, Ist Bn, Queen’s 

Own, 39, 45) 

Dorset, 2nd Bn, 458 

Duke of Wellington’s, 2nd Bn, 498 

King’s Dragoon Guards, 90 

Lancashire Fusiliers, 498 

Lincolnshire, 283 

Northamptonsire, Ist Bn, 366, 368 

North Staffordshire, 283 

Seaforth Highlanders, 328 

Somerset Light Infantry, 496, 497 

South Lancashire, 374, 375 

Sussex, R, 133, 137 

Welch Fusiliers, R, 458 

West Kents, 2nd Bn, R, 334 

West Yorkshire, xi, 42, 44, 107, 257, 
258, 291, 338 

Worcester, 337 

Regiments, ‘Indian 

Assam Rifles, 318, 333, 338 

Burma Rifles, 215, 318 

C. |. H., 90 

Garwhal Rifles, 3/18th R, 42 

Gurkha Rifles, 1/2nd, 118; 2nd, 137; 

1/4th, 465; 2/Sth, R, 458; 4/10th, 325 

Gurkhas, /r, 53; P, 63; Af, 
133, 134; Ma, 199; B, 218-220, 243, 
252, 261, 263, 292, 297, 
366, 393, 402; SE A, 451; Ind, 486 

Lancers, {3th, 57, 61 

Light Cavalry (IAC), 7th, 458 


532 


Mahratta, 328, 330, 345, 458 
Punjab, 266, 442; 3/Ist, 40; 5/Ist, 
458, 460, ‘461; 3/14th, 39; 4/15th, 
375; 16th, 133; 3/16th, 190 
Rajput, 440; Ith, 5 
Regiments, Malaya; Malaya Volunteers, 
181, 205 
Regiments, French, Foreign Legion, 57 
Regiments, German, Panzer Grenadiers, 
137, 160 
Regiments, apuanes: 33rd, 450 
Railway, 
Reid, May cn D. W., 158 
Reilly, Maj J. F. C., 29 
oa Lt-Col A. ’B., xili, 74, 158, 420, 


Rhodes, Col Sir Godfrey, 70, 71 
Rhodes, Lt, 232 
RIAS.C., 123rd Coy, 439 
Richards, Col 334 
Richards, Lt-Col G. C., 55, 68, 106 
Richards, Lt-Col H. C. G., 437, 445 
Ritchie, Lt-Gen N. M., 86, 87, 93, 96, 97 
Road Roller Platoon, 14, 508 
Roads and tracks 
road construction and maintenance, 
Ind, 12; NE Af, 31, 32, 38, 44; P, 
65; Ir, 67, 68; It, 164-166; B, 228, 
238, 242-246, 249-259, 277-282, 295, 
328, 341, 348, 358, 367, 372, 381, 
396, 403, 407, 416; Ma, 429-431, 
434; SE A, 445; FE 457 
road surfacing, brick, 282, 399; stone, 
348; temporary road surfacing with 
Sommerfeld Track, mesh, timber, etc, 
NE Af, 36; N Af, 129, 130; It, 147; 
B, a 282, 303, 308, 369, 372, 381, 
tracks for jeeps, mules, or tanks, 
NE Af, 37. 40-43, 45; P, 69; N Af, 
93; It, 152, 159, 162, 166; ’B, 228, 
244, 251, 270, 271, 277, 280: 281, 
285, 286, 293, "295, 297, 319-321, 325, 
io des 338, 341 -343, 349, 367, 429; 
n 
eeticlinars Maj D., 122 
Roberts, Lt-Gen Sir Ouvry, Yi ee 262, 
314, 317, 323, 330, 403, 423, 4 
Robertson. Lt- Gen H. C.H., “9° 
Robertson, Col W. D., 481 
Roche, Maj G. T., 95, "100, 157 
Rocke, Maj R. P., 459 
Rommel, Field- Marshal Erwin, 44, 47- 
49, 69, 82, 85-87, 91-93, 95-98, 102, 
107, 108, 110, 112-114, 116, 117, 121- 
123, 126, 128, 141, 240 
Roome, Maj- Gen Sir Horace, 248, 477, 
Roorkee (HQ Bengal S & M), vil, xiii, 
1, 3, 18, 19, 470-472, 481-483, 489-492 
Row, Maj J. WwW. L., 428 
Royal Australian Engineers, 183; 18 Fd 
Coy, 455 
mal Engineers, 8th Rly Coy, 9; see also 
eld Companies, and Fortress Engi- 
nee Singapore 
Royal Indian Engineers, 15, 419 


INDEX 


Royal Indian Military College, Prince of 
Wales’, 4 

Royal Marines, 432 

Royal Pakistan Centre, 475, 489, 491, 
514, 516 

Royal Pakistan Engineers, 464, 475, 491 
31st Assault Fd Coy, 464, 491 
68th Fd Coy, 464 

Russell, Maj C. C. F., 55, 95, 103, 104 

Russia, supplies to, through Persia, 70, 


71, 75 
Rusted, Maj J. F. W., 320 


Ss 


Saegert, Lt-Col J. M., 95, 104 

St. George, Maj H. E. G., 29, 32 

Sakurai, Maj-Gen, 287 

Sampangi Raju, Havildar-Major (later 
Capt), 41 

Sandeman, Lt-Col E. E. N., xii, 391 

Sandes, Maj A. H. W., xiii, 301, 302, 
304, 310, 311, 424 

Sandes, Lt-Col E. W. C., (the Author), 


Sangre: a: battle of the River, 146-149 
Sankaranarayana Nair, Havildar, 297 
Sappers and Miners, re-designated Royal 
Indian Engineers, and now called the 
Corps of Engineers, 
before the war, vii, 1, 5, 6, 501, 506, 
511 
changes in title, 15,71, 419, 480, 482, 
484 


connections with Burma, 420, 421 

see under Madras, Bengal, Bombay, 

Burma, and Indian States S & M 
School of Military Engineering (SME), 

now the College of Military Engineer- 

ing, xii, 4, 469, 470, 472, 476, 490, 491, 

499 


Scobie, Maj-Gen R. Mack, 80, 85 


' Scoones, Lt-Gen G. A. P., 241, 260, 262, 


268, 314, 323, 339, 351, 355 


“Scorpions”, 137 
' Scott, Maj A. E., 123, on 335 
i Selkirk, Maj A., 109, 1 


123 
Seymour- -Williams, i Cel F., 352-354 


. Shah, 2/Lt K. M., 
| Shamsher Singh, Cal, "ill, 103, 171-173 
: Shave, Maj J.S. R., 446 


Shaw, Maj G. W., 462 
Shazada Khan, Naik, 155 
Shenoy, Maj B. P., 448 
Sher Ali, Jemadar, 155 
Shibala, Vice-Admiral, 436 
Shiv Dial Singh, Col, 2, 72 
Showers, Lt-Col L. J., 137 
Shrinagesh, Maj-Gen S. M., 460, 461 
Sicily, invasion of, 140, 141 
Sidi Barrani, battle of, 23-27 
Sikander Hayat Singh, Sir, 124 
Simson, Brig I., 
Singapore, one and loss of, 175-185, 
189, 195, 204-209 
reoccupation of, 431-436 
Sinzweya, action of, 288-293 


INDEX 


Sirmur State Sappers and Miners, 16 
Fd Coy, 276, 281, 477, 478 

Sittang River, action at the, 218-221 

Slim, Field- Marshal Sir William, NE Af, 
29, 31; Sy, 58; P, 63; 3B, 224, 225, 
227, 229, 237, 239, 260, 283, 284, 314, 
343, 344, 354-357, 379, 382, 383, 386, 
404; Ma, 435 

Sloot, Maj P. R., 214, 226, 227 

Smith, Capt A. P., 326 

Smith, Maj G. V. J. M., 146 

Smith, Maj J. Mac C., 214 

Smuts, Gen, 108 

Smyth, Maj-Gen J. G., VC, 212, 213, 218, 
221 


Snape, Maj J. W., 280 

Soerkano, Dr, 438 

Sollum, battle of, 83, 84 

Somana, Lt K. M., ve 

South African Sappers, 

South East Asia Contes (SEAC), 225 
254, 259, 435, 436 

Sourabaya operations, 438-441 

Spencer, Capt, 103 

Spring-Smyth, Maj T.le M., xiii, 478, 491 

Stalin, Marshal, 140 

Steed, Brig R. S., 464 

Steedman, Maj-Gen J. F. D., 9, 183, 252, 
467, 487, 498 

Stenhouse, Lt-Col E. E., 18, 151 

Stevenson, 2/Lt, 104 

Stewart, Brig A. Mac G., xiii, 79 

Stiffile, Maj K. O., xii 

Stileman, Brig E. C. R., 335, 349, 424 


Stilwell, Gen Joseph, 211, 241, 245, 246, 


260-262, 267, 268, 313, 346, 347, 355 


Stopford, Lt-Gen Sir Montagu, 332, 347, 


355, 383, 397, 404, 412, 436 

Stuart, Maj N. L., 90 

Stumme, Gen Von, 113, 115 

Subbiah, Naik, 297 

Subramaniam, Subedar, 154, 170, 467 

Subramanyam, Maj P. V., 

Sudan Defence Force, 28, 31, 34 

Sultan, Lt-Gen D. I., 355, 356 

Sumatra, pacification of, 444-446 

Surrender of German Army in North 
Africa, 137, 138 

Surrender of Japanese, 412-414, 423, 427, 
432-436, 447, 449 

Survey Depot, Group, and units, vii, 7, 


Sussex, H. M. S., 432, 433 

Sutherland, Maj J. B., 21, 28, 89 
Swan, Brig D. C. T., 214, 226, 437, 443 
Swinhoe, Col M. R. H. Z., 498 

Syria, operations in, 51, 56-58 


T 
Tal Din Subedar-Major and Hon Capt, 
Talwar, Lt A. L., 171 
Tanahashi, Col, 280, 287-289 


“‘Tanahashi” Force, 287, 289, 290 
Tanaka, Maj-Gen, 339 


533 


Tanks, types of, N Af, 23, eS 137; It, 
163, 170; B, 364, 390-393 
major engagements, NE Af, 34, N Af, 
25, 26, 96, 181, 117, 121, 
Sapper co-operation with, N Mf, 26, 
43, 83, 168, 169; B, 291, 293, 326, 
336, 341, 342, 410 
Taylor, Col H. M., 183, 207 
Taylor, Maj I. B. C., 251, 468 
Taylor, Li-Col, (Burma Rifles), 215 
Tehri Garhwal Sappers and Miners, 16 
Fd Coy, B, 238, 239, 241, 242, 254, 
255, 259, 315, 319, 320, 370, 388, 
389, 394, 395, 413, 416 
Terauchi, Field-Marshal, 423, 435, 450 
Thailand operations, 447-450 
Thimayya, Brig K. S., 305, 435, 458-460 
Thoma, Gen Von, 116, 117 
Thomas, Capt N. B., 83, 94 
Thomas, Lady Shenton, 433 
Thomason, College, Roorkee, 4, 470, 490 
Thompson, Maj H. F., 389, 434, 440 
Thorat, Maj-Gen S. P. P., 500 
Thorpe, Maj L. A., 276 
Tito, Marshal, 140 
Tobruk, capture of, 24, 
defence of, 47, 48, 42, ” 848i, 88, 95 
fall of, 97, 102 
Toliworthy, Maj W. C., 294 
Toogood, Lt-Col A. F., xiii, 465 
Topham, C. S. M., 202 


! Towell, Maj W. F., 330 


Training Divisions, 283, 466, 469, 476 


| Transportation Services, 6, 9-11, 300 


Transportation Stores Companies, vii, 11 
104th, 55 

Transportation Training Centres (TTCs), 
7, 10, 493, 516 

Treays, Col W. H., 183, 206, 208 

Trigg, Maj J. H., 462 

Tucker, Col P. A., 9 

Tuker, Lt-Gen Sir Francis, 91, 92, 94, 
128, 132, 133, 137, 138, 485 

Tunisia, operations in, 126-139 

Tylden-Pattenson, Maj K., 315, 319 


U 


Ullman, Maj-Gen P. A., 23, 457 

Unexploded bombs, 33 

Urquhart, Col H. A., 183 

Urwin, Maj (later Rev) R. T., xiii, 256, 
26S, 271, 342 

U Saw, 420 

Usher, Maj I. D., 428 


v 


Veitch, Col W. L. D., 18, 470 
Verma, Col A. D., 4, 72 
ey French, Sy, 49, 51, 56-59; SE A, 


Victoria Cross awards, 35, 36, 308, 513 

Volunteers, Federated Malay States, 
Engr Sec, 183, 206 

barat Straits Settlements, Engr Sec, 


183, 
Vreeden, Col B. Van, 435 


534 


Ww 


Wadhera, Lt-Col B. P., xiii 
Wadia, Capt L. M. H., 72 

Wadi Akarit, battle of, 133, 134 
Wakeham, Lt-Col P. O. G., 348 
Wakely, Maj W. H. D., 100, 112 
Walker, Maj P. A., 315, 388, 494 
Waller, Lt-Col D. R. W., 437, 494 


Ward, Lt-Col R. S. B., 214, 232, 264, 310 | 


315 
Waring, Maj E., 21, 22 
Warren, Maj-Gen D, F. W., 334, 350,371 


P, 65, 74; 11, 165; B, 214, 217; SE A, 
448, 452, 453; FE, 457, 460; Ind, 465 

Watson, Capt J. D., 161 

Wavell, Field-Marshal Sir Archibald, 
Mid E, 20-22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 36, 47, 
48, 51, 52, 66, 82, 84, 85, 93, 108, 274; 
Ma, 202; Ind, 211, 213, 219, 222, 240, 
241, 245, 254, 485; B, 274, 279 

Waziristan, operations in, 15, 16, 465 

Weld, Brig C. J., 57 

West African Divisional Engineers, 502 

Western Desert Force, 24, 25, 82-84; 
becomes 8th Army, 85 

Weygand, Gen, 56 

Wheaton, Maj E. B., 80, 134, 137, 151 

Wheeler, Lt-Gen R. A., (U.S.A.), 435 

Whistler, Maj-Gen L. G., 496, 497 

Whitman, Brig B. E., xiii, 183, 202, 203, 
480, 499 

Williams, Maj C. W., 349, 389, 434 

Williams, Lt-Gen Sir Harold, vii, xii, 2, 
4, 18, 252, 253 318, 477, 490, 498, 499 


INDEX 


Williams, Lt-Col J. H., or “Elephant 
Bill’, 238, 367 

Willis, Maj R. M., 325 

Wilson, Maj D. S., 360 

Wilson, Gen Sir H. Maitland, N. Af, 24, 
35; Sy, 51, 56, 57, 62; Jr, 70; It, 150 

Wilson, Lt-Col J. B., xiii, 187, 188 

Winchester, Maj J. C., 68, 94, 105, 112 


| Wingate, Maj-Gen Orde, 249, 250, 253, 


261, 268, 269 
Wood, Maj-Gen G. N., 298, 424, 436 


‘ Wood, Maj J. G., 55, 157, 491 

! Works Services, 12; Ma, 183, 206; 8B, 

Water-supply, /r, 53, 54, 59, 60, 69; : 
N Af, 23, 26, 88, 124; NE Af, 31, 36; | 


252, 253; FE, 462 
Works units, 443, 452, 460 
107 CRE Wks, 252, 253 
114 Wks Bn, 238, 242, 243 
145 DCE Wks, 348 
907 Ind Wks Sec, 458, 460 
Workshops Company, 352 
Wren, Maj J. K., 308 
Wright, Lt E. J., 367 
Wright, Lt J. W., 336 
ets Lt-Col T., 290, 336, 370, 373, 


Y 


Yamashita, Gen, 207 
Yarrow, 2/Lt, 227 
Young, Lt, 154 
Youngs, Maj M. J., 157 


Zz 


- “Z” Craft Operating Companies, 11